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THE GORDIAN KNOT OF THE TREATMENT OF SECONDHAND
FACTS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703 GOVERNING
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINIONS: ANOTHER
CONFLICT BETWEEN LOGIC AND LAW
Edward J. Imwinkelried
"The life of the law has not been logic .... "
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881)
Some commentators have suggested that the American judicial hearing is
becoming trial by expert.' In the early 1990s, the Rand Corporation released a study of the
use of experts in trials in California courts of general jurisdiction.2 Expert witnesses
appeared in 86% of the trials studied, and on average there were 3.3 experts per trial.3 It is
undeniable that in the United States the role of expert witnesses is growing.
Although commentators sometimes refer to the role of the expert at trial, in truth
witnesses who qualify as experts can play at least four different roles. Suppose, for
example, that an eminent toxicologist is driving to work and observes a traffic accident.
Like any witness who has personal knowledge of a fact, the toxicologist could testify at
the trial against the driver that she observed the defendant's car run a red light.4 Next, if
the toxicologist had attempted to help the drivers and smelt a strong odor of alcohol on the
defendant's breath, the toxicologist would be competent to give the lay opinion that the
defendant was intoxicated.5 Thirdly, suppose that the defendant were prosecuted for drunk
driving, and the arresting officer testified that on an intoxilyzer test the defendant
registered 0.13, exceeding the statutory limit of 0.08.6 At the same trial, the prosecutor
could call the toxicologist to provide expert testimony about the general reliability of
I Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; former chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools; coauthor, PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA
ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (51h ed. 2012).
'William T. Pizzi, Expert Testimony in the U.S., 145 NEW L.J. 82 (1995).
2 Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1120 n. 19 (1991).
Id. at 1119.
4 FED. R. EVID. 602.
Id. at FED. R. EVID. 701; 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 11, at 55 n.23 (6th ed. 2006).
6 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 22.01 at 474, 476 (5th ed. 2012).
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intoxilyzers as a method of determining blood alcohol concentrations.'
Although an expert witness can play any of the above roles, in most instances the
attorney calling the witness wants him or her to perform a fourth function, namely, to
apply a general theory or technique to the specific facts in the case to generate an opinion.
When the expert witness plays this role, the structure of the witness's testimony is
essentially syllogistic." In a classic syllogism, the logician applies a major premise to a
minor premise to derive a conclusion.9 When an expert witness testifies in this syllogistic
manner, the expert's major premise is the general theory or technique that he or she relies
on.10 For example, a psychiatrist who testifies as an expert witness might posit a set of
diagnostic criteria for a particular mental illness: If the patient displays symptoms A and
B, the patient is probably suffering from psychosis C. The psychiatrist's minor premise is
the case-specific data that he applies the major premise to: This patient's case history
includes symptoms A and B. The psychiatrist's conclusion is the opinion generated when
he employs the general theory to evaluate the significance of the particular facts in the
case: Ergo, the patient is probably suffering from psychosis C.
In its landmark decision on the admissibility of scientific evidence, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," the United States Supreme Court indicated that
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the question of which theories or techniques an
expert may rely on as a major premise.12 The Court held that to serve as a basis for expert
testimony, the theory or technique must qualify as reliable "scientific . . . knowledge"
within the meaning of that expression in Rule 702.13 In contrast, Federal Rule of Evidence
703 answers the question of the types of case-specific data that the expert may rely on as
the minor premise.1 4 Effective December 1, 2011, restyled Rule 703 reads:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has
been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would
reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they
need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would
otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only
if their probative value in helping the jury to evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect. 15
'Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits an expert to "testify only in the form of an opinion." FED. R. EVID. 702.
The original Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 702 state:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of opinions. The
assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on the
stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the
case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.
Id.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Educational Significance ofthe Syllogistic Structure ofExpert Testimony, 87 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1148 (1993); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 'Bases' ofExpert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1988).
9 Imwinkelried, The Educational Significance ofthe Syllogistic Structure ofExpert Testimony, supra note 8.
'oId. at 1148.
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
12 Id. at 589-90.
13 Id.
14 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory ofthe Structure ofFederal Rule ofEvidence 703, 47
MERCERL. REV. 447, 457 (1996); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Facts or Data" in FederalRule of
Evidence 703: The Significance ofthe Supreme Court's Decision to Rely on Federal Rule 702 in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 54 MD. L. REv. 352, 372-73 (1995).
" FED. R. EVID. 703.
2 [Vol. 3
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Since Rule 702 served as the foundation for the Court's celebrated Daubert
decision, Rule 702 has been the principal focus of the scholarly commentary on scientific
evidence.16 However, Rule 703 has proved to be the more controversial statute and has
produced a larger number of splits of authority among the lower courts.
17
Until 2012, the United States Supreme Court itself had not entered the fray over
Rule 703. However, in June 2012, the Supreme Court finally considered a case, Williams
v. Illinois," in which Rule 703 played a prominent role. Technically, Williams is a
constitutional criminal procedure decision that governs only in prosecutions.19 However,
as we shall soon see, Williams raises questions about Rule 703 that apply to both civil and
criminal litigation.
Williams was charged with rape and his case was set for trial.2 0 Cellmark is a
private laboratory conducting DNA testing.21 Before Williams's trial, Cellmark extracted
22
a male DNA profile from the rape victim's vaginal swab. Cellmark sent the profile
information to the Illinois State Police Laboratory (ISP). 23 At the laboratory Ms. Sandra
Lambatos, an ISP specialist, found a match when she compared the Cellmark profile to
24that of the accused. Ms. Lambatos testified at William's bench trial and answered the
following question in the affirmative:
Was there a computer match generated of the male DNA profile found in semen
from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to a male profile that had been identified as having
originated from Sandy Williams?25
The issue posed in Williams was whether Lambatos's reference to Cellmark's
26statement about the male DNA profile violated the Sixth Amendment. In 2004 in
Crawford v. Washington,2 7 the Supreme Court announced that the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause precludes the admission of "testimonial" hearsay statements at trial
unless (1) the accused had a prior opportunity to question the declarant and (2) the
declarant is unavailable at trial.28 However, the Crawford Court also indicated that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to a statement if, at trial, the statement is admitted for
a nonhearsay purpose, that is, for a purpose other than proof of the truth of the assertion in
the statement.29
In Williams, the prosecution argued that Lambatos's testimony did not violate the
16 Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Facts or Data" in Federal Rule ofEvidence 703, supra note 14, at 358 n.54.
Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory ofthe Structure ofFederal Rule ofEvidence 703, supra note 14.
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); see Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, Round
Four, 45 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 51 (2012); United States v. Turner, 709 F.3d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he
divergent analyses and conclusions of the plurality and dissent sow confusion as to precisely what limitations the
Confrontation Clause may impose when an expert witness testifies about the results of testing performed by
another analyst, who herself is not called to testify at trial.").
19 See id.
20 Id. at 2227.
21 Id.
2 2 Id. at 2229.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 2236.
26 Id. at 2238.
27 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
28 Id. at 59.
29 Id. at 59 n. 9 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
2013]
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Confrontation Clause because the reference to the Cellmark statement was not offered for
the hearsay purpose of proving the truth of the assertion that the vaginal swab contained
that male DNA profile. 3 0 Rather, according to the prosecution, the reference was used for
the limited, nonhearsay purpose of showing the basis of Ms. Lambatos's opinion and
helping the trier of fact to evaluate the quality of Ms. Lambatos's reasoning.31 Both
32
Federal Rule 703 and Illinois law permit expert witnesses to rely on third-party out-of-
court statements for that purpose.3 3 In Williams, however, five justices (the "703 majority"
including Justice Thomas in concurrence and four dissenters led by Justice Kagan) found
that Cellmark's statement had been used for a substantive purpose at trial.3 4 The justices
contended that it is illogical to allow the trier of fact to consider an expert opinion that
rests on premises that are unsupported by admissible evidence.3 5
At the same time, another five-justice majority (the "Crawford majority"
including Justice Thomas and a four-justice plurality led by Justice Alito) mooted the Rule
36703 issue by holding that Cellmark's statement was not testimonial to begin with. Based
on that holding, these five justices voted to affirm Williams' conviction.3 7 For its part, the
plurality characterized the statement as non-testimonial because the police had not
identified any suspect at the time of Cellmark's test.38 Justice Thomas also characterized
the statement as non-testimonial, but he did so for an entirely different reason, namely, the
relative informality of the statement.39 Given the fragmented nature of the decision, the
narrowest common ground supporting the affirmance is arguably the proposition that a
forensic analyst's statement is non-testimonial if it is both informal and made before the
police identified a particular suspect.40
The Crawford ruling in Williams is of concern only to criminal practitioners; the
ruling relates to a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause limitation on prosecution
hearsay. In contrast, although the Crawford ruling formally mooted the Rule 703 issue,
many lower courts will undoubtedly pay attention to the reasoning of the 703 majority;
any time five members of the Supreme Court agree on a proposition, lower court judges
tend to sit up and pay attention. The 703 majority's reasoning applies not only to expert
evidence offered against a criminal accused but also to expert testimony offered by civil
42litigants. What precisely does Rule 703 authorize? Does the use sanctioned by Rule 703
constitute a legitimate nonhearsay use of an out-of-court statement? If not, how should the
courts apply Rule 703 in the future?
The 703 majority's position has substantial merit. The thesis of this article,
however, is that although the falsity of an essential premise of an expert opinion can
render the opinion irrelevant, in most cases it is sound to assign the ultimate relevance
30 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2230-33.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 2234-35.
33Id.
34 Id. at 2256-59 (Thomas, J., concurring), 2268-72 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
3 See id. at 2255-56 (Thomas, J., concurring), 2264-73 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 2240, 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring).
3 Id. at 2244 (majority opinion).
3 Id. at 2243-44.
39 Id. at 2259-60.
40 Hugh B. Kaplan, Commentary, Criminal Law - Confrontation: Divided Supreme Court Says DNA Expert Can
TestifyAbout Profile Created By Others, 80 U.S.L.W. 1747 (2012).
41 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2247.
42 See id. at 2247-48 (Breyer, J., concurring).
4 [Vol. 3
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decision to the jury. In the typical case it is more satisfactory to use the sort of jury
instructions approvingly mentioned in Justice Alito's plurality opinion than to empower
the judge to exclude the opinion.43 The first part of this article surveys the state of Rule
703 jurisprudence prior to the Williams decision. The second part describes the positions
on the Rule 703 issue that the various justices took in Williams. The third part highlights
the stakes involved in the dispute between the 703 majority and the plurality. The fourth
and final part of the article evaluates the merits of the competing positions both as a matter
of logic and as a question of statutory construction.
I. THE STATE OF RULE 703 JURISPRUDENCE ON SECONDHAND REPORTS BEFORE
THE WILLIAMs DECISION
As previously stated, Rule 703 regulates the permissible sources for information
about the case-specific data that the expert witness relies on as a basis for an opinion.
What are the sources from which the expert may draw information about, for example, a
patient's case history or skidmarks and debris found at a traffic accident scene?
A. The State of the Law Prior to the Enactment of Federal Rule of
Evidence 703
At early common law, there was only one permissible source for the expert's
knowledge of case-specific information: the expert's firsthand, personal knowledge.
However, it soon became apparent that the personal knowledge limitation was unrealistic;
it was frightfully time-consuming for the expert to personally confirm every fact that he or
she intended to use as a basis for the opinion.
Consequently, the common law developed the technique of the hypothetical
question.46 Using this technique, other witnesses supplied admissible evidence of the facts,
the attorney asked the expert witness to hypothetically assume the truth of those facts, and
the expert testified to an opinion based on the assumed facts:
Dr. Worth, please assume the following facts as true: One, in the accident, the
plaintiff sustained a cut three inches in length and 1/8 inch in depth on the right, front part
of his head. Two, the plaintiff bled profusely from that cut. Three, immediately after that
accident, the plaintiff experienced sharp, painful headaches in the right, front part of his
head.
Based on those facts, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, do you have
an opinion as to the nature of the injury the plaintiff suffered?
In most cases, the trial judge did not allow the attorney to pose the question to the
expert unless the attorney had already presented enough admissible evidence to permit
the jurors to find that all the assumed facts were true.4 9 It is true that in most jurisdictions
4 See id. at 2233-34 (majority opinion).
44 Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory ofthe Structure ofFederal Rule ofEvidence 703, supra note 14;
Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Facts or Data" in Federal Rule ofEvidence 703, supra note 14.
45 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 14, at 87(6th ed. 2006).
46 Id. at 89-90.
47 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 9.03(4)(d) (8th ed. 2012).
48 See Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to Professor
Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 587 (1987); see also DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L.
MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE - EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.5, at 154 (2d ed. 2010) (part
of "the evidentiary record").
49 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7:15, at 892-94 (3d ed. 2007).
2013] 5
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the judge had discretion to allow the opinion before the presentation of the admissible
evidence and subject to the attorney's later presentation of the evidence.5 0 The trial judge
might exercise discretion to permit the later presentation of the foundational evidence if,
for instance, the only source of admissible evidence of a certain fact was a physician
whose surgical schedule precluded her from testifying before the expert witness. Absent
such exceptional circumstances, however, trial judges rarely deviated from the
requirement that the admissible evidence be presented prior to admission of the expert's
opinion. If a judge did admit the expert opinion first and the attorney later neglected to
submit the promised evidence, the trial judge might have to strike the expert's opinion; if
the judge believed that it was unrealistic to believe that the jury could follow a curative
instruction to disregard the stricken testimony, the judge might have to declare a mistrial.
As a general rule at common law, if the expert lacked personal knowledge of a
fact and the expert's proponent failed to present other admissible evidence of that fact, the
expert could not base an opinion even partially on that fact.52 Prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence,5 3 there were only two notable exceptions to the general rule.
One exception dealt with testimony by expert physicians.4 Under this exception,
physicians could rely on statements describing the patient's symptoms even if the
statements were not admissible under a recognized hearsay exception.5 5 The second
56exception concerned real estate valuation experts. It allowed experts who testified about
real estate values to base their opinions on "sources that were technically [inadmissible]
hearsay-price lists, newspapers, information about comparable sales, or other secondary
sources."57 In In re Cliquot's Champagne," a leading 1865 decision, the Supreme Court
approved this practice.5 9 In justifying its decision, the Court commented that courts
"should not encumber the law with rules which will involve labor and expense to the
parties, and delay the progress of the remedy ... without giving any additional safeguard
in the interests of justice."60 With those two exceptions, though, the courts forbade experts
from relying on inadmissible secondhand reports61 of facts as a basis for their opinions.62
B. The Change Effected by the Enactment of Rule 703
Like the prior common law, Rule 703 permits experts to base opinions on facts
that are observed personally and hypotheses that are supported by independent, admissible
63evidence. The first sentence of Rule 703 states that an expert may base an opinion "on
facts or data in the case that the expert has ... personally observed."64 The same sentence
also allows the expert to consider "facts or data in the case that the expert has been made
soId. § 7:15, at 894.
* See id. § 7:15, at 894 n.13.
52 See 1 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 14, at 89 (6th ed. 2006); id. § 7:15, at 897.
53
Id. § 7:16, at 897; 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 6271(13)-(14), at 302-04 (1997).
5 KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 155-56.
Id. § 4.5.
Id. § 4.5.1, at 154-55.
1
7 Id. § 4.5.1, at 154.
"70 U.S. 114 (1865).
59 Id. at 141.
60 Id.
61 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 49 § 7.13, at 886.
62 Id.
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aware of."65 That language is broad enough to include facts mentioned in a hypothetical
question posed to the expert, and the Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 703
expressly endorses the continued use of the hypothetical question.66
While the first sentence largely tracks the earlier common law, the second
sentence introduces an important innovation with respect to secondhand reports.67 That
sentence reads: "If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of
facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the
opinion to be admitted."6 Thus, secondhand out-of-court reports can serve as a basis for
an opinion even when the report is neither admitted nor admissible.69 This provision does
not purport to be a hearsay exception7o authorizing the trier of fact to consider the content
of the report for its truth. 1 The provision appears in Article VII governing opinion
evidence, rather than Article VIII regulating hearsay.72 Hence, the secondhand report is
admissible only for the limited credibility73 purpose of helping the trier of fact to
understand the basis of the expert's opinion.74 Given that purpose, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 105 7 the trial judge must give the jury a limiting instruction on the opponent's
request.76 The instruction must forbid the jury from treating the report as substantive
evidence in the case and explain the permissible nonhearsay use of the evidence.
Even when Rule 703 was initially adopted, there was sharp criticism of the
provision permitting the expert to rely on inadmissible secondhand reports as a basis for
an opinion. In particular, Professor Paul Rice derided the provision as illogical.78
Anticipating the position of the 703 majority in Williams, Professor Rice argued that in
order to accept the ultimate opinion, the factfinder necessarily had to accept the truth of
the bases for the opinion.79 In his view, if the factfinder did not assume the truth of the
bases, it made no logical sense to accept the opinion purportedly supported by the bases;o
the falsity of the premises rendered the opinion itself irrelevant and inadmissible.1
Moreover, at the time Rule 703 was adopted, many, if not most, other courts in the rest of
the common law world still adhered to the traditional view that an expert could not base
an opinion on secondhand reports that did not qualify for admission under the hearsay
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 49 § 7.13, at 886.
6 
FED. R. EVID. 703.
69 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL §703.02[1], at 703-3 (Matthew Bender, 1 0 th ed. 2011).
70 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §703.05[2] at 703-24-26
(Joseph M. McClaughin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997).
71 Id.
72 
FED. R. EVID. 703.
7 SALTZBURGETAL., supra note 69 §703.02[4], at 703-8.
74 See id. §703.02[4], at 703-8-9.
75 FED. R. EVID. 105.
76 Id.
77 Id.
7' Rice, supra note 48, at 585-86 (arguing that it is illogical for courts to admit an expert's opinion without
admitting the facts that formed the basis for the expert's opinion).
79 Id. at 585.
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rule. In the words of one Canadian commentator, logically it was 'quite impossible" to
justify admitting an expert opinion as substantive evidence when the opinion's essential
premises lacked supporting, admissible evidence.83 Although most states followed the
federal lead and adopted a version of Rule 703 essentially identical to the federal statute,
some states balked. For example, Ohio substituted a rule requiring that the expert base
his or her opinion either on facts the expert had perceived or facts admitted into
evidence.
Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee defended the provision as follows:
[T]he rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions
beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial
practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in
court. Thus a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on
information from numerous sources and of considerable variety,
including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from
nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays. Most
of them are admissible in evidence, but only with the expenditure of
substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating
witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance
upon them. His validation, experts performed and subject to cross-
examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.86
The drafters' reference to the needless expenditure of time echoed the Supreme
Court's 1 9 th century decision in the Cliquot's Champagne case.
With few dissents," it became the orthodox position that under Rule 703
secondhand reports can be used for a legitimate nonhearsay purpose,8 namely, allowing
the trier of fact to assess the bases of the expert's opinion90 and the quality of the expert's
reasoning.91 It was also the conventional wisdom that a limiting instruction was the proper
mechanism for ensuring that the trier of fact considered the secondhand report only for
nonhearsay purposes.92
82 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Comparativist Critique ofthe Interface Between Hearsay and Expert Opinion in
American Evidence Law, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1, 23-26 (1991) (citing authorities from Canada, New Zealand,
Scotland, and South Africa).
8 J.H. HOLLIES, Hearsay as the Basis of Opinion Evidence, in 10 THE CRIMINAL LAW QUARTERLY 288, 303
(Claude C. Savage ed., 1968).
84 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE
STATES §52.1, at 1 (1987).
85 Id.
86 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
" In re Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. 114, 141 (1865) (courts "should not encumber the law with rules which
will involve labor and expense to the parties, and delay the progress of the remedy ... without giving any
additional safeguard to the interests of justice").
" See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE § 6272 (1997)
89 3 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 13.11, at 456 n. 17
(15th ed. 1999)(citing Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155 (8th Cir. 1999); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 49 § 7:16, at 910; SALTZBURGET AL., supra note 69 § 703.04[4] at 703-8 to 703-9.
90 Id. at 703-9; BERGMAN & HOLLANDER, supra note 89 § 13.11, at 457 (citing Barrettv. Acevedo, 169 F.3d
1155 (8th Cir. 1999); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 49 § 7:16 at 912-13.
91 SALTZBURGET AL., supra note 69 § 703-9.
92 BERGMAN & HOLLANDER, supra note 89 § 13.11, at 457.
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II. THE POSITIONS OF THE JUSTICES IN WILLIAMS ON THE EVIDENTIARY STATUS
OF SECONDHAND REPORTS USED UNDER RULE 703
In Williams, Justice Alito wrote for a four-justice plurality, Justice Breyer filed a
concurrence, Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, and Justice Kagan authored an
opinion for a four-justice dissent.93 The opinions written by Justices Alito, Thomas, and
Kagan all addressed the topic of the evidentiary status94 of secondhand reports ostensibly
admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the basis for an expert opinion.95
A. Justice Alito's Plurality Opinion
For the most part, Justice Alito's opinion endorses the conventional wisdom
described above in subpart I.B. Justice Alito points out that in Williams the prosecutor did
not attempt to introduce the Cellmark report itself during Ms. Lambatos's testimony.96 He
then insists that the secondhand oral report about Cellmark's finding was not used to
prove the truth of the assertions in the report: "Lambatos did not testify to the truth" of the
male DNA profile found by Cellmark.97 Quoting the Advisory Committee Note to Rule
703, Justice Alito stated that secondhand reports such as the reference to Cellmark's
finding "assist[t] the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion."9 The justice asserted that "the
disclosure of basis evidence can help the factfinder understand the expert's thought
process and determine what weight to give to the expert's opinion."99 The justice then
elaborated on the possible nonhearsay uses of secondhand reports.100 For example, in the
plurality's view the factfinder may weigh the reports to determine whether "the expert
drew an unwarranted inference from the premises on which the expert relied." 101 In other
words, assuming arguendo the truth of the premises, do the premises provide adequate
support for the opinion? Alternatively, the factfinder could consider the secondhand
reports to decide whether "the expert's reasoning [process] was . . . illogical."102 Did the
expert commit any evident logical fallacies in reasoning about and from the premises to
the conclusion embodied in the opinion? The factfinder can conduct both of those
inquiries regardless of the truth of the assertions in the secondhand reports.103
However, Justice Alito acknowledged that the falsity of the secondhand reports
can sometimes render the ultimate opinion irrelevant.104 He stated that [iff there was no
proof that Cellmark produced an accurate profile based on that sample, Lambatos' [s]
,105
testimony regarding the match would be irrelevant .... Justice Alito does not propose,
93 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227.
94 Rice, supra note 48, at 583.
95 132 S. Ct. at 2233-69.
96 Id. at 2235 ("Lambatos ... made no other reference to the Cellmark report, which was not admitted into
evidence and was not seen by the trier of fact.").
97 Id.
98 Id. at 2239-40.





104 Id at 2237.
'0' Id at 2238. For that matter, in addition to demonstrating the scientific soundness of the analysis of the sample,
the prosecution must establish the chain of custody for the sample analyzed; to do so the prosecution must
present independent, admissible evidence of the chain. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA
ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 7.03 (5th ed. 2012); The identification of physical
evidence, including chain of custody, is a conditional relevance issue. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Determining
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however, that the irrelevance problem be dealt with by tasking the trial judge to pass on
the sufficiency of any independent admissible evidence of the fact mentioned in the
secondhand report, as the judge would do today if the issue were the sufficiency of the
foundation for a hypothetical question.106 Instead, he seems to contemplate that the trial
judge will give the jurors instructions assigning the relevance determination to them.1 0 7
Near the end of his opinion, Justice Alito endorses the general proposition that "the trial
judges may, and under most circumstances, must instruct the jury . . . that an expert's
opinion is only as good as the independent evidence that establishes its underlying
premises."108 Justice Alito's opinion goes farther. Earlier in the opinion, in discussing
hypothetical questions, Justice Alito approvingly quoted a jury instruction from Forsyth v.
Doolittle.10 9 The instruction informed the jurors that '[i]f the statements in these questions
are not supported by the proof, then the answers to the questions are entitled to no weight,
because based upon false assumptions or statements of fact." 110 Near the end of his
opinion and immediately after discussing jury instructions, Justice Alito harks back to
Forsyth and adds that "if the prosecution cannot muster any independent admissible
evidence to prove the foundational facts that are essential to the relevance of the expert's
testimony, then the expert's testimony cannot be given any weight by the trier of fact." 1
That passage lends itself to the interpretation that, rather than precluding the proponent
from exposing the jury to the opinion, the judge is to charge the jury to disregard the
opinion if it finds that the prosecution has failed to muster such "independent admissible
evidence."1 1 2
B. Justice Thomas' Concurrence
As previously stated, Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment affirming
Williams's conviction.113 He agreed with the plurality's conclusion that the Cellmark
report was not testimonial. 11 4 The plurality reached that conclusion on the ground that the
primary purpose of the report:
was not to accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial. When
the ISP lab sent the sample to Cellmark, its primary purpose was to
catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain evidence for
use against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under suspicion at
that time."
Justice Thomas found the plurality's rationale unpersuasive. 116 However, in his
view only statements "bearing 'indicia of solemnity"' can constitute testimonial
Preliminary Facts Under Federal Rule 104, 45 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, 44 - 45 (1992). Consequently, the
prosecution's foundational testimony must satisfy the technical evidentiary rules. Id. at 58. If the record did not
contain such evidence, on proper motion the defense would be entitled to a judgment of acquittal as a matter of
law. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. However, in Williams the various opinions do not discuss this argument as an
alternative basis for disposing of the case.
106 132 S. Ct. at 2241.
107 id.
10g Id.
109 Id at 2234.
1o Id (quoting Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 77 (1887)) (emphasis added).
Id at 2241 (emphasis added).
112 id
113 Id. at 2255-65.
114 Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
. Id. at 2243 (plurality opinion).
116 Id. at 2258-60 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
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assertions.1 1 7 On that basis he distinguished the relatively formal forensic certificates that
the Court had previously ruled testimonial in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts1  and
Bullcoming v. New Mexico.119 The upshot of Justice Thomas's perspective was that
although he rejected the plurality's reason for characterizing the report as nontestimonial,
he reached the same result as the plurality and, hence, cast the fifth vote affirming the
- - 120conviction.
Just as he rejected the plurality reasoning on the testimonial issue, Justice
Thomas rebuffed the plurality's position on Rule 703.121 He declared that "[t]here is no
meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement so that the factfinder
may evaluate the expert's opinion and disclosing that statement for its truth." 122In a
footnote, he asserted that "the purportedly 'limited reason' for such testimony-to aid the
factfinder in evaluating the expert's opinion-necessarily entails an evaluation of whether
the basis testimony is true."123 As support for his position, Justice Thomas quoted the
following passage from the expert testimony text coauthored by Professors Kaye,
Bernstein, and Mnookin:
To use the inadmissible information in evaluating the expert's
testimony, the jury must make a preliminary judgment whether this
information is true. If the jury believes that the basis evidence is true, it
will likely also believe the expert's reliance is justified; inversely, if the
jury doubts the accuracy or validity of the basis evidence, it will be
skeptical of the expert's conclusions.124
Justice Thomas ultimately concluded that "basis testimony is admitted for its
truth"12 rather than a 'legitimate' nonhearsay purpose . . . ."126
As previously stated, in his lead opinion Justice Alito conceded that the falsity of
the facts mentioned in secondhand reports can sometimes render the opinion irrelevant.127
Even in those cases, however, Justice Alito apparently contemplated that the judge would
go no farther than delivering jury instructions assigning the relevance or weight
128determination to the jury; he did not raise the possibility of excluding the opinion itself.
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas did not reach the question of whether the judge should
bar the opinion itself when the evidentiary record does not contain independent,
admissible evidence of the facts mentioned in the secondhand reports the expert relies
01.129
117 Id. at 2259-61 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836-37, 40
(2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-312 (2009).
119 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011).
120 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2255. (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
121 Id. at 2256.
122 Id. at 2257 (Thomas J., concurring in judgment).
123 Id. at 2257 n.1.
124 Id. at 2257 (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 196.
125 Id. at 2258.
126 Id. at 2258 n.4 (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 417 (1985)).
127 Id. at 2241 (plurality opinion).
128 id
129 Id. at 2258 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing out-of-court statements relied on by the expert).
2013] 11
17
Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2013
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
C. Justice Kagan's Dissenting Opinion
While disagreeing with Justice Thomas's characterization of the Cellmark report
as nontestimonial, the dissenters agreed with his rejection of the plurality's contention that
the reference to the Cellmark report had been used for a nonhearsay purpose.130 The
dissent advances two different arguments as bases for rejecting the plurality's
contention.131 One argument is that it is unrealistic to believe that the jury will be willing
and able to follow a limiting instruction precluding the jury's substantive use of the
secondhand report.132 Citing the Kaye text, the dissent dismisses that belief as "factually
implausible" and "sheer fiction."133 The dissent then makes the alternative argument that
"'as a simple matter of logic,"134 it is "nonsense"135 to believe that the secondhand report
can be used for a nonsubstantive, nonhearsay purpose.136 Just as Justice Thomas professed
that he could find no "meaningful distinction" between the hearsay and purported
nonhearsay uses of secondhand reports under Rule 703, the dissenters quoted People v.
137Goldstein, a 2005 New York decision, to the effect that "[t]he distinction between a
statement offered for its truth and a statement offered to shed light on an expert's opinion
is not meaningful." 13 On the facts of the case, the dissent felt that "the only way the
factfinder could consider whether [Cellmark's] statement supported her opinion (that the
DNA on L.J.'s swabs came from Williams) was by assessing the statement's truth."
1 3 9
There is a further parallel between the dissent and Justice Thomas's concurrence.
As previously stated, Justice Thomas stopped short of discussing the implications of his
conclusion that secondhand reports under Rule 703 are necessarily used for the hearsay
purpose of proving the truth of the report. In particular, Justice Thomas did not discuss the
nature of the judge's authority to admit or exclude an expert opinion when the record is
devoid of independent, admissible evidence establishing the truth of a secondhand report
that forms an essential premise of the opinion. Likewise, the dissent avoided discussing
the implications of its conclusion that secondhand reports are used for hearsay purposes.
In the context of Williams, the failure to reach that issue is understandable. Although he
found that the statement had been used for its truth, Justice Thomas was able to moot the
703 hearsay issue by focusing his analysis on the formality requirement for testimonial
statements.140 In the case of the dissenting justices, their rejection of the plurality's 703
argument led them directly to the testimonial issue, which is where they parted company
with Justice Thomas. 141
The rub is that in Williams five Supreme Court justices clearly expressed the
view that, in order to be used under Rule 703, a secondhand report must be put to a
hearsay purpose.142 In the procedural setting, neither Justice Thomas nor Justice Kagan
130 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2268-70.
132 id
133 Id. at 2269 (quoting KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 196.)
1
34 Id. at 2271.
131 Id. at 2269.
136 Id.
137 People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-33 (N.Y. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2293 (2006).
138 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732-33
(N.Y. 2005)).
139 Id. at 2271.
140 Id. at 2260-63 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
141 Id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 2226 (plurality opinion).
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found it necessary to explore the implications of that view. However, since a majority of
the Court's members has stated that view, it will now be on the mind of many lower court
judges who must apply Rule 703 in post-Williams cases.143 What are the implications of
that view? What are the stakes involved in the dispute between the Rule 703 majority and
the plurality? The two remaining parts of this article turn to those issues.
III. THE STAKES INVOLVED IN THE DISPUTE OVER THE EVIDENTIARY STATUS OF
SECONDHAND REPORTS USED UNDER RULE 703
In his plurality opinion, Justice Alito acknowledges that at least in some
circumstances the falsity of a secondhand report used under Rule 703 can render the
opinion irrelevant. 1 He does not seem to believe, however, that the lack or insufficiency
of independent, admissible evidence of the fact mentioned in the report calls into question
the admissibility of the opinion itself. 1 Rather, he apparently views the problem as one of
the weight of the opinion.146 As previously stated, near the end of his opinion he asserts
that "the trial judges may and, under most circumstances, must instruct the jury that . .. an
expert's opinion is only as good as the independent evidence that establishes its
underlying premises." 1 He specifically discusses the extreme fact situation in which the
proponent "cannot muster any independent admissible evidence to prove the foundational
facts that are essential to the relevance of the expert's testimony .... " In addressing
that situation, he does not even mention the possibility of outright judicial exclusion of the
opinion. Rather, he states that in such a circumstance, "the expert's testimony cannot be
given any weight by the trier of fact."149 In that circumstance, the trial judge would
presumably give an instruction like the Forsyth jury charge that Justice Alito approvingly
quoted earlier in his opinion: "If the [facts mentioned in the secondhand reports] are not
supported by [independent] proof, then the answers to the questions are entitled to no
weight ....
As noted in subparts II.B and II.C, unlike Justice Alito, Justice Thomas and
Justice Kagan do not explore the consequences of their conclusion that the secondhand
report about the Cellmark test had to be admitted for its truth; after reaching that
conclusion, both justices immediately segue to their analysis of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause issue in Williams.1 5 1 Yet the obvious, unanswered question is:
Where does the logic of their position lead? Their position could lead to the conclusion
that the lack or insufficiency of admissible evidence of the fact mentioned in the
secondhand report poses an admissibility problem, not merely a weight problem. There is
certainly a plausible argument that if (1) secondhand reports are necessarily admitted for
the truth of the report, (2) the falsity of the reports renders the opinion irrelevant, and (3)
in a given case there is either no admissible evidence or insufficient admissible evidence
of the truth of the fact mentioned in the secondhand report, the opinion itself should be
excluded. The proper enforcement mechanism would arguably be a judicial ruling
143 See, e.g., State v. Nararette, 81 U.S.L.W. 1068 (N.M. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 2013).
144 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2238 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 2239.
146 Id. at 2237.
147 Id. at 2241.
148 id
149 id
"' Id. at 2234.
... Id. at 2259, 2272.
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excluding the opinion, not the weaker measure of a Forsyth-style judicial instruction
telling the jury to assign the opinion "no weight." 1 5 2
Ultimately, the position taken by the 703 majority in Williams could lead to the
abolition of many of the procedural distinctions between hypothetical questions and
153questions based on secondhand reports used under Rule 703. As subpart I.A explained,
in the case of hypothetical questions, before posing the question to the expert the
proponent must ordinarily present independent, admissible evidence of every fact included
in the hypothesis. 1 54 If the proponent neglects to do so, the judge bars the question and
prevents the jury's exposure to the opinion.1 5 5 In contrast, if the proponent opts for an
opinion based on secondhand reports under Rule 703 rather than a hypothetical question,
the judge does not impose the condition precedent hat the proponent submit independent,
admissible evidence of the fact mentioned in the report.156 At most, as Justice Alito's
opinion indicates, the judge instructs the jury that they should consider the lack of
independent evidence of the fact in deciding how much weight to ascribe to the opinion.15 7
However, if the 703 majority's position is sound, at first blush the differential treatment of
hypothetical questions and questions based on secondhand reports seems indefensible. The
position strongly implies that if the presentation of admissible evidence aliunde is a
condition precedent o posing the hypothetical question, the judge should impose the same
condition in the case of questions resting on secondhand reports under Rule 703.
IV. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE OVER THE
EVIDENTIARY STATUS OF SECONDHAND REPORTS USED UNDER RULE 703
We now turn to the merits of the dispute over the evidentiary status of
secondhand reports. We shall evaluate the dispute from two perspectives. Initially, we
shall consider whether, as a matter of logic, the plurality or the 703 majority has the better
argument. Then we shall analyze the issue as a problem of statutory construction.
A. The Logic of the Use of a Secondhand Report as a Basis for an
Expert Opinion
A dissection of the logic of using secondhand reports poses several subissues:
1. Nonhearsay Uses of Secondhand Reports
Can a secondhand report that is used as the basis for an expert opinion ever
possess legitimate, nonhearsay logical relevance?
Both Justices Thomas and Kagan believe that whenever an expert relies on a
secondhand report as the basis for an opinion, the contents of the report are necessarily
being put to a hearsay, substantive use. 15" As subpart III.C noted, when Congress enacted
the Federal Rules, most jurisdictions in the common law world were of the same mind.15 9
152 Id. at 2234.
153 Id. at 2239.
154 Id. at 2241.
SId.
156 Id. at 2228.
157 Id. at 2240.
151 Id. at 2259, 2272.
159 Id. at 2239; Edward I. Imwinkelried, A Comparativist Critique of the Interface Between Hearsay and Expert
Opinion in American Evidence Law, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24-29, 34 (1991).
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That view, however, was not universal throughout the common law world. 160
One English commentator, Keane, took the position that when secondhand reports serve
as the basis for an expert opinion, the reports have "no hearsay quality."16 A Canadian
evidence scholar, McWilliams, agreed that so long as the judge gives the jury a "careful"
instruction specifying the proper use of the report, the report is not subject to a hearsay
objection.162 In short, just as the plurality and the 703 majority disagree in Williams,163 the
authorities in other countries are divided over the evidentiary status of secondhand reports.
The question recurs: Can such reports possess legitimate nonhearsay logical
relevance? The answer is Yes. Justice Alito's opinion suggests two examples.1 6 4
In one passage, Justice Alito states that a secondhand report possesses plausible
nonhearsay relevance to the question of whether "the expert's reasoning was . . .
logical."165 The justice explains that the factfinder's consideration of the secondhand
report can help the factfinder assess the quality of "the expert's thought process."166 By
reviewing the secondhand reports mentioned by the expert and the manner in which the
expert processed the reports, the factfinder can determine whether the expert committed
any evident logical fallacies in reasoning to his or her opinion.167 The factfinder can make
that determination regardless of the truth of the secondhand report. 16 Putting aside the
question of the truth of the report, the factfinder's consideration of the report for this
purpose can give the factfinder some insight into the caliber of the expert's reasoning.169
Even if the secondhand report is false, a consideration of the report can help the jury
decide whether the expert correctly connected the dots in his or her reasoning.170
In another passage, Justice Alito indicates that the factfinder's consideration of
the secondhand reports can aid the factfinder in deciding whether "the expert drew an
unwarranted inference from the premises on which the expert relied."17 1 The factfinder
can review all the secondhand reports cited by the expert and inquire whether,
cumulatively, they have adequate probative value to support the inference the expert
proposes drawing.172 Considered together, do the secondhand reports furnish sufficient
warrant for the expert's claim? Do the reports justify the proposed inference, or is the
expert overstating the conclusion that can be drawn from the premises? Once again the
factfinder can put the report to this use regardless of its truth.
This second use of secondhand reports brings a traditional nonhearsay use of out-
of-court statements-mental input-into play. Under the mental input theory of logical
relevance, the trial judge admits the statement for the limited purpose of showing its effect
160 Imwinkelried, supra note 159, at 23-24.
161 ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 369-70 (2d ed. 1989).
162 PETER K. MCWILLIAMS, CANADIAN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 251 (2d ed. 1984).




16' ROBERT J. KREYCHE, LOGIC FOR UNDERGRADUATES Ch. 2-3 (3d ed. 1970) (listing the fallacies of
equivocation, amphiboly, composition and division, accent, accident, special case, ignoring the issue, begging
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on the state of mind of the hearer or reader.173 Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff sued a
police officer for false arrest. Under the law of the jurisdiction, the officer is not liable if
she based the arrest on a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief that the defendant had
committed a crime. At trial, the officer attempts to testify that before she arrested the
plaintiff, a third party told her that he had just observed the plaintiff selling cocaine. Even
if the third party's report to the officer is false, the officer's receipt of the report can
produce in her mind an honest, reasonable belief that the plaintiff had perpetrated a felony.
Under Rule 105, the trial judge would give the jury a limiting instruction that although
they could not treat the report as substantive evidence that the plaintiff sold cocaine, they
may consider the report in evaluating the honesty and reasonableness of the officer's
belief. 17
By the same token, an expert's receipt of a secondhand report can help establish
the reasonableness of the expert's thought process. 175 The jury is surely entitled to inquire
whether, on its face, the expert's analytic process is reasonable. The more secondhand
data the expert receives, the better grounded the opinion will be. In footnote 3 in his
concurrence, Justice Thomas dismisses the application of the mental input theory.176
However, he considers one variation of the mental input theory: offering the secondhand
report of the Cellmark finding "to explain what prompted [Ms. Lambatos] to search the
DNA database for a match."17 7 He is correct in concluding that use of the evidence in this
way would not necessitate disclosing the details that Cellmark had found a male DNA
profile in the semen from L.J.'s vaginal swabs. 17" But using the report to explain the
recipient's subsequent conduct is only one variation of the mental input theory. As the
preceding paragraph demonstrates, the report could also be used to show the honesty and
reasonableness of the recipient's state of mind. A proponent offering a secondhand report
to establish the reasonableness of an expert's thought process is invoking a variation of the
mental input theory. The trial judge may permit a reference to the report for that
nonhearsay purpose and give the jury a limiting instruction specifying that purpose. 179
2. Hearsay Uses of Secondhand Reports
Even if the secondhand report possesses nonhearsay logical relevance, is it
realistic to think that the lay jurors will be able and willing to follow the limiting
instruction? Or are they likely to disregard the instruction, misuse the evidence for a
hearsay purpose, and treat the report as substantive evidence of the fact mentioned in the
report?
In many instances, a single item of evidence is logically relevant to the facts on
multiple theories.'s In the preceding discussion, we saw that secondhand reports can
sometimes be logically relevant on a nonhearsay theory for the purpose of helping the
factfinder evaluate the quality of the expert's reasoning. However, the same report may be
relevant for a hearsay purpose as well. Suppose, for example, that a testifying physician
relies on a nurse's secondhand report about the plaintiff patient's symptoms. It is clear that
the Advisory Committee contemplated Rule 703's application to such reports.8 The
173EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIEDET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1004, at 10-17-24 (5thed. 2011).
174 Id.
171 Imwinkelried, supra note 159, at 14.
176 132 S. Ct. at 2258 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 173 § 1004, at 10-17-24.
"s DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 1.4, (2002).
. FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note (reports and opinions from nurses).
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nurse's report, however, could also be logically relevant as substantive evidence on the
issue of the plaintiff's damages. The rub is that although relevant to damages, the nurse's
report could be inadmissible for that purpose because it might not fall within any hearsay
exception.182 In these dual relevance fact situations when an item of evidence is admissible
for one purpose but not for another, the common law solution has been to admit the
evidence but to require a limiting instruction.183 Federal Rule of Evidence 105 continues
the traditional practice.
184
Because the hearing in Williams was a bench trial, there was minimal risk that
any secondhand report would be misused. 1 5 The risk of misuse is much greater when the
factfinder is a jury of laypersons. In the 1980s Professor Rice asserted that it is an absurd
fiction that the jurors can and will comply with the limiting instruction in this setting.186
More recently, in their text on scientific evidence, Professors Kaye, Bernstein, and
Mnookin state that it is "highly unlikely that juries are capable of such mental
gymnastics." 1 If the jurors disregard the limiting instruction, Rule 703 becomes a
backdoor hearsay exception that admits the secondhand report as substantive evidence.8
Evidence scholars are not the only commentators who have expressed skepticism
about the jurors' compliance with the limiting instruction. To begin with, as Professors
Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin point out, there is an extensive body of psychological
research indicating that in some circumstances, lay jurors are likely to ignore limiting
instructions, including instructions about the limited evidentiary status of secondhand
reports.18 9 A number of courts have voiced the same skepticism.190 On the particular facts
of specific cases, the United States Supreme Court has occasionally held that it was
unrealistic to believe that a limiting or curative instruction to disregard would be
effective.191 Indeed, as amended in 2000, Rule 703 itself reflects an awareness of this
danger. In that year, the rule was amended to codify a presumptive rule that the expert
may not go into detail elaborating the content of an otherwise inadmissible secondhand
report.192 The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the amendment mentions the
danger of "the jury's potential misuse of the information as substantive evidence."193 The
182 Cf FED. R. EvID. 803(4) (exception to the rule against hearsay: statement made for medical diagnosis or
treatment).
183 LEONARD, supra note 180 § 1.4. For instance, with a limiting instruction, a judge might admit an accused's
prior conviction for impeachment under Rule 609 but bar its use as bad character evidence on the historical
merits under Rules 404-05. Likewise, ajudge could permit the introduction of evidence of an accused's prior
crime on a noncharacter theory to show motive under Rule 404(b) but preclude the prosecution from treating the
act as evidence of the accused's general bad character under Rule 404(a).
184 Id. § 1.5.
185 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2222, 2242.
186 Rice, supra note 48, at 585.
187 KAYE ET AL., supra note 48 § 3.7.2; see also BARBARA & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 4:8, (15th ed. 2012).
3 FederalRules ofEvidence Manual, § 703.2[4] (Matthew Bender 10th ed.).
189 KAYE ET AL., supra note 48 § 3.7.2, at n. 37 (2004).
190 E.g., People v. Coleman, 695 P.2d 189 (Cal. 1985).
191 RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS § 15.3(A), at 439-41 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933),
Jacksonv. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), and Brutonv. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)).
192 The last sentence of restyled Rule 703 now provides: "But if the facts or data would otherwise be
inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if the probative value in helping
the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect."
FED. R. EVID. 703.
193 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note (amended 2000).
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Note counsels trial judges to "consider the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness
of a limiting instruction under the particular circumstances."1 9 4
This line of argument is not so much an attack on Rule 703 as it is a plea for the
more frequent invocation of Rule 403. In general terms, Rule 403 allows trial judges to
exclude otherwise inadmissible evidence when they believe that the attendant probative
dangers such as unfair prejudice substantially outstrip the probative worth of the
evidence.195 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403 explains that unfair prejudice
includes the danger that the jury will decide the case on an improper basis. 19 More to the
point, the Note indicates that the risk of unfair prejudice arises when evidence is
admissible only for a limited purpose but the judge believes that the jury will misuse the
evidence for another, inadmissible purpose.197 When a juror misuses the item of evidence
and that misuse influences the juror's vote, the misuse can prompt a verdict on an
improper basis. Given the right facts and the psychological research into the efficacy of
limiting instructions, trial judges should be more receptive to the argument that Rule 403
trumps Rule 703 in a given case because there is an intolerable risk that the jury will
ignore the limiting instruction. However, the Supreme Court has rarely found such an
intolerable risk.198 Typically, the Court has done so only when a "perfect storm" created
the risk: The out-of-court statement was directly relevant to a critical issue in the case, the
declarant presumably had personal knowledge of the fact asserted, and the declarant was a
key player in the case-the accused himself or herself, a co-conspirator, or the named
victim.199 In many cases, secondhand reports used under Rule 703 will lack one or more of
these characteristics: The report might not bear directly on a vital issue in the case, it may
be doubtful whether the declarant possessed firsthand knowledge, or the declarant may
have only a minor role in the transaction. Perhaps trial judges should accept such Rule 403
arguments more often, but this line of argument does not undermine Rule 703 itself. In
contrast, the next argument represents a more formidable, fundamental challenge to Rule
703.
Even if the secondhand report possesses nonhearsay logical relevance, does the
factfinder have to put the report to hearsay use and treat it as substantive evidence of the
truth of the report in order to make an intelligent decision whether to accept the opinion
based on the report?
The attack discussed above rests on a prediction that in some cases jurors will
disregard the limiting instruction and put the report to a substantive, hearsay use. In the
final analysis that attack sounds in Rule 403 rather than Rule 703. The next argument,
however, rests on logic rather than a prediction of juror behavior. According to this
argument, in every case the factfinder must put the report to a substantive, hearsay use in
order to decide whether the opinion is relevant and should be accepted.20 The thrust of the
argument is that as a matter of logic, the secondhand report must always be used for that
purpose; if the fact mentioned in the report is essential to the validity of the opinion and
there is no sufficient admissible evidence of the truth of the fact, the opinion is irrelevant
194 id
195 FED. R. EvID. 403.
196 FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
197 Id. (Specifically: "In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration
should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.").
'98 United States v. Martinez, 939 F.2d 412, 414-415 (7th Cir. 1991).
199 CARLSON& IMWINKELRIED, supra note 191 § 15.3, at 441.
200 Ian Volek, FederalRule ofEvidence 703: The Back Door and the Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80
FORDHAML. REv. 959, 977-8 (2011).
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and should be excluded.2 01
A number of respected commentators subscribe to this line of argument.202 They
contend that it is "logically incoherent" to admit the opinion absent admissible evidence of
the truth of its premises.203 The validity and relevance of the opinion necessarily depend
on the truth of its premises.204 Absent such evidence of the truth of the premises, the
205
opinion is unsubstantiated and irrelevant. If sufficient admissible evidence supporting
the opinion's premises is not available, it is illogical to admit the opinion as substantive
206evidence in the case. It is fallacious for the factfinder to accept the truth of the opinion
absent admissible proof of the truth of the premises.207 Some courts have embraced this
argument20 and, as previously stated, even Justice Alito acknowledged in Williams that
the falsity of the premise of the truth of Cellmark's report would render Ms. Lambatos's
opinion irrelevant.2 0 9
As a generalization, this line of argument is correct. When a conclusion or
opinion rests on certain premises, the opinion is conditional in nature.210 When a
conclusion is said to be conditional on a certain fact, the validity of the conclusion is
contingent on the truth of the condition.211 That understanding of the nature of a condition
is pervasive in the law. For example, Contracts law treats the concept of a condition in that
manner.212 The Federal Rules of Evidence also reflect the concept of conditional
validity.2 1 3 If the validity of an opinion is conditional upon the truth of a certain premise, a
decision maker cannot accept the opinion as valid unless and until the premise is proven to
be true.
There is an important qualification, though, to this generalization: The
generalization holds true only when the premise essential to the conclusion. In some
instances a secondhand report used under Rule 703 lends further support to the expert's
opinion but the fact mentioned in the report is not an essential premise. Consider, for
example, a defense psychiatrist's opinion that a person is suffering from a certain mental
disorder. The disorder is one of the illnesses for which there are Feigner inclusionary
214criteria. Assume that the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM) IV-TR states that there are four classic symptoms of the disorder and that
before diagnosing a subject as suffering from the disorder, the psychiatrist must find that
201 id.
202 KAYE ET AL., supra note 48 § 4.7.2, at 178-81; Charles Alan Wright et al., 29 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVIDENCE
§ 6272 (1997); Rice, supra note 48, at 585.
203 KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 179.
204 Rice, supra note 48, at 585.
205 KAYE ET AL., supra note 48, at 179.
206 Wright et al., supra note 202, at 320.
207 KAYEET AL., supra note 48, at 179; Rice, supra note 48, at 585.
208 See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 127 (2005) (the court did not see how a factfinder could accept
an opinion "without accepting [the] premise . . . that the statements were true . . .
209 Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2238 (2012).
210 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Comparativist Critique of the Interface Between Hearsay and Expert Opinion in
American Evidence Law, 33 B.C. L. REV. 1, 33 (1991).
211 Black's Law Dictionary 293 (6 th ed. 1990).
212 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.2, at 519 (3d ed. 1999).
213 FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
214 See generally Jules B. Gerard, The Usefulness of the Medical Model to the Legal System, 39 Rutgers L. Rev.
377, 402 (1987) (explaining the Feighner Criteria, their application to certain mental illnesses, and how they are
used in legal processes).
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the subject's case history includes at least three of the four symptoms.2 The psychiatrist
is prepared to testify that the accused suffers from the disorder and that the basis for her
opinion consists of 703 secondhand reports about all four symptoms. Suppose further that
while the record contains independent, admissible evidence of three symptoms, there is no
such evidence of the fourth. In these circumstances, the prosecution could attack the
weight of the psychiatrist's opinion by pointing to the absence of admissible evidence of
the fourth symptom. However, since the diagnostic criteria require a finding of only three
symptoms, the lack of admissible evidence of the fourth symptom would not render the
opinion irrelevant; even if the fourth symptom is absent, there is an adequate basis for the
opinion. The absence of independent evidence of the fourth symptom would not make it
illogical for the factfinder to accept the psychiatrist's opinion.
Vary the hypothetical. Assume that there is either no evidence or insufficient
independent evidence of both the third and fourth symptoms or that the factfinder rejects
the evidence of the existence of the third or fourth symptoms. Now the state of the
evidentiary record undercuts an essential premise of the opinion; ex hypothesi only two of
the three necessary symptoms are present in the accused's case history. Given these
assumptions, the opinion is irrelevant and it would be illogical for the factfinder to
embrace the opinion. Simply stated, the falsity of a truly essential premise216 invalidates
the expert's conditional opinion.
3. The Allocation of the Factfinding Responsibility Between the Judge
and Jury with Respect to Secondhand Reports
Does the fact that the falsity of an essential premise of a conditional opinion
renders the opinion irrelevant dictate the conclusion that the trial judge should be assigned
the task of deciding the truth of the premise and empowered to exclude the opinion
whenever he or she would conclude that the essential premise is false? Or is jury is
generally competent to perform that task?
As we have seen, the falsity of an essential premise of an opinion can render the
opinion irrelevant; if an essential premise of an opinion is false, it is illogical for the
factfinder to accept the opinion as true. That analysis, however, does not dictate the
conclusion that in all cases the trial judge should be authorized to decide whether an
essential premise is false and, if so, bar the opinion. The basic question is one of the
217allocation of factfinding responsibility between the judge and jury.
In several cases, the common law of Evidence and the Federal Rules assign to the
jury the responsibility of deciding facts which determine the logical relevance of an item
2181of evidence. Concededly, the trial judge usually resolves factual questions that
determine the admissibility of evidence.219 Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) recognizes
this practice.220 For example, suppose that an opponent makes a hearsay objection to
testimony about an out-of-court statement offered as an excited utterance under Federal
215 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR,
(4th ed. text revision 2010).
216 In the analogous context of hypothetical questions, the trial judge has authority to bar the question when the
judge believes that the hypothesis omits an essential premise. The judge determines whether the hypothesis
furnishes "an adequate basis" for the expert's opinion. KENNETH BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
14, at 90 (6th ed. 2006).
217 Rice, supra note 48, at 588.
218 See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Determining Preliminary Facts Under Federal Rule 104, 45 AM. JUR.
Trials 1, § 33 (1992).




University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol3/iss1/8
THE GORDIAN KNOT OF SECONDHAND FACTS UNDER RULE 703
Rule 803(2).22 The trial judge decides the foundational question of whether the declarant
was in a state of nervous excitement at the time of the statement. Similarly, assume that an
opponent objects to a question on the ground that the question calls for the disclosure of a
communication protected by the attorney -client privilege under Federal Rule 501.222 These
issues fall into the category of foundational or preliminary facts conditioning the
.1 223
"competence" of evidence. The judge decides the question of the existence or truth of
these facts.
However, there is another category of foundational facts-those conditioning the
224logical relevance of evidence. This category includes such foundational facts as a lay
witness's possession of personal knowledge225 under Rule 602 and the authenticity of
exhibits226 under Rule 901.227 Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b) codifies the conditional
relevance doctrine: "When the [logical] relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact
exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The
court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced
later." 228
When a fact falls under Rule 104(b), the trial judge plays a limited, screening
role.229 Rather than passing on the credibility of the proponent's foundational testimony,
the trial judge accepts the testimony at face value.230 The judge then conducts a limited
inquiry: If the jury chooses to believe the foundational testimony, does the testimony have
sufficient probative value to support a rational, permissive inference of the existence of
the foundational fact such as, for instance, the fact that the witness saw the accident or the
plaintiff actually authored the letter?231 Assume the trial judge ruled that there was
sufficient evidence. The trial judge would then allow the lay witness to testify about the
accident or permit the letter's proponent to submit it to the jury. In the final jury charge,
the judge would instruct the jurors that they have to decide the issue of whether the lay
witness possessed firsthand knowledge of the accident or whether the plaintiff signed the
232letter. More specifically, the trial judge tells the jurors that:
* If they find that the preliminary fact is true, they may consider the lay
witness's testimony or the exhibit during the balance of their deliberations.
* However, if they find that the preliminary fact is false, they should
233
completely disregard the testimony and exhibit during their deliberations.
221 Imwinkelried, supra note 218, at § 50.
222 Id. § 42.
223 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 133 (5th ed. 2011).
224 Id. § 134.
225 Imwinkelried, supra note 218, at § 10.
226 Id. § 20-22.
227 id
228 FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
229 Imwinkelried, supra note 218, at § 31.
230 Id. § 31.
231 45 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Determining Preliminary Facts Under Federal Rule 104 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 31
(1992).
232 Id. § 65.
233 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges- Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge Critically Assess the
Admissibility ofExpert Testimony Without Invading the Jury's Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight
ofthe Testimony? 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 11 (2000).
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Federal Rules of Evidence 602 and 901 make it clear that the conditional
relevance doctrine governs the preliminary facts of a lay witness's personal knowledge
234and an exhibit's authenticity. For its part, Rule 602 states that a lay witness may testify
about a fact or event "if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the
witness has personal knowledge of the matter." 23 Rule 901(a) adds that in the case of
exhibits such as letters, "the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it to be."2 36
Why treat these preliminary facts differently than the run-of-the-mill preliminary
facts that fall under Rule 104(a) and that are assigned to the trial judge? The title of the
231doctrine codified in Rule 104(b), "conditional relevance," is suggestive. Suppose that at
the outset of their deliberations, the jurors decide that the lay witness called by the
plaintiff does not have personal knowledge of the accident he testified about; they are
convinced that the witness is lying or mistaken. On that supposition, common sense will
naturally lead the jury to disregard the witness's testimony during the remainder of its
deliberations. The jurors have literally decided that this witness "doesn't know what he's
talking about." This is a common sense notion, not a technical legal doctrine. The
justification for classifying the authenticity of exhibits as falling under Rule 104(b) is
similar.238 Assume that, at the beginning of their deliberations, the jurors decide that the
letter purportedly signed by the plaintiff is a forgery. Again, they should have no difficulty
putting aside the letter for the remainder of their deliberations. Here they have decided that
the letter "isn't worth the paper it's written on." Foundational facts are categorized under
104(b) when they condition the logical relevance of the evidence in such a fundamental
sense that even lay jurors without legal training will see that the falsity of the fact renders
the evidence irrelevant.239 For that reason, we trust the jury to make the ultimate
determination whether the witness has firsthand knowledge or whether the exhibit is
authentic. If the jurors decide that the preliminary fact is false, their prior exposure to the
witness's testimony or the letter is unlikely to taint the remainder of their deliberations;
once they decide that the preliminary fact is false, they will view the evidence as irrelevant
and worthless. They should be perfectly capable of putting the testimony out of mind.
There is a strong analogy between these "conditional relevance" preliminary
facts and the question of the truth of the essential premises for an expert opinion. If a lay
witness lacks personal knowledge of the accident he proposes to testify about, his lack of
firsthand knowledge renders his testimony irrelevant. Again, if an exhibit is not genuine,
its inauthenticity renders the exhibit irrelevant and patently worthless. Similarly, when an
essential premise of an expert opinion is false, its falsity renders the opinion irrelevant.
The question is whether we can generally trust the jury to determine the falsity of
the essential premise. The bottom line issue is whether we can be confident that the jurors
can and will disregard the expert's opinion if they conclude that an essential premise is
false. That does not seem to be too much to ask of lay jurors. Any reasonably intelligent
person can understand this common sense argument: A (the opinion) is true only if B (the
essential premise) is true; B is false; ergo, A is false. One does not need a college degree,
234 David S. Schwartz,A Foundation Theory ofEvidence, 100 GEOL.J. 95, 100 (2011).
235 FED. R. EvID. 602.
236 FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
237 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 134 (5th ed. 2011).
238 Id. § 401.
239 John Kaplan, OfMabrus and Zorgs-An Essay in Honor ofDavid Louisell, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 987, 995 (1978);
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions ofPreliminary Facts Conditioning
the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence? 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 594 (1984).
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much less a J.D. or a B.S., to realize that the conclusion follows inexorably from the
premises. We can therefore safely entrust the decision to the jury.2 4 0
Admittedly, Federal Rule 104(a)'s competence procedure governs some of the
foundational facts conditioning the admissibility of expert opinions.241 For example, in the
majority opinion in the celebrated Daubert decision, Justice Blackmun explicitly stated
that 104(a) controls the judge's determination whether the theory or technique the expert
proposes employing has been validated by adequate, methodologically sound empirical
242reasoning and data. However, the admissibility of a single item of evidence is often
conditioned on multiple preliminary facts, some falling under 104(a) and others under
243104(b). For example, suppose that a defense counsel offers a conviction to impeach a
prosecution witness. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(c), the trial judge determines
whether the conviction is inadmissible because the witness has been pardoned for the prior
244
crime. However, the conviction is obviously irrelevant and inadmissible for the purpose
of impeaching this witness unless the witness is the person who suffered the conviction.24 5
246The determination of the witness's identity as the convict falls under Rule 104(b). Thus,
it is quite possible to assign the jury the task of determining the sufficiency of the
admissible evidence of the facts mentioned in the secondhand reports under Rule 703 even
though the trial judge has the determinative vote on many of the other facets of the
admissibility of the expert's opinion.
If the jury can be assigned this task, the approach outlined in Justice Alito's
plurality opinion is generally satisfactory. In the typical case, rather than personally
deciding whether the opinion's essential premises are true, the judge instructs the jurors
that they have that task; they are to weigh the independent, admissible evidence of the fact
stated in the secondhand report to decide whether that fact is true. Moreover, as in
Forsyth, the judge bluntly tells the jurors that if they find that one of the opinion's
essential premises is false, they must give the opinion "no weight." 2 4 7
What about the exceptional situation in which the expert's proponent fails to
present sufficient independent evidence of the truth of the facts stated in the secondhand
reports used under Rule 703? In that situation, does logic dictate that the opinion is
irrelevant and the trial judge should bar the proponent from submitting the opinion to the
jury?
The previous paragraphs developed a parallel to Federal Rule of Evidence
104(b).248 That statute assigns the ultimate conditional relevance determination to the jury.
By its terms, however, the statute also prescribes that the trial judge must submit that
240 Ia a given case, it might be tenable to argue that under Rules 403 and 6 11(a) the trial judge is authorized to
deviate from the normal rule allocating the responsibility to the jury. Suppose, for example, that the foundational
testimony about the scientific evidence consumed hours of courtroom time and hundreds of pages of transcript.
"Understandably, when jurors listen to hours of foundational scientific testimony, they [may] have difficulty
ignoring the proof during their deliberations [even after] they find that" the opinion is inadmissible.
Imwinkelried, supra note 239, at 605. That argument is plausible when the jury realizes that the evidence is
being excluded for a technical legal reason. The argument carries less weight in a setting such as here in which
the jury has decided that the opinion is irrelevant.
241 Imwinkelried, supra note 231, at § 47.
242 Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
243 Imwinkelried, supra note 231, at § 47.
244 FED. R. EvID. 609(c).
245 Id. at advisory committee's note (1974 Enactment).
246 Imwinkelried, supra note 231, at §19.
247 Williamsv. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2234 (2012).
248 FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
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ultimate decision to the jury only when the proponent has "introduced [proof] sufficient to
support a finding [by the jury] that the fact does exist." 24 Rule 602's restatement of the
standard is explicit; according to Rule 602, the judge must permit the jury to make the
final decision "only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the
witness has personal knowledge of the matter."250 Suppose that after reviewing the record,
the judge concludes either that the proponent has presented no evidence of the fact or that,
as a matter of law, the proponent's evidence is insufficient to support a rational inference.
In that situation, the judge makes a peremptory ruling, never submits the question to the
jury, and excludes the evidence. In that state of the record the jury could not make a
rational finding that the witness possessed firsthand knowledge; to regulate the rationality
of the verdict, the judge bars the testimony.
Consider a parallel situation involving secondhand reports. Assume that after
reviewing the state of the record at the time the proponent proffers the opinion, the judge
concludes that there is no admissible evidence of the fact stated in an essential secondhand
report or that the independent evidence is too flimsy to sustain a rational inference. Even if
the jurors chose to believe the independent evidence, they could not find the essential
premise to be true. As under Rule 104(b), the state of the record calls out for the judge to
make a peremptory ruling and exclude the expert opinion.251 It makes no sense to expose
the jury to the opinion when it is clear that it would be irrational for the jury to find the
existence of one or more of the essential premises of the opinion. It would hardly enhance
the integrity of the factfinding process to give the jury an opportunity to make an
undeniably irrational decision.
B. The Legislation Governing the Use of a Secondhand Report as a
Basis for an Expert Opinion
Subpart A demonstrates how logic strongly indicates that at least in some cases,
the trial judge should bar expert opinions supported by secondhand reported used as the
252basis for the opinion under Rule 703. Logic, however, is not the only force that shapes
253the law. Moreover, the use of secondhand reports is not a matter of common law in
most jurisdictions; there are statutes on point.254 In federal practice Rule 703 governs, and
the majority of jurisdictions have state statutes modeled after Rule 703.255 What issues
arise under the statute?
Did the drafters perceive a distinction between the facts recited in the attorney's
hypothetical question and facts stated in secondhand reports?
It is understandable that the courts and legislatures have insisted that the facts
recited in hypothetical questions be supported by independent, admissible evidence. Aside
from the independent evidence, the only mention of the fact is the attorney's reference in
the question he or she poses to the expert. In virtually every American jurisdiction, there is
a pattern jury instruction that the attorney's statements during trial are not evidence.2 5 6
249 id.
250 FED. R. EvID. 602.
251 Imwinkelried, supra note 231, at 10.
252 Dana G. Deaton, The Daubert Challenge to the Admissibility ofScientific Evidence, 60 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 8
(1996).
253 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881).
254 See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 703 (advisory committee notes) (West 2012); CONN. CODE OF EVIDENCE, §7-4(b)
(West, 2012).
255 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 84 § 52.2 (1987).
256 E.g., Cal. Jury Instructions: Criminal §§ 1.02, 5002 (2012).
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However, the drafters of Rule 703 viewed secondhand reports as having much
more substance than an attorney's bare assertion.257 Rather than emanating from attorneys,
in the words of the Advisory Committee Note, secondhand reports come from other
sources such as "nurses, technicians and . . . doctors . . . .,258 The Note adds that, to an
extent, the witness screens or "expertly perform[s]" a "validation" of the report.259 For
instance, over the course of his or her career a forensic pathologist gains considerable
experience working with findings from toxicology laboratories and in the process the
pathologist may develop a "special talent[]" for evaluating such findings.260 The Note
concludes by pointing out that experts "make[] life-and-death decisions in reliance upon"
261such secondhand reports. If the expert is willing to place such faith in secondhand
262
reports, it seems silly to bar their use at trial. Professor Rice has gone to the length of
arguing that the expert's screening creates such a strong inference of trustworthiness that
any secondhand report passing muster under Rule 703 should be treated as admissible
263hearsay and received as substantive evidence. Citing Professor Rice, Professors Kaye,
Bernstein, and Mnookin observe that many secondhand reports are at least as reliable as
264the out-of-court statements routinely admitted under some hearsay exceptions. Even if
one is unwilling to go as far as Professor Rice, the drafters' conclusion that a secondhand
report is a more substantial basis for an expert opinion than an attorney's statement in a
hypothetical question is defensible.
If the drafters discerned a distinction between secondhand reports and an
attorney's statement in a hypothetical question, did they also manifest an intent to treat
secondhand reports differently procedurally? In particular, did they manifest an intent to
dispense with any necessity for the proponent of an opinion based on secondhand reports
to present independent, admissible evidence of the facts stated in the reports?
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703 not only demonstrates that the
drafters perceived a distinction between secondhand reports and an attorney's reference to
a fact in a hypothetical question. More importantly, the Note also indicates that given the
perceived distinction, the drafters wanted to treat hypothetical questions and questions
265based on secondhand reports differently in a procedural sense. Early in the first
paragraph in the Note, the drafters mention the requirement that the proponent of a
hypothetical question must present independent evidence of the facts recited in the
266hypothesis. The drafters describe the variant of the hypothetical question in which the
expert attends trial, "hear[s] the testimony establishing the facts,"267 and later opines on
268"the basis of the testimony that has already been admitted. In the middle of the
paragraph, the drafters shift the focus from the traditional hypothetical question practice to
269their innovation permitting reliance on secondhand reports. In the third to last sentence
257 FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note (1972 Proposed Rules).
258 id
259 id
260 Rice, supra note 48, at 591.
261 FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
262 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 69 § 702.02[3] at 702-12.
263 Rice, supra note 48, at 587-88.
264 KAYE ET AL., supra note 48 § 4.7.2, at 180.
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in the paragraph, the drafters state that they intend to allow proponents to use secondhand
reports "with[out] the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various
authenticating witnesses."270 In the next sentence, the drafters assert that the witness's
"'validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for
judicial purposes."271
Those two sentences are informative. Requiring the proponent to present
independent, admissible evidence of the truth of the secondhand reports would directly
frustrate the drafters' express intent to obviate the need for the proponent to expend
.1 ,272"substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses.
Furthermore, if the presentation of such evidence is a formal requirement, the expert's
screening of the secondhand report no longer "suffice[s]" as a basis for introducing the
opinion.273 Adding that requirement as a judicial gloss would flatly contradict the intent
clearly expressed in the Advisory Committee Note. Whatever the appeal or merit of the
logic underlying the 703 majority's position in Williams, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to justify construing Rule 703 as a mandate that the proponent submit such evidence as a
274condition precedent o presenting the expert opinion to the factfinder.
Even if the drafters intended to treat hypothetical questions and questions based
on secondhand reports differently, is the differential treatment unconstitutional?
If the 703 majority in Williams is correct, the admission of an expert's opinion
based on secondhand reports as substantive evidence is illogical when the record does not
contain sufficient, admissible evidence of the facts stated in the reports. Does that
conclusion damn Rule 703 to unconstitutionality?
It certainly does not have that effect in civil actions. Consider the related issue of
the constitutionality of "illogical" presumptions in civil cases: presumptions in which the
basic fact lacks sufficient probative value to support an inference of the existence of the
275 276presumed fact. On the civil side, the due process clause imposes minimal constraints.
The prevailing view is that the presumption can be constitutional even when, without
more, the basic fact would not support a rational, permissive finding that the presumed
277fact exists. In fashioning a presumption for a civil case, the court or legislature may
consider factors other than probability.278 For example, they may consider policy factors
and convenience.279 The decisionmaker may consider the very sorts of factors that the
drafters mentioned in the Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 703.280 The
drafters could reasonably conclude that if the witness has "expertly performed" a
"'validation"281 of a secondhand report of a fact, there is little to be gained by also
requiring admissible evidence of the fact. Further, the drafters may legitimately weigh the
270 
Id.; see also 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 6272 (1st ed. 1997).
271 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
272 id.
273 id
274 Williamsv. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2225 (2012).
275 2 CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 522 (6th ed. 2006).
276 Id. at 523.
277 Id. at 522-23.
278 id
279 Id. at 522.
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inconvenience of "the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various
authenticating witnesses."282 That inconvenience was one of the policy factors the Court
2813
weighed in Cliquot's Champagne.
Criminal cases are a different matter. There are at least two situations in which
the adoption of the 703 majority's position could lead to a finding of a constitutional
violation. First, assume that in Williams, the Cellmark report was a formal certificate, like
the certified reports in Mellendez-Diaz284 and Bullcoming.28 If that has been the case,
Justice Thomas would have sided with the four dissenters on the question of whether the
report was testimonial. He concurred with the plurality on the testimonial issue only
because the Cellmark report was not a "formalized statement[] . . . characterized by
solemnity .... " If we vary the facts in that respect, there would have been five votes
both for the proposition that the report was testimonial and that Lambatos's reference to
the report was used for the truth of the content of the report. On those assumptions, a
majority of the justices would have found a violation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause.
Justice Alito's plurality opinion suggests another possibility. In footnote 8, the
justice mentions the Court's 1979 decision in Jackson v. Virginia. In Jackson, the
Supreme Court announced that the Due Process Clause controls the standard the trial
judge must use to determine whether the prosecution has sustained its initial burden of
production and made out a submissible case for the jury.2 More specifically, the Court
ruled that the trial judge must determine that a hypothetical juror could find the existence
of every essential element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.28 The prosecution
must meet its burden by presenting admissible, substantive evidence of each element of
290the offense. Suppose that in a given case, the only substantive prosecution evidence of
an essential element is an expert opinion resting on secondhand reports. Assume further
that the record does not contain admissible, independent evidence of the truth of an
essential premise supported by only a secondhand report. Citing the view of the 703
majority in Williams, the defense could argue that it is illogical to treat the opinion as
substantive evidence absent such admissible corroborating evidence.291 Research reveals
no case in which a defense counsel has pressed this argument, but post Williams it may be
only a matter of time before someone does.
While these constitutional attacks are viable, like the Rule 403 argument
discussed in subpart IV.A.2, they do not amount to facial attacks on Rule 703 itself. For
292the most part, the Supreme Court has confined facial constitutional attacks to legislation
293
burdening First Amendment activity. In other contexts, a constitutional attack must be
282 id
283 In re Cliquot's Champagne, 70 U.S. 114, 141 (1866).
284 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
285 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2707 (2011).
286 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2261 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
287 Id. at 2238 n.8 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979)).
288 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979).
289 
Id. at 313-14.
290 Id. at 313-14, 317.
291 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2258.
292 But see Bergerv. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (a Fourth Amendment case involving electronic
surveillance).
293 Arriagav. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that facial constitutional attacks are
"generally limited to statutes that threaten First Amendment interests."); United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135,
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as-applied. If a court adopted the view of the 703 majority in Williams, the court might
294find that a particular application of 703 violated the Fifth or Sixth Amendment.
However, even in a criminal case the court would not strike down Rule 703 entirely.295
V. CONCLUSION
296There are many variations of the famous legend of the Gordian Knot.
According to one version, at one time the Phrygians were without a king.297 An oracle
predicted that an eagle would land on the cart of the new king.298 A peasant named
Gordias was driving his ox-cart into town when an eagle landed on the cart.299 Gordias
was proclaimed king.3 0 0 Out of gratitude, Gordias's son Midas dedicated the cart to the
Phyrygian gods and tied the cart to a post with an intricate knot.301 An oracle later
prophesied that whoever untied the knot would become the king of all Asia.302 While
wintering nearby in 333 B.C., Alexander the Great was challenged to untie the knot.3 0 3
Alexander could not unravel the mystery of the knot.304 Frustrated, he unsheathed his
305
sword and slashed through the rope-cutting the Gordian knot. The expression, 'cutting
the Gordian knot," has become a metaphor for overcoming a seemingly intractable
problem by a bold stroke.
The remarks of the 703 majority in Williams have converted the evidentiary
status of secondhand reports used under Rule 703 into a Gordian knot of sorts. Those
remarks introduce a tension into Rule 703 jurisprudence. When a secondhand report is an
essential premise of an expert opinion, the logic of the 703 majority's position points to
the substantive conclusion that the lack of independent, admissible evidence of the facts
stated in the report renders the opinion irrelevant. In turn, that substantive conclusion
seems to dictate the procedural outcome that at least in extreme cases, the judge should
exclude the opinion and bar its presentation to the jury. However, that logic collides with
the legislative intent manifest in the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 703.306
The drafters asserted that the expert's screening of the second report ought to "suffice."307
The drafters were equally emphatic that it would be unnecessary for the expert's
proponent to go to the length of incurring "the expenditure of substantial time in
1142 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the constitutional claim must fail because the overbreadth doctrine does not
implicate "First Amendment protections."); Coleman v. DeWitt, 282 F.3d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Neither the
Supreme Court nor this court has applied the overbreadth doctrine when the First Amendment was not
implicated."); Edward J. Imwinkelried & Donald N. Zillman, An Evolution in the First Amendment: Overbreadth
Analysis and Free Speech Within the Military Community, 54 TEX. L. REV. 42, 50-55 (1975).
294 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2223, 2232.
295 See id. at 2262, 2264.
296 JOHN MAXWELL O'BRIEN, ALEXANDER THE GREAT: THE INVISIBLE ENEMY: A BIOGRAPHY 69 (1992).







304 Id at 69.
305 id
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producing and examining . . . authenticating witnesses. 308 The tension between the 703
majority's logic and the drafters' intent creates a knotty problem for the lower courts.
3 09
There may be a way to cut this Gordian knot. A few lower courts have treated
Rule 703 as a hearsay exception.310 In his often cited 1987 article on Rule 703, Professor
Rice called for an amendment to Rule 703 to convert the statute into a hearsay
exception.311 In the ensuing years other respected commentators have lent support to
312Professor Rice's proposal. That proposal squarely poses the question whether the
witness's expert screening of the secondhand report is a sufficient guarantee of the
313
report's reliability to lift the bar of the hearsay rule. Whatever else may be said about
the wisdom of the proposal, it would directly and cleanly cut through the Gordian knot
created by the comments of the 703 majority in Williams. The problem would vanish
because any secondhand report used under Rule 703 would be automatically admissible as
substantive evidence of the truth of the fact stated in the report.
However, until some legislature or court is bold enough to adopt this proposal,
lower courts will have to cope with the tension generated by the 703 majority's position.
At the very least it would be advisable for lower courts to administer the sort of jury
instructions that Justice Alito approvingly mentioned in his plurality opinion. In an
extreme case in which the expert's proponent has presented no or clearly insufficient
admissible evidence of an essential premise in a secondhand report, the trial judge ought
to charge the jury that without such evidence the opinion is "entitled to no weight." In
such extreme cases the judge will have to struggle with the decision whether to take the
next step seemingly mandated by logic and bar the proponent from presenting the expert
opinion to the jury. That struggle is an important reminder of the contemporary relevance
of Justice Holmes's insight that "[t]he life of the law [is] not [exclusively] logic . ... 314
308 id.
309 The pun is obvious but apt.
3o WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 53, at 318; United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) ("the
expert testimony exception to the hearsay rules"); United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971)
("this exception to the rule against hearsay").
3 Rice, supra note 48 at 587-88.
312 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 53 at 318-20; KAYE ET AL., supra note 48 §4.6.
313 Cf Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 156, 166-68 (1988) (the Court construes Federal Rule
803(8)(C), dealing with the admissibility of findings in government investigative reports; the Court makes it
clear that such findings can quality for admission even if they are not based on the investigator's personal
knowledge; in deciding whether to admit the finding, the trial judge should consider whether the investigator
possesses relevant expertise).
314 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED: THE RECEPTION OF
INCRIMINATING EXPERT EVIDENCE (I.E., FORENSIC SCIENCE)
IN FOUR ADVERSARIAL JURISDICTIONS
Gary Edmond,* Simon Cole,t Emma Cunliffe, and Andrew Roberts§
INTRODUCTION
The single most important observation about judicial [gate-keeping] of
forensic science is that most judges under most circumstances admit
most forensic science. There is almost no expert testimony so threadbare
that it will not be admitted if it comes to a criminal proceeding under the
banner of forensic science. . . . The applicable legal test offers little
assurance. The maverick who is a field unto him- or herself has
repeatedly been readily admitted under Frye, and the complete absence
of foundational research has not prevented such admission in Daubert
jurisdictions.'
There is an epistemic crisis in many areas of forensic science. This crisis
emerged largely in response both to the mobilization of a range of academic commentators
and critics and the rise and influence of DNA typing. It gained popular and authoritative
support through the influence of the National Academy of Science (NAS) and a
surprisingly critical report produced under its auspices by a committee of the National
Research Council (NRC). Interestingly, as this article endeavors to explain, the courts
themselves seem to have played a rather indirect, inconsistent and ultimately ineffective
role in the supervision and evaluation of forensic science evidence. Indeed, in the
I Professor, School of Law, The University of New South Wales. This research was supported by the Australian
Research Council (FT0992041, LP100200142 and LP120100063). Thanks to David Faigman, Jeremy Gans,
Mehera San Roque, and William Thompson for comments. Versions of this paper were presented at Law &
Society Conferences in San Francisco (2011) and Hawaii (2012).
Associate Professor, School of Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine.
Associate Professor, School of Law, University of British Columbia.
Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Melbourne.
Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial
Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES J. 16, 29 (2005).
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aftermath of recent criticism of the forensic sciences, this essay considers the effect of the
dominant admissibility standards that operate in four common law jurisdictions. The
revealing result seems to be that although admissibility standards vary across these
jurisdictions, actual admissibility practices are remarkably consistent. In this article we
will question the extent to which courts (and legal personnel) are able to meaningfully
invigilate the use of forensic science evidence in criminal proceedings and consider some
of the ideological commitments and institutional pressures that might lead judges in all
jurisdictions to prefer inclusive approaches to incriminating expert opinions.
In the first part of the article, we compare rules, jurisprudence and practices,
across four jurisdictions: the United States, England and Wales, Canada, and Australia.
All profoundly shaped by the English common law, these jurisdictions (and their sub-
jurisdictions) tend to use a mixture of common law (e.g. England and Wales and Canada),
judge-made rules (e.g. the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence) and statutory schemes (e.g. the
Australian Evidence Act 1995 Cth and many states in the United States) to regulate the
admission of evidence, including expert opinion.3 These jurisdictions tend to maintain
criminal trial processes that remain reasonably similar and facilitate broad brush
-4comparisons.
Forensic science and medical techniques are used routinely in criminal
proceedings. We have selected techniques (and technologies) that are not necessarily
standardized, but are regularly used in each of the four jurisdictions. Legal recognition
and treatment as distinctive types of evidence enables us to consider what these advanced
jurisdictions, with different, though evolving, admissibility standards have done (and are
doing) in response to the various techniques and opinions. Our findings suggest that
admissibility standards, including the first generation of reliability-based standards, seem
to make little, if any, difference to (traditional) admissibility decision-making and
practice. Allowing for some variation, the same sorts of forensic science evidence are
admitted across all jurisdictions, even where the techniques are not demonstrably reliable
and the jurisdiction in question has explicit reliability standards and other rules regulating
the admission of expert opinion evidence. Moreover, it is our contention that the legal
accommodation of the techniques considered in this article exemplifies a more general
response to admissibility and the regulation of forensic science and medicine evidence. In
the second part of the article we will consider possible explanations and some of the
implications of our findings.
2 Our study surveys and summarizes the leading decisions rather than a detailed empirical study of actual case
practices across jurisdictions. Both would be interesting and informative, but this offers a first attempt to survey
leading decisions against formal rules and overarching criminal justice objectives and values.
See generally FED. R. EVID.; FED. R. EVID. 702 (Federal Rule of Evidence concerning expert testimony);
Australian Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (a statutory scheme covering everything from cross examination to
admission of evidence).
4 It should be noted, however, that there are many differences, not all of which should be considered trivial. Canada,
for example, has fewer trials before juries than the other jurisdictions. Many prosecutors and judges in the United
States are elected, and the United States retains civil juries, making the admissibility of expert opinion evidence an
important, and frequently controversial, issue in civil proceedings (e.g. tort and product liability litigation). There are
no capital cases or capital juries in England, Canada, and Australia. Australia and England tend to provide relatively
well-resourced defense lawyers and are more likely to expend state resources on defense experts than most U.S. states.
Undoubtedly, these and a myriad of other differences in practice, traditions, and resourcing (of courts, police and
forensic sciences, as well as parties) influence the ways in which forensic science and medicine evidence is developed,
contested, and admitted.
While there can be quite significant differences in actual practices, many of the techniques feature remarkably
similar ingredients across our sample. Many of these similarities flow from information and technology sharing
or the use of proprietary systems.
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A. Rules of Evidence and Procedure
A fundamental condition of admissibility is that evidence must be relevant.6 That
means it must be capable of rationally influencing the assessment of facts in issue (i.e., the
7contested or material facts). Ordinarily, opinion evidence is not admissible. Witnesses are
normally required to testify about facts." There are exceptions for some kinds of opinion
evidence. Lay witnesses are frequently allowed to express opinions, especially those
necessary to make sense of the witness' perceptions or impressions.9 It is, for example, not
uncommon for a witness to be allowed to express an opinion on events within their
experience: such as a person's emotional state; whether someone was intoxicated; and
even whether a car was being driven fast or dangerously.10 Most of the forensic science
evidence considered in this article is opinion evidence and subject to exclusionary rules
operating in all of our jurisdictions. Because of its great potential to assist the tribunal of
fact, all jurisdictions maintain an exception for the opinions of "experts" or for opinions
based on "specialized knowledge."" Though not all require evidence about the reliability
of the method or technique, or the expert's ability, for admissibility purposes. In most
common law jurisdictions (with a jury), where the admissibility of expert opinion
evidence is contested, the trial judge will conduct a hearing (a voir dire or Daubert
hearing) into the admissibility of the evidence. Such hearings are normally held in the
absence of the jury.
Once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, the expert witness is subject
to direct (i.e., examination-in-chief) and limited re-direct (i.e., re-examination) by the
party calling the witness and cross-examination by the other parties. It is not uncommon
for an expert's report (or part thereof) to be tendered as his or her evidence-in-chief. In
most adversarial jurisdictions the trial judge maintains a discretion to exclude otherwise
admissible evidence if its reception would result in unfairness, or the value of the evidence
is outweighed by any unfair prejudice it might engender.1 2 In practice, where expert
opinion evidence satisfies the exception to the opinion rule, trial and appellate judges
rarely resort to discretionary powers to exclude incriminating evidence. In some
jurisdictions (such as England), depending on the kind of evidence, the judge may offer
some guidance or cautionary instructions to the tribunal of fact, in others (parts of
Australia, under the uniform statutes, for example), there may be a duty to do so. 13In
recent years, in response to challenges and increasing sensitivity to reliability discourses,
some judges have been prepared (or obliged), often in consultation with the lawyers, to
prescribe the precise wording of parts of an expert's testimony. On some occasions,
reading down the confidence or strength of opinions and conclusions operates as an
admissibility compromise.
6 See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 485 (1898).
See id. at 267; see also FED. R. EvID. 401 (establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence test for what evidence is
relevant).
In practice, courts in all jurisdictions acknowledge the blurred boundary between fact and opinion.
9 See FED. R. EVID. 701.
10 See, e.g., id. §§ 701 & 803(3).
" See, e.g., id. §§ 702-703; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79 (Austl.); Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Can.);
Criminal Procedure Rules, (2012), c. 33 §§ 1-2 (Eng.). We use 'tribunal of fact' interchangeably with 'trier of
fact' and 'fact-finder.' A jury is the proto-typical tribunal of fact, but increasingly judges (and appellate courts)
are involved in fact-finding. Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and
Propriety ofAppellate Courts'Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1521, 1521, 1525
(2012) (discussing the role of appellate courts as fact-finders).
12 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 130 (Austl.) (codifying the common law Christie
Discretion first established mR. v. Christie AC [1914] 545 (Austl.)); Evidence Act 2008 (Cth) s 137 (Austl.).
" Civil Procedure Rules, (2012), c. 32 § 1 (Eng.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 116 (Austl.).
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Once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, the "weight" attached is a
matter for the tribunal of fact based on what transpires at trial (e.g. cross-examination and
rebuttal experts), along with any other evidence and instructions.
All of the jurisdictions considered in this article offer some kind of judicial
review or appeal mechanism.14 Trial and appellate courts appear to hold great confidence
in the effectiveness of trial safeguards, and the abilities of tribunals of fact (whether judges
or juries) and appellate courts to understand and evaluate incriminating expert opinion
evidence.
B. The Epistemological Status of the Forensic Identification Sciences
Before moving to review admissibility rules, jurisprudence and practice in the
U.S., England and Wales, Canada and Australia, it is helpful to provide a backdrop to the
epistemic status of the forensic comparison techniques that form the primary focus of our
study.
In what follows, we draw upon studies that have cast doubt on the adequacy of
empirical support for the forensic science techniques that are routinely admitted in all of
our jurisdictions. Our reason for doing so is that the results of these studies will tend to
amplify the implications of our findings. In this respect, an important backdrop to our
discussion and understanding of the value of the techniques is a recent report by the
National Research Council of the United States National Academy of Science (NAS)
published in 2009 (hereafter the NRC report).1 5
The NRC report is authoritative, particularly in relation to understanding the
value of forensic science and medical evidence and the effectiveness of admissibility
standards. The report is particularly illuminating of a range of "identification" sciences;
because the multidisciplinary committee responsible for its drafting was surprisingly
critical of the research base, or lack thereof, underpinning many techniques that are
routinely relied upon in criminal investigations and prosecutions.16 According to the NRC
report:
The degree of science in a forensic science method may have an
important bearing on the reliability of forensic evidence in criminal
cases. There are two very important questions that should underlie the
law's admission of and reliance upon forensic evidence in criminal
trials: (1) the extent to which a particular forensic discipline is founded
on a reliable scientific methodology that gives it the capacity to
accurately analyze evidence and report findings and (2) the extent to
which practitioners in a particular forensic discipline rely on human
interpretation that could be tainted by error, the threat of bias, or the
absence of sound operational procedures and robust performance
standards. These questions are significant: The goal of law enforcement
actions is to identify those who have committed crimes and to prevent
the criminal justice system from erroneously convicting the innocent. So
it matters a great deal whether an expert is qualified to testify about
14 England and Wales also have a free-standing Criminal Cases Review Commission. Peter Duff, Straddling Two
Worlds: Reflections ofa Retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner, 72 MOD. L. REV. 693, 695-96 (2009);




NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD
(2009).
16 Harry T. Edwards & Constantine Gatsonis, Preface to NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD, at xix-xx (2009).
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forensic evidence and whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to
merit a fact finder's reliance on the truth that it purports to support....
Unfortunately, these important questions do not always produce
satisfactory answers in judicial decisions pertaining to the admissibility
of forensic science evidence proffered in criminal trials."
And, directly relevant to this article:
With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis . .. no forensic method has
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a
high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence
and a specific individual or source. . . . The law's greatest dilemma in its
heavy reliance on forensic evidence, however, concerns the question of
whether-and to what extent-there is science in any given forensic
science discipline.8
While image evidence, and several other techniques and methods in widespread use were
not included within the scope of its purview, many of the Committee's concerns appear
readily applicable to these areas of practice.19
The NRC report is salient because the inability to support forensic science
techniques and derivative opinion evidence with empirical evidence-and this applies to
techniques that have been routinely admitted and relied upon for more than a century-
seems to be a common feature of practice in all of our jurisdictions. In other words, the
NRC report authoritatively exposes the lack of underlying research support for many
20
forensic science and medical techniques in the United States and elsewhere.
The NRC report recommends establishing a National Institute of Forensic
Sciences to undertake research, standard setting and accreditation, in response to
expressed doubts about the ability of lawyers and judges to credibly respond to what is
characterized as the parlous state of affairs.2 1
The report finds that the existing legal regime-including the rules
governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable
standards governing appellate review of trial court decisions, the
limitations of the adversary process, and judges and lawyers who often
lack the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate
forensic evidence-is inadequate to the task of curing the documented
ills of the forensic science disciplines.22
It is also important to indicate that the authors have reservations about the value
of many types of forensic science and several of those discussed in this article. In
' NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 9, 87.
' Id. at 7, 9.
'9 See STEPHEN GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO 80 (2008) (discussing
forensic pathology).
20 Scholarly criticisms were frequently dismissed or ignored, but it is much more difficult to challenge the NRC
report. See Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility ofthe State's Forensic
Science andMedical Evidence, 61 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 343, 367-68 (2011). In Australia, forensic sciences are
often defended on the basis of standards and accreditation, but the research underlying these standards is far from
always obvious. Edmond is a member of the Standards Australia committee tasked with drafting standards for
the forensic sciences in Australia. See also Gary Edmond, What lawyers should know about the forensic
'sciences', 36 Adelaide L. Rev. (2014) (forthcoming).
21 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 19.
22 Id. at 85.
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particular, we are concerned that fingerprint, bite mark, image and voice comparison
evidence is often relied upon or expressed in ways that are not consistent with existing
empirical evidence.2 Each of us has written about problems with expert evidence, and
particularly forensic science and forensic medicine, and the manner in which admissibility
standards and practice do not seem to prevent problematic forms of expert opinion
evidence being adduced and admitted in criminal proceedings.2 4 By way of summary, we
share the general outlook expressed by the NRC. Our research and observations affirm
that techniques routinely relied upon by investigators, prosecutors, jurors and judges are
25either unreliable or of unknown reliability. This article represents an attempt to
consolidate these experiences in a manner that facilitates a systematic comparison capable
of illuminating the limits of current standards, practice and personnel when assessed
against the overarching objectives of the accusatorial criminal trial.
The NRC report suggests that DNA evidence generally stands on a stronger
scientific foundation than these other techniques;26 though it should not be seen as
infallible. There are continuing problems with DNA evidence that extend beyond chain of
custody issues, to interpretations (especially of mixed samples and the random match
probabilities for sub-populations), how to respond to increasingly sensitive analyses (such
as those associated with low copy number techniques), the transportability of microscopic
biological traces, and finally, whether the real-world risk of error (laboratory or otherwise)
should be imposed on the fantastically large probabilities (and likelihood ratios) routinely
23 We are also engaged in debates about the expression of results in reports and testimony as well as the adequacy
of the adversarial trial (and the effectiveness of its various processes and safeguards). See Gary Edmond, Kristy
Martier & Mehere San Roque, Unsound Law: Issues With (Expert) Voice Comparison Evidence, 35 MELB. U.
L. REV. 52, 53-54 (2011) (contending that voice comparison evidence is readily admitted when the probative
value is unknown and traditional features of the adversarial trial are inadequate to correct the associated
problems).
24 THE LAW COMM'N, EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 14 (2011)
(stating that an expert's opinion evidence must satisfy a threshold of acceptable reliability); SIMON A. COLE,
SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION, 4-5 (2001) (reflecting on
methods of criminal identification that have been suspect, such as fingerprint identification); Simon A. Cole,
More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985,
988-91 (2005) (arguing that fingerprint identification is not error free); Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint
Identification Valid? Rhetorics ofReliability in Fingerprint Proponents'Discourse, 28 L. & POL'Y 109, 109-10
(2006) (considering whether or not latent print identification is valid); EMMA CUNLIFFE, MURDER, MEDICINE
AND MOTHERHOOD 2-4 (2011) (arguing that behavioral and scientific evidence cannot provide independent proof
of guilt); Gary Edmond et al., Mere guesswork': Cross-Lingual Voice Comparisons and the Jury, 33 SYDNEY L.
REV. 395, 396 (2011) (outlining the dangers associated with the allowance ofjurors to engage invoice
identification and comparison); Gary Edmond at al., Unsound Law: Issues With (Expert) Voice Comparison
Evidence, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 52, 53-54 (2011) (contending that voice comparison evidence is readily admitted
when the probative value is unknown and traditional features of the adversarial trial are inadequate to correct the
associated problems); Gary Edmond et al., Law's Looking Glass: Expert Identification Evidence Derived from
Photographic and Video Images, 20 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 337, 337-38 (2009) (illustrating limitations
with approaches to the use of images as evidence); Gary Edmond et al., Atkins v. The Emperor: The 'Cautious'
Use of Unreliable Expert' Evidence, 14 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 146, 146 (2010) (concerning
jurisprudential weakness and problems with photo comparison and facial mapping evidence); Andrew Roberts,
Rejecting General Acceptance, Confounding the Gatekeeper: The Law Commission on Expert Evidence CRIM. L.
REV. 551 (2009).
25 Professor Edmond is engaged in ongoing observational research. Professor Cole participates as an expert
witness and advisor. Professor Cunliffe has undertaken empirical research into the relationship between expert
testimony and scientific research. Professor Roberts is primarily a scholarly commentator. See, e.g., Michael
Lynch & Simon Cole, Science and Technology Studies on Trial: Dilemmas ofExpertise 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 269,
272-73 (2005). See generally Simon Cole, A Cautionary Tale About Cautionary Tales About Intervention, 16
ORG. 121 (2009).
26 Although, there would appear to be more chance of accidental (though potentially incriminating)
contamination with DNA than with most images and voice recordings, for example. See BRANDON L. GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go WRONG 100-02 (2011).
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27generated. There are also problems with the manner in which DNA matches should be
expressed that seem to raise profound challenges for a system of trials based on lay
assessment of technical and other forms of evidence.28 Moreover, it is unlikely that the
possibility of full genetic sequencing will eliminate all of these risks, even if it changes
29what is meant by 'matching' DNA profiles. Many of the original problems with DNA
evidence are known (or "visible") today because of the existence and involvement of
scientists (e.g. biologists, geneticists and statisticians) from beyond the institutionalized
forensic sciences (and commercial providers). Nevertheless, the inclusion of DNA
evidence, as a stabilized and research-based technology, enables us to compare practices
associated with less stabilized or more controversial techniques, including some that are
not supported by empirical evidence and openly questioned by the NRC and/or most
attentive academic commentators.
Those allowed to give evidence, as some kind of expert, routinely use apparent or
alleged similarities as the basis for opinions pertaining to the identification of a person of
interest (POI). In some cases, as with photo-interpretation and bite marks, there is no
established technique for explaining how traces-say images or bruising, respectively-
relate to the objects that features in them or produced them. Even where the similarities or
artifacts are real (or, as is more often the case, not contested) in most circumstances we
have little idea of how common a particular feature is, or its relationship to (or
independence from) other features. Notwithstanding such deficiencies, techniques based
on comparisons are routinely used for the purposes of identification or to assist with
identification at trial (and during pre-trial processes).30 There is little, if any, evidence to
support the value of opinions derived from these techniques, and furthermore, many of
these forms of evidence are obtained in ways that are likely to create or exacerbate errors.
Taking just one example, it is very common for those using comparison
techniques where the identity of an offender or source is at stake-and this even applies to
latent fingerprint examiners and the interpretation of DNA profiles (especially in mixed
samples)-to have access to information that is strictly irrelevant to their analysis but
implicates a particular person, or persons, or source. Consequently, we have a range of
individuals of varying levels of training and experience, offering opinions about evidence
in conditions where there may be few, if any, empirically established methods or
standards, and in circumstances where gratuitous information may influence the
interpretation.31 Moreover, attempts to ascertain proficiency or substantially mitigate
many of the problems identified by scholarly commentators (and other critics) and the
NRC report are highly variable. Rather, as this article illustrates, admissibility decisions
are often relied upon by witnesses and investigative institutions to support techniques, and
displace the need for scientific validation and proficiency testing.
One caveat. It may well turn out that some of the techniques and opinions we are
discussing have considerable probative value. If evidence emerges that supports the
27
1 Id. at 101-02.
2 8Aytugrulv. The Queen [2012] HCA 15 (Unreported, 18 April 2012) (Austi.) (an example of a case in which
the method of expressing DNA evidence was contested); see also Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks,
Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS
L.. 1159, 1180 (2008) (citing research that indicates the method of expressing DNA match evidence can affect
jurors).
29 Ironically, this might be closer to what the latent fingerprint examiners had historically assumed.
30 Problems with forensic science and medicine apply to pre-trial negotiations, especially plea-bargaining, where
the limits of expert opinion evidence might not be recognized.
" See Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous
Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 74, 74 (2006). See generally, GARRETT, supra note 26.
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accuracy of these techniques, that could hardly be seen as a vindication of past legal
practice and a liberal approach, particularly in those jurisdictions with formal reliability
standards. Moreover, future empirical vindication will not overcome the ways in which a
range of biases and procedural problems, that may contaminate forensic science practice
and conclusions, were and are routinely trivialized. Nor will it address persistent and
unanswered questions about the ability of adversarial criminal proceedings and the various
participants (i.e., lawyers, forensic scientists, judges and jurors) to credibly manage even
highly reliable techniques. It is our contention that unreliable and speculative
incriminating expert opinion evidence always threatens important institutional values such
32as rectitude of decision and the fairness of accusatorial proceedings.
I. COMPARISON
Our comparative review begins with the U.S. because of its influence in the wake
of the rise of DNA evidence and the institution of reliability standards and admissibility
jurisprudence following the seminal Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
decision in 1993.33
A. The United States: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and
Practice
The United States is a federal system encompassing 50 state courts as well as
federal courts. In recent decades an expectation has emerged that judges will assume a
"gate-keeping" role in controlling the admission of expert opinion evidence. Most, but not
all, jurisdictions adhere to one of two principal approaches which are generally known by
their leading cases: Frye v. United States (1923) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals (1993).34 Today, 29 states and the federal courts adhere to Daubert or a
Daubert-like model.35 Daubert has been described as a 'reliability-validity' model.36 The
principal attribute of Daubert, as opposed to Frye, is that it mandates that the trial court
undertake an independent assessment of the evidence to determine its admissibility.3 7 This
aspect of Daubert has been often criticized, most conspicuously in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent, for its assumption that judges without scientific training are
competent to evaluate scientific evidence.38 Though commonly described as a four or five-
part test, Daubert is really a two-part test derived from Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE).3 9 The two criteria for admissibility under Daubert are relevance and
32 See Gary Edmond & Andrew Roberts, Procedural Fairness, the Criminal Trial and Forensic Science and
Medicine 33 SYDNEY L. REv. 359 (2011).
" Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
34 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
" David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 355-56
(2004).
1 DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE 288 n.22 (2d ed. 2010).
1 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-93.
" Id. at 600-0 1.
39 Id. at 588-89. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was designed to govern the admissibility of expert
opinion evidence in United States Federal Courts (as an exception to the general prohibition on opinion evidence
provided by the exclusionary Rule 701). The original version of Rule 702 read, "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise"; See FED. R. EvID. 702 (1975) (amended 2011).
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reliability.40 It was by way of explicating the idea of "reliability," that the Court
articulated four (or five) criteria: (1) testing, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error rate
and standards,4 1 and (4) general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.42 Not
intended as a checklist, the criteria were to be applied flexibly to assist with admissibility
decision-making.
Daubert was explicated in two further appeals to the Supreme Court, often
described as its 'progeny': General Electric v. Joiner and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.4 3
Reiterating the importance of flexibility, in Kumho the Court explained that the Daubert
criteria may be applied to admissibility determinations for non-scientific forms of expert
evidence-i.e., "'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge."4  Joiner, importantly,
states that the standard of review for admissibility decisions by trial courts is "abuse of
discretion."4 5 In consequence, admissibility decisions are not subject to stringent review
and similar types of expert evidence may be treated disparately across jurisdictions,
courtrooms and cases, as well as over time.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, on which Daubert and Kumho were
based, was revised in 2000 to make the need for 'reliability' explicit.46 It now reads:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.
The revised version of Rule 702 seems to have made little discernible difference to
practice and is largely conceived as a statutory explication of the Daubert and Kumho
decisions.
Sixteen U.S. states, including some of the most populous, continue to adhere to
the 'general acceptance' approach embodied in the earlier Frye decision.4" Frye has been
40 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95; see FED. R. EVID. 401, (stating that 'relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence).
41 It is these two items which are sometimes-quite logically since they have little obvious relation-
disaggregated to purportedly render Daubert a five-, rather than a four-, part test. See, e.g., Bond v. State, 925
N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
42 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. Sometimes the existence and use of standards is included as a fifth criterion.
Perhaps the most notorious addition occurred when, on remand, Judge Kozinski added anxiety about 'science for
litigation' into the mix. See Gary Edmond, Supersizing Daubert: Science for Litigation and its Implications for
Legal Practice and Scientific Research, 52 VILL. L.REV. 857, 864-65 (2007).
43 Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Some legal
scholars find Kumho to be the most coherent of the three opinions (Kumho, Joiner, and Daubert) and argue that
evidence scholars should speak of a 'Kumho approach' to evidence, rather than a 'Daubert approach.' E.g., D.
Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, orA Fool's Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped WorryingAbout
Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and "Forensic Science" in General) and Learned to Love
Misinterpretations ofKumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TuLSA L. REv. 447, 462, 467 (2007).
44 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-48.
4
5 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141.
46 FED. R. EVID. 702(c) (2000) (amended 2012).
47 Id. We use the terms 'trier of fact' and 'tribunal of fact' interchangeably.
48 Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility ofScientific and Other Expert Evidence
in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2011).
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called a 'deference' approach in that, rather than asking the trial judge to evaluate the
reliability and validity of proffered evidence, Frye suggests that the judge try to ascertain
how those scientists best positioned to undertake such an evaluation-'the relevant
scientific community'-evaluate the evidence.
Though deference and independent assessment of validity-reliability are quite
different philosophically, in practice the two approaches have tended to produce
remarkably similar outcomes. Indeed, empirical studies have observed little difference in
outcomes between Frye and Daubert jurisdictions.5 0 While the Daubert approach retains
"general acceptance" as one of its "factors," this does not provide a very persuasive
explanation for the apparent convergence. Interestingly, studies suggest hat U.S. judges
struggle with several of the Daubert criteria, and are not in a position to make an
assessment of the relevant community or the extent of acceptance.5 2 Instead, they tend to
use heuristics, such as credentials and experience, when making admissibility decisions in
criminal trials and appeals.53
In addition, six U.S. states have been characterized as "hybrids" because their
admissibility standards combine features from Frye and Daubert.54 Three U.S. states have
their own independent admissibility regimes.55 Once again, these alternative admissibility
standards have not produced practices or outcomes that diverge significantly from those
associated with Frye and Daubert.
Among evidence scholars (and other observers), the U.S. courts' handling of
forensic evidence in admissibility hearings and trials has been soundly and nearly
56universally excoriated. This critical view was recently endorsed by the NRC Report,
which characterized U.S. courts as "utterly ineffective" in using the law of expert evidence
to encourage "forensic science professionals . . . to establish either the validity of [their]
approach or the accuracy of [their] conclusions."5 7
49 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility ofNovel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980). Frye was decided in 1923 but it was not widely used until much
later.
'o E.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study ofScientificAdmissibility
Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 511 (2005); Veronica B. Dahir et al., Judicial Application ofDaubert o
Psychological Syndrome and Profile Evidence, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 62, 62, 64, 78 (2005); Lloyd
Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the
Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 251, 252, 285-86 (2002); Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of
Daubert on the Admissibility ofBehavioral Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 443-44 (2003); Jennifer
Groscup et al., The Effects ofDaubert on the Admissibility ofExpert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal
Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 339 (2002).
* Cheng & Yoon, supra note 50, at 478.
52 Groscup et al., supra note 50, at 341, 367.
* Id. at 357.
54 Lustre, supra note 48.
5 Id.
56 E.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: FORENSICS (Student ed. 2008); KELLY M.
PYREK, FORENSIC SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE CHALLENGES OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES AND THE MEDICO-
LEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM (2007); Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade ofDaubert Wrought?,
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59 (2005); Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court's "Criminal" Daubert Cases, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 ISSUES IN SCI. &
TECH. 47 (2003); Risinger, supra note 43; Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift
in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892 (2005). E.g., Andre Moenssens, Fingerprint Identification: A
Valid Reliable "Forensic Science"?, 18 CRIM. JUST. 31 (2003); Andre Moenssens, Palmprint and Handwriting
I.D. Satisfy Daubert Rule, THE CRIMINALIST (Spring 2004), available at http://njiai.org/Criminalist0604.pdf.
5 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 53.
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Other potential methods of controlling the reception of expert opinion in U.S. law
include the probative value/prejudice discretion and jury instructions. Rule 403,
embodying the federal version of the discretion, states that evidence may be excluded "if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice,
confusi[on of] the issues, [or] misleading the jury, [or by considerations of] undue delay,
[waste of] time, or needless[ presentation of] cumulative evidence." Techniques deemed
admissible under Rule 702 might, in theory, run afoul of Rule 403. Courts reluctant to
tangle with complex reliability debates might go directly to Rule 403 to make a
determination on the admissibility of evidence. Such reasoning appears most common in
cases involving lie detection techniques, such as the polygraph. Some courts have evaded
technical debate over the accuracy of the polygraph by finding that, whatever its accuracy,
its potential for prejudice is greater.5 9 Because many jurisdictions maintain an explicit
reliability standard, once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, and therefore
implicitly reliable, there is limited scope for subsequently finding that the evidence will
create unfair prejudice.60 Admissibility standards (such as Rule 702), in effect, almost
always trump exclusionary discretions (such as rule 403).61
Courts might also seek to counter expert testimony that is exaggerated or of
questionable validity through jury instructions, similar to those that have been delivered
by some courts regarding the accuracy of eyewitness identification or extensions of the
standard instructions for expert witnesses. Thus far, the use of jury instructions for
forensic science in the U.S. has been quite limited, and much more limited than in the
other jurisdictions considered in this article.6 2
Across the many U.S. jurisdictions, there is considerable variation in the
selection and quality of judges, prosecutors and defenders, as well as the resources
available to public defenders. It is often difficult to obtain public funding for a defense
63expert, especially in state-based prosecutions. There is, in addition, tremendous variation
in the provision and quality of forensic science and medicine evidence by the state. Some
facilities employ personnel with academic-level scientific credentials and state of the art
equipment and facilities. Others are tiny, poorly equipped laboratories operated by a
handful of employees with modest scientific credentials, at best. Some forensic disciplines
are situated within police departments, rather than crime laboratories. Some states still rely
on coroners, rather than medical examiners. Virtually all U.S. public forensic science
providers suffer from serious resource constraints.
" FED. R. EVID. 403.
59 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSuES 60 (2002).
60 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d
809, 815-16 (4th Cir. 1995). The example of the lie detector probably encapsulates older attempts to manage
polygraphs that pre-date the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert. We might expect that rule 702, Daubert,
and rule 403 will be applied to manage new techniques of lie detection associated with scanning technologies
such as fMRI. Although, several appellate courts have suggests that rule 403 might have more purchase in
relation to expert evidence than other kinds of evidence.
6' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
62 United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Perhaps the best known instruction was
delivered by the court which analyzed forensic document examination to harbor piloting. State v. Quintana, 103
P.3d 168 (Ct. App. Utah 2004) (Thorne, J., concurring); United States v. Zajac, 2010 WL 4363637 (D. Utah
2010). Disclosure: One of the authors was a consultant o the defendant in this case. Jury instructions have been
proposed by attorneys, but not delivered by judges, in cases involving latent prints, and perhaps other areas as
well.
6' Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); see Paul C. Giannelli, The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-
Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2004).
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1. Latent Fingerprint Evidence
Latent print evidence was first deemed admissible in the United States in People
v. Jennings in 1911.64 In that case, the primary defense argument was oriented toward
treating the evidence as "ostensive" evidence-that is, evidence that did not require expert
65interpretation-rather than exclusion. In finding the testimony of the latent print expert
admissible, the decision relied primarily on two propositions which formed the backbone
of many subsequent decisions: first, the fact that numerous authorities stated that latent
print evidence was reliable; and, second, the reasoning that the reliability of latent print
evidence may be inferred from the supposed "uniqueness" of the human friction ridge skin
,66that produces the impressions we call "fingerprints." For good reason, the second
proposition has been characterized as the "fingerprint examiner's fallacy."6 7
Subsequent cases generally followed this pattern, culminating perhaps in Grice v.
State, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals suggested "that instead of the state
being called upon . . . to offer proof that no two finger prints are alike, it may now be
considered in order for those taking the opposite view to assume the burden of proving
their position."68 With this ruling the admissibility of latent print evidence no longer
seemed susceptible to challenge until the Daubert decision in 1993.
Beginning with United States v. Mitchell, there have been numerous admissibility
challenges to latent print evidence in the U.S in the aftermath of Daubert.69 Many of these
cases have generated reported decisions. In almost all cases, latent print evidence was
deemed admissible.70 Page et al. found that 93 per cent of admissibility challenges to
6 4 96 N.E. 1077, 1083 (Ill. 1911).
61 Id. at 1082. This approach has been adopted by some courts in India. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Images of Truth:
Evidence, Expertise, and Technologies of Knowledge in the American Courtroom (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author).
6 6 
Id. at 1082.
67 Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Ruling from Jennings to Llera Plaza and
Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1197 (2004); see Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness,
Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology ofForensic Identification, 8 L. PROBABILITY &
RISK 233, 233-255 (2009).
6' Grice v. State, 151 S.W.2d 211, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941).
69 United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). AlthoughMitchell was the earliest post-Daubert
admissibility challenge to latent print evidence, heard in 1999, the trial court did not issue a written ruling (after a
five-day admissibility hearing), and the appellate decision was not issued until 2004. By that time, cases whose
admissibility hearings (or refusals to hold admissibility hearings) has been held later, such as Havvard, had
already become law, including at least one case, Llera Plaza, which had relied upon the admissibility hearing
record generated by Mitchell. When it finally appeared, however, the 2004 opinion by a respected justice on the
Third Circuit of Appeals was quite comprehensive. The decision is perhaps most notable for its very weak
interpretation ofDaubert, in which evidence that relies on 'testable' propositions is deemed admissible, even if,
even after nearly a century of courtroom use, those propositions have never been formally 'tested', but only
subjected to what the court termed-apparently without irony-'implicit testing.' See Simon A. Cole, 'Implicit
Testing': Can Casework Validate Forensic Techniques?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 117 (2006).
7o Mara L. Merlino et al., Meeting the Challenges of the Daubert Trilogy: Refining and Redefining the Reliability
ofForensic Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 417 (2007). One group of commentators developed a useful taxonomy
summarizing the reasoning used by the federal courts to continue to admit latent fingerprint evidence in this
substantial body of cases. For them, the taxonomy amounts to "little more than a catalog of evasions." FAIGMAN
ET AL., supra note 56, at 187. Reasons include: refusing to hold an admissibility hearing (e.g., United States v.
Reaux, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11883 (E.D. La. 2001)); reversing of the burden of persuasion (e.g., United States
v. Rogers, 26 Fed. App'x 171 (4th Cir. 2001)); misinterpretingDaubert and Kumho (e.g., United States v.
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001));
deferring to the pro-admissibility decisions produced by other courts (e.g., Havvard); emphasizing the
'flexibility' language in Daubert (e.g., Rogers); "bringing the standards down to meet the expertise" (e.g., United
States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2002)); and relegating the issues to weight rather than
admissibility (e.g., Cline). Faigman and his colleagues found the reasoning in state cases much the same,
regardless of whether the jurisdiction adhered to Frye or Daub ert. "Whatever route is taken," they note dryly,
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latent print evidence resulted in unrestricted admission, and that figure is probably
conservative given that many of the cases coded as "exclusions" were either only partial
exclusions, concerned case specific issues peripheral to reliability, or were reversed on
appeal.'
72The leading case in the post-Daubert era is United States v. Havvard. The trial
court described latent print evidence as "the very archetype of reliable expert testimony .73
Undoubtedly, the most notorious appeal was United States v. Llera Plaza. It represented
the first time in nearly a century that latent print evidence was substantially restricted or
impugned in any way . Based on the stipulated admissibility hearing record from
Mitchell, the court found latent print evidence wanting when judged against the Daubert
"factors,' with the exception of 'general acceptance."76 The court did not, however,
exclude the latent print evidence, preferring to opt for what has subsequently been labeled
"split testimony." That is, the examiners were permitted to describe similarities between
the two prints but prevented from expressing an opinion about the significance of those
findings of similarity.7" Following a motion for reconsideration and a live hearing, the
court reversed itself.7 9 Perhaps the most significant move was shifting the burden of
persuasion to the defendant and requiring him to show that latent print evidence is
unreliable.so
U.S. courts almost always rule that latent print evidence satisfies whatever
admissibility threshold is in place." The few exceptions to this overall trend are: Virgin
Islands v. Jacobs, in which the government put on no case whatsoever in response to the
defendant's motion to exclude the evidence; Commonwealth v. Patterson, in which
"the destination is admission." FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 212; Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire
and into the Fryeing Pan? The Admissibility ofLatent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 453 (2008). It is possible, however, that Frye jurisdictions, somewhat counter intuitively, offer a more
hospitable forum for admissibility challenges to latent print evidence than do Daubert jurisdictions. The State v.
Rose decision provides some anecdotal support for this notion, but it is, of course, difficult to conclude much
from a single case.
" Mark Page et al., Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since Daubert: Part I-A Quantitative Analysis of
the Exclusion ofForensic Identification Science Evidence, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1180 (2011).
72 United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).
" United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
74 United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa.
2002).
" Id. at 494. A second reason for its prominence was probably the eminence of the trial judge.
1 Id. at 515.
" Laura Tierney, Forensic Science Disciplines and Daubert: A Trend Toward "Split Testimony," Impression &
Pattern Evidence Symposium (2010).
78Id.
79 United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
'o But see, e.g., FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56; Cole, supra note 67, passim; David H. Kaye, The Nonscience
ofFingerprinting: United States v. Llera Plaza, 21 QLR 1073 (2003); Tara Marie La Morte, Sleeping
Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and the Unreliability ofForensic Fingerprinting Evidence under
Daubert, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 171 (2003). Among the most perplexing aspects of the opinion was the way
in which the discovery, in the live hearing, that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation imposed extremely easy
proficiency tests on its examiners somehow increased the court's confidence in the reliability of latent print
identification. Another curious aspect of the opinion, quite relevant to the cross-national focus of this article, was
the court's reliance on events in the U.K.-specifically its recent abandonment of its historic '16-point standard'
for declaring a latent print 'identification' in favor of the North American practice of having no standard at all-
as somehow vouching for the reliability of latent print evidence in the U.S., based on the logically and
historically dubious reasoning that the British had 'invented' latent print identification. See Cole, supra note 67.
" Cole, supra note 70, at 516; Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity ofLatent Fingerprint Identification:
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008).
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts deemed latent print evidence in general
admissible, but excluded evidence based on "simultaneous" or "cluster" impressions; and,
United States v. Llera Plaza I (discussed previously).8 In addition, Judge Michael of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a strong dissent to the upholding of the trial court's
admission of latent print and handwriting evidence in United States v. Crisp.8 3 Another
glimmer of dissent may be found in a concurring opinion in State v. Quintana, where
Judge Thorne, though agreeing that latent print evidence should be admissible, argued that
the defendant should be entitled to a jury instruction on the fallibility and limitations of
latent print evidence.4
The most significant exception, however, was State v. Rose, in which a Maryland
trial judge excluded latent print evidence in a capital murder trial." The government's
motion for reconsideration was unsuccessful, and, because Maryland does not allow
816
interlocutory appeals, this decision effectively ended the case. Interestingly, the case was
re-filed in federal court, shifting the case from a Frye to a Daubert jurisdiction, where the
evidence was subsequently deemed admissible.7 Rose is one of a handful of admissibility
decisions written after the publication of the landmark NRC report." These decisions are
significant because it seems plausible that the NRC Committee's findings might have
altered the courts' overwhelming tendency toward admission. Specifically, the Report
concluded that "ACE-V," the "methodology"8 9 that U.S. latent print examiners purport to
use, is not validated, and that "individualization," the only inculpatory testimonial
conclusion that U.S. latent print examiners are permitted to offer, is not empirically
sustainable.90 The Committee's ability to find only "limited" information on the accuracy
and reliability of latent print identification would seem to have some bearing on the
admissibility of the evidence.91 Although the Report never explicitly takes a position on
the aforementioned cases, its discussion of cases admitting latent print evidence assumes a
critical tone.92
82 John P. Black, Pilot Study: The Application ofACE-V. to Simultaneous (Cluster) Impressions, 56 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 933 (2006) (discussing a description of 'simultaneous' impressions)
8 United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d. 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003).
84 State v. Quintana, 2004 UT App 103 P.3d 168, 170 (Thorne, J., concurring).
8 State v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore Cty. Md. 2008).
86 Id.
87 United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (D. Md. 2009).
" NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15.
89 Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 JL. & POL'Y 143, 178 (2005). It is almost certainly not correct to
call ACE-V. a methodology. Courts generally do so, however, and the dispute is probably of minor importance.
Id. at 177-78.
90 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15.
91 Id. at 142. See also Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, Latent Print
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach (U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012). Commissioned by the National Institute of
Science and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and focused exclusively on latent
fingerprints, this multi-authored, multidisciplinary report endorses and develops the concerns expressed in by the
NRC committee.
92 Id. at 103-05. It calls evidence scholars' critiques of Crisp 'telling' and notes that the Crisp Court's assertion of
the 'reliability' of latent print evidence rested solely upon legal precedents but "pointed to no studies supporting
the reliability of fingerprint evidence." The Report accuses the Havvard Court of 'overstat[ing]' the expert's
testimony and "giv[ing] fuel to the misconception that the forensic discipline of fingerprinting is infallible." The
Report is conspicuously not commensurately critical of the State v. Rose decision excluding latent print evidence,
which the Report commends for going "into considerable detail."
44 [Vol. 3
50
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol3/iss1/8
ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED
Nevertheless, the NRC Report has not exerted the effect that one might have
anticipated.9 3 There have been no cases excluding latent print evidence since its release.
Anecdotally, where the evidence is challenged, courts appear to be eschewing blanket
admission or exclusion in favor of the "split testimony" approach.9 4 Some courts have
precluded very strong conclusions couched in words like "individualized", "identification
to the exclusion of all others", and "absolute" by restricting witnesses to describing
similarities between two prints but not offering an opinion as to the meaning of those
findings. Given the position adopted in the NRC Report, split testimony is likely to remain
an attractive option for trial courts.
2. DNA Evidence
During the earliest years in which DNA evidence was introduced, its
admissibility was extensively litigated in the U.S. in a series of contests, sometimes
labeled as the "DNA wars."9 5 In the earliest cases, DNA evidence was either not
challenged or not challenged competently, and it was routinely admitted.96 In later cases,
defense attorneys enlisted well-credentialed molecular biologists who were able to
gradually expose sloppy practices, failure to adhere to protocols, and unprincipled (and
biased) interpretations of data.9 7 These interventions and criticisms produced a number of
cases in which state courts excluded DNA results, perhaps most famously in People v.
Castro.98 Not insignificantly, these exclusions were quickly followed by federal courts
deeming similar evidence admissible; in United States v. Jakobetz and United States v.
Yee.99
Successful challenges to the admissibility of DNA evidence drew on population
genetics to challenge the calculation of the "random match probability" (RMP) which is
generally a vital component in the interpretation of DNA evidence. Drawing on debates
among geneticists about human mating patterns, defendants argued that the state's RMP
calculations were not accepted in the scientific community. These cases helped to trigger
the intervention of the National Academy of Sciences-through its National Research
Council committees. The NRC issued two reports, in 1992 and 1996, each of which
endorsed two different ways of estimating the RMP, the "ceiling principle" and the
"product rule" respectively.100 Following the first report, some courts excluded RMPs
93 See Harry Edwards, Solving the Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 5
(2010).
94 Tierney, supra note 77. Simon A. Cole, Splitting Hairs? Evaluating 'Split Testimony' as an Approach to the
Problem ofForensic Expert Evidence, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 459 (2011) (discussing 'split testimony').
9 5 
See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA
PROFILING (2007); DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2010). See also MICHAEL
LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING (2008); Sheila
Jasanoff, The Eye ofEveryman: Witnessing DNA in the Simpson Trial, 28 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 713 (1998); Eric
Lander, DNA Fingerprinting: Science, Law, and the Ultimate Identifier, in THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC
AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 191 (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992); Michael
Lynch, The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson 'Dream Team' and the Sociology of
Knowledge Machine, 28 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 829 (1998); Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro: Challenging
the Forensic Use ofDNA Evidence, in EVIDENCE STORIES 207 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006); William C.
Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility ofNew Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the 'DNA War, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993).
96 ARONSON, supra note 95, at 41; KAYE, supra note 95, at 65.
97 ARONSON, supra note 95, at 42.
98 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). See also State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989);
ARONSON, supra note 95, at 57; KAYE, supra note 95, at 74; Thompson, supra note 95, at 42-43.
99 ARONSON, supra note 95, at 118, 120; KAYE, supra note 95, at 75, 94.
'0o ARONSON, supra note 95, at 153; KAYE, supra note 95, at 98.
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proffered by the government: Commonwealth v. Lanigan, State v. Bible, State v.
Cauthron, and State v. Anderson.10 1 The second report, however, practically eliminated
admissibility challenges based on population genetics. to the extent that the government
asserted that it was adhering to the NRC recommendation, admissibility challenges were
unlikely to succeed, and subsequent cases upheld admissibility.102 Since the mid-1990's
DNA evidence in general has been universally admissible.103
Targeted admissibility challenges are still made. In People v. Venegas, the
California Supreme Court reversed a conviction because of an improper "binning"
procedure in calculating the RMP.1 0 4 Another avenue of challenge concerns how a "cold"
database search affects the calculation of the RMP. Since statisticians disagreed about how
the fact that a DNA association was generated through a database search should be
handled (though all agreed that it mattered), defendants argued that the government's
method of calculating the RMP was not "generally accepted." o0 DNA evidence was
excluded on this basis in United States v. Jenkins,106 though, this ruling was overruled by
the D.C. Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal.107 The appeals court reasoned that
the disagreement over which statistic was appropriate to present to the jury fell into the
"legal" rather than the "scientific" domain and thus a decision that could be made by the
trial court without deferring to the "relevant scientific community."'o The California
Supreme Court, on the other hand, denied a similar appeal by simply rejecting what to
statisticians would be an indisputable point-that the manner in which the search is
conducted affects the probability that one can assign to the result of that search.109 The
Court concluded that the fact that database search was conducted "simply does not
matter."110 Two years later, however, the California Supreme Court reached the same
result but switched its rationale to one more like that employed in Jenkins."'
There has been some litigation about the conclusions that DNA analysts should
be permitted to state in their testimony and that prosecutors should be permitted to state in
their summations. In several cases, defendants challenged the use of likelihood ratios to
present the probative value of DNA mixtures. These challenges were all unsuccessful.112
In Commonwealth v. Girouard, the defendant sought to exclude what he characterized as
101 KAYE, supra note 95, at 107.
102 Id. at 158.
'0o ARONSON, supra note 95, at 173; DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: FORENSICS 62
(Student ed. 2008); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 99 (2009). Perhaps the most famous motion to exclude DNA evidence was one that
was never filed. Although the defendant's "Dream Team" prepared an extensive motion to exclude DNA
evidence in People v. O.J. Simpson, sometimes called the "Trial of the Century," they withdrew the motion early
in 1995. Instead, the defense team famously-and generally, it would appear, successfully-opted to attack the
weight of the evidence at trial by showing sloppy procedures, inadvertent contamination, and possible planting of
evidence. See ARONSON, supra note 95, at 173; KAYE, supra note 95, at 152-53; Michael Lynch, The
Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson 'Dream Team' and the Sociology ofKnowledge Machine,
28 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 829, 830 (1998); William C. Thompson, Proving the Case: The Science ofDNA: DNA
Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 831-40 (1996).
104 People v. Venegas, 954 P.2d 525, 553-55 (Cal. 1998).
'0' Id. at 549.
106 United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
107 Id. at 1016.
108 Id. at 1025-26.
109 People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
10 Id. at 598.
.. People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49, 66 (Cal. 2008).
112 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 103, at 90.
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an overstated conclusion by the state's DNA expert: that "no one other than [the
defendant] is the donor of the DNA."11 The trial court admitted the testimony, and the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld this decision, reasoning that any
problems with such testimony could be rectified through cross-examination or rebuttal
expert testimony.1  In McDaniel v. Brown, the Supreme Court accepted that the state's
witness had made erroneous calculations and committed the "prosecutor's fallacy." The
court adverted to the impropriety of the prosecutor's fallacy, but concluded that the
defendant had legally forfeited the claim.1 16
There has thus far been only a small amount of litigation over DNA profiling
techniques more exotic than the STR testing that has become standard. An admissibility
challenge to Y-STR haplotyping failed in Curtis v. State, and this result was upheld by the
appellate court.1 1 7 Similarly, a trial court admitted mitochondrial DNA profiling in State v.
Pappas, and this result was upheld by the Supreme Court of Connecticut.1 The Court
found the procedures for mitochondrial DNA testing to be "generally accepted in the
scientific community" and "that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
statistical methods used to derive that mtDNA type frequency in this case were
scientifically valid," even though a defense expert demonstrated that the particular
calculations advanced by the government's expert were flawed.119 In marked contrast to
England, Wales and Australia (more below), there have been no published U.S. cases
concerning low copy number (LCN) DNA profiling, though the use of LCN has been
litigated.120 Notably, some of the principal defenders of the use of DNA profiling during
the "DNA wars," such as Bruce Budowle, formerly of the FBI, have emerged as critics of
LCN. 12 1
3. Bite marks
Bite mark evidence has almost always been found admissible by U.S. courts.122
The earliest reported case seems to be Doyle v. State from 1954. 12 Typically, for the time,
113 Commonwealthv. Girouard, 766 N.E.2d 873, 882 (Mass. 2002).
114 Id. at 882.
115 McDanielv. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 120 (2010); KAYE, supra note 95, at 173. Erin Murphy & William C.
Thompson, Common Errors and Fallacies in Forensic DNA Statistics: An Amicus Briefin McDaniel v. Brown,
46 CRIM. L. BULL. 709 (2010); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation ofStatistical
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 11 L. & Hum. BEHAv. 167 (1987) (explaining fallacies in the interpretation of
statistical evidence to which lay people are susceptible).
116 McDaniel, 558 U.S. at 120.
11. KAYE, supra note 95, at 211.
. Id. at 232; State v. Pappas, 776 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Conn. 2001).
119 Pappas, 776 A.2d at 1104-05, 1111; KAYE, supra note 95, at 236.
120 United States v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658 (D. Md. 2009).
121 Bruce Budowle et al., Validity ofLow Copy Number Typing andApplications to Forensic Science, 50 CROAT.
MED. J. 207 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2702736/.
122 Maljorie A. Shields, Admissibility and Sufficiency ofBite Mark Evidence as Basis for
Identification ofAccused, 1 A.L.R. 6th 657, 657 (2005); Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The
Illusion ofScience in Bite-Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1369, 1369 (2009); FAIGMAN ET AL.,
supra note 103, at 446. Page et al. found that it was admitted without restriction in 83 percent of cases
in which it was challenged. Mark Page et al., Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since
Daubert: PartI-A Quantitative Analysis ofthe Exclusion ofForensic Identification Science
Evidence, 56 J. FORENSIc ScI. 1180, 1183 (2011). This figure is probably an underestimate because
several cases, such as Ege v. Yukins discussed below, were coded as 'exclusions' notwithstanding
their case-specific holdings.
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the defendant raised only procedural objections that did not extend to the empirical
foundations of the technique.124 The leading case is People v. Marx, in which a California
appellate court upheld the admission of bite mark evidence.125 It is important to note that
the expert in Marx cautioned that the bite mark was particularly distinctive and expressed
doubt about the value of less distinctive marks.126 This cautionary caveat was overlooked
by later courts drawing upon Marx as authority for the admissibility of bite mark
evidence.127 California is a Frye (or Kelly) jurisdiction.128 Nevertheless, the court upheld
the admission of the bite mark evidence not because bite mark identification was
"generally accepted in the relevant scientific community" (the central requirement of the
Frye rule), but because of two loopholes in the interpretation of Frye.129 First, bite mark
evidence, in contrast to polygraph evidence (about which Frye was concerned), was
determined to be evidence that the jury could observe and interpret for itself, at least
sufficiently so that it would not be compelled to adopt the expert's opinion entirely on
faith.13 Secondly, bite mark evidence was determined to be non-novel and therefore not
subject to Frye-a decision concerned with a novel lie-detection technique.131
In a thorough review of the case law, Beecher-Monas categorized the courts'
reasoning in admitting bite mark evidence as follows: some courts admit bite mark
evidence because other courts have (for half a century);132 some courts employ the same
non-novelty loophole employed in Marx;133 some courts have reasoned that bite mark
evidence is not science and that Daubert does not apply to non-scientific evidence;134 and
some courts have employed this reasoning even after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Kumho Tire (and subsequent revision of the FRE in 2000) made clear that "reliability"
applies to all expert opinion evidence and the Daubert factors may be applied where
appropriate.1 3 5
Bite mark identification evidence has been excluded in only a handful of cases.
Ege v. Yukins is an interesting example.136 The trial judge admitted the bite mark
evidence.137 Ege filed and won a federal habeas corpus claim based in part on the federal
court's conclusion that the bite mark evidence "was unreliable and not worthy of
consideration by a jury."138 As it turns out, the court's judgment was case specific and did
124 id
125 People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); FAIGMANET AL., supra note 103, at
448.
126 Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
127 FAIGMANET AL., supra note 103, at 448.
128 People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 30 (Cal. 1976).
129 These loopholes should themselves be the topic of a separate study.
"0 The strangeness of this reasoning has been often discussed. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 103, at
449. The same reasoning was recently applied to fingerprint evidence as well in an unpublished
decision. People v. Greenwood, No. BA351185 (Super. Ct. Cal. Cty. of Los Angeles 2010), available
at http://www.swgfast.org/Resources/100210_CA-v-GreenwoodSchneggOrder.pdf. Frye was based
on a blood pressure test claimed to assist with lie detection.
13 Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire, supra note 70, at 526.
132 Beecher-Monas, supra note 122, at 1372.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1373.
131 Id. at 1397; FAIGMANET AL., supra note 103, at 457.
136 Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 374-75 (6th Cir. 2007).
137 Id. at 374.
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not apply to bite mark evidence more generally.139 The court felt that the particular expert
used at trial had "been cast into disrepute as an expert witness."140 Of particular concern
was the expert's attempt to attach something akin to an RMP to his testimony.141 The
expert testified that only 1 of 3.5 million people (the population of the city in which the
crime occurred) would have dentition consistent with the bite mark.142 There was, as the
court accepted, no basis for this statement.143
At least two Oklahoma trial courts have excluded bite mark testimony, one in an
unpublished decision. 1 In the reported case of Garrison v. State, the court excluded
testimony attributing the bite mark to the defendant, but permitted testimony that the mark
was a "probable bite-mark." 1 The defendant appealed the admissibility of this testimony
and the failure of the trial court to conduct an admissibility hearing, but this appeal was
rejected.146 In Howard v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court expressed some critical
remarks about bite mark evidence while reversing Howard's conviction on other
grounds. 1 After Howard was subsequently re-convicted and his conviction was again
appealed, the court held, "without explanation," that the admission of the bite mark
evidence was not an abuse of discretion. In another case, one Mississippi Supreme
Court justice dissented from an opinion upholding the admissibility of bite mark
evidence.149 In State v. Adams, a court precluded a physician who claimed no expertise in
forensic dentistry from testifying as to whether a mark was consistent with being a bite
mark.15 0 In State v. Fortin, the court excluded experience based testimony concerning the
rarity of a combination of bite marks on different parts of the body without a database
upon which to base such an estimate,15 1 a holding that presaged R. v. T.
Based on this record, the NRC report concluded, "[t]here is nothing to indicate
that courts review bite mark evidence pursuant to Daubert's tandard of reliability."152
4. Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings
a. Opinions about Images
Images have been admitted as evidence into U.S. courts for more than a hundred
years.153 In recent decades, in criminal proceedings, images have been used for purposes
139 Beecher-Monas, supra note 122, at 1394-95; FAIGMANETAL., supra note 103, at 453.
140 Ege, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 857.
141 id
142 This terminology has been subject to scholarly and judicial censure, especially in Canada.
143 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 13; A similar situation arose for latent print in Michigan v. Ballard. See
Cole, supra note 70, at 120 (explaining that the ruling merely punishes forensic expert witnesses who make their
baseless probability calculations quantitative and explicit, while rewarding witness who conceal their baseless
probability calculations behind vague verbal formulations like "no one else in the world could be found
consistent with this mark").
144 FAIGMAN ET AL, supra note 56, at 15.
145 id
146 BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 122, at 1398; FAIGMAN ET AL, supra note 56, at 15.
147 701 So. 2d 274, 288 (Miss. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722 (Miss. 2008).
148 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 17-18.
149 Id at 18.
15o Majorie A. Shields, Annotation, Admissibility and Sufficiency of Bite Mark Evidence as Basis for
Identification ofAccused, 1 A.L.R.6th 657 (2011).
1 Mark Page et al., Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since Daubert: Part II-Judicial Reasoning in
Decisions to Exclude Forensic Identification Evidence on Ground ofReliability, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 913, 914
(2011).
152 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 107 n.81.
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related to identification primarily in relation to robberies of banks, convenience and liquor
stores with video surveillance facilities.
American juries are permitted, and often required, to interpret surveillance
images and make identifications, but in several cases both the state and/or defendants have
sought to adduce expert opinion to assist with the interpretation of images. 15 In contrast to
England, Canada and Australia, anthropometry-particularly the use of (reverse
projection) photogrammetry-is pronounced in the United States.156 Courts in the United
States have been inconsistent in their responses to identification evidence as opposed to
descriptions of similarities between a person of interest (POI) and the accused.15
Generally, positive identification (or individualization) is allowed and on some occasions
the inability of a defense expert to positively identify a POI or to exclude the accused, as
opposed to criticizing assumptions and techniques, has led to the exclusion of their
rebuttal evidence.15 1
United States v. Alexander is an early, though not entirely representative,
example of the uses of images for identification purposes.15 9 Alexander, a medical doctor,
was accused of committing a bank robbery.160 Three bank employees selected a
photograph of Alexander when shown a photo array in the aftermath of the robbery. The
state also called four acquaintances who supported the identification.161 In response,
Alexander called five witnesses "who stated that he was not the person photographed by
the bank surveillance cameras."162 Alexander also sought to adduce two expert
witnesses-one specializing in cephalometrics and the other a former FBI agent with
photographic comparison expertise-both opining that "it was impossible for Dr.
Alexander to be the person depicted in the photographs."163 Prior to Daubert, the trial
judge excluded the expert witnesses called by the defense.164 The Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court had abused its (considerable) discretion, explaining:
"[b]ecause of the specific nature of the proffered testimony in this case, together with the
complete lack of any evidence other than the eyewitness identification connecting Dr.
Alexander to the robbery, we find that the district court's exclusion of Dr. Alexander's
153 See NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL
PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 107 (2009); JONATHAN FINN, CAPTURING THE CRIMINAL IMAGE: FROM MUG SHOT
TO SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY xii (2009); TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF
SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 176 (2004) [herinafter LAWS OF MEN]; Tal Golan,
The Emergence of the Silent Witness: The Legal and Medical Reception ofX-rays in the USA, 34 SOC. STUD. OF
SCI. 469, 476 (2004); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of
Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. &HUMAN. 1, 13 (1998).
154 LAWS OF MEN, supra note 154, at 209-10.
. See United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Johnson 575 F.2d
1347, 1361 (5th Cir. 1978).
116 Photogrammetry is the process of obtaining information, usually measurements, from images. Lee Dechant,
How a Photogrammetry Expert Can Help You Win Your Case, 14 NEV. LAW. 19, 19 (2006).
. See United States v. McGinnis, 201 F. App'x 246, 249-51 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing expert qualification and
the reliability of photogrammetry); see also United States v. Welch, 368 F.3d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 2004) (excluding
expert testimony in favor of eyewitness identification).
.. See United States v. Brewer 783 F.2d 841, 842 (9th Cir. 1986).
159 See Michael W. Mullane, The Truthslayer and the Court: Expert Testimony on Credibility, 43 ME. L. REV. 53,
83-84 (1991).
16o Id. at 83.
161 Id.
162 United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 166 (5th Cir. 1987).
163 Id. at 167. Cephalometrics involves measuring the head and its features.
164 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
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expert witnesses was clearly erroneous."165 The fact that the "entire case ... turned on the
photographic identification" rendered the exclusion erroneous.166 The Court did not hold
"that such evidence will always be admissible in every case."167
A more representative example of the willingness to exclude defense evidence
emerged in United States v. Dorsey. 16 Dorsey adduced the opinions of two forensic
anthropologists-that he was "not the individual depicted in the Bank ... surveillance
photographs"-at very short notice during his trial.169 The trial judge excluded the
evidence, questioning whether "this is a recognized science" and noting that all "we are
doing here is ... comparing some photographs."170 The Court of Appeals concluded that
the evidence was inadmissible under Daubert: not amounting to 'scientific knowledge'
and not "helpful to a trier of fact."1 7 1 Applying the Daubert criteria, the Court of Appeals
noted that "Dorsey never contended anywhere in his brief, or during trial, that the forensic
anthropologists' method of analysis had been tested."172 Affirming, they explained: "there
is no indication that the expert testimony was at all necessary in the instant case; ... the
comparison of photographs is something that can sufficiently be done by the jury without
help from an expert."173 The Court of Appeals was reassured in their exclusionary stance
by the other evidence suggesting Dorsey's guilt.174 In United States v. Crotteau, the
defendant's attempt to call a friend as an expert witness who used crude measurements to
compare two videos, one of Crotteau at a bank and the other of a bank robbery, was
deemed inadmissible under the FRE. Other friends of Crotteau were allowed to express
their opinions about the identity of the bank robber as the state's lay "familiarity"
witnesses.17 6
Many appeals against conviction involving the interpretation of images are based
on grounds such as exclusion of the defendant's expert(s) was improper or, more
commonly, that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call (or apply for funding
for) an expert in photographic interpretation (usually photogrammetry) to counter the
state's expert or to explore problems and limitations. In the main, these appeals have been
unsuccessful, largely because of the very onerous standards governing the review of
decisions made by counsel and admissibility determinations (after Joiner).
Generally the state has been allowed to call expert witnesses to testify about
height, and similarities in features, and possessions (such as clothing), and sometimes
even to positively identify the accused. 1" Figure 2 illustrates the comparison of clothing
161 Alexander, 816 F.2d at 167.
166 Id. at 169.
167 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. McGinnis 201 F. App'x 246, 249-52 (5th Cir. 2006).
16 45 F.3d 809 (4th Cir. 1995).
1
6 9 Id. at 811.
17o Id. at 812.
171 Id. at 8 14-15 (applying the Daubert criteria).
172 id
1 Id. at 815; see Claritty. Kemp 336 F. App'x 869, 870 (1Ith Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Welch, 368
F.3d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the evidence was proposed primarily to cast doubt on the eyewitness
testimony), vacated, 543 U.S. 1112 (2005).
174 Dorsey, 45 F.3d at 815.
17' 218 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 833.
177 See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
171 United States v. Brown, 511 F.2d 920, 924 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726, 735-36
(2d Cir. 1973) (determining height through superimposition).
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photographed during a bank robbery (Figure 1). The Court in United States v. Sellers
explained that expert testimony to assist the jury with identification would allow an
"'opinion as to whether the defendant is the person in the picture." 179 In United States v.
McKreith, the FBI analyst's interpretation of video and still images, led him to testify that
a shirt recovered from McKreith "matched the class characteristics of the shirt worn by the
bank robber" and a black bag was "'indistinguishable' from the bag seen in the photos."80
According to the Court of Appeals, Bruegge's opinions were properly admitted, able to be
cross-examined and, given the strength of the case, if they were inadmissible his testimony
was "harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence."8  In United States v. Cairns, an
FBI agent was allowed to testify about similarities in "the nose and mouth area, chin line,
hair lines, ear contours and inner folds of the ears, among other things" and then
proceeded to positively identify the defendant "or another individual having all of these
characteristics."182 In United States v. Brown the state's expert was allowed to take new
photographs of the defendant at the bank and compare them with the surveillance images
of the actual robbery to assist with identification.18 Experts called by the state have been
allowed to make positive identifications (i.e., to individualize) but have also been
restricted, on occasion, to describing similarities between the accused and the person of
interest-so-called "splitting." 8 4 Comparisons, and positive identifications, may be based
upon clothing and accessories, weapons, and even mannerisms (such as handedness).8
179 566 F.2d 884, 886 (4th Cir. 1977).
"' United States v. McKreith, 140 F.App'x 112, 114 (11th Cir. 2005) (involving Vorder Bruegge, perhaps the
most ubiquitous of the United States expert witnesses).
181 Id. at 116.
182 434 F.2d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Brown, 511 F.2d at 924 (describing ear lobes as "being like a
fingerprint").
183 511 F.2d at 924; see also Sellers, 566 F.2d at 886. The trial court's refusal to support a similar defense request
in United States v. Armstrong was not considered reversible error. 621 F.2d 951, 954-55 (9th Cir. 1980).
184 United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d
623, 631 (6th Cir. 2004) (where a great deal of time, such as 60 years, has passed); Cole, supra note 94, at 462.
185 United States v. McGinnis, 201 F.App'x 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2006) (jeans); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d
808, 811-13 (8th Cir. 1997) (height, shoe size, and logo on baseball cap) aff'd, 278 F.3d 839 8th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (guns); People v. Smith, No. D035500, 2004 WL
406991, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 29, 2004) (clothing, masks, and weapons). In United States v. D Ambrosio, the
analyst asserted that on the basis of similarities, a pair of the defendant's jeans "were the same" as those in the
robbery video. 9 F.3d 1554 (9th Cir. 1993).
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Figure 1: Security images taken during a bank robbery.
QUESTIONED KNOWN
Figure 2: Detail of image of bank robbery ('Questioned' from left-hand image of
Figure 1) and jeans belonging to the accused ('Known'). The condition of the seam
was used to positively identify the jeans.1 8 6
Early challenges to the admissibility of the state's reverse projection
photogrammetry were unsuccessful and consequently were transformed into grounds of
appeal based on the failure of counsel to adequately cross-examine such witnesses or
obtain similar expert assistance. 17 After Daubert, challenges to photogrammetry, in
116 Images reproduced from Vorder Bruegge, Photographic Identification ofDenim Trousers From Bank
Surveillance Film, 44 J. FORENSIC SCI. 613-22 (1999); see also Kitty Hauser, A Garment in the Dock; Or, How
the FBIlluminated the Prehistory ofa Pair ofDenim Jeans, 9 J. MATERIAL CuLTURE 293, 295-305 (2004).
Claritt v. Kemp 336 F.App'x 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2009); Webster. v. Sec'y, DOC, 291 F. App'x 964, 966-67
(11th Cir. 2008); Chappel v. Garcia, No. CIV. S-03-0132, 2006 WL 1748424, at *39-40 (E.D. Cal. June 26,
2006) (noting that Superior Court opined that the decision not to consult his own photogrammetry expert was a
2013]
59
Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2013
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
particular, have been unsuccessful' or seen as irrelevant.1 8 9 Photogrammetry evidence
often passes without comment or challenge.190 An earlier defense challenge to the
reliability of photogrammetry was rejected in United States v. Everett, where the
perceived inability of the jurors to make an accurate assessment of heights from images
was, along with the impartiality of the FBI witness, accepted.191 More recently,
photogrammetrists have tended to testify in terms of a range,192 rather than a specific
heightl93 and increasingly tend to place emphasis on their ignorance of the height of the
suspect prior to analysis of the images.19 4
In addition, and sometimes without objection or appeal, investigators and
analysts are allowed to interpret and narrate images. In The People v. Apodaca, a detective
was allowed to express his opinion about a video that was said to corroborate the account
of the central prosecution witness.195 Issues about enhancement have not been particularly
controversial and even some minor losses from a recording might not render the remaining
images inadmissible.196
A second strand of image evidence concerns attempts to determine whether an
image is "real" or computer generated, an area of expertise that has become important in a
sub-set of child pornography prosecutions. Some individuals so accused have offered as a
defense the argument that the government cannot rule out the possibility that the image is
computer generated, in which case it would not violate the law.197 In United States v.
Frabizio, the government initially proffered a computer scientist to testify as to whether
child pornographic images depicted real children or were computer generated.198
Apparently after defense counsel demonstrated that this expert's methods produced a high
rate of errors, the government withdrew this expert and proffered an FBI photography
expert, who made subjective experience based judgments to render conclusions on the
reasonable tactical decision); see also Dixon v. Admin. Appeal Dep't Office of Info. & Privacy, No. 06 Civ.
6069, 2008 WL 216304, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008) affd, 336 F. App'x 98 (2d Cir. 2009); cf Hutchinsony.
Hamlet, 243 F. App'x 238, 240 (9th Cir. 2007) (challenging ineffective counsel for not obtaining expert
assistance to challenge height evidence).
.. See, e.g., United States v. Kyler, 429 F. App'x 828 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Williams, 235 F. App'x
925, 928 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Everett,
825 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir. 1987).
189 Using "the varying heights of known objects in a photograph ... to calculate the height of other objects in the
photograph, does not require analysis under Daubert." McGrew v. Indiana, 673 N.E.2d 787, 798 n.10 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1997) aff'd in part, vacated in part, 682 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind. 1997).
190 See United States v. Bobbitt, Nos. 98-4489, 98-4490, slip op. at 2 (4th Cir. Jan 31, 2000); see also United
States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 309 (6th Cir. 2000).
191 825 F.2d at 662.
192 United States v. Kyler, 429 F. App'x 828, 831 (11th Cir. 2011).
193 E.g., United States v. Watson, No. 94-10354, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 26101, at *6 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 1995)
(precisely same height as accused based on DMV. records: 6'4").
194 Chappel v. Garcia, No. CIV. S-03-0132, 2006 WL 1748424, at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2006) (Bruegge
testified that when he "made his [height] estimates, he did not know .. .defendant's actual height.").
195 Apodacav. Horel, No. 1:08-CV-00414, 2009 WL 1357444, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2009); see also Aviva
Sports, Inc. v. Fingerhut Direct Mktg., Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d 802, 834-36 (D. Minn. 2011) (granting in part and
denying in part plaintiffs' and defendants' motions to exclude expert opinion testimony interpreting photographs
in suit alleging violation of federal and state deceptive trade practices acts).
196 Wisconsin v. Avery, 807 N.W.2d 638 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (digital video enhancement), cert. granted, 810
N.W.2d 221 (2012); United States v. Codrington, No. 07 MJ 118, 2008 WL 1927372 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008)
(upholding use of surveillance video where portions of the video were lost due to human error), aff'd, No. 08-
MC-0291, 2009 WL 1766001 (2009).
197 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 263-64 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198 United States v. Frabizio, 445 F. Supp. 2d 152, 154 n.2 (D. Mass. 2006).
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same question.19 The government's apparent belief that the testimony based on a
subjective judgment and experience was "more admissible" than testimony based on
quantifiable, computer science methods has important implications for the subject of this
200article. Judge Gertner excluded the testimony, based on extensive Daubert analysis.
Judge Gertner concluded that the government had offered no evidence measuring the
ability of the expert to correctly determine whether images were "real" or computer
generated.201 This ruling was later extended to a second proffered witness who used
similar techniques.2 02
Interestingly, the government appears to have secured a legal fix for this issue
with a subsequent ruling in United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, holding that expert
203testimony was not necessary for a court to conclude that an image depicted a real child.
Curiously, the expert witness in that case testified to his methodology for analyzing
images, but not conclusions.204 Neither the expert's methodology nor the nature of his
expertise is clear from the opinion. The opinion holds that the court was competent to
render the conclusion that the images depicted real children based solely on the conclusion
of a pediatrician that the depicted individuals, if real, would be younger than 18 years old
and the testimony of the photographic expert describing his methodology, but not his
conclusion.205
b. Opinions about Voices (and Sounds)
In contrast to the other techniques discussed in this article, U.S. courts have been
equivocal about the admissibility of speaker or voice "identification" evidence offered by
professional experts (as opposed to "earwitnesses"), using techniques such as voice
spectrography in recent decades. It also seems that the admissibility standard used by the
court may influence the outcome of the admissibility ruling.206 Historically, courts have
tended to divide fairly evenly on whether to admit the evidence, with around 60 percent of
207cases resulting in admission, a pattern that appears to be consistent across time. In a
telling analysis, Faigman et al. show that the ultimate result has tended to hinge on
whether the courts interpreted the "relevant scientific community"-referred to in Frye-
narrowly as consisting of individuals who perform voice spectrography (thus resulting in
admission) or broadly as consisting of a broader group of experts with knowledge relevant
to claims of voice spectrographers such as audiologists, acousticians, electrical engineers,
linguists, phoneticians, physicists, physiologists, psychologists, and statisticians (thus
resulting in exclusion).208 They also note that the 1979 publication of a National Academy
of Science sponsored NRC report on voice identification, which might be conceived as
similar to (if somewhat narrower in scope than) the more recent NRC response to the
pattern recognition disciplines, had limited impact on court admissibility
199 Id.
200 id
201 Id. at 159 n.9.
202 United States v. Frabizio, 463 F. Supp. 2d 111, 112-13 (D. Mass. 2006). Contra United States v. Christie, No.
07-332, 2009 WL 742722, at *1 (D. N.J. 2009) (expert evidence was admissible underDaubert in response to
multiple images and video).
203 United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 438 (1st Cir. 2007).
204 id
205 id
206 Michelle Meyer McCarthy, Annotation,Admissibility and Weight of Voice Spectrographic Analysis Evidence,
95 A.L.R. 5th 471 (2009).
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determinations.209 Revealingly, only one third of subsequent opinions even cite it, and
only one opinion suggests substantial engagement.210
Several courts have considered the admissibility of voice identification evidence
after Daubert. The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a trial court's admission of voice
spectrography was not an abuse of discretion.211 This was based on "a limited and
superficial review of the research . . . doing little more than quoting the trial court's
212conclusory assertions". Voice identification evidence has also been excluded after
Daubert. A trial court excluded voice spectrography in United States v. Bahena (2000) as
unreliable, and the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision.213 In United States
v. Angleton (2003), the trial court was quite critical of the evidence of reliability put
forward.214 In United States v. Ramos (2003) the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
1 215summarily' rejected the claim that exclusion was erroneous. Voice identification
216evidence was also excluded under Frye in People v. Persaud (1996). Voice
identification evidence was excluded in United States v. Ricketts (2005) for lacking
probative value.2 17 Expert evidence as to whether the defendant had uttered an "intelligible
vocalization[]" was also excluded on relevance grounds in United States v. Naegele
(2007).218 Not insignificantly, all of these cases concerned voice identification evidence
proffered by defendants.219
In State v. Cooke, the trial court excluded what has been called "negative
evidence" testimony proffered by the government-that is, testimony showing that efforts
were made to perform voice identification, but that those efforts were unsuccessful.220 So-
called negative evidence is often used in order to correct for the imputed "CSI effect", in
which it is claimed that jurors will assume that the absence of testimony about forensic
techniques that the jurors believe are available to the government based on their
experience viewing television dramas will lead them to infer either that tests excluded the
defendant or that the government was negligent in not performing them.221
209 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNSEL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 60 (Richard H. Bolt
et al. eds., 1979) (explaining that the degree of accuracy and error rates vary from case to case due to the
properties of the voices compared, the recording conditions used to obtain voice samples, the skill of the
examiner, and the examiner's knowledge about the case. Estimates of error rates are available only for a few
situations, and they "[d]o not constitute a generally adequate basis for a judicial or legislative body to use in
making judgments concerning the reliability and acceptability of aural-visual voice identification in forensic
applications."). See also Julie C. Reyonlds & Julius W. Weber, The Admissibility ofSpectrographic Voice
Identification in the State Courts, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 349, 354 (1973).
210 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 522.
211 State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1999).
212 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 524.
213 United States v. Bahena, 233 F.3d 797, 810 (8th Cir. 2000); McCarthy, supra note 207.
214 United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 892, 898-99 (S.D. Tex. 2003); McCarthy, supra note 207.
215 United States v. Ramos, 71 F. App'x 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003).
216 People v. Persaud, 406 N.Y.S. 2d 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
217 United States v. Ricketts, 141 F. App'x 93, 95 (4th Cir. 2005).
218 United States v. Naegele, 471 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2007). This issue assumed significance in a
very high profile mass-murder exoneration in New Zealand. See Bain v. Queen [2009] NZSC 16 (SC) [2], [5]-
[8], [68] (N.Z.).
219 Ricketts, 141 F. App'x at 95; United States v. Ramos, 71 F. App'x 334, 335 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2000); Naegele, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 159; United States v. Angleton, 269 F.
Supp. 2d 892, 893 (S.D. Tex. 2003); People v. Persaud, 640 N.Y.S.2d 261, 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
220 State v. Cook, 914 A.2d 1078, 1096 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007).
221 Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the 'CSIEffect'Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in
Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1344 n.48 (2009).
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B. England and Wales: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and
Practice
An attempt to state the principles that govern the reception of expert evidence in
England and Wales is, in some respects, a relatively simple undertaking. Admissibility is
222governed for the most part by common law principles. English courts have adopted a
characteristically pragmatic approach to determining whether a witness's skills and
experience are such that he or she is qualified to provide expert testimony. The essential
question is whether the witness can satisfy the court that he or she has "sufficient
familiarity with and knowledge of the expertise in question to render his opinion
potentially of value."22 3
Perhaps the most significant obstacle to the reception of a suitably qualified
expert's testimony is the principle identified by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Turner:224
An expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific
information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge
of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their
own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is
unnecessary []25
This principle is considered by many commentators to be an expression of the common
knowledge rule. The Law Commission interpreted it to require expert evidence to have
sufficient probative value to be of assistance to the fact-finder in resolving the issues in the
case.226 In concentrating attention on the assistance that might be derived from
developments in science and technology, the courts have elided the significance of
reliability.227 In R. v. Dallagher, 22 the Court of Appeal suggested that the English
approach was analogous with that established by rule 702 of the U.S. Federal Rules of
Evidence.229 However, the analogy is tenuous. Daubert and the text of rule 702 indicate
that expert testimony will only assist the tribunal of fact if it is the product of reliable
theories and techniques. While Daubert provides criteria for the evaluation of scientific
and other forms of expert testimony, English courts have taken the view that reliability is
primarily an issue for the tribunal of fact in determining the weight to be attached to such
evidence, and have declined to identify any specific criteria relating to reliability as a
condition of admissibility.
In recent judgments, rather worryingly, the Court of Appeal has cast doubt on the
credentials of witnesses called to give expert opinion (almost exclusively for the defense)
who have no clinical or investigative experience with the methods or techniques to which
222 See PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 2010); MiKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT
EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2001); TRISTRAM HODGKINSON & MARK JAMES, EXPERT EVIDENCE: LAW
AND PRACTICE (20 10).
223 Barings v. Coopers & Lybrand (No. 2) [2001] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 85 (Eng.); see also R. v. Robb, [1991] 93
Cr. App. R. 161, 164-65 (Eng.); R. v. Stockwell [1993] 97 Cr. App. R. 260, 264-66 (Eng.).
224 R. v. Turner, [1974] QB 834 (Eng.).
225 Id. at 841.
226 Law Commission of England and Wales, Report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and
Wales (London: The Stationery Office, 2011) 2.17. Roberts and Zuckerman have taken it to be the articulation of
a broader 'helpfulness' principle.
227 Ian Dennis, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 895 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2010).
228 [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 12.
229 The practice may be analogous, but the governing rules are distinctively different.
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their opinions relate.230 This trend appears to be predicated on the misguided assumption
that those who have considerable knowledge and understanding of scientific and
methodological principles generally can say nothing of value about the application of
those principles in particular forensic contexts. In R. v. Weller, 23 the Court went so far as
to issue an admonishment o parties (in practice, the defense):
[W]e do hope that the courts will not be troubled in future by attempts to
rely on published work by people who have no practical experience in
the field and therefore cannot contradict or bring any useful evidence to
bear on issues that are not always contained in scientific journals.2 3 2
A peculiar feature of English appellate decisions is the frequency with which the
South Australian Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Bonython is cited as a statement of the
rules that govern the reception of expert evidence in England and Wales. One of those
rules is that the subject matter of an expert's testimony must form "a body of knowledge
or experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable
,233body of knowledge or experience." The prevailing view in several Australian states
seems to be that this principle embodies an approach that is similar to that established by
U.S. v. Frye.234 This is not to say that a Frye-like test forms any part of the common law in
England and Wales (or Australia), for although the Court of Appeal has cited the relevant
passage in Bonython with some regularity, there has been no pause to consider its meaning
or to focus attention on the acceptance (or reliability) of techniques and opinions.235
Interestingly, the Law Commission of England and Wales suggested that recent
236appellate decisions confirm the existence of a common law reliability threshold. In Reed
& Reed237 the Court of Appeal held that "a court must consider whether "the subject
matter of the evidence [is] part of 'a body of knowledge or experience which is
sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or
experience. "238 Despite the obvious allusion to Bonython, the Court explained that this
did not constitute an enhanced test of admissibility for expert (scientific) evidence:
[E]xpert evidence of a scientific nature is not admissible where the
scientific basis on which it is advanced is insufficiently reliable for it to
be put before the jury. There is, however, no enhanced test of
230 See, for example, the Court of Appeal's observations regarding the experience of the expert called by the
defense to provide opinions relating to the reliability of LCN DNA analysis in R. v. Reed & Reed [2009] EWCA
Crim 2698, at [106-110]: "He bases much of his knowledge of DNA and the analysis of Low Template DNA on
papers and discussion with other scientists; he does not conduct laboratory research . . . his expertise on the
interpretation of DNA profiles is limited, without any relevant first hand laboratory research experience. He is
not qualified to make a scene of crime investigation."
231 [2010] EWCA Crim 1085.
232 Id. at [38].
233 R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45.
234 In Kastelein v. Newmont Australia Ltd, [2006] N.T.M.C. 081, for example, the Northern Territory Work
Health Court suggested that in Runjanjic, King C.J. had applied the test set out in Frye. In Mallard v. The Queen
[2003] W.A.S.C.A. 296 (December 3, 2003), the Supreme Court of Western Australia cited Runjanjic and the
South Australian Supreme Court's decision in Karger, S.A.S.C. 64 (March 29, 2001), in support of its
observation that 'the Frye test has been adopted in a number of Australian jurisdictions'; [2003] W.A.S.C.A. 296
at [285]. In the latter case, the South Australian Supreme Court, after close analysis of the judgment of King C.J.
in Bonython, concluded: 'It is clear from his judgment that King CJ was accepting the [Frye] general acceptance
test'; at [178].
235 Roberts, 'Rejecting General Acceptance'; Law Commission, Expert Evidence, 2.12.
236 LAW COMM'N, supra note 24, at 14.
237 [2010] 1 Crim. App. 23 (Eng.).
238 Id at [I11].
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admissibility for such evidence. If the reliability of the scientific basis
for the evidence is challenged, the court will consider whether there is a
sufficiently reliable scientific basis for that evidence to be admitted, but,
if satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for the
evidence to be admitted, then it will leave the opposing views to be
tested in the trial.239
It seems, then, that Bonython 's acceptance-orientation has been assimilated into the
common law in England and Wales in a way that leaves it devoid of any real meaning. In
practice, the common law test of admissibility does not appear to establish anything more
substantial than the general position expressed in various appellate court judgments that
expert evidence is subject to the "'ordinary tests of relevance and reliability."'
240
In view of this, it might be no surprise that trial judges' decisions to admit
incriminating expert opinion of questionable reliability have, with a few exceptions, been
generally endorsed by the Court of Appeal. A striking example of this tendency is the
decision in Dallagher, in which the Court rejected a challenge to the admissibility of
expert opinion concerning latent ear print impressions.241 The witness allowed to express
an opinion at trial was a Dutch police officer who had developed an interest in ear
242
prints. His evidence was, having compared an ear print found on a window at the crime
scene with a print taken from the appellant, he was able to conclude that the print found at
243
the crime scene had been left by the appellant. The foundation for this conclusion was a
portfolio of 600 photographs and 300 ear prints compiled by the officer in which he had
244not found two ear prints that were alike in every detail. Although the police officer and
a second expert witness conceded that the assumption that ear prints taken from any two
persons are distinguishable was based on limited experience and had little empirical
support, the Court of Appeal took the view that the trial judge could not possibly have
245concluded that the evidence was so unreliable that it ought to be excluded. In other
239 id
240 E.g., R. v. Dallagher, [2003] 1 Crim. App. 12 at [29] (Eng.). The source of this principle is one of the most
well-established texts on the law of evidence in England and Wales, Cross and Tapper on Evidence. "The better,
and now more widely accepted, view is that so long as the field is sufficiently well-established to pass the
ordinary tests of relevance and reliability, then no enhanced test of admissibility should be applied, but the
weight of the evidence should be established by the same adversarial forensic techniques applicable elsewhere."
COLIN TAPPER, CROSS & TAPPER ON EVIDENCE 523 (9th ed. 1999). The text cites the Canadian Supreme Court
decision in R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 (Can.), discussed below, as authority for this proposition. In light of
subsequent cases, however, support for this proposition can no longer be found in the jurisprudence of the
Canadian Supreme Court. See Christophe Champod et al., Earmarks as Evidence: A Critical Review, 46 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 1275 (2001) (explaining that there are weaknesses in earmark evidence knowledge base).
241 1 Crim. App. at [29].
242 Id. at [9].
243 Gary Edmond, Is Reliability Sufficient? The Law Commission and Expert Evidence in International and
Interdisciplinary Perspective: Part 1, 16 INT'L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 30, 56 (2012) [hereinafter Reliability]
("[T]he expert witness might have explained merely that there were consistencies and no inconsistencies as
between the defendant's ear print and those from the scene, and given an account of the probability of them
coming from the same person.").
244 Dallagher, 1 Crim. App. 12 at [9].
245 Id. at [14], [23]. The salutary postscript in this case is that prior to the re-trial ordered by the Court, the
defense submitted genetic material that had been lifted from the crime scene along with the latent print for DNA
analysis. At the re-trial the prosecution offered no evidence after analysis of the material suggested that the
source of the material and therefore the print was someone other than the appellant. Sean O'Neill, Expert
Evidence Flaws Clear Earprint Killer,' THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 23, 2004, 12:01 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1452346/Expert-evidence-flaws-clear-earprint-killer.html. See
generally Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions Without Individualization: The New
Epistemology ofForensic Identification, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 242-43 (2009), for a discussion on the
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cases, even where the error rate of a technique has been found to be significant (as great as
50 per cent), courts have been willing to admit the opinion.246 The general view is that
reliability is primarily an issue for the tribunal of fact rather than a factor regulating
admissibility.
Trial judges in England and Wales also have discretion, under section 78 of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, to exclude evidence the reception of which would
247have an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings. Though there is little guidance on
the exercise of this discretion, it seems that expert evidence might be excluded where it is
presented in a form that would not enable it to be adequately tested through cross-
2481examination. In R. v. Otway, for example, the question of whether the methods used by
an expert were "sufficiently explained to be tested in cross-examination and so to be
verifiable or falsifiable"249 was considered to be a matter that was the province of a trial
judge in determining exclusion under section 78.250 Similarly, the Court observed in R. v.
251Ahmed, that an expert's refusal to disclose the material that formed the basis of his or
her testimony, thus rendering it unchallengeable, "would be likely to be a reason for
refusing to admit it."252 Notwithstanding these instances, the exclusionary discretion is
253
typically applied with a very light touch.
The prevailing laissez faire approach to the admissibility of expert evidence in
England and Wales presumes that juries possess the capacity to distinguish reliable from
254unreliable expert testimony and attach appropriate weight. However, a series of recent
appellate court decisions seem to belie this presumption.255 These have established that
where there is uncontradicted and unequivocal expert evidence, the jury must be directed
that it is to accept the expert evidence, it cannot substitute the expert's views with its
own.256 More recently, in R. v. Henderson, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the
difference between the "banal" observation that skin surfaces are unique and a measurable scale of detection that
relates to uniqueness.
246 InR. v. Luttrell, [2004] 2 Crim. App. 31 (Eng.), for example, a lip-reading expert was permitted to give
incriminating evidence of the words allegedly spoken by the appellants in a surveillance video. This was so
notwithstanding that tests previously conducted in order to ascertain her accuracy revealed that in video
recording of conversation-containing 890 known words-revealed her accuracy to be about 50 percent. Id. at
[13]. She also reported over 224 words that were not spoken. Id. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial
judge in Luttrell had been entitled to admit the expert's evidence. Id. at [38]. It was accepted that lip-reading
evidence may fall "significantly short of perfection," and that this required the jury to be warned of the
limitations of this kind of evidence. Id. at [42], [44].Though, there is no general requirement to issue a warning to
a jury regarding the reliability of expert evidence. See id. at [42] (explaining that a warning is necessary when
there is particular evidence about which the jury should be cautioned).
247 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, § 78 (Eng.).
248 [2011] EWCA (Crim) 3 (Eng.).
249 Id. at [17] (quoting Luttrell, [2004] 2 Crim. App. 31 at [34]).
250 Id. at [17], [19]-[20].
251 [2011] EWCA (Crim) 184 (Eng.).
252 Id. at [68] (emphasis added).
253 LAW COMM'N, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND AND
WALES: A NEW APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION OF EVIDENTIARY RELIABILITY, 2009, Consultation Paper
190, ¶ 3.14. Although the Law Commission has suggested that "the courts permit the adduction of any expert
evidence so long as it is not patently unreliable," id., there are a number of appellate cases that cast doubt on the
claim that such evidence will be excluded.
254 See, e.g., R. v. Henderson, [2010] 2 Crim. App. 24, [74]-[77] (Eng.).
255 See, e.g., Andersonv. R., [1972] A.C. 100 (P.C.) (Eng.); see also R. v. Sanders, [1991] 93 Crim. App. 245
(Eng.).
256 See, e.g., Anderson, A.C. at 106 (holding that it was "serious misdirection[]" to instruct the jury to disregard
the evidence of an expert); see also Sanders, 93 Crim. App. at 248, 250 (holding that a judge is not required to
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difficulties that juries will inevitably encounter in evaluating some forms of expert
testimony, particularly conflicting medical opinion.25 The Court acknowledged that in
such cases there is a real risk of juries reaching verdicts that do not have a logical basis,
and ventured that:
[T]o suggest, in cases where the expert evidence is fundamental to the
case, that the jury should approach [the] expert opinion in the same way
as they do in every other criminal case, is inadequate ... Juries, we
suggest, should not be left in cases requiring [proof beyond reasonable
doubt] to flounder in the formation of a general impression. A
conclusion cannot be left merely to impression ... a jury needs to be
directed as to the pointers to reliable evidence and the basis for
distinguishing that which may be relied upon and that which should be
rejected.2 5 8
Rather than reflect on whether more rigorous scrutiny of expert evidence was required at
the admissibility stage, the response to this concern over the ability of the jury to
undertake this task satisfactorily was resort to jury directions and cautionary warnings.
The jury should be asked to consider, among other things, whether the witness has strayed
beyond the area of his or her expertise, if the witness is able to point to a recognized peer
reviewed source for his or her opinions, and whether the expert has recent or
contemporary clinical (practical) experience of the matters on which he or she is
testifying.
Overall, English jurisprudence and practice is impoverished. There are few
obstacles to the reception of incriminating expert opinion evidence. Although there appear
to be significant reservations about the ability of advocates to expose the flaws in expert
evidence, and the capacity of juries to undertake satisfactory evaluation of it, the general
approach to admissibility appears to be grounded on contrary assumptions.
In March 2011, the Law Commission released a report on Expert Evidence in
Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales.259 The report recommends the codification
of the common law rules supplemented by an explicit reliability standard which would
replace the "rudimentary" version associated with the common law, Bonython, and
260
Reed. Patently influenced by Daubert and the revised FRE, a draft bill sets out several
factors that might assist a trial judge to determine whether expert opinion evidence is
"sufficiently reliable" to admit.261 The Commission, in addition, recommended greater
remind ajury about evidence to the contrary of expert testimony). But c.f Walton v. R., [1978] A.C. 788 (P.C.) at
793 (Eng.) (holding that ajury is not required to accept expert testimony as conclusive).
257 See Henderson, [2010] 2 Crim. App. 24 at [218]-[19] (Eng.).
258 Id. at [218].
259 LAW COMM'N, supra note 24.
260 Id. at 15-16, 18-19.
261 Id. at 3, 18 (discussing the influence of the United States' Federal Rules of Evidence); Id. at 83 (discussing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)); Id. at 148 (clause 4 of the draft bill); Id. at 157 (schedule,
part 1 of the draft bill); Roberts, supra note 24 (explaining the three factors proposed by the Commission to help
judges determine admissibility of scientific evidence); see Gary Edmond & Andrew Roberts, The Law
Commission's Report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 11 CRIM. L.R. 844, 844-848 (2011)
[hereinafter The Law Commission's Report] (explaining the draft proposals of the Law Commission and the
difficulties trial judges will face with their implementation); see generally LAW COMM'N, supra note 254, at 33-
41 (laying out the proposals of the Law Commission's draft bill).
2013] 61
67
Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2013
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
scope for judicial review of admissibility decisions, increased use of court-appointed
experts at the admissibility stage, and further education for lawyers and judges.262
1. Latent Fingerprint Evidence
As in other jurisdictions, there is long-standing acceptance of fingerprint examiners'
claims that fingerprints are uniquely distinctive. For many years identification (i.e.,
individualization) on the basis of fingerprints was predicated on an expert finding 16
points of similarity. The formal adoption of a non-numeric approach was precipitated by
the decision in R. v. Buckley, in which the Court of Appeal held that where there were
eight or more points of similarity, a trial judge "may or may not exercise his or her
,263discretion in favour of admitting the evidence." The Court suggested that the manner in
which the discretion is exercised would depend on the experience and expertise of the
witness, the number of similar ridge characteristics, whether there are any dissimilar
characteristics, and the size and quality of the crime scene print.264
The validity of fingerprint evidence has not been subjected to serious or sustained
challenge in England and Wales and it seems doubtful that this position will change if the
265Daubert-like approach to admissibility proposed by the Law Commission is enacted.
The Commission's draft legislation identifies a number of reasons why expert testimony
might not be "sufficiently reliable," among which are that the opinion is based on a
hypothesis that has not been subjected to sufficient scrutiny, and that the opinion is based
on an unjustifiable assumption.266 Latent fingerprint evidence might be challenged on
either of these grounds. However, the Law Commission envisages that the reliability test
need not be applied where the party objecting to admissibility is unable to satisfy the trial
267
judge that the evidence might not be reliable. It cited the remote possibility that two
persons will have the same fingerprints as one example of circumstances in which it might
not be necessary to apply the reliability test.268 Were the courts to look to the
Commission's report for guidance, if the draft legislation is enacted, it seems unlikely that
any challenge to the validity of the claims that fingerprints are unique, and that individuals
can be positively identified will be entertained.
As things stand, fingerprint examiners are routinely allowed to assert that a
defendant is the unique source of a latent fingerprint found at a crime scene and the courts
appear to readily accept such testimony.269 There is no requirement that the jury be warned
270
about any dangers or limitations.
262 LAW COMM'N, supra note 24, at 181-82, 195-96; see also Edmond & Roberts, supra note 32, at 368
(discussing the relationship between the fundamental principles of evidence law and expert evidence) and
Edmond, supra note 244 (assessing the Law Commission's report and proposals).
263 [1999] EWCA (Crim) 1191 (Eng.).
264 id
265 See The Law Commission 's Report, supra note 262, at 860 (discussing the "serious problems" with such
evidence in England and Wales that the Commission's recommendations are unlikely to solve).
266 LAW COMM'N, supra note 24, at 61.
267 Id. at 32 (explaining that when there is "no meaningful dispute" the court may "disapply" the test).
268 Id. at 32 n.65.
269 See, e.g., R. v. Arbia, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2417, [8] (Eng.); R. v. Brown, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 80, [10]
(Eng.).
270 The inquiry in Scotland following HM Advocate v. Shirley McKie (1999) (acquitting McKie of perjury after
she stated fingerprints collected at a crime scene were not attributable to her), along with several other national
and international mistakes, have caused some disturbance in the United Kingdom. See SIR ANTHONY CAMPBELL,
THE FINGERPRINT INQUIRY REPORT 600, § 34.21 (2011).
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Although it has not benefitted from the unencumbered route into criminal
proceedings that fingerprint evidence enjoyed, the science of DNA analysis has been
broadly accepted. In Gordon, for example, the Court of Appeal stated that it had no doubts
over the validity and value of DNA evidence in general, suggesting that "unlike
fingerprinting, a DNA profiling match is not unique."271 The challenge that the Court
considered was not to the validity of DNA analysis generally, rather to the manner in
272which the expert had arrived at the match probability. Anticipating the effect that
probabilities running into many millions to one may have on juries, the Court accepted
that the jury in the particular case may not have convicted had it had the benefit of expert
evidence concerning the effect on the match probability of variation produced by differing
equipment and the tolerances that are applied in the subjective process of comparison.273
Although such issues remain salient, they have not received close attention in any
subsequent appellate proceeding.274
While it appears to be presumed that the jury has the capacity to evaluate the
(partially subjective) analysis that results in a random match probability, in Adams, the
Court of Appeal deprecated defense use of Bayesian analysis to evaluate the probability
that the defendant left the genetic material at the crime scene on which DNA analysis had
275been conducted. The Court doubted whether the jury should be led into the realms of
theory and complexity that the presentation of a Bayesian approach to evidence would
entail.276
The most significant recent challenge in the United Kingdom has been to the
admissibility of LCN DNA analysis, a relatively new technique that enables DNA alleles
found in very small samples of genetic material to be amplified in order to obtain a DNA
profile that can be used for forensic analysis.277 Doubts were expressed over the reliability
of LCN DNA analysis in R. v. Hoey, 27 a first instance decision in Northern Ireland.279 The
problem is that the quantities of DNA available for analysis are so small that the process
used to amplify the samples is susceptible to statistically random (i.e., stochastic) effects,
which give rise to a risk of both false positive and false negative results. More recently,
however, the Court of Appeal has admitted the testimony of biologists, about the
significance of LCN DNA results, in circumstances where the analyst was unable to attach
a mathematical expression in the form of a RMP or likelihood ratio.280
211In Reed & Reed, the Court of Appeal held that evidence of LCN DNA analysis
on samples of genetic material that were not susceptible to stochastic effects were
271 R. v. Gordon, [1995] 1 Crim. App. 290 at 290, 294 (Eng.).
272 Id. at 296.
273 Id. at 295-96.
274 InR. v. Hookway, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1989, [15]-[20], [33] (Eng.), the Court of Appeal rejected a
submission that disagreement between experts over the appropriate statistical model for generating a random
match probability in relation to LCN DNA warranted exclusion of the evidence. Such disagreement ought to be
addressed in an appropriate direction to the tribunal of fact. Id. at [33].
275 R. v. Adams, [1998] 1 Crim. App. 377 at 383-84 (Eng.).
276 Id. at 384.
277 See David Bentley & Peter Lownds, Low Template DNA, 1 ARCHBOLD REV. 6, 6-7 (2011) (explaining the
current court challenges to low template DNA admissibility and procedures in the U.K.).
278 [2007] NICC 49 (N. Ir.).
279 See Charles Foster, Comment, Untwining the Strands, 158 NEWL.J. 157, 157 (2008).
280 R. v. Dlugosz [2013] EWCA (Crim) 2 (Eng.).
281 [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698 (Eng.)..
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admissible and suggested that even where there was a risk of them occurring the expert
evidence may still be admissible.28 In Broughton,28 the Court was more emphatic,
declaring:
In our judgment, the science of [LCN DNA] is sufficiently well
established to pass the ordinary tests of reliability and relevance and it
would be wrong wholly to deprive the justice system of the benefits to
be gained from the new techniques and advances which it embodies, in
cases where there is clear evidence ... that the profiles are sufficiently
reliable.2 84
Generally, evidence that was susceptible to random statistical effects would be admissible
where repeat testing (even a low number of repeat tests) produced consistent results.285 In
cases where the profiles generated were "wholly and obviously unreliable," it was
envisaged that the prosecution would not seek to rely on them, and if it did, then the trial
judge ought to exclude the evidence if he or she considered them unreliable. In cases in
which the probative value of the profiles was more debatable, the evidence may properly
be adduced and its weight established by 'adversarial forensic techniques.'287 The Court of
Appeal appears to have great faith in the capacity of pre-trial management hearings, which
impose various reporting duties on experts, on prosecutorial restraint, and the ability of
advocates to reveal in cross-examination any shortcomings in methodology used and
opinions expressed by expert witnesses to address the uncertainties surrounding such
nascent forensic techniques.288 Where the empirical basis for opinions proffered by an
expert has been inadequate, the court has resorted to the "experience of the expert" as a
2819
means of bridging the scientific gap. In Reed & Reed, although the Court acknowledged
that with respect to the mechanisms through which DNA may be transferred from one
object or place to another, there was little research and much more was needed, an expert
could still enumerate the possible means of transfer of small quantities of DNA.290 The
admissibility of this form of expert evidence was renewed in Weller.29 The appellant
submitted that if a proper review of the scientific literature concerning transfer of DNA
were to be undertaken, it would show that the state of scientific knowledge to be such that
292no evaluative judgment on the possible means of transfer could be made. This
submission was rejected by the Court of Appeal, which was satisfied that an expert's
practical experience could provide 'a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for a forensic
science officer to give evidence of the evaluation of the possibilities of transfer' in the
circumstances of the particular case.2 93
282 Id. at [114].
283 R. v. Broughton, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 549 (Eng.).
284 Id. at [36].
285 See Andrew Roberts, Drawing on Expertise: Legal Decision-Making and the Reception ofExpert Evidence, 6
CRIM. L.R. 443, 446 (2008) ("[W]here the validity of a new hypothesis or method is demonstrated
through repeat testing it might come to be so widely accepted as methodologically sound and reliable that it may
be judicially noticed.").
286 Broughton, [2010] EWCA (Crim) at [35].
287 R. v. Broughton, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 549, [36] (Eng.).
288 See id. at [32].
289 Id. at [32].
290 R. v. Reed, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, [119] (Eng.).
291 R. v. Weller, [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1085, [45] (Eng.).
292 Id. at [23].
293 Id. at [44].
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Bite mark evidence has not attracted the degree of judicial scrutiny in England
294and Wales that it has in other jurisdictions. It seems that odontologists have been
permitted to proffer a range of opinion on the significance of similarities found in the bite
mark impressions left on the skin of a victim of crime (or an object found at the scene of a
crime) and dental impressions taken from a defendant.295 In some cases, this appears to
have been restricted to evidence that an impression left on a victim corresponds with an
296impression of a defendant's teeth. In others, it has been claimed on the basis of
291similarities in such impressions, that the defendant was the source of the bite marks. it
would be in keeping with the approach in respect of other forms of forensic science and
medical evidence for experts to be given significant latitude in the terms used to state the
significance of their findings where the basis for the evaluation is their own experience.298
4. Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings
Incriminating expert opinions concerning identification from voice recordings
and images are routinely admitted in criminal proceedings in England and Wales. In
common with other forms of forensic comparison evidence, the reliability of the
techniques that form the basis of such opinion is not subject to any form of rigorous
scrutiny for the purposes of determining admissibility.
a. Image Comparison Evidence (So-Called 'Facial Mapping')
A range of individuals with expertise and/or experience in anatomy, medical art,
photography, information technology and military intelligence (and so on) have been
allowed to interpret images and express opinions about the identity of persons of interest
appearing in them. In addition, police and other investigators are entitled to express
opinions about identity from repeated exposure to images. There is, in contrast to
Australia (and Canada), no need for prior familiarity (with the suspect/POI) or something
beyond what a jury might be able to do through its own examination of the images and the
accused during the course of a trial.
Since the 1980s, courts have been admitting identification evidence derived from
photographs-initially of soccer riots and robberies-by investigators and more recently
digitally-recorded images and videos, analyzed by a range of investigators and
299consultants. Since the early 1990s, English courts have allowed police officers and other
witnesses-formally qualified as expert witnesses and frequently described as "facial
mappers"-to express incriminating opinion evidence, even in circumstances where the
CCTV evidence and the witnesses' interpretation was the only evidence against the
294 See, e.g., R. v. Bourimech, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2089, [13] (Eng.); R. v. Singleton, [1995] 1 Crim. App. 431
at 434 (Eng.); R. v. Egan, [1992] 95 Crim. App. 278 at 280 (Wales).
295 See R. v. Egan, [1992] 95 Crim. App. 278 at 280 (Wales); R. v. Bourimech, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2089, [13]
(Eng.).
296 In R. v. Bourimech, a forensic odontologist read a statement o the jury: "to the effect that there was no doubt that
the bite mark to the complainant's left shoulder corresponded in detail with the dental impressions taken from the
appellant." [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2089, [13]. See also, e.g., R. v. Singleton, [1995] 1 Crim. App. 431 at 434 (Eng.)
(finding a match between a cast of the defendant's teeth and bite marks found on the victim, a forensic odontologist
claimed the marks identified the defendant as the assailant).
297 See R. v. Egan, [1992] 95 Cr. App. R. 278 at 280 (Wales) ("She had a bite mark on her lower right thigh
which on the evidence of an odontologist must have been caused by the appellant.").
298 See R. v. Liverpool City Council, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 1477, [46] (Eng.).
299 R. v. Hookway, [1999] Crim. L.R. 750 (A.C.); R. v. Clare and Peach, [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 333 at 335-38; R.
v. Clarke, [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 425 at 429-31; R. v. Stockwell, [1993] 97 Cr. App. R. 260 at 261-66. See Ruth
Costigan, Identification from CCTV: the risk ofinjustice, CRIML.R. 591, 591-605 (2007).
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accused.300 With the massive expansion in the number of images available from publicly
funded CCTV schemes, along with the proliferation of private security systems and
mobile recording devices, English courts have maintained their generally liberal approach
to the admission of images and opinions based on images.301 Two leading cases indicate
the receptiveness to image comparison evidence.
In Attorney-General's Reference No 2 of 2002, the Court of Appeal confirmed
four circumstances in which photographic comparisons are acceptable.302 The two of
immediate interest are where the remote witness (often an investigator) spends time
viewing and analysing images "thereby acquiring special knowledge [as an ad hoc expert]
which the jury does not have" and "a suitably qualified expert with facial mapping skills
can give opinion evidence of identification based on a comparison between images."303n
both cases, the images should be available to the jury and the admissibility 'subject to
appropriate directions in summing up'.304 Considering the admissibility of a "sufficiently
qualified expert" in R. v. Atkins, the Court of Appeal confirmed that his evidence was
305admissible provided limitations were made clear to the jury. The Court explained that
there was no rule against positive identification (i.e. individualization), though the absence
of statistical information about the frequency or interrelatedness of facial features (i.e.,
306some kind of database) ought to be disclosed. General methodological critiques and
frailties with techniques employed by the analyst were matters for weight at the trial.307
In the decades since it first appeared in courts, facial mapping in England has
largely abandoned any pretensions to mathematical precision and measurement (i.e.,
3081anthropometrics). Witnesses now tend to testify in terms of general morphology and
similarities. While courts do not proscribe individualization, the witnesses themselves tend
to prefer the use of scales that facilitate the provision of qualified opinions derived from
subjective impressions of the strength of the evidence (see Figure 3 and Table 1).309 Such
opinions are routinely admitted even though, as the Court in Atkins recognized, they do
"'not have a scientific basis."310
300 See Hookway, [1999] Crim. L.R. 750.
301 Gary Edmond, Just truth? Carefully applying history, philosophy and sociology of science to the forensic use
of CCTV images, 44 Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2013) 80-91.
This may be technologically-driven. The sheer abundance of images seems to demand judicial consideration.
See, e.g., BENJAMIN J. GOOLD, CCTV. AND POLICING: PUBLIC AREA SURVEILLANCE AND POLICE PRACTICES IN
BRITAIN (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2004).
302 Attorney-General's Reference No 2 of 2002, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2373, [9]-[12] (Eng.).
303 Id. at [19].
304 See also R. v. Abnett, [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3320, [14], [20] (Eng.). In the nineteenth century English judges
had been reluctant to allow investigators to express opinions based on knowledge/experience gained during the
course of an investigation; See also R. v. Crouch, (1850) 4 Cox C.C. 163 (H.C.) 164.
30' R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [31] (Eng.).
306 Use of such scales is difficult to reconcile with the criticism of the misuse of statistics in R. v. Clark, [2003]
EWCA (Crim) 1020, [174]-[175]. Reliance on warnings was also a feature of permissive responses to the use of
images for the purposes of identification. See e.g., R. v. Dodson, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 971 at 979 (Eng.); R. v.
Downey, [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 547 at 556 (Eng.).
307 Gary Edmond et al.,Atkins v. The Emperor: The "Cautious" Use of Unreliable "Expert" Opinion, 14 Int'l
Journal of Evidence & Proof 146, 148 (2010).
30' See COMPUTER-AIDED FORENSIC FACIAL COMPARISON (Martin Paul Evison et al. eds., 2009).
309 These are crude attempts to mimic the likelihood ratios associated with DNA results.
30 R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [20]; see Michael C. Bromby, At Face Value?, 2003 NEw L.J.
EXPERT WITNESS SUPPLEMENT 301, 302, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1562655 (discussing the use of
facial mapping and CCTV. image analysis for identification).
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Figure 3: Single image from the crime scene in R. v. Atkins (top left). One of the
accused (top right). Same images with grids reproduced below."'
Table 1: "Expert's" assessment of the probative value of the image from Atkins 
in
terms of identity (taken from expert's report).
There has been some controversy around facial mapping evidence in England. In
this regard, the response to the opinions of one facial mapping witness (Harrow) are
suggestive.3 13 After many appearances, Harrow came to be seen as 'an expert 
who over-
. The left images in Figure 3 contain the single image retrieved from a security camera system after a home
invasion after enhancement. The image on the right is of one of the Atkins brothers. Photographs 
courtesy of Joe
Stone.
" R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [8] (this is an attempt to mimic a Bayesian approach to the
provision of evidence with no underlying research support).
" Id. at [12].
Level Description
0 Lends no support
I Lends limited suppqrt.2 Lents-modgmt-e-Auppo
3 nds suppo
4 LendS strong uppp!f
5 support
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stepped the mark' and whose reliability "appeared seriously questionable."31 Rather than
consider Harrow's mistakes as exposing or exemplifying a wider range of problems with
facial mapping evidence, the lack of a research base and absence of standardized
techniques, as Justice Mitting did in R. v. Gray, most courts have preferred to characterize
Harrow as a "bad apple", thereby restricting Gray to its particular facts.31 Atkins
explicitly exemplifies this tendency.3 16
Much of the image comparison evidence, apart from opinions expressed by
investigating police officers, is supplied by (or outsourced to) independent consultants
(rather than state-employed forensic scientists).3 1 7 Experience with facial mapping
indicates how judges may be implicated in the creation and perpetuation of some forensic
"fields" and how those fields may possess little, if any, scientific credibility.3 Facial
mapping, per se, does not exist beyond its incarnation in law enforcement and
investigative communities.
b. Voice Comparison Evidence
Although it is widely accepted that voice identification using only auditory
analysis is an unsatisfactory basis of speaker identification, in R. v. Robb the Court of
Appeal considered such analysis to be admissible evidence.319 The Court acknowledged
that the great weight of informed opinion, including world leaders in the field, was that
such techniques unless verified by acoustic analysis were an unreliable basis of speaker
identification.320 It also observed that respected forensic institutes had rejected the use of
auditory analysis without supplementation as a basis of voice identification.321 Further, the
Court noted that the expert in question was part of a very small minority of practitioners
who were prepared to testify solely on the basis of auditory analysis, that he had not tested
the accuracy of his findings and had published no material that would allow such testing to
322be conducted. It concluded that his opinion had not been shown to be wrong and had
323
therefore been properly admitted at trial.
In R. v. Chenia and R. v. Flynn, the Court of Criminal Appeals expressed the
need for caution when the witness purporting to identify a voice was an investigating
police officer whose interpretation might be contaminated by knowledge of the
324investigation. Such cases now require careful warnings and where possible recordings
should be made available so the jury can undertake its own comparison.
It is notable that the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland, when called upon to
consider the admissibility of voice comparison evidence, declined to follow the casual
314 Id. at [16].
R. v. Gray, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 1001, [16] (Eng.).
3 R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [16]-[18].
317 This may, in part, be a risk management strategy.
31. On co-production, see SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AVIERICA (1995).
319 R. v. Robb, [1991] 93 Cr. App. R. 161 at 166-68 (Eng.). See David C. Ormerod, Sounding Out Expert
Voice Identification Evidence, CRIM. L.R. 771 (2002) (UK); David C. Ormerod, Sounds Familiar? Voice
Identification Evidence, CRIM. L.R. 595, 595-98 (2001) (UK).
320 Robb, 93 Cr. App. R. at 164-166.
321 See id. at 164-166.
322 Id. at 164-66.
323 See id. at 167.
324 R. v. Flynn, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 970, [53] (Eng.); R. v. Chenia, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2345, [100], [102]








approach adopted in Robb. In R. v. O 'Doherty, it declared that in light of the state of
scientific knowledge at the time, no prosecution ought to proceed in Northern Ireland in
which the Crown proposed to rely predominantly on auditory analysis of voice
326recordings.
C. Canada: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and Practice
Canada is a federal system, divided into ten provinces and three territories. The
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law, but courts administration,
policing and some prisons are provided provincially. Federal and provincial evidence acts
establish some rules of admissibility, however common law is the leading source of
327evidence law. Though originating in England, the common law of Canada has departed
from contemporary English law in some important respects. In particular, the Supreme
Court of Canada has adopted a principles-based approach to evidence, seeking to
articulate and apply a uniform set of values to guide trial judges when deciding the
3281admissibility of evidence. Principles such as necessity, reliability and the right to a fair
trial have been judicially defined and are balanced against one another at the time of the
admissibility decision.329 In adopting this approach, the Court has moved away from the
traditional rigid approach based on categories of admissibility. In many areas, this has led
to a more liberal (i.e., inclusive) admissibility standard, although it is sometimes suggested
that expert evidence has become more difficult to tender under the principles-based
approach.3 30
Since 1982, the Canadian constitution has incorporated a Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.331 The Charter has had an enormous impact on criminal procedure and
evidence, and particularly on investigative practices. Rights protected under the Charter
include a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, a right to a fair and public
trial, and a right to legal counsel.332 Three decades of jurisprudence has given texture and
limits to these rights, and set out the manner in which courts must safeguard Charter rights
in their procedures. The focus on Charter protections has outweighed the articulation of
other evidentiary principles in relation to forensic science and medicine, and the vast
majority of defense challenges to the admissibility of forensic evidence are predicated on
an alleged Charter violation such as a warrantless search, illegal arrest or denial of
counsel. In light of this emphasis, Canadian trial practice on such issues as the reliability
of forensic evidence has at times become an afterthought to the procedural protections
afforded by the Charter. The seeming reluctance of trial counsel to challenge the reliability
of expert opinion evidence is particularly striking given recent decisions from the
325 Although part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland is a distinct common law legal jurisdiction, although
its criminal procedure is, in many respects, similar to that in England and Wales.
326 R. v. O'Doherty, [2003] Cr. App. R. 5, 91 (N. Ir.).
327 Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science and
Medical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 343, 346-47 (2011).
328 id
329 Id. at 392.
330 ALAND. GOLD, EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW: THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH 1-2 (2d ed. 2010). See
also Edmond & Roach, supra note 327, at 375. The leading textbook on Canadian evidence law is ALAN W.
BRYANT, SIDNEY N. LEDERMAN & MICHELLE K. FUERST, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CANADA (3d ed. 2009) (the
introduction to this text provides a very helpful review of the trends within Canadian evidence law, elaborating
on the principles/rules distinction described in the text accompanying this footnote).
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.).
332 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8, s. 10, s. 11, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, s. 8-10, 11. (U.K.).
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Supreme Court of Canada endorsing Daubert and its criteria, and a body of critical work
that has emerged from high profile wrongful convictions.333
The leading Canadian case on the admissibility of expert evidence is R. v.
Mohan.3 3 4 A unanimous Court moved away from the relevance and helpfulness standard
in place in English law, holding that:
Admission of expert evidence depends on the application of the following
criteria:
(a) relevance;
(b) necessity in assisting the trier of fact;
(c) the absence of any exclusionary rule; [and]
(d) a properly qualified expert.3 3 5
On behalf of the Court, Justice Sopinka explained that relevance is a broad inquiry,
encompassing logical as well as legal relevance, and requiring a trial judge to assess the
reliability of the putative evidence against its costs, including the risk of distortion or over-
valuation.336 Necessity was described as a standard that is higher than the "helpfulness"
requirement set out in English precedent, but that should not be judged "by too strict a
standard."3 3 7 However, novel scientific evidence (which seems to mean evidence that has
not previously been accepted in a court, but may extend to new applications of established
techniques) must be "essential" in the sense that a jury will be unable to come to the
338"correct decision without the evidence, in order to be admissible. The requirement that
another exclusionary rule must not apply is consistent with rules applied elsewhere in the
Commonwealth.3 3 9 The qualification requirement was described by Sopinka J as a need
for the expert to demonstrate "special or peculiar knowledge [acquired] through study or
experience."3 4 0 While the qualification requirement was initially relatively lax, and
arguably remains so in some fields, the identification of wrongful convictions attributable
to poor quality expert evidence has led to some instances of a more rigorous assessment of
qualifications. Trial judges are increasingly being encouraged by appeal courts to identify
341
and enforce the boundaries of a witnesses' expertise.
Rules prohibiting an expert from testifying on the ultimate issue and requiring
that expert evidence go beyond matters that are common knowledge have become less
important over time, though they retain some formal status and are occasionally
. See, e.g., STEPHEN T. GOuDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO: REPORT 514
(2008), available at
http://www.attomeygeneraljus.gov.on.ca/inquiries/goudge/report/v3_en_pdf/Vol_3Eng.pdf; PATRICK J.
LESAGE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION OF
JAMES DRISKELL 172-73 (2007), available at http://www.driskellinquiry.ca/pdf/final report jan2007.pdf; FRED
KAUFMAN, REPORT OF THE KAUFMAN COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN 12-13
(1998), available at http://www.attomeygeneraljus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/morin chl.pdf.
334 R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, para. 32 (Can.).
.Id. at paras. 17-21.
336 Id. at paras. 22-23.
. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, para. 26. See also R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, para. 21 (Can.); R. v. J.-L.J., 2000
SCC 51, para. 56 (Can.).
338 Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, para. 32.
39 See, e.g., R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R 345, paras. 54-64 (Can.).
34 0 Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, para. 31.
341 See R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, paras. 62-64 (Ont. C.A.); GOUDGE, supra note 333, at 457; Emma
Cunliffe, Without Fear or Favour? Trends and Possibilities in the Canadian approach to Human Behaviour
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invoked.342 Canadian judges have been reluctant to admit expert evidence on matters they
regard as being common knowledge, such as the inadequacies of human memory in
eyewitness identification.3 4 3 The Supreme Court of Canada suggested for a time that
expert evidence is admissible regardless of the extent to which the facts underlying the
opinion have been proven, but that the jury should be instructed to consider the extent of
proof in deciding what weight to give the evidence.3 4 4 More recent cases seem to have
backed away from this laissez-faire approach, holding instead that a lack of admissible
proof of underlying facts can undermine the admissibility of the opinion.345 The latter
approach is certainly more consistent with the cost/benefit analysis adopted by the Court
in Mohan.
During the last decade the Supreme Court has formally supplemented the Mohan
approach with a more explicit recognition of the need for evidence of reliability.346
Conspicuously influenced by Daubert, this standard is sometimes characterized as
"threshold reliability." 3 4 7 In J-LJ, DD and most recently Trochym, the Court referred
approvingly to Daubert and/or endorsed the reliability criteria.34 8 Subservient to Mohan,
Daubert-style criteria have not been strictly applied, especially to types of evidence that
have long been admitted or are not easily assessed in terms of validation and proficiency
testing.349
Despite the relatively large number of Supreme Court of Canada decisions on the
admissibility of expert evidence, much expert evidence (particularly evidence tendered by
the Crown) is admitted with, at best, a perfunctory admissibility enquiry.350 A study of the
courts of British Columbia by Cunliffe suggests that when admissibility is contested, trial
judges most often admit the expert testimony and leave reliability as an issue of weight to
be determined by the tribunal of fact. Expert evidence is rarely excluded on the basis of
unreliability, particularly when that evidence relates to what is considered as a routine
forensic procedure. Police officers and other investigative professionals are at times
qualified by trial judges as expert witnesses on the basis of relatively slight experience, or
to testify about the results of tests developed and performed in the context of a specific
351 352case.31 At other times these opinions are admitted as non-expert opinion evidence.
342 See R. v. Marquard, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223 (trial judge did not commit error of law when expert was allowed to
testify outside area of expertise); R. v. R(D.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 291 (evidence was admissible but trial judge must
give reasons for reaching conclusions or a new trial will be ordered); R. v. Bums, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656 (expert
testimony admissible to explain human behavior).
343 Compare R. v. McIntosh (1997), 35 OR. 3d 97, para. 25-26 (Can. Ont. C.A.); andR. v. Myrie (2003), 57
W.C.B. 2d 72 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), and Lee Stuesser, Experts on Eyewitness Identification: IJust Don't See It,
31 MAN. L.J. 543 (2006) (A representative discussion), with PETER CORY, THE INQUIRY REGARDING THOMAS
SOPHONOW: THE INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION, AND CONSIDERATION OF ENTITLEMENT TO COMPENSATION
(2001) (Man.), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/toc.html.
344 R. v. Abbey, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 24, para. 52 (Can.).
345 R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.); R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, paras. 147-49 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
346 See, e.g., R. v. Trochym, 2007 SCC 6, para. 33 (Can.); R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, para. 57 (Can.); R. v. J-L.J.,
2000 SCC 51, paras. 31, 33 (Can.).
347 Trochym, 2007 SCC 6 atpara. 33.
34 8 Id. at paras. 36, 139-40; D.D., 2000 SCC 43 at paras. 36, 57; J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51 at paras. 33, 59.
349 Compare R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624 para. 48 (Can. Ont. C.A.), with Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A
Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science and Medical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO
LI. 343, 344 (2011).
350 See Atty Gen. of Can. v. D.O.L., [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, para. 52 (Can.) (declaring a trend toward inclusion),
quoted in R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, para 18 (Can.); R. v. Graat, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819, para. 48
(Can.).
. R. v. Nikitin (2003), 176 C.C.C. 3d 225, paras. 6-7 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Collins (2001), 160 C.C.C. 3d 85,
para. 9 (Can. Ont. C.A.); R. v. Brooks (1998), 129 C.C.C. 3d 227, paras. 7-9 (Can. Ont. C.A.), rev'd, 2000 SCC
11 (Can.); R. v. Laverty (1979), 47 C.C.C. 2d 60, para. 3 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
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These trends in trial courts suggest a lack of engagement with the
recommendations made by commissions of inquiry into wrongful convictions. Successive
commissioners have recommended closer trial scrutiny of investigative practices
associated with forensic science: most recently in the Goudge Inquiry into child homicide
cases.35 In many of these inquiries forensic science or medicine was identified as a source
of error that positively, and sometimes systematically, contributed to wrongful
convictions.354
The leading provider of forensic services is an arm of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP), and there is no independent forensic science institute like those
that currently exist in some parts of Australia (e.g., South Australia) and once existed in
England-before the demise of the Forensic Science Service (FSS). Only one published
judgment cites the NRC report (without engaging with it substance), and the number of
challenges to the reliability of forensic science and medicine evidence does not seem to
have increased since its publication. Legal aid funding is a particular concern, in this
regard. As is true in other jurisdictions, the amount of funding available to legally aided
defendants is inadequate and has been declining over time. This presents a considerable
barrier to contested trials of any sort, preventing robust analysis of Crown (or state
adduced) forensic science and medicine evidence.3 55 Defense experts are out of the
question in many cases.
In the vast majority of criminal trials in Canada a trial judge, rather than a jury,
acts as the tribunal of fact.
1. Latent Fingerprint Evidence
Canada came relatively late to latent fingerprint evidence, although the RCMP
began using latent fingerprint identification as an investigative technique in the early
twentieth century. The first two reported decisions on the admissibility of fingerprint
356evidence were both decided in 1934, and in both cases the evidence was excluded. In R.
v. Wiswell, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal suggested that the knowledge and practices
underlying fingerprint identification had not been sufficiently proven to admit the
evidence.3 5 7 In R. v. De 'Georgio & Servello, the Crown argued that a fingerprint
identification was a question of fact rather than of expert opinion.3 58 The judge treated the
officer's evidence as potential expert testimony, and excluded it on the basis that the
officer had given no account of how he reached his conclusion.3 5 9
The first reported case in which fingerprint evidence was admitted was R. v.
360
Buckingham & Vickers. Justice Robertson distinguished the earlier cases, finding that
the police officers who testified to a match on this occasion had given "a very complete
352 R. v. Graat, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819, para. 10 (Can.); R. v. Walizadah, 2007 ONCA 528, para. 36 (Can. Ont.
C.A.); R. v. Ilina, 2003 MBCA 20, para. 64 (Can. Man. C.A.).
" STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO: REPORT 420 (2008).
54 E.g., LESAGE, supra note 333; ANTONIO LAMER, THE LAMER COMMISSION OF INQUIRY PERTAINING TO THE
CASES OF: RONALD DALTON, GREGORY PARSONS AND RANDY DRUKEN (2006); KAUFMAN, supra note 333.
3 See, e.g., MELINA BUCKLEY, MOVING FORWARD ON LEGAL AID, RESEARCH ON NEEDS AND INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES (2010); AB CURRIE, THE UNMET NEED FOR CRIMINAL LEGAL AID: A SUMMARY OF RESEARCH
RESULTS (2003).
356 R. v. Wiswell, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 624, para. 9 (Can. N.S. Sup. Ct.); R. v. De'Georgio, [1934] 3 W.W.R. 374,
para. 18 (Can. B.C. Cnty. Ct.).
3 R. v. Wiswell, [1935] 1 D.L.R. 624, para. 9.
35' R. v. De'Georgio, [1934] 3 W.W.R. 374, para. 7.
359 Id. at paras. 7, 19.
360 R. v. Buckingham (1943), [1946] 1 W.W.R. 425, paras. 7, 22 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).
72 [Vol. 3
78
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol3/iss1/8
ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED
and adequate explanation as to why they came to the conclusion that these fingerprints are
the same as those of the accused."361 There was no other evidence linking the accused to
362the crime in this case, and the accused was ultimately acquitted by the jury. Pelletier. v.
Le Roi was the first Court of Appeal decision to confirm the admissibility of latent
363
fingerprint evidence. The Quebec court affirmed the reliability and universal
admissibility of fingerprint evidence, effectively approving this evidence for use in
364criminal trials thereafter. By 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada felt sufficiently
confident in latent fingerprint comparison to describe the technique as 'an invaluable tool
of criminal investigation . .. because it is virtually infallible.' 3 65
There appears to be no reported case in which fingerprint evidence has been
366excluded since Pelletier. v. Le Roi affirmed admission in 1952. From time to time,
judges acknowledge that experts must exercise judgment in declaring a match,367 or
provide a critical assessment of the inferences that may or may not be drawn from the
3681presence of matched fingerprints at a crime scene. In other cases, judges declare that
fingerprinting is so widely accepted that it can be admitted with little or no screening.369
Canada has no investigative or evidentiary requirements of a minimum number
of similar points to declare a match.3 7 0 Experts tend nonetheless to testify to the number of
similar features identified, at times using visual aids to demonstrate them to the tribunal of
fact. Experts usually testify to a "match" between the accused's fingerprints and those
found at a scene. The advent of Mohan, with its emphasis on case-by-case determinations
of the admissibility of expert evidence, does not seem to have affected fingerprint
evidence.371 Effectively, this and the other familiar forms of forensic evidence considered
372
in this article seem to have been grandfathered out of the Mohan-Daubert framework.
1
61 
Id. at para. 22.
36 2 Id. at paras. 9, 24.
363 Pelletier. v. R., [1952] B.R. 633 (Can. Que. K.B.).
364 Id. at para. 21.
36' R. v. Beare (1987), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, para. 21 (Can.).
366 Pelletier. v. R., [1952] B.R. 633 at para. 21 (Can. Que. K.B.).
367 R. v. Murrin (1999), 181 D.L.R. 4th 320, para. 74 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Borden (1993), 124 N.S.R. 2d
163, para. 147 (Can. N.S. C.A.).
361 See R. v. Mars (2006), 206 O.A.C. 387, paras. 19-21 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
369 R. v. Johnston (1992), 69 C.C.C. 3d 395, para. 92 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.).
370 Jeff Wise, Under the Microscope: Legal Challenges to Fingerprints and DNA as Methods ofForensic
Identification, 18 INT'L REV. L., COMPUTERS & TECH. 425, 427 (2004).
.. R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 (Can.).
372 Wise, supra note 371, at 427.
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2. DNA Evidence
The leading Canadian case on the admissibility of DNA evidence is R. v.
Terceira.3 7 3 In that case, the Court confirmed that the Mohan test applies to DNA
evidence, and defined a "match" as a "failure to exclude a suspect's DNA." The
Terceira court regarded reliability as the touchstone of admissibility for a novel technique
(as RFLP analysis was in 1991).375 Evidence on the statistical probability of a random
match was also accepted, although the Court held that the admissibility of this evidence
should be considered on a case-by-case basis.376 While probability evidence was often
ruled inadmissible in the 1990s, evidence of a match was invariably admitted from the
first cases. Probability estimates are now routinely admitted.
Early Canadian case law on the admissibility of DNA relied heavily on U.S.
judges' conclusions regarding the reliability of DNA matching and the appropriateness of
forensic techniques adopted in crime investigation laboratories.377 As new techniques were
introduced (e.g. PCR and mtDNA), this reliance on U.S. precedent has persisted.
Questions about the applicability of probability-based statistics to indigenous populations
and ethnic minorities have been recurrent.378 In one Alberta case, a defense expert who
testified about the shortcomings of the statistical evidence given by prosecution witnesses,
partly in reliance on the first NRC report,3 79 was found to have given irrelevant and
unreliable evidence by a judge who ultimately relied on the Crown expert's evidence that
a match had been found.380 However, in the first decision on the admissibility of
mitochondrial DNA evidence, the Supreme Court of British Columbia ordered that
proficiency tests be disclosed to the accused, and carefully considered evidence regarding
both proficiency and validity testing.381 In keeping with earlier decisions, Henderson J
concluded that the risk of contamination occurring in a particular case is a matter for the
jury which should not preclude admission of the evidence.382
The openness towards DNA evidence that has been shown by Canadian courts is
not restricted to human DNA. Forensic scientists have been permitted to testify that a
comparison of the phylogenetic profile of HIV made it highly likely that an accused
infected 11 victims with HIV.383 Phylogenetic comparisons were also admitted in an effort
to establish that HIV contaminated blood was used in a coagulant product administered to
hemophiliacs in the mid 1980s, although the application of the technique in that case was
ultimately found unreliable by the trial judge.384 In another case, cat hairs found on a
jacket similar to one the accused had been known to wear were alleged to match the DNA
"' R. v. Terceira (1998), 38 OR. 3d 175, para. 12 (Can. Ont. C.A.), affd, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 866, paras. 2-3 (Can.).
374 Id. at paras. 15, 19.
. Id. at para. 29.
376 Id. at para. 43.
. R. v. Lafferty, [1993] 4 W.W.R. 74, para. 44 (Can. N.W.T. Sup. Ct.); R. v. Baptiste, 1991 CarswellBC 1277
(Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (WL); R. v. Bourguignon, [1991] O.J. No. 2670 (Can. Ont. Ct. J.) (QL); R. v. Bourguignon,
[1990] O.J. No. 1205 (Can. Ont. Provincial Ct.) (QL).
.. R. v. Lafferty, [1993] 4 W.W.R. 74, para. 44; R. v. Baptiste, 1991 CarswellBC 1277, paras. 54-56; R. v.
Bourguignon, [1991] O.J. No. 2670.
39 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992).
"s R. v. Love, [1994] A.W.L.D. 761, paras. 162-167 (Can. Alta. Ct. Q.B.) (discussing that probability statistics
given by Crown experts ranged from 1 in 470 billion to 1 in 1.19 trillion), affd, 174 A.R. 360 (Can. Alta. C.A.).
.. R. v. Murrin (1999), 181 D.L.R. 4th 320, paras. 76, 108 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).
382 R. v. Murrin (1999), 181 D.L.R. 4th320; see also R. v. G.J.T. (2001), 200 Nfid. & P.E.I.R. 81 (Can. Nfid.
Sup. Ct.) (discussing the Profiler Plus test).
R. v. Aziga, [2008] O.J. No. 5131, paras. 24-26 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.) (QL).
384 R. v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co. (2007), 226 C.C.C. 3d 438, para. 94 (Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J.).
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of the victim's cat.385 In response to defense criticisms of the number and homogeneity of
cats included in the ad hoc sample of local cat DNA assembled for this case, the forensic
scientist testified, "We used a lot of loci instead of a lot of cats."6 The evidence was
admitted, and its admissibility was upheld on appeal.3 8 7
There seem to be no Canadian cases in which DNA evidence was wholly
excluded from trial.
3. Bite Marks
In Canada, bite mark evidence has been associated with exculpation in high
profile cases. Two important examples are R. v. Unger, in which a forensic odontologist
testified that bite marks on the victim were not made by the accused; and R. v. Reynolds,
where a forensic pathologist opined that wounds were made by scissors leading to murder
charges being laid against the victim's mother.38 Unger is now considered to have been
wrongly convicted, and Reynolds is also widely regarded as innocent of the charges that
were laid against her.3 9 0 In Reynolds, a forensic odontologist concluded that the puncture
wounds were made by a dog.391 Forensic odontology seems to be one of relatively few
fields in which defense experts are occasionally called in Canada.
A review of cases in which bite mark evidence is admitted suggests that lawyers
and judges allow bite mark specialists wide latitude when testifying. For instance, courts
have permitted bite mark witnesses to testify about the force required to leave a particular
mark;392 about the psychological state experienced by a person when biting;393 and about
whether an injury to a victim's head was caused by a boot.3 9 4 In some of these cases, the
court suggested that little weight should be given to the opinion-nonetheless, the
testimony was permitted.
A rare example of a more critical assessment of bite mark evidence is R. v.
Taillefer; R. v. Duguay.3 9 5 In this case, the expert testified that a bite mark was consistent
"beyond reasonable doubt" with the accused's bite pattern.396 The expert had previously
given an opinion that the same mark was caused by a different suspect.3 9 7 The Supreme
Court of Canada upheld the accused's appeal from conviction on the basis of non-
disclosure of the earlier opinion.398 While discussing the relevance of the inconsistent
opinion to the expert's credibility, the Court did not comment on the reliability arguments
R. v. Beamish (1999), 177 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 265, para. 9 (Can. P.E.I. Sup. Ct.).
316 Id.at paras. 9-10.
..Id. at para. 19.
R. v. Unger (1993), 83 C.C.C. 3d 228, para. 9 (Can. Man. C.A.).
39 GOUDGE, supra note 354, at 23 (Crown withdrew the case before proceeding to verdict).
390 See GOUDGE, supra note 354, at 25; Gabrielle Giroday, Unger's Murder Conviction Overturned, WINNIPEG
FREE PRESS (Mar. 11, 2009, 4:54 PM), available at
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/breakingnews/Conviction-of-Unger-overturned-41085982.html; Kyle Unger
Acquitted of1990 Killing, CBC NEWS (Oct. 23, 2009, 9:38 PM),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2009/10/23/mb-unger-acquitted-manitoba.html.
391 GOUDGE, supra note 354, at 23.
392 R. v. Ho (1999), 141 C.C.C. 3d 270, para. 69 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
393 R.v. J.A.A., 2011 SCC 17 at para. 31 (Can.).
394 R. v. Smith, 2005 BCSC 1624, paras. 76-79 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).
395 R. v. Taillefer, 2003 SCC 70 (Can.).
396 Id. at para. 36.
397 id
3 98 Id. at paras. 134-135.
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raised by the accused.3 9 9 The Court did not suggest that the patent reliability concerns in
this case mandated exclusion of the evidence.400
4. Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings
a. Opinions about Images
Expert testimony about images is rarely offered in Canada for two reasons. First,
in R. v. Nikolovski, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a tribunal of fact may reach its
own conclusion about identification by comparing images of a person of interest with the
401accused person, even in cases where no other evidence links the accused with the crime.
Trial judges are exhorted to emphasize the care required to reach such a verdict, but the
Mohan criteria will not condition the admissibility of footage or photographic evidence for
this purpose. Secondly, Canadian courts routinely permit a witness who knows the
accused to testify that he or she can identify the accused as the person depicted in video or
402
photographic images. Often, the witness called by the Crown for this purpose is a police
or probationary officer, or prison guard. Nonetheless, and perhaps reassuringly, the case
law includes several examples of those accused being acquitted in circumstances where
images and supplementary identification evidence are the only evidence presented to
establish identity.40 3 However, while judges frequently rehearse the general dangers of
identification evidence, they never disclose any familiarity with technical literature on the
topic, nor offer an analysis of the special issues associated with image identification
beyond occasional references to image quality.404
We have identified only three reported decisions in which expert testimony was
405admitted to assist the court to interpret video imagery. In R. v. Brown, the defense led
expert evidence from an anthropologist (relying on facial morphology, photo-
anthropometry and video superimposition) to support its claim that the accused were not
406the individuals shown in a video linked to the charged murder. The trial judge allowed
the evidence over the Crown's objections, finding that it was likely respectable within its
field and that any frailties in the expert's methodologies could be fully canvassed in cross-
examination.40 In R. v. Eakin, the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench admitted expert
evidence proffered by the Crown to show that the movements captured on a video were
consistent with the accused punching the alleged victim, and inconsistent with the
399 Id. at paras. 46, 54, 105.
400 id
40 R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, para. 23 (Can.).
402 E.g., R. v. Leaney, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 393, paras. 18, 28 (Can.); R. v. Anderson, 2005 BCSC 1346, para. 25
(Can. B.C.) (summarizing indicia relevant to determining whether a witness is sufficiently familiar with the
accused to perform this role).
403 See, e.g., R. v. Copeland, 2011 ONSC 1568 (Can. Ont.) (holding that a fingerprint "match" was not
conclusive proof of identity where there may have been an innocent explanation for its existence); R. v. New,
2010 ABPC 391, paras. 30, 36, 48 (Can. Alta.); R. v. Boersma, 2009 ONCJ 178, paras. 35, 42-43, 48 (Can.
Ont.); R. v. Gamble, 2009 SKPC 65, paras. 34-36 (Can. Sask.); R. v. Grewal, 2008 BCPC 211, paras. 41, 63
(Can. B.C.); R. v. D.A.H., 2006 BCPC 400, paras. 60,62 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Chohan, 2006 BCPC 421, paras. 23-
24, 28 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Martin, 2005 NSPC 32, paras. 29-30 (Can. N.S.); R. v. Moyou, 2003 BCPC 63 (Can.
B.C.); R. v. Gibbons, 2003 ABPC 114, paras. 10, 24-25 (Can. Alta.); R. v. Griffith, 1997 CarswellBC 2819,
paras. 20, 22 (Can. B.C. S.C.). But see R. v. R.H., 2010 ONCA 704, paras. 6-7, 9-10 (Can. Ont.) (holding that the
trial judge's reliance on videotape evidence was not error).
404 See R. v. Lindgren, 2010 BCPC 283, para. 9 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Elkins, 2007 BCSC 929, para. 21 (Can. B.C.);
R. v. Aitken 2012 BCCA 134 (Can. B.C.).
405 R. v. Eakin, 2000 MBQB 107, para. 5 (Can. Man.); R. v. Brown, 1999 CarswellOnt 4703, paras. 1, 4 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL).
406 Brown, 1999 CarswellOnt at paras. 1, 4.
407 Id at para. 8.
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accused's version of events.408 In R. v. Aitken the British Columbia Court of Appeal
upheld admission of the analysis of video by a podiatrist (so-called gait analysis) to help
identify the accused.40 9
b. Opinions about Voices (and Sounds)
Voice identification evidence is routinely admitted in Canada, almost always via
lay witnesses.410 Courts allow police officers to testify to voice identifications that match
intercepted communications based on a few words spoken by an accused person at the
time of arrest. This evidence is considered directly admissible as a question of fact, and
412
is expressly not subject to the rules regulating opinion and expert evidence.
Accordingly, arguments about the reliability of voice identification go to weight rather
than admissibility.4 13
The tribunal of fact is encouraged to consider several aspects of a purported
identification before acting on it.414 The factors set out in the case law regarding jury
instructions are effectively indicia of reliability. Because lay identification evidence is
directly admissible, the vast majority of challenges to the admissibility of voice
identification evidence are made on the basis of alleged Charter violations, without raising
reliability.4 " The Canadian receptivity towards lay voice identification does not seem to
have been disturbed by two high profile wrongful convictions that relied upon lay voice
identification evidence .416
Given that lay voice identification is so readily accepted, expert evidence about
voice identification is very rarely called. One of the first Canadian cases in which an
417
expert was admitted was R. v. Medvedew. The trial judge allowed a trained police
officer to testify on the basis of spectrographic analysis that two voices were "the
same."418 Instructions encouraged the jury to provide "a respectful audience,", but also to
419consider the possibility of error. Unusually, a defense expert was also called in this
case.420 The defense expert was highly critical of the methods used by the Crown
expert.421 The defense also argued that the Crown expert should have tendered the
408 Eakin, 2000 MBQB at para. 5.
409 Aitken 2012 BCCA 134.
410 Although the trier of fact, as with images, may make its own interpretation of both the identity of a speaker
and of the content or meaning ofwhat was allegedly spoken. See, e.g., R. v. Turpin, 2011 ONCA 193, para. 36
(Can. Ont.).
411 R. v. Lepage, 2008 BCCA 132, paras. 20, 25 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Parsons (1977), 17 OR. 2d 465, para. 26
(Can. Ont. C.A.), aff'd, Charette v. R., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 785, 786 (Can.).
412 R. v. Adam, 2006 BCSC 1884, para. 136 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Chan, 2001 BCSC 1180, para. 28 (Can. B.C.); R.
v. Williams (1995), 80 O.A.C. 119, para. 18 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Parsons, 17 OR. 2d at para. 18.
413 Williams, 80 O.A.C. at para. 17.
414 Adam, 2006 BCSC at paras. 137-40.
415 R. v. Ngo, 2003 ABCA 121, para. 13 (Can. Alta.); R. v. Scarpino, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1563, para. 1 (Can. B.C.)
(QL); R. v. Rendon, [1997] O.J. No. 5505 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL).
416 R. v. Henry, 2010 BCCA 462, para. 118 (Can. B.C.); R. v. Morin, [1991] O.J. No. 2528, paras. 260-61 (Can.
Ont.) (QL); FRED KAUFMAN, REPORT OF THE KAUFMAN COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL
MORIN, 405-06, 964-66 (1998).
417 R. v. Medvedew (1978), 91 D.L.R. 3d 21, paras. 8-10, 25 (Can. Man. C.A.). See also R. v. Montani (1974), 26
C.R.N.S. 339, para. 25 (Can. Ont. P.C.).
418 Medvedew, 91 D.L.R. 3d at para. 16.
4 19 Id. at para. 14.
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spectrogram results for the jury's consideration.422 The trial judge left all of this evidence
to the jury, and a majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal found that he was right to
admit the evidence and that there was no error in the instructions provided to the jury.423 A
strong dissent was issued, referring to inadequacies in the Crown case and explaining the
424controversies then raging about voice identification evidence in the United States.
Justice O'Sullivan held that the trial judge should not have qualified the Crown expert
without first being satisfied that the technique was scientifically valid.425 While O'Sullivan
JA's dissent has occasionally been favorably mentioned in subsequent cases, it has never
formally been adopted by an appeal-level court.
A second dimension to "expert" testimony about voice identification is the use of
translators to identify a speaker. At times, courts have been willing to extend the field of
expertise (translation) in which a translator is qualified to include expertise in identifying
individual voices speaking in the translator's language.426 However, even in this context,
the question of expertise rarely arises because of the readiness with which lay
identifications are admitted.
D. Australia: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and Practice
Australia is also a federal system. The six states and two territories are
responsible for the vast majority of criminal laws and prosecutions. There are basically
two systems of evidence law operating among the various state, territory and federal
jurisdictions.427 The older, common law system was originally drawn from England and
continues to resemble contemporary English practice. The more recent addition is the
uniform evidence law (UEL), introduced in 1995 following the coordinated enactment of a
series of largely standardized evidence statutes.428 The common law continues to apply in
South Australia, Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory.429 The
Commonwealth (i.e., federal courts), the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales,
Tasmania and Victoria apply the UEL. 4 3 0 This slowly expanding second group comprises
the most populous states where the majority of commercial and criminal litigation occurs.
In general, Australian judges in both systems have developed liberal (or inclusive)
422 Id. at para. 19.
423 Id. at paras. 20-21.
424 Id. at paras. 41-55.
425 Id. at para. 55.
426 E.g., R. v. Hoang, 2000 ABPC 55, paras. 9, 46 (Can. Alta.). But see R. v. Ngo, 2003 ABCA 121, paras. 13, 36
(Can. Alta.) (excluding voice evidence on the basis of a Charter breach).
427 For an overview of Australian evidence law, see JOHN D. HEYDON & RUPERT CROSS, CROSS ON EVIDENCE
(gth ed. 2009); ANDREW LIGERTWOOD & GARY EDMOND, AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO
THE COMMON LAW AND THE UNIFORM ACTS (5 th ed. 2010). For an annotated commentary of the UEL, see
STEPHEN ODGERS, UNIFORM EVIDENCE LAW ( 9 th ed. 2010). On expert evidence, see IAN FRECKELTON & HUGH
SELBY, EXPERT EVIDENCE: LAW, PRACTICE AND ADVOCACY (2005); Gary Edmond, Specialised Knowledge, the
Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability: Reassessing Incriminating Expert Opinion Evidence, 31 U.N.S.W. L.J.
1(2008).
428 Also described as the "uniform law" or the "new evidence law," the UEL is comprised of the following:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 2011 (Aust. Cap. Terr.); Evidence Act 2008 (Vict.); Evidence Act 2001
(Tas.); Evidence Act 1995 (N.S.W.).
429 In all of these jurisdictions, parochial evidence acts supplement the common law: Evidence Act 1977
(Queensl.); Evidence Act 1939 (N. Terr.); Evidence Act 1928 (S. Austl.); Evidence Act 1906 (W. Austl.). The
rules of evidence regulating expert opinion in criminal proceedings are mainly common law and remarkably
consistent across these jurisdictions.
430 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 4(1) (Austl.). The UEL does not apply to Commonwealth Family Court
proceedings unless on appeal from certain State courts, most federal and state tribunals, and until 1998 did not
apply to Indigenous land claims under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 5-6 (Austl.).
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approaches to incriminating expert opinion evidence and there is considerable
431convergence between the two systems.
At common law, as in England and Canada, those with expertise are normally
allowed to express opinions, provided the opinions are sufficiently relevant to the facts in
432issue. The witness must have undergone training (and received appropriate
qualifications or certification) or hold experience, and the opinion should be derived from
a recognized "body of knowledge" (or "field"') or experience.4 33 The opinion should also
be of assistance to the tribunal of fact.4 3 4 Rules preventing expert witnesses from
expressing opinions on the ultimate issue or trespassing on matters considered to be within
common knowledge-because of their invasion of the prerogatives of the jury-have in
effect become moribund. Although, Australian common law judges (and their UEL
counterparts) remain reluctant to admit the testimony of experimental psychologists on
matters pertaining to human sensory experience and memory (e.g., on eyewitness
identification).4 35
There is, in addition, a supplementary consideration: the basis rule (which
persists under the UEL).436 In its more technical guise, the basis rule requires that the facts
on which an expert opinion is based must be identified, and in its strictest form, supported
437by admissible evidence. This approach has been described by the full Federal Court as
"a counsel of perfection" and, in consequence, tempered. Another strand, requires the
expert witness to explain the process or technique through which his or her opinion is
derived-the so-called basis of the technique and opinion.439 Provided the witness can
articulate some kind of process, even if it involves speculative and untested techniques,
that will ordinarily satisfy this version of the rule. In practice, both strands tend to be either
ignored or treated perfunctorily in criminal proceedings.440
Under the UEL, there is an exception to the proscriptive opinion rule (s 76) for
opinions substantially based on "specialized knowledge" derived from the witness's
'training, study or experience' (s 79). 4 Section 79 states:
If a person has specialized knowledge based on the person's training,
study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an
431 Victoria, however, may be slightly more exclusionary than the other UEL jurisdictions. Compare Evidence
Act 1995 (Cth) s 76 (Austl.), with Evidence Act 2008 (Vict.) s 76 (Austl.).
432 The common law maintains sufficient relevance, rather than logical relevance associated with the Evidence
Act. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 55, 56 (Austl.).
4' R. v. Bonython [1984] 38 SASR 45, 46-47 (Austl.).
434 Clarkv. Ryan [1960] 103 CLR 486, 491 (Austl.); Bonython, 38 SASR at 47.
435 See, e.g., R. v. Smith, [1987] VR 907, [14]-[17] (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 79(2), 80. Judges are
also reluctant to admit evidence about truth telling, as with polygraphs.
436 LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT No. 26 (INTERIM) EVIDENCE, para. 750 (1985).
437 Makita (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Sprowles [2001] 52 NSWLR 705, [85] (Court of Appeal) (Austl.); Dasreef Pty.
Ltd. v. Hawchar [2011] 277 A.L.R. 611, [91]-[92] (Austl.).
" Sydneywide Distrib. Pty. Ltd. v. Red Bull Austl. Pty. Ltd. [2002] FCAFC 157, [7] (Austl.). See also Dasreef
[2011] HCA at [25]; Alphapharm Pty. Ltd. v. H Lundbeck [2008] FCA 559, [758]-[59] (Austl.).
439 Usually the derivation is linked to Davie v. Magistrates of Edinburgh, [1953] S.C. 34 (Scot.).
440 See, e.g., R. v. Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 (Austl.).
441 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 76(1) (Austl.): "Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of
a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed."
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opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on the
knowledge.44
Judges in UEL jurisdictions have not taken the opportunity to read the need for
"reliability" into "specialized knowledge" or to substantially revise their common law
443
practice. Somewhat paradoxically, the leading case in NSW explicitly rejected the need
to consider "an extraneous idea such as 'reliability."4 4 4
In consequence, UEL practice tends to resemble the common law, as lawyers and
judges focus attention upon the qualifications of the witness and whether there is a "field"
of "specialized knowledge" ." There are relatively few criminal decisions where
incriminating expert opinion evidence is examined in detail or where the precise terms of
s79 are applied rigorously to incriminating expert opinions.446 Consequently, most
incriminating opinion evidence is simply admitted and its weight left to the tribunal of
fact. Under the UEL, the ultimate issue and common knowledge rules have been formally
tempered, if not quite abandoned (s80).44 7
In addition, drawing upon and contorting authority from New Zealand and the
Australian High Court-in relation to the preparation of transcripts of voice recordings-
several Australian jurisdictions have developed the concept of the ad hoc expert.4  These
witnesses, usually investigators, though sometimes translators or formally qualified
individuals, have been allowed to express their incriminating opinions on the basis of
exposure to (or analysis of) some kind of evidence: usually repeated exposure to voice
recordings or incriminating images. Originally developed to facilitate the admission of
transcripts as an aid for the tribunal of fact when they were required to listen to the content
of voice recordings of inferior quality, in recent years the use of ad hoc experts has
dramatically expanded as Australian courts have allowed a variety of witnesses to express
incriminating opinions about identity drawn from the rapid increase in the availability of
images and voice recordings.
Allowing ad hoc experts to express opinions sits awkwardly with the common
law because often the witnesses do not have appropriate qualifications and, to the extent
that there is a relevant body of knowledge or experience, these particular individuals are
not part of, or familiar with, it. Recourse to ad hoc experts also contravenes the explicit
442 The influence of the original Federal Rules of Evidence should be obvious. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 702, with
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79(1) (Austl.).
443 See, e.g., Velevskiv. The Queen (2002) 187 ALR 233, [82] (Austl.);HGv. The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414,
438-39 (Austl.).
444 Notwithstanding the statutory interest in 'specialised knowledge' under the UEL, common law jurisdictions
are slightly more likely to exclude expert evidence where the evidence is unreliable. R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A
Crim R 377, 378 (Austl.).
445 There is an explicit exception for opinions from indigenous persons on traditional laws and customs (s 78A),
and s 79 was recently extended to make clear that opinions are not inadmissible merely because they concern the
impact of sexual assault on the behavior of children: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79(2)(a) and s 79(2)(b). Evidence
Act 1995 (Cth) s 78A (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79 (Austl.).
446 There are very few civil trials before juries in Australia. In consequence, trial judges do not need to be as
exclusionary in their civil justice practice. The participation of wealthy parties, frequently corporations, means
that in many civil cases the parties dedicate considerable amounts of time and resources to developing and
challenging expert opinion evidence. This is far less likely to occur in the very asymmetrical criminal contest,
especially as the state has an effective monopoly on many sources of expertise and, in most trials, the resources
available to the defense.
447 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 80 (Austl.): "Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about:
(a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue; or (b) a matter of common knowledge."
448 G. Edmond and M. San Roque, Quasi-Justice: Ad Hoc Expertise and Identification Evidence, 33 CRIM. L.J. 8,
11-14 (2009). Ad hoc experts have also featured in proceedings in England and Wales, although the use has been
questioned recently in R. v. Flynn [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. 20, 266, 271 (Austl.).
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terms of the UEL for, s76 imposes an exclusionary rule that appears to cover the field.4 4 9
Those purporting to express opinions on the basis of their interpretation of images or
voices invariably possess no "specialized knowledge" or "training and experience" in
voice or image comparison and analysis.
Only rarely do Australian judges use discretionary-and in UEL jurisdictions,
their mandatory and discretionary-exclusions.4 5 0 Australian judges seem to be reluctant
to exclude potentially probative expert opinion evidence even where it is likely to be
unfairly prejudicial-that is, unreliable and the jury likely to misuse or overvalue it.
Rather than require the state to support the probative value of incriminating expert opinion
with evidence of reliability or proficiency, common law and UEL judges tend to admit
speculative opinions-such as those of ad hoc expert witnesses-because a jury might
find unreliable or speculative opinions persuasive (i.e., "accept" them). Questions about
the value of evidence are conventionally left for the jury to determine (as matters for
weight).
In addition, Australian judges maintain faith in the ability of warnings, directions
and cautionary instructions to overcome problems with expert opinion evidence. The
ability to comment, usually in quite general terms, about expert evidence and its dangers
often facilitates the admission of evidence that might appear unreliable, speculative or
controversial.
It is reasonably common for judges to hold a voir dire, following challenges to
the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. NSW has also experimented with expert
452witnesses giving evidence concurrently in such preliminary proceedings. Preliminary
hearings rarely lead to the exclusion of incriminating expert opinion evidence adduced by
the state. Though, judges may sometimes direct a witness to avoid the use of certain terms
and expressions and encourage "splitting". None of the admissibility and regulatory
interventions (e.g., the imposition of preferred expressions) is based on empirical research
concerning underlying techniques, the value of trial practices or jury comprehension.
In practice, there is often little difference between the way common law and UEL
courts approach the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. Notwithstanding
developments in the U.S. and Canada, Australian courts have preferred their common law
heuristics (i.e., "field" and qualifications or experience) and been reluctant to consider, let
alone incorporate, "reliability" as an admissibility criterion for incriminating expert
opinion evidence.4 5 3 Judges in both common law and UEL jurisdictions exhibit a tendency
to admit incriminating opinion evidence and leave questions about validity and reliability
to the trial and the tribunal of fact. This liberal approach to admissibility and effective
disinterest in reliability places both the risk of unreliability and the need to persuade the
tribunal of fact of the weakness of unreliable opinions on the accused-all in the context
of the accusatorial trial. Australian judges invest considerable confidence in defense
449 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 76 (Austl.).
45 At common law, Christie, and under the UEL, s 137: "In a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit
evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant." See also UEL 135 and 136; R. v. Christie [1914] AC 545 (Eng.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 137
(Austl.).
451 See, e.g., R. v. Shamouil [2006] 66 NSWLR 228, [49] (Austl.); R. v. Carusi (1997) NSW LEXIS 1, 40
(Austl.); R. v. XY [2013] NSWCCA 121 (Austl.). Though compare R. v. Dupas [2012] VSCA 328 (Austl.).
452 See Gary Edmond, Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence in Australian Civil
Procedure, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (2009).
453 "Reliability" is discussed, incidentally, in several cases. See, e.g., Velevski v. The Queen (2002) 187 ALR
233, [82] (Aust.); HG v. The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414, [82] (Austl.); Osland v. The Queen (1998) 197 CLR
316, 374 (Austl.); R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 47 (Austl.).
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lawyers and cross-examination, rebuttal experts, directions and warnings,"' and the
common sense of juries to identify and overcome weaknesses and limitations in expert
opinion evidence-especially incriminating expert opinions.4 5 5
Australian judges and law reformers have been pre-occupied with the elimination
of partisan bias and improving institutional efficiencies, particularly in civil litigation.
Recourse to formal codes of conduct (for experts), along with the desire to extend the use
of single experts, joint experts and concurrent evidence (so-called "hot tubs") from civil
litigation to the criminal sphere, reinforce the primary interest in institutional efficiencies
and longstanding concerns about expert partisanship rather than the validity and reliability
of incriminating expert opinion evidence and the accuracy and fairness of criminal
456verdicts. Except in the immediate aftermath of miscarriages of justice and wrongful
convictions, and in response to a few specific types of evidence (e.g., bite marks),
Australian judges have been largely disinterested in reliability and have devoted little
attention to critical developments in the U.S. (or Canada).57 Australian judges are yet to
cite or engage with the NRC report, though their complacency, and indifference to
empirical research and reliability, may be disturbed should the recommendations of the
Law Commission of England and Wales, about the need for a formal reliability threshold
in criminal proceedings, be embraced by English parliamentarians or judges.
1. Latent Fingerprint Evidence
Latent fingerprint evidence is presumptively admissible in all Australian
jurisdictions. The long history of admission, dating back to formal consideration by the
High Court in Parker. v. The King (1912), has provided a largely uncontested
admissibility pathway that has not been substantially revisited during the course of the
century, notwithstanding technological refinements, changes in reporting practice and the
introduction of the UEL.459
454 The most a judge might say is: '"Expert evidence is admitted to provide you with ... information and opinion
which is within the witness's expertise, but which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of the
average lay person. The expert evidence is before you as part of all the evidence to assist you with ... [set out the
particular aspect(s) ... ]. You should bear in mind that if, having given the matter careful consideration, you do
not accept the evidence of the [expert/experts], you do not have to act upon it. [Indeed, you do not have to accept
even the unchallenged evidence of an expert]." These are taken from Criminal Trial Courts Benchbook (NSW).
JUDICIAL COMM'N OF N.S.W., CRIMINAL TRIAL COURTS BENCHBOOK (2012), available at
http://wwwjudcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/index.html.
45 The decision, by the defense, to obtain rebuttal expertise, often assuages any judicial concerns about
incriminating opinion evidence.
456 Gary Edmond, Impartiality, Efficiency or Reliability? A Critical Response to Expert Evidence Law and
Procedure in Australia, 42 AuST. J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 83 (2010).
45 There are a few incidental references to Frye and Daubert. On Daubert, see HG v. The Queen (1999) 197
CLR 414, 418 (Austl.); Osland (1998) 197 CLR at 375 (Austl.); Murdochv. The Queen (2007) 167 A. Crim. R.
329, 354 (Austl.); R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A Crim R 377, 410-11 (Austl.); R. v. Karger [2001] SASR 1 (Austl.);
R. v. McIntyre [2001] NSWSC 311, [14-15] (Austl.); R. v. Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462, [35] (Austl.); R. v.
Pantoja [1996] NSWSC 57, [17] (Austl.); R. v. Tillott [1995] NSWSC 83, [106], [111] (Austl.). OnFrye, see R.
v. Parenzee [2007] SASC 143, [63]-[64] (Austl.); R. v. Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237, 252 (Austl.); Mallard v.
The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1, [271]-[97] (Austl.); R. v. Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443, 447 (Austl.); R. v. Rose
(1993) 69 A Crim R 1, [15] (Austl.); R. v. Brown [1990] TASSC 28, [25]-[26] (Austl.); Lewis v. The Queen
(1987) 88 FLR 104, 121-22 (Austl.).
45 Australian judges have looked primarily to England for law reform. Many, though not all, of the civil justice
reforms were drawn from LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1996) and consequent changes to the English rules
of civil procedure (CPR).
459 (1912) 14 CLR 681, 681 (Austl.). See, e.g., Moreshead v. Police [1999] SASC 162, [8] (Austl.); R. v. SMR
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There are no formal restrictions imposed on what a latent fingerprint examiner
might say, by way of identification. The expression of opinions, derived from the
comparison of prints, is largely determined by latent fingerprint examiners (with
sensitivity to other jurisdictions, originally the UK, though increasingly Daubert and
NRC-inspired responses from the U.S.) rather than anything the court or independent
research might demand. No minimum number of points is required, although numbers of
points of similarity are frequently referred to in testimony and used to support the
declaration of a "match" and the attribution of significance. To the extent that they offer
positive testimony, latent fingerprint examiners ordinarily individualize.46 That is, they
declare a match between a latent fingerprint and a print on file as a positive identification
to the exclusion of all other individuals.46 There is no need for a latent fingerprint
examiner to bring photographs or workings to court (to show the tribunal of fact),
although most would probably be willing to do so. Where examiners do rely on exhibits
the jury may be formally exhorted not to engage in its own assessment of the prints.462
There are relatively few challenges, and surprisingly few considered decisions on
the admissibility and basis for identification evidence derived from latent fingerprint
comparison. Positive identifications derived from latent fingerprints are very rarely
contested and it is exceptional to have an expert appear for the defense. Cross-examination
is usually superficial or non-existent and almost never addresses methodological issues
and interpretations, as opposed to possible contamination or obvious mistakes. Judicial
instructions do not tend to warn about the dangers of relying upon a latent fingerprint
match as positive identification-other than in the general terms that even highly skilled
experts might make mistakes.4 63
The few cases where fingerprint (and palm and footprint) evidence has been
excluded (or appeals succeeded) involved fingerprint examiners failing to disclose
substantial weaknesses in opinions or clearly moving beyond their legally-recognized
competence. In Hillstead v. The Queen (2005), for example, the examiner purported to
464link a bloody fingerprint with the accused's presence at the precise moment of death.
This witness, however, had no information about the rate at which blood dries, or the
temperature and humidity in the room, or whether the blood associated with the accused's
465
latent fingerprint was from a pool or a thin smear. According to the Court, the witness
could only testify about the existence of a match and its significance in relation to
466
identification. To say more was to transgress the boundaries of the witness's expertise.
Problems with latent fingerprint evidence are understood and presented as
individual failings (due to inexperience or hubris-going beyond the proper scope of the
"field", as in the previous example) rather than problems with the underlying methodology
and/or the totalizing manner in which results are expressed.
460 DNA and fingerprint experts are sometimes called to explain that no fingerprint or DNA sample was
recovered.
461 R. v. SMR [2002] NSWCCA 258, [86]-[91] (Austl.) (discussing Parker. v. The King, (1912) 14 CLR 681, 681
and Moreshead v. Police [1999] SASC 162).
462 Bennett v. Police [2005] SASC 167, [7] (Austl.). Originally jurors were shown images to consider, but more
recent cases suggest hat it is experts who should undertake comparisons: R. v. Lawless [1974] VR 398 (Austl.).
463 There is no heading in the Criminal Trial Courts Benchbook advising on judicial instructions for fingerprint
evidence. JUDICIAL COMM'N OF N.S.W., CRIMINAL TRIAL COURTS BENCHBOOK (2012), available at
http://wwwjudcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/index.html.
464 Hillstead v. The Queen [2005] WASCA 116, [34] (Austl.).
465 Id. at [42].
466 Id. at [63].
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2. DNA Evidence
DNA evidence is interesting because trial judges and appellate courts were
reasonably cautious in their uptake. Notwithstanding the traditionally liberal approach of
the common law, several courts initially excluded, or upheld the exclusion of, DNA
evidence: because the prejudicial effect was considered to outweigh the probative value;
because of problems with the technology (e.g., whether faints bands were artifacts) and
the danger that the jury might undertake their own comparison; because of questions
associated with population statistics and the size of databases; and, because the jury might
be confused or overwhelmed.467 From the mid-1990s, around the time of the second NRC
report (US), Australian courts largely accepted that DNA techniques were admissible (and
reliable). Subsequently, challenges were almost always left to the trial and for weight.
Since that time the major issues have been the introduction of new techniques and
commercial kits (e.g., PCR and Profiler Plus), the soundness of databases and their
applicability to indigenous populations, and the appropriate way to express results.
In R. v. Jarrett, the South Australian Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of
PCR techniques even before the reporting issue was effectively settled by the second NRC
report in 1996.468 For Mulligan J, resolving disagreement between mainstream scientists
469
was a matter for the jury. In R. v. Humphrey, Bleby J dismissed an admissibility
challenge to the database and distinguished the discretionary exclusions in R. v. Green and
R. v. Pantoja.470 The same Court also dismissed the challenge to the adoption of the
Profiler Plus system, after an unusually lengthy voir dire in R. v. Karger.n More recently,
in R. v. Murdoch, the Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal (NTCCA) expressed
ambivalence about incriminating evidence, and expert disagreement, associated with
results obtained through LCN techniques, though without deeming the incriminating
opinions inadmissible.4 72
Other challenges have appeared in response to the population statistics applied to
Australian Aborigines and some unexpected results from criminal databases, possibly due
to recidivists changing names (i.e., using aliases).4 73 Judges, particularly in NSW, continue
to wrestle with the expression of results derived from population statistics. Originally, this
emerged in relation to paternity indices (as opposed to percentages) and more recently in
the way random match probabilities should be presented at trial. 7  The main issues
occupying the appellate courts tend to be the expression of probabilities associated with
DNA matches4" and whether DNA evidence alone can sustain a conviction.476
467 See R. v. Pantoja [1996] NSWSC 57, [85] (Austl.); R. v. Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443, 455-56 (discussing R.
v. Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 (Austl.)); R. v. Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109 (Austl.); R. v. Green (unreported,
NSWCCA, 26 Mar. 1993) (Austl.).
468 R. v. Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443, 458 (Austl.).
469 R. v. Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1, [659] (Austl.).
470 R. v. Humphrey (1999) 72 SASR 558, 563-64 (Austl.).
471 Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1, 125 (AustI.) (influential on R. v. McIntyre [2001] NSWSC 311, [8]). See also R. v.
Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462, [36] (Austl.).
472 Murdochv. The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329, 363-64 (Austl.).
473 See, e.g., R.v. Pantoja [1996] NSWSC 57, [30]-[31] (Austl.).
474 R. v. GK (2001) 125 A Crim R 315 (Austl.); R. v. JCG (2001) 127 A Crim R 493, [112] (Austl.); R. v. Lisoff
[1999] NSWCCA 364, [49] (Austl.).
475 Aytugrulv. The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 157, 174-76 (Austl.), aff'd, [2012] HCA 15 (Austl.). See also
Andrew Ligertwood, Can DNA Evidence Alone Convict an Accused? 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 487 (2011).
476 See Jeremy Gans, A Tale ofTwo High Court Forensic Cases, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 515, 527-28 (2011).
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In trials, the possibility of innocent transfer and the interpretation of results (e.g.,
electropherograms) are not infrequently explored in cross-examination. There have been a
few successful appeals: where experts disagreed over interpretations of a mixed sample
(R. v. Juric); where secondary transfer was not excluded by the prosecution (R. v. Joyce);
and, where prosecution disclosure was incomplete (Hillier. v. R). Although, these cases
should be considered exceptional.4 ' Several high profile mistakes with DNA evidence,
particularly in Victoria, have stimulated public and private inquiries, but these seem to
4781have done little to temper overall confidence in DNA evidence.
Today there are very few constraints on the admission and presentation of DNA
evidence. Short of obvious contamination or clearly inappropriate forms of expression,
DNA evidence is admissible and routinely admitted. Most of the institutions undertaking
DNA analysis (for the prosecution) tend to report in probabilistic terms-purporting to be
conservative, the probabilities almost never exceed 1 in 10 billion in written documents (at
least). That is, greater than the number of persons currently believed to be living on earth.
Where incriminating DNA evidence is not available the prosecutor often calls a forensic
biologist to provide reasons for the failure to obtain any positive (i.e., incriminating)
results-so-called "negative evidence. "47
3. Bite Marks
The admissibility of the opinion evidence of dentists, orthodontists and
odontologists on bite mark comparison and identification is complicated by a series of
controversial convictions, particularly the role of English and Australian odontologists in
the notorious wrongful conviction of Lindy Chamberlain for the murder of her daughter,
Azaria ("the dingo baby").4so Because of this negative experience, since the mid-1980s
Australian judges have taken an uncharacteristically skeptical approach to incriminating
bite mark evidence and several common law judges have demonstrated a willingness to
exclude it.4 1
It is probably no coincidence that bite mark evidence is still considered by some
judges and commentators as controversial. In R. v. Lewis, perhaps the leading Australian
bite mark decision, the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory considered the
reliability, rather than just the field and qualifications (which were actually recognized, as
satisfied, in the earlier R. v. Carroll (1985) appeal). Interestingly, in considering the
admissibility of incriminating bite mark evidence, the Court suggested that the Crown had
a duty to explicate through evidence, "in ordinary language", the expert's "discipline and
methods necessary to put them in a position to make some sort of evaluation of the
4813
opinions he expresses"-a form of the basis rule. Where the expert evidence is of a
477 See R. v. Juric (2002) 129 A CrimR 408, [15]; R. v. Joyce (2002) 173 FLR 322, [324]; Hillier. v. Rex [2008]
ACTCA 3.
478 See, e.g., F H R VINCENT, REPORT: INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT LED TO THE CONVICTION OF MR
FARAH ABDULKADIR JAMA (2010).
479 See, e.g., Sankey v. Whitlam(1978) 142 CLR 1, 56.
480 See EVIL ANGELS (Cannon Entertainment 1988); see also JUSTICE T.R. MORLING, ROYAL COMMISSIONOF
INQUIRY INTO CHAMBERLAIN CONVICTIONS (1987) (which was contemporaneous with Lewis v. The Queen
(1987) 88 FLR 104 and R. v. Carroll [1985] A CrimR 410 and involved some of the same expert witnesses); see
also Gary Edmond, Azaria sAccessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction ofthe Chamberlains' Guilt
and Innocence 22 MELB.U.L.REV. 396 (1998).
481 See Lewis (1987) 88 FLR at 115-17.
482 Lewis (1987) 88 FLR at 123-24. See R. v. Carroll [2001] QCA 394, [6]-[8] (discussing R. v. Carroll (1985) 19
A Crim R 410 (Austl.)).
48 Lewis (1987) 88 FLR 104, 124.
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"comparatively novel kind, the duty resting on the Crown is even higher: it should
demonstrate its scientific reliability.""'
Lewis-like the early DNA appeals-is now decades old and sits awkwardly
with the very accommodating trend toward incriminating expert opinion evidence
4815currently in vogue under the UEL and the common law. Because the individuals
purporting to undertake bite mark analysis and comparisons possess tertiary qualifications,
it is likely that Australian judges will gradually admit this evidence, even if longstanding
skepticism manifests in restrictions upon the way interpretations are expressed (as in the
case of images, below).
4. Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings
a. Opinions about Images
A range of individuals with formal qualifications and/or through repeated
exposure are allowed to express opinions about the identity of persons of interest (POI) in
images associated with criminal activity (e.g. CCTV recordings) or to interpret what is
transpiring in them. Here we can observe how weak "body of knowledge or experience"
and "specialised knowledge" are in practice. Judges have tended to allow those with
formal qualifications in anatomy and physical anthropology or experience as forensic
photographers and intelligence analysts-rather than photo-interpretation-and those who
have acquired their "knowledge" or "experience" during the course of an investigation
(such as police officers) to express incriminating opinions-usually about the identity of
offenders (sometimes as ad hoc experts). The former group, with formal qualifications, are
sometimes described as "facial mappers" or "face and body mappers." Most use
morphological (i.e., impressionistic assessments of form) rather than anthropometrical
(i.e., quantitative) techniques of comparison. Of the variety of witnesses qualified as
"expert" and allowed to express incriminating opinions, few have expertise in image
interpretation and specialization in face and/or body comparison. Few, if any have a
demonstrated ability to compare POI in conditions where the images are of low quality,
highly distorted, poorly lit, out of focus, and the POI often wear disguises or baggy
clothing and hats, and the images may be obtained years, and sometimes decades, apart.
Initially, these witnesses, including some with graduate qualifications, and senior
academic positions, were allowed to express positive opinions about the identity of
persons of interest (e.g., "one and the same"). However, more recently, they have been
required to refrain from making positive identifications (i.e. individualizations) and to
restrict their testimony to evidence of similarities and, in theory, differences. n7 Though, it
is now common for Australian facial mappers to testify in terms of "high similarity" or
"high level of anatomical similarity." Several have adopted the scale relied upon by many
English witnesses (see R. v. Atkins and Table 1, above).
Image comparison witnesses are routinely sent only two sets of images-one set
of the person of interest and one reference set of the suspect (based on a police forensic
procedure)-and are often told about the suspect and other features of the case. Such
484 id.
485 See, e.g., R. v. Humphrey (1999) 72 SASR 558, 562-63 (AustI.).
486 See, e.g., R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 47.
487 R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A CrimR 377 at 384; Murdoch v. The Queen (2007) 167 A CrimR 329, 346-47; R. v.
Tanner [2010] SADC 128, [5]-[8] (Austl.); R. v. A [2010] SADC 126, [7]-[12] (AustI.); R. v. Miller[2008]
SADC 86, [90]-[93] (AustI.); R. v. Harradine [2008] SADC 179, [33]-[37]; R. v. Dastagir [2013] SASC 26
(AustI.) R. v. Alrekabi [2007] NSWDC 110, [28]-[34] (AustI.).
488 See R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [16]-[18] (Eng.).
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suggestive procedures, to the extent that they are considered problematic or revealed, are
treated as issues for cross-examination and weight (rather than admissibility or
exclusion-on grounds of unfair prejudice).
Investigating police, with some familiarity of suspects-such as that obtained
through the course of an investigation or prior arrest-are not allowed to express opinions
489based on the interpretation of incriminating images. In contrast to England and Canada,
this evidence is treated as inadmissible because of its deemed irrelevance-incapable of
rationally assisting with the assessment of facts in issue, because the jury can make the
same comparison-rather than because of reliability issues.4 9 0 Police and other
investigators are, however, allowed to express opinions, including positive opinions about
identity, where they have some perceived advantage over the jury caused by changes in
the accused's appearance or because the tribunal of fact will not have an opportunity to
observe the defendant in motion (i.e., gait evidence).4 9 1 These exceptions, to the general
rule against positive identification, might be based on features as vague as the way a
person holds their head, the tendency to swing an arm while walking, or due to a modified
hairstyle or weight gain.492
Recently, the Court of Criminal Appeal in NSW, has excluded the opinion
evidence of an anatomist concerning similarities in body shapes between images of a
disguised armed robber and a person accused of the robbery.49 3 In the absence of
information about his method of photo-interpretation and without credible information
about the prevalence of body shapes, the witnesses' similarity evidence was considered
inadmissible.4 9 4 The decision seems to have rendered "body mapping" evidence
inadmissible (at least where the offender is well disguised) though without restricting the
provision of facial comparison evidence relying upon analogous techniques.4 9 5
b. Opinions about Voices (and Sounds)
Expert opinion evidence about the identity of voices (and sounds) is generally
496admissible and admitted. Voice identification evidence is even less regulated than the
interpretation of images, and frequently (especially under the UEL) is not even treated as
evidence of opinion.497 As in Canada, the identification of a voice is often classified as
direct evidence, or evidence of fact rather than interpretation (i.e., opinion). At common
law, and under the UEL, language scholars and linguists are allowed to proffer
4981
incriminating opinions about identity. Sometimes these opinions may refer to voices
489 Smithy. The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650, 655-56, 657-70 (AustI.) (the majority treated the lay opinion
evidence as irrelevant and thus inadmissible whereas Kirby, J., treated the lay opinion evidence as relevant but
inadmissible).
490 Smithy. The Queen (2001) 206 CLR at 655.
491 See Nguyenv. The Queen (2007) 180 A Crim R 267, 272-73 (Austl.); Liv. The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R
281, 294-95 (Austl.); Smithy. The Queen (2001) 206 CLR at 656.
492 See Li (2003) 139 A Crim R at 294-95; Smith (2001) 206 CLR at 656. Limited familiarity may also provide a
basis for a police officer to offer positive identification evidence, notwithstanding Smith (2001) 206 CLR at 653.
See, e.g., Nguyen (2007) 180 A Crim R at 272.
493 See Morganv. The Queen [2011] NSWCCA257, [144]-[46] (Austl.).
494 Id. at [132]-[33].
495 See id. at [123]-[27] (citing R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A Crim R 377, 409).
496 See, e.g., Li (2003) 139 A Crim R at 292-93.
497 Id. at 289-90.
498 See R. v. Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310 (Austl.) (citing R. v. McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733; Gilmore
[1977] 2 NSWLR 935 (noting that these cases are relatively old and involved the use of apparently discredited
techniques such as spectrographs and sonograms)). See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION(1979).
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speaking in languages with which the listener is not familiar, and even where-as in most
cases-their actual expertise is not in the realm of voice comparison.499 Similarly,
interpreters and translators and even investigating police officers without voice
comparison training or experience, are allowed to express incriminating opinions, all as ad
hoc experts, on the basis of their exposure to voices during translations, surveillance or
interactions with the accused on arrest or during a search.oo
All of these witnesses are allowed to make positive identifications (i.e.,
individualize) in circumstances where they are not familiar with the voices and even
where the voices they are comparing speak in different languages (e.g., Mandarin and
English) and their exposure, or the length and quality of samples, is limited.5 0 1 In many
cases, the witness is told by investigators, prior to their analysis, to whom the voice is
believed to belong.502
As with image analysis, it is not clear that there is a mature field of forensic voice
comparison capable of consistently producing reliable evidence about identity.503 The
need for a 'field" or "specialized knowledge" tends to be either ignored or trivialized.
Faced with the potential exclusion of incriminating opinions judges often refer to the,
apparently unpalatable, alternatives of requiring the jury to listen to recordings that are
often very long, of low quality and (arguably of) marginal relevance, and sometimes in
foreign languages or, more radically, excluding the evidence. Significantly, juries are
routinely encouraged to undertake their own voice comparisons, even where they have
already heard the opinion evidence and the voices are speaking in different languages
(e.g., English and the Nigerian language of Igbo).son
II. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Having supplied a survey of admissibility practices in four jurisdictions, this part
draws on similarities and differences between these jurisdictions, as well as our collective
research experience, to identify key themes in the admissibility of forensic identification
sciences. Observing that admissibility practice tends to be similar across jurisdictions, we
first anticipate and counter the proposition that widespread admissibility of forensic
identification sciences reflects that the techniques are basically reliable. It is simply not
possible to know the reliability of many common techniques because they have never been
properly studied. In some instances, techniques that continue to be routinely admitted have
499 Li (2003) 139 A Crim R at 287-89.
'oo Compare R. v. El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461, [96]-[98] (Austl.); andR. v. Riscuta [2003]
NSWCCA 6, [7]-[8] (Austl.); and R. v. Gao [2003] NSWCCA 390, [20]-[24] (Austl.); andR. v.
Camilleri (2001) 127 A Crim R 290, 296-97 (Austl.); andR. v. Leung [1999] NSWCCA 287, [6]-
[11] (Austl.); with R. v. Rich (No 6) [2008] VSC 436 (Austl.); and R. v. Harris (No 3) [1990] VR
310.
'' See Li (2003) 139 A CrimR at 287-88. But cf Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310, 322-23 (Ormiston, J., ruling that
evidence should be excluded on judge's discretion due to questionable methodology).
502 Relevant experimental literatures are almost never cited or discussed by lawyers or judges. Problems, to the
extent that they are identified and recognized, tend to be conveyed in abstract terms to the jury. See Gary Edmond
et al., Unsound Law: Issues With (Expert) Voice Comparison Evidence 35 MELB.U.L.REv. 52, 54 (2011).
'o3 Although, there is ongoing research into more robust forms of voice comparison. See, e.g., Joaquin Gonzalez-
Rodriguez et al., Emulating DNA: Rigorous Quantification ofEvidential Weight in Transparent and Testable
Forensic Speaker Recognition, 15 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUDIO, SPEECH & LANGUAGE PROCESSING 2104
(2007).
504 See, e.g., Bulejcikv. The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375, 381-82 (Austl.); Korgbara v. The Queen (2007) 210
FLR 36, 36-7 (Austl.); Nevillev. The Queen (2004) 145 A CrimR 108, 124-25 (Austl.); Nguyenv. The Queen
(2002) 131 A Crim R 341, [138]-[40]. But see R. v. Lawless [1974] VR 398 (whereinthe jury is formally
proscribed from assessing the fingerprint evidence, as opposed to the experts opinion).
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been demonstrated to be incapable of reliable individualization. This leaves us with the
surprising conclusion that admissibility standards seem not to make much difference to the
rigor with which courts scrutinize expert evidence. We canvass several possible
explanations for the broad trend towards admitting expert opinion evidence without a
demanding assessment of reliability, and consider some of the implications of this
impulse. This part also considers some important differences among and between
jurisdictions, and the possible sources of these differences.
A. Basic Conclusion: Admissibility Standards Do Not Seem to Make
Much Difference
Our basic conclusion-which may surprise many readers, particularly lawyers,
and disappoint those contemplating law reform-is that formal admissibility standards do
not seem to make much difference. Formal admissibility standards, particularly those
incorporating reliability, are not enforced in ways that regulate the reception of expert
opinion evidence that is of unknown reliability. On the basis of the preceding examples,
there does not appear to be a coherent, let alone principled, approach to the admission of
incriminating expert opinion evidence in any of these jurisdictions and admissibility
standards do not seem to clearly correlate with admissibility practice.
Table 2 (below) provides a summary of our basic findings. Given considerable
variation in rules, the similarities in response should be considered revealing, especially
where the reliability and appropriate way to express the results of most of these techniques
continues to generate controversy.
Jurisdiction DNA Latent fingerprint Bite mark Image comparison Voice comparison
(and comparison comparison comparison
admissibility
standard)
US Admissible Admissible Admissible Admissible Admissible
(reliability) (probabilistic) (individualization) (individualization) (individualization) (generally not
spectrographs)
Canada Admissible Admissible Admissible Admissible (non- Admissible
(reliability) (probabilistic) (individualization) (individualization) expert opinion & (individualization)
individualization
where familiar)
England (no Admissible Admissible Admissible Admissible Admissible
reliability) (probabilistic) (individualization) (individualization) (individualization) (individualization)
Australia (no Admissible Admissible Admissible Admissible Admissible
reliability) (probabilistic) (individualization) (individualization - (similarities only; (individualization)
some caution) no 'body mapping')
Table 2: Summary of admissibility practice with respect to jurisdiction and type of
evidence
Regardless of the admissibility standard, whether "assistance to the jury",
"specialized knowledge", recognized "expertise" or "experience" (more below), 'field" or
the need for "reliability", all of the jurisdictions considered in this article admit most
forensic science and medical techniques proffered by the state. They "qualify" individuals,
sometimes highly trained scientists from adjacent domains, as experts. Individuals without
relevant expertise or investigators whose only experience was obtained in an unsystematic
manner during the course of a criminal investigation (or series of investigations) are also
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frequently found by the courts to possess "expertise" that allows them to testify. While
there are some variations in what these "experts" are permitted (or might prefer) to say,
typically any qualifications imposed by courts bear no relation to what empirical research
can support (or what the experts themselves might otherwise say: see infra Section
II.C.).sos Sometimes the absence of underlying research is used to impose restrictions
(such as limiting those performing image comparison in Australia to descriptions of
similarities) as something of an admissibility compromise, although that is not always the
case (e.g. voice comparison in Australia). Moreover, most jurisdictions enable legally
qualified experts to express opinions that exceed what available research could credibly
support. "Legally qualified" or recognized experts are not necessarily experts in the sense
that they are masters of their domain or can even do what they claim.
Contrary to the expectations of some, the introduction of new admissibility
standards purportedly indexed to reliability in the U.S. and Canada has not radically
disrupted historical settlements around admissibility practices and the expression of
506
opinions. Rather, the response to techniques and opinions, including new techniques,
seems to be guided as much by an inclusionary ethos as a consistent interest in validity,
reliability, error rates or proficiency.o7 Inverting procedural propriety, admissibility
standards seem to be indexed to the proffered techniques with a general commitment to
admission rather than a genuine interest in reliability (or even relevance).5os Significantly,
DNA evidence was exposed to aggressive challenges, (and higher admissibility
standards), because: there was a great deal of published research and specialized
knowledge in the possession of non-forensic scientists (i.e., mainstream scientific
researchers); the defense eventually obtained access to highly qualified research scientists
who were critical of existing practice; there was a good deal of controversy (and criticism
from) beyond the courts; and, DNA profiling had many potentially valuable criminal
justice uses so it was widely seen as important (by investigative communities, as well as
politicians and judges) to "get it right." Even so, it took a public controversy characterized
as the "DNA wars", two formal (extra-legal) inquiries, several years and hundreds of
millions of dollars, to stabilize the technology and interpretations derived from population
statistics.5 0 9 At best, the courts played an indirect and inconsistent role in the refinement of
DNA techniques and evidence.1 o Significantly, the responses to DNA evidence are not
representative of responses to other types of forensic science and forensic medicine
evidence.
Interestingly, recent challenges to the forensic sciences-primarily in the United
States-emerged in the aftermath of Daubert and largely in the shadow of the controversy
"o Interestingly, expert witnesses are often willing to say more than courts will allow. It is the courts, rather than
experimental evidence, that often shape the way experts express opinions. If experts had done the necessary
research, courts would have much more limited grounds for overriding the bases for opinions. Intervention
usually reflects ignorance and judicial concern, even if it does not lead to exclusion.
06 Edward K. Cheng& Albert H. Yoon, Does Fry or DaubertMatter? 91 VA.L.REV. 471 (2005).
1o7 See Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos: The Convergence of Corporate and
Judicial Attitudes towards the Admissibility ofExpert Evidence in TortLitigation, 26 LAW &POL1Y 231, 235-36
(2004).
'0' See Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws
and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 A.B.A. J. 16, 28 (2005); Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed
Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. &
Soc. SCI. 149 (2008).
509 See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA
PROFILING (2007); see also DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2010).
50 See Gary Edmond, Review Essay: The Building Blocks ofForensic Science and Law: Recent Work on DNA
Profiling (and Photo Comparison), 41 SOC. STUD. SCI. 127 (2011).
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associated with DNA evidence and its stabilization.511 Challenges to the forensic sciences
seem to have been an unintended (and largely unforeseen) consequence of Daubert-itself
a response to perceived problems with expert evidence in civil proceedings-informed by
the DNA wars, ongoing skirmishes around a range of forensic techniques (e.g.,
handwriting, voiceprints, latent fingerprints, bullet lead, ballistics and tool marks) and
more recently and directly, authoritative intervention by the National Academy of
Sciences (through the NRC) and high profile Innocence Projects.5 12
This is all revealing. It illustrates how admissibility jurisprudence and practice
are potentially open to exogenous influences. Admissibility standards stipulating the need
for reliable expert opinion evidence, though largely dormant in the criminal justice
system, eventually stimulated sufficient dissonance to encourage scholarly criticism that
led to NAS intervention. Admissibility standards are always available as a resource with
the potential to be mobilized to challenge and exclude expert opinion evidence that is
insufficiently reliable. Unfortunately, there seems to be limited interest in questioning
technical abilities when it comes to the legal assessment of most of the comparison
sciences. Not insignificantly, the operation of admissibility regimes predicated upon
reliability seem to be confounded by earlier liberal admissibility practices that make
reversals (i.e., exclusion) institutionally unsettling in criminal justice systems concerned
with rectitude of decision, finality and managing their social legitimacy in societies
increasingly anxious about crime and the costs of criminal justice.5 1 3
B. Reliability?
Before proceeding to consider a variety of issues and implications flowing from
our basic conclusion (and research experience), we want to discount one possible
response. It might be argued that admissibility practice is similar across these four
jurisdictions because the various forensic science techniques are basically reliable. We
believe this response to be untenable. Returning to the NRC report (and unanswered
criticisms directed toward many forensic science and medicine techniques), it is our
contention that, with the exception of most of the DNA techniques, among our sample
there is limited research supporting many of the claims routinely advanced by forensic
scientists in courts. In many domains the value of techniques is simply unknown. Rather
than demonstrable evidence of reliability-such as validity studies that would inform our
understanding of ability and accuracy-many of these and other techniques (e.g.,
comparison or analysis or foot, shoe and ear prints, hair and fibers, documents, ballistics,
explosives, tool marks, blood spatter, stab wounds, soils and so on) are considered to be
effective because they are used in investigations and prosecutions and have assisted in the
production of "guilt." That is, forensic sciences (and forensic scientists) are often judged
against their role in securing convictions. In some forensic science "fields", legal
decisions to admit the evidence, the ability to withstand cross-examination, and
contributions to guilty verdicts, represent the primary forms of "proof' of reliability-
. Though, some challenges, such as those to handwriting, pre-date DNA evidence. See D. Michael Risinger,
Symposium: Daubert, Innocence, and the Future ofForensic Science: Goodbye to All That, or A Fool's Errand,
By One of the Fools: How I Stopped WorryingAbout Court Responses toHandwriting Identification (and
"Forensic Science" in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations ofKumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA
L.REv. 447, 454 (2007); D. Michael Risinger& Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Court: Daubert
Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWAL.REV.21 (1996); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons ofHandwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U.PA.
L.REV. 731, 772-73 (1989); NAT'LRESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 498, at 58.
512 See generally BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS Go
WRONG (2011); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION & OTHER DISPATCHES
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1st ed., 2000).
. It is our contention that accuracy ought to trump finality.
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sometimes characterized as "testing." In the absence of evidence of ability, derived from
case-like conditions where correct answers are known-thereby excluding trials and guilty
verdicts-legal responses do not provide appropriate grounds for epistemic confidence.
Premature legal recognition of insufficiently reliable techniques and opinions may
discourage research, contribute to the emergence and persistence of inferior techniques,
and simultaneously threaten some of the primarily objectives of the accusatorial trial (see
infra Section II.C.). In many cases unreliable forensic science techniques and misleading
interpretations will have contributed to pleas and/or guilty verdicts. Inattention to
capabilities and actual reliability means that evidence may have been misleading and
processes unfair. The expert evidence may have been mistaken and in some proportion of
cases independent opportunities to expose erroneous assumptions or leads, false
confessions, or misleading evidence (such as erroneous eyewitness identifications) were
lost.,,,
Inattention to the reliability of forensic science and medicine means that
prosecution cases may appear stronger than they actually are (or were). Such impressions
have the potential to mislead prosecutors, defense lawyers (at trial, and when advising on
pleas), juries and judges as well as forensic scientists. The upshot is that legal practice is
not a credible platform on which to ground claims about efficacy. The courtroom cannot
replace validity, reliability and proficiency studies. Forensic science techniques can only
be evaluated through empirical study separate from actual investigations and
prosecutions .
There is limited evidence to support the reliability of many forensic science
techniques (the examples we have chosen are broadly representative), and in consequence,
there is a need to explain admissibility in terms other than the actual research base and
technical abilities. We accept that DNA profiling evidence represents something of an
exception, but have included it as an influential recent development that casts much
needed light on many established forensic science institutions, techniques and
assumptions.516 It is significant that many of the most aggressive challenges have been
made against DNA evidence. Whether other forms of forensic science and medicine can
(or even should) emulate DNA is contentious, though ultimately doubtful.
With respect to many forensic science and medicine techniques (and expert
opinions drawn from the social sciences and humanities), mimicking practices associated
with DNA will be inappropriate.5 " This should not, however, divert attention from
empirical study, notably validity and valuation studies-even if the results will rarely be
514 See GARRETT, supra note 512.
. See Bruce Budowle et al.,A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic Sciences and
Direction for Continuing Advancement, 54 J.FORENSIC SCI. 798, 806-07 (2009).
516 See id. at 804-06. We accept that some areas of forensic science are quite reliable. Many areas of chemistry
are, for example, very reliable and, like DNA techniques, closely linked to research and commercial communities
beyond the institutionalized forensic sciences. ARONSON, supra note 509, at 98. We also recognize that in some
contexts, such as around the use of drugs in sport, where there are very considerable resources available (and at
stake), the level of assessment and evidence is generally of a much higher standard than in many serious criminal
investigations.
1 This is, in part, a response to the power of DNA evidence, but also reflects the availability of independent
experts able to testify about the processes and interpretations initially adopted by the state and manufacturers. See
Budowle et al., supra note 515, at 804.
. See Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility ofState's Forensic Science and
Medical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 343 at 391-95 (2011) (discussing R. v. Abbey 2009 ONCA 624).
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519as compelling as those associated with DNA profiling and population statistics.
Responses to DNA evidence, along with conspicuous differences between the responses to
DNA evidence and many other areas of forensic science, illuminate inconsistencies (and
unsustainable consistencies) in legal practice as well as the epistemic frailty of techniques
(and opinions) that are not derived from scientific research and not routinely used by (non-
forensic) scientists. Conclusions based on these techniques are routinely expressed in
confident terms-where the accused is not merely implicated, but actually identified, often
to the exclusion of all other persons in the world (or who have ever lived).520 Legal
responses betray serious limitations in law-science relations, including a remarkably
accommodating response to forensic science and medicine evidence and authority, and are
suggestive of the difficulties courts have encountered and will experience even more
acutely as they endeavor to renegotiate longstanding admissibility settlements.5 2 1
C. Explanations for the Basic Conclusion
The basic conclusion that admissibility standards seem to make little difference
in the admission of many types of forensic science, coupled with our rejection of the
proposition that this reflects essential reliability, raises difficult questions about why it has
proven difficult to focus legal attention on assessing reliability. In this section, we provide
a number of linked explanations for this difficulty. Suggesting that courts have tended to
use experience as a proxy for expertise, and that they have been generally uninterested in
scientific literatures leads us to the possibility that judges and lawyers have substituted a
legally-negotiated concept of reliability (which might be labeled forensic reliability) for
the empirical concept of reliability that we might have expected to see. A seeming lack of
interest in empirical studies of courts' practices has compounded this tendency. When
inescapable problems do arise, as when wrongful convictions are produced by poor-
quality forensic science and medicine evidence, courts tend to blame those problems on
individual experts and thereby sidestep engaging with the possibility that legal processes
might create systematic vulnerabilities to unreliable and speculative forms of expert
opinion evidence. We suggest hat the legal concept of forensic reliability is predicated on
confidence in the capacity of trial safeguards, such as cross-examination, to reveal
shortcomings in expert evidence, and that this trust in trial safeguards is accompanied by a
faith in the capacity of triers of fact to understand expert testimony and combine it
rationally with other evidence. In short, it may be that lack of attention to empirical
research allows judges to remain unpersuaded that careful attention to reliability adds
anything of substance to available trial safeguards. Given the disruptive potential of
adopting a more critical stance towards routine forensic comparison evidence, and the
often-stated desire to avoid intruding too far upon the role of the tribunal of fact, this
ambivalence may help to explain judicial reluctance to engage deeply with reliability.
1. Demarcating Science from Non-Science, and 'Testing' and
'Experience'
Boundary work around what constitutes science, as opposed to some technical
realm of expertise derived primarily from experience frequently tempers the application of
reliability standards. Judges often read down the need for reliability to accommodate the
practices of a field or group of practitioners rather than attend to what might be required to
519 See Jason M. Tangen et al., Identifying Fingerprint Expertise, 22PSCHOLOGICAL SC. 995, 997 (2011). DNA
profiling and population statistics may actually be more straightforward than voice and image comparison. See
Budowle et al., supra note 515, at 804.
520 See Oregonv. Angius, No. 200924231, at *2 (Or. Cir. Ct. July 2, 2010).
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demonstrate that a technique is valid and accurate, or the practitioners genuinely
proficient.522
There is much that could be said about philosophical and sociological work on
523science/non-science boundaries. In the context of the forensic sciences, however, the
primary issue is not whether some technique or skill is characterized as scientific (or non-
scientific) or technical, but rather whether the individual can do what they claim and how
we know this. In relation to the vast majority of techniques and practices, gauging
proficiency requires some kind of empirical assessment. Too often forensic scientists and
others involved in providing technical and scientific opinions in relation to investigations
and prosecutions evaluate their performance against past legal recognition, convictions,
and appeals to experience, as epistemic justifications. Such metrics are inappropriate.
When it comes to techniques and practices that are used reasonably regularly, and
especially those used routinely, there should be extensive testing of both the techniques
and practitioners in realistic case conditions, where the correct result is known. This is the
only way to obtain credible information about capabilities and limitations whether
classified as scientific, technical or experiential.5 2 4
"Experience" is often used to recognize "expertise" and facilitate the admission
of opinion evidence in the absence of experimental studies. While 'experience' is included
as a basis for opinion in several jurisdictions-both common law (e.g., England, Canada
and Australia) and "statutory" (e.g., FRE 702 and UEL s79)-courts rarely consider the
particular experience in detail and very rarely take notice of how the experience was
obtained, the nature of the experience and whether it is systematic and rigorous. One of
the problems with recourse to "experience", that includes its role in techniques in regular
or even routine use, is that we do not know if the technique works nor how accurate it is,
nor if the expert performs better than a juror (or judge) orjury.
An individual's experience does not provide a basis to ground the admission of
techniques and opinions that can be readily assessed but have not been. There is good
reason to believe that people's experiences manifest very differently and equip them in
quite divergent ways. Moreover, and this reflects the procedural difficulties associated
with opinions predicated upon (or primarily upon) "experience", it can be very difficult to
effectively challenge the testimony of persons who purport to base their opinions on
experience. Opinions based on experience are frequently ipse dixit (i.e., bare assertion)
525
even if they are not presented or understood in this way. Where the witness is an ad hoc
expert or, as in the case of Canadian image witnesses, proffers non-expert opinion
evidence on the basis of quite limited familiarity with the accused, there are even fewer
reasons to believe that the opinion offered by the witness is reliable. Moreover, such
witnesses are not usually familiar with relevant literatures, appropriate processes or
common mistakes, nor methodological limitations that might erode the probative (if not
necessarily the persuasive) value of their opinions. Such opinions are difficult to challenge
and lay people-both jurors and judges-are likely to assume that techniques in long or
widespread use have been properly studied and shown to be reliable. Where experience is
relied upon as the basis for admission (and credibility), the accused needs to persuade the
judge and tribunal of fact about limitations, but must also overcome the implicit
522 This has been characterized judicially as 'sufficiently reliable' or 'threshold reliability,' though Professor
Edmond prefers the phrase 'demonstrable reliability.' Edmond & Roach, supra note 330, at 345.
523 See, e.g., THOMAS F. GIERYN, CULTURAL BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE 9 3 (1999).
524 See Tangen et al., supra note 520.
525 We do not wish to suggest that experience is not incredibly valuable, but rather to reject the assertion that
experience alone is sufficient to ground admissibility for techniques. There is, instead, a need for empirical
assessment. Id. at 997.
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endorsement, even imprimatur, conferred by admission (and prior use). "Experience", in
the absence of testing, tends to prevent appropriate scrutiny and weighing. In fact, when
confronted with methodological and reliability challenges, it is common for courts and
persons recognized (in court) as experts to place great weight on experience and historical
use.526
2. The Absence of Scientific Literatures and Knowledge
One interesting feature of the focus on experience rather than testing is the
infrequency with which courts are presented with relevant and recent research-let alone
synoptic literature reviews pertinent to the issues before the court-from professional
527scholarly communities and researchers. Rather, lawyers and judges often rehearse and
imagine a range of issues that may, or may not, bear upon some of the main issues and
problems with forensic science techniques and the expression of results as opinions-
often from their own experience. These are sometimes expressed, though usually clumsily
and only partially, in admissibility challenges and directions and warnings.528
In relatively few of the decisions are there references to relevant non-legal
529literatures or authority. In most proceedings and, consequently reported decisions, the
parties and the "experts" do not tend to refer to relevant scientific studies or bring the
court's attention to the existence of critical literatures and challenges to the value of
techniques or the manner in which evidence is expressed-even when these are known to
the state's expert witness (and required by ethical obligations or formal codes of
conduct).5 3 0 As a result, lawyers, judges and juries are often oblivious to relevant
literatures, critical commentary, experimental research and alternative techniques that
might be directly relevant to the evidence and the issues confronting the court.
In most Anglo-Australian jurisdictions, judges are formally proscribed or
informally discouraged from undertaking their own research. In consequence, trial and
appellate judges are at the mercy of the parties and a system that does not adequately
support the defense, particularly in relation to expert evidence. Admissibility decision-
making is vitally important, but prosecutors and defense lawyers have been unwilling or
incapable of improving admissibility practice. Notably, the NRC report has been cited in
about fifty U.S. decisions, though with limited engagement and little deference.
Notwithstanding its international implications, it has yet to be cited in a reported English
or Australian judgment and its implications for forensic science and legal practice have
not been taken seriously by courts.
It is not our intention to suggest hat extant research and knowledge is necessarily
clear-cut, or would always be decisive, but rather to draw attention to legal-forensic
ignorance, omission and indifference. Current practices in all these jurisdictions-though
perhaps less so in a tiny proportion of U.S. cases, where some techniques are aggressively
526 See, e.g., R. v. Reed [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, 1 Crim. App. 23, [72]-[73] (Eng.); Murdoch v. The Queen
(2007) 167 A CrimR 329, 346-47 (Austl.);R. v. Harradine [2008] SADC 179, [33]-[37] (Austl.).
527 This may be reflected in the lack of references to scientific literatures in many judgments. See Gary Edmond
et al., Unsound Law: Issues With (Expert) Voice Comparison Evidence 35 MELB.U.L.REv. 52, 54 (2011).
528 The exceptions would seem to be some amicus curiae briefs in the U.S. and where the defendant is very well-
resourced. See generally, Brief of Amici Curiae Individuals Exonerated by Post-Conviction DNA Testing in
Support of Respondent at 28, Dist. Att'ys Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (No.
08-6) (arguing that DNA evidence is conclusive as biological evidence).
529 Even DNA jurisprudence tends to rely on previous legal decisions. See generally, 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches
and Seizures § 288 (2012).
"0 See, e.g., Expert Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal Court ofAustralia, Practice Note CM 7 (2011);
Bryan Found & Gary Edmond, Reporting on the Comparison and Interpretation ofPattern Evidence:
Recommendations for Forensic Specialists, 44 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 193, 193 (2012).
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challenged (often with assistance from legal scholars and scientists)-have developed in
ways that structurally exclude or discourage recourse to those who might actually know
more.53 Experience with DNA profiling would seem to be salutary in this regard.
3. Forensic Reliability?
In the absence of attention to scientific literature, it might be argued that the way
judges have interpreted various rules and decisions has created a special legal (or forensic)
definition of reliability. Legal negotiations and settlements around what reliability means
has produced a somewhat incoherent meaning that has little relationship to what others,
particularly scientists might mean by reliability. For judges, 'reliability' is often defined
by: whether a person is formally qualified or (minimally) experienced; whether a
technique has been used for a long time; whether a technique has been accepted by a
court; whether a technique has been reviewed by another "expert" (i.e., peer review);
whether a technique has survived cross-examination; whether a technique has been upheld
on appeal; and, responsively, to the question of what the alternatives to admission of an
532expert's opinion might be. These, as well as more orthodox uses, have created a very
complicated, indeed incoherent set of resources that enable individual lawyers and judges
to construct a very wide range of meanings around reliability that may have little if
anything to say about the value of techniques, actual abilities and levels of accuracy.
To the extent that law, or legal institutions, develop their own models of
reliability that have very little, if anything to do with ideas of (validity and) reliability in
relevant scientific communities (concerned with epistemic considerations) or require
attention to underlying research, these would seem to be creating scope for future
challenges and dissonance and, in the criminal justice system, might be considered
undesirable and possibly pathological. We accept that legal institutions may need to
develop and articulate peculiar models of reliability designed for specific legal purposes,
but these should be principle-driven, coherent and indexed to evidence or ability and what
is known in exogenous knowledge communities.
The objectives of criminal justice systems, increasingly embodied in formal
admissibility standards, would seem to require that forensic science and medicine
evidence should be demonstrably reliable. That is, expert witnesses should be able to do
what they claim, have procedures that minimize risks and error, and have a clear idea of
limitations, sources and levels of error. They should also acknowledge evidentiary
constraints, controversy and respond to authoritative criticism.
4. Legal Institutions Disinterested in Empirical Studies or Studying
Their Own Practices
Compounding the problems presented by legally negotiated reliability standards,
courts in all of these jurisdictions have been relatively inattentive to empirical studies of
their own practices. Inattention is particularly pronounced in England and Australia.5 3 3
Practicing judges have expressed little interest, and less practical action, in supporting
methodologically rigorous studies of courts, trials and institutional practice.
" Such cases often involve attentive scholars, frequently through the production of jointly authored amicus
curiae briefs.
532 See, e.g., R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 47 (Austl.). For example, judges seem reluctant to exclude
'expert' opinion where the jury might be left to undertake any analysis without assistance. See R. v. Tang (2006)
161 A Crim R 377, 381 (Austl.).
. See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FACTS (2008); J.D. Heydon, Developing the Common Law, in CONSTITUTING LAW: LEGAL ARGUMENT AND
SOCIAL VALUES 93 (2011). To be fair, little of this evidence is ever brought before judges and in many situations
it is not obvious whether judges should or could respond.
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The judicial disinterest in empirical studies is especially important because in
many areas of legal practice, including areas where courts routinely admit(ted) techniques
and derivative opinions, independent reviews of techniques and research have exposed
(and continue to expose) serious methodological shortcomings and misleading forms of
reporting opinions. Examples include: the use of voice prints (spectrographs), bullet lead
analysis, handwriting comparisons, early population statistics associated with DNA
matches, latent fingerprint evidence, and most recently the various techniques criticized in
the NRC report. In each of these areas, academic commentators had criticized the
techniques and lawyers and courts had, to varying degrees, ignored or marginalized these
critiques-preferring jurors to determine the issue at trial. In the main, however, the
criticisms of independent scholars have been consistently vindicated. This vindication has
come through institutional disclosures, the research emerging from Innocence Projects,
and scientific research and interventions (e.g., NRC report).5 3 4
Nevertheless, in many jurisdictions adjectival law reform tends to be predicated
upon perspectives from the top of the legal pyramid (appellate judges and senior
practitioners) and based on their unsystematic experience rather than empirical research or
commissioned studies.535 Given the performance of those outside the courts, and the
difficulties experienced by lawyers and judges in all of these jurisdictions, it makes sense
to think about developing institutional mechanisms, staunchly independent of the
institutionalized forensic sciences and the courts, and not populated by stakeholder groups,
to provide advice about forensic science and medical techniques that are (or become)
controversial regardless of their longevity or apparent value.536 Criminal courts should be
cautious adopters of emerging forensic science and medical technologies.53 7
Given the limited resources available to the defense, along with the past
performance of lawyers, judges and many expert witnesses, there is little sense in making
the defense responsible for demonstrating that forensic science and medical evidence is
unreliable, weak and/or developed in ways that tend to undermine any probative value it
might possess.538 That is, the accused should not bear the risk or responsibility of
persuading the tribunal of fact about problems with expert opinion-including the
unreliability and limitations with incriminating expert opinion evidence-particularly in
the context of an accusatorial trial.
5. Problems Blamed on "Bad Apples"
While courts are particularly resistant to learning from academic research, it is
harder to ignore the wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice that have been
associated with problems in forensic science evidence in each of the jurisdictions
discussed.5 3 9 Reports written about these miscarriages of justice often identify systemic
534 See generally GARRETT, supra note 512; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 498, at 58-69.
" We do not suggest that empirical research would be unequivocal about what should be done, but that it should
be commission and considered.
536 See Gary Edmond, Advice for the Courts? Sufficiently Reliable Assistance with Forensic Science and
Medicine (Part 2), 16 INT'L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 263 (2012).
" In most jurisdictions, regardless of admissibility standards, judges tend to accommodate emerging, and
sometimes unproven, techniques and technologies. See R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [27]-[3 1]
(Eng.).
" Itiel E. Dror, David Charlton, & Ailsa Peron, Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making
Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 74, 77 (2006). See also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott,
The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291.
59 In the U.S., see, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-97 (2009). In the UK, see, e.g., R. v. Mark Dallagher [2002] EWCA
(Crim) 1903 (Eng.). In Canada, see GOUDGE, supra note 354; FORENSIC EVIDENCE REVIEW COMM., FINAL
REPORT (2004). In Australia, see, e.g., VINCENT, supra note 478; MORLING, supra note 480.
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failures within police investigations and the forensic sciences as well as failures of
institutional culture.5 4 o Trial and appellate processes, and lawyers and judges, are less
often subject to criticism. However, miscarriages of justice, wrongful convictions and
associated inquiries, along with law reform proposals, rarely seem to produce long term or
fundamental changes in admissibility practice. Rather, individual wrongful convictions
tend to become associated with the poor behavior of particular experts (such as Harrow in
the English image cases) or institutions, producing a discourse in which the "problem" of
low quality expert evidence will be eliminated by the identification and exclusion of the
bad apple(s). On some occasions, scandal leads to censure and even the exclusion, at
least for a time, of particular techniques or practices, such as voice spectroscopy in the
542U.S. and bite marks in Australia. Scandals tend to be localized to particular techniques,
practices and disciplines, and only rarely influence analogous practices and
methodological indifference in other domains.543
The practice of blaming individual experts for their errors seems to mask broader
practices that expose criminal investigation and prosecution processes to unreliable
forensic science evidence. Unfortunately, any "lessons" are rarely learned and very rarely
applied beyond a particular case or, as is more likely, an individual expert (or laboratory)
once discredited. Even doubts and regular criticisms are unlikely to prevent admission
until epistemic failure is confirmed. The case method and focus on individualized justice
tends to accentuate these problems and frustrate the scope of more principled practice or
reform.
6. Mediating Admissibility Strictures Because of the Trial Safeguards
The practice of relying on legally-negotiated reliability is predicated on judicial
confidence in trial safeguards. Judges in all jurisdictions endeavor to ground their
admissibility practice in relevant adjectival rules and jurisprudential traditions.
Concerns about the admission of "shaky"-that is weak or potentially unreliable
opinions-tend to be mediated by the availability of trial safeguards and other protections.
Implicitly, the protection provided by cross-examination, rebuttal experts, and instructions
and cautionary warnings reduce or eliminate the risks to the accused from unreliable and
speculative forms of expert opinion evidence. That is, the ability to cross-examine the
expert, to obtain a contradictory or critical expert opinion, and for the judge to give
directions and cautionary warnings, all serve to temper the rigorous application of
exclusionary rules whether derived from the common law or otherwise (e.g. FRE 702 and
UEL s79).
540 See also, GOUDGE, supra note 354; VINCENT, supra note 478.
541 Consider also Dr. Black in the English IRA cases, or Joy Kuhl in Chamberlain v. The Queen (No. 2),
Transcript of Record at Testimony of Joy Kuhl (1984) 153 CLR 521 (Austl.), 1984 WL 441785. See Clive
Walker and K. Starmer, (eds), MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR (1999). Consider
also the responses to the performance of police crime laboratories in St Paul, Minnesota (2013), and Houston,
Texas (2003).
542 See, e.g., Ohio v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ohio 1983) (discussing jurisdictional differences regarding
admissibility of voice spectroscopy evidence); Mark Page, Jane Taylor & Matt Blenkin, Reality bites-A ten-
year retrospective analysis ofbitemark casework in Australia, 216 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 82 (2012).
543 See, e.g., GOUDGE, supra note 354, at 25 (focusing on individual and forensic pediatric pathology, but with
relatively little influence beyond).
544 See, e.g., JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE:
BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 27 (2012).
545 FED. R. EVID. 702; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s79 (Austl.).
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A fairly typical expression of this commitment can be found in the Daubert
decision.54 On behalf of the majority, Justice Blackmun wrote, "Vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence." In the civil sphere, and notwithstanding the 'relevance and reliability' regime
he was inaugurating, Justice Blackmun explained that 'shaky' evidence was potentially
admissible because it could be substantially addressed through traditional trial
safeguards.4 We question this as a principled response to incriminating expert opinion
evidence in criminal proceedings. We also note that emerging research questions the
effectiveness of trial safeguards both individually and in combination.549
In addition to the limited impact of formal admissibility standards, judicial
discretions to exclude forms of evidence that might create unfairness, because of their
potential to mislead the jury or because they are practically difficult to explain to lay
decision makers-such as those embodied in the probative value/unfair prejudice
discretion (e.g. FRE 403 and UEL sl37)-are rarely used to exclude evidence that is not
demonstrably reliable.5 0 Once expert evidence is deemed to have satisfied formal
admissibility rules-especially in jurisdictions with a reliability threshold-discretions are
very rarely used to exclude. It seems that judges rarely consider the probative value of
incriminating expert opinion evidence, preferring to leave such issues for the tribunal of
fact (and "weight"). In some jurisdictions, a range of supplementary considerations have
emerged to facilitate admission, such as compromises around the strength of expression
(so-called "splitting"), or liberally admitting incriminating opinion where the defense has
access to a "rebuttal" expert.5 51
The value and effectiveness of trial safeguards is uncertain. Cross-examination
can have a devastating impact on an expert witnesses' testimony, and a rebuttal witness
might change the way in which a decision maker understands expert evidence and even
the case. On occasion, the trial judge might even identify the major limitations of an
expert's opinions and convey them to a jury through cautionary warnings.552 Generally,
546 Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
547 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Daubert, it should be remembered, was a civil case dealing with the admissibility of
epidemiological studies and meta-analyses. See CARL F. CRANOR, Toxic TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF JUSTICE (2006).
548 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
549 Gary Edmond & Mehera San Roque, The Cool Crucible: Forensic Science and the Frailty of the Criminal
Trial, 24 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 51,62 (2012); EMMA CUNLIFFE, MURDER, MEDICINE AND
MOTHERHOOD 196 (2011); Keith A. Findley, Innocents at risk: Adversary imbalance, forensic science and the
search for truth, (2003) 38 Seton Hall L.Rev 893.
550 FED. R. EVID. 403; Evidence Act 1995, s137 (Austl.); e.g., R. v. Jung [2006] NSWSC 658, [68]-[86] (Austl.).
. See, e.g., Jung [2006] NSWSC at [76]-[86] (Austl.). On the 'equality of arms' more generally, see JOHND.
JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW
AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 83-85, 133-35 (2012).
552 Note that this does not mean they will be understood. The ability to give directions and instructions with the
authority of the court often mediates the admission of expert evidence, particularly in England, Wales and
Australia. This response is interesting given that the research on judicial instructions, directions and cautionary
warnings has repeatedly questioned their influence and therefore value. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 505, at 58. In addition, a review of directions in Australia in response to voice identification evidence found
that the content of instructions did not provide any scientifically-derived information and presented them in a
way that made them practically difficult, perhaps impossible, to apply them. Rather than inform juries about the
magnitude of risks of error, instructions tend to be remarkably general, often merely pointing to potential
difficulties (e.g. the length of exposure was short, or the quality of the recording was poor) or these is no
database, or the police officer was not very familiar, and imploring jurors to be cautious. Empirical studies
revealing very high levels of error associated with the interpretation of voices and images, statements by learned
societies imploring members not to use particular methods for forensic purposes, and the emergence of more
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however, trial safeguards tend to be weak-much weaker than credible safeguards ought
to be-and inconsistent in their operation. Their existence and presumptive claims as to
their effectiveness are often used as grounds for admitting incriminating expert opinions
that are neither demonstrably reliable nor effectively challenged. The many limitations
associated with incriminating expert opinions are not usually canvassed or explained to
juries. Juries are rarely provided with much detail and almost never with the assistance of
relevant empirical studies, even where they exist.553 Often, appellate courts treat the poor
performance of lawyers, specifically in response to incriminating expert opinion evidence,
as strategic decisions in the conduct of the defense.
In relation to these trial safeguards we might note that traditions, especially in
England, Canada and some parts of Australia, of prosecutorial restraint seem to have little
conspicuous impact on the handling of expert evidence.54 In theory, the prosecuting
attorney should aim to prosecute in a manner that is robust, but also principled and fair.
Concerns with rectitude and fairness should extend to the use and reliance placed on
incriminating expert opinion evidence that is unreliable or of unknown probative value. In
addition, the prosecutor has a responsibility to direct attention to the actual value of expert
evidence and concede and convey limitations with that evidence.55 Where a technique is
weak or untested, the state might be obliged to abstain from relying upon it even if the
courts are willing to admit it.556
The ideal, rather than the reality, of trial safeguards, tends to be used to support
admission and reliance upon speculative and unreliable forms of expert opinion evidence
in all common law jurisdictions. Ironically, the limits of trial safeguards and prosecutorial
restraint, individually and in combination, reinforce the need to be more aggressive about
admissibility and to exclude evidence developed through techniques that are not
demonstrably reliable.
7. Confidence in Juries and Judges (and Their Ability to
Understand Complex Technical Evidence and Rationally Combine
It with Other Evidence in an Accusatorial Setting)
Ultimately, the issue of admission determines whether the tribunal of fact-lay,
whether jury or judge-will get to hear the testimony of a person formally recognized by
the court (and the state) as expert enough to express opinions in criminal proceedings.
Most judges express confidence in the ability of fact-finders to assess expert evidence
regardless of whether it is adequately contested or explained and regardless of whether it
is demonstrably reliable. Nevertheless, the jury's performance depends upon their
understanding of the meaning of the decision to prosecute (e.g., that the accused is likely
to be guilty), the way the trial is conducted, particularly representations by the prosecution
and the adequacy of the defense, the way different types of evidence are combined, as well
as general cognitive capabilities.
technical methods by highly skilled linguists, statisticians and engineers all tend to be disregarded-whether
deliberately or inadvertently. See id. at 60-69.
. See Gary Edmond, Kristy Martire & Mehera San Roque, Mere Guesswork': Cross Lingual Voice
Comparisons and the Jury, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 395, 421 (2011).
554 David S. Caudill, Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimpifying Science and Undervaluing Advocacy to
Construct an Ethical Duty?, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 675, 678-79 (2011).
.. Michael Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations ofAttorneys, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 430-31
(2001). See also Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering
Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2007).
556 The appropriate response might be to require research or the reform of investigative practices. See NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 505, at 63-66.
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Despite the expectation placed on the tribunal of fact, our criminal justice
systems are not well designed to facilitate jury (or judicial) comprehension of expert
evidence. It is far from obvious that juries perform well with expert opinion evidence or
with the integration of different forms of expert and non-expert evidence. There is little
evidence that judges perform much better.57 Where there are serious methodological
and/or statistical limitations or problems, or where there is no credible "research base", it
is reasonably unlikely that this will be drawn to the attention of juries or explained in a
manner that might lead them to appreciate how serious concerns voiced by the NRC, for
example, actually are. We do know that juries do not perform well with statistical and
probabilistic information (or with likelihood ratios) and this is the way that many types of
forensic science are now being expressed-sometimes in the absence of underlying
research (see Table 1).551 In addition, there are good reasons to believe that judges and
jurors struggle to disaggregate components of the case. Once they have heard evidence,
even if it is not particularly probative, they may have serious difficulties discounting it.
There is little evidence that judges or juries are capable of ignoring evidence, regardless of
its admissibility .
We do not say that juries are incapable of understanding complex evidence-
although this requires further attention-but rather that our current institutional
arrangements are not particularly well suited to jury comprehension. It may be that
procedures could be dramatically improved, but even improvement might not be adequate
for lay persons (including judges) to credibly cope with the tremendous variety of expert
opinion evidence, and evidence that is especially complex (or technical), unreliable or of
unknown reliability.560 The limits of the tribunal, once again, reinforce the importance of
admissibility decision-making and the reliability of incriminating expert opinion evidence.
And yet, admissibility gate-keeping is dependent upon legally-trained judges who, for a
variety of professional, ideological and pragmatic reasons, tend to maintain confidence in
the state and its criminal justice institutions.
D. Implications of the Basic Conclusion
The implications of a lack of judicial attention to reliability are troubling. Most
obviously, it is disconcerting that trial practice does not seem to have been altered by a
major formal shift in admissibility standards. Courts and prosecutors have not yet engaged
with the possibility that past convictions were based on unreliable evidence, or with the
responsibility to review past practice that this realization entails. Adherence to forensic (or
legal) reliability in lieu of empirical reliability allows courts to cleave to a precedent-based
1 There may be exceptions, such as where judges are regularly exposed to particular techniques, but this is not
particularly common. See generally Margaret Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects ofPeer Review
and Evidence Quality on Judge Evaluations ofPsychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J.
OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000); Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make
Decisions?, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 379, 387-93 (1996); Groscup et al., supra note 50, at 365, 367.
. Ben R. Newell et al., Getting Scarred and Winning Lotteries: Effects of Exemplar Cuing and Statistical
Format on Imagining Low-Probability Events, 21 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 317, 319 (2007); Kristy Martire
et al., How Likely Is It that Fact Finders Understand Likelihood Ratios?, paper presented at Impressions and
Expressions: Expert Opinion Evidence in Reports and Courts (December 2011), in AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI.
(forthcoming 2012).
59 Where the trial judge is also the tribunal of fact (i.e. the ultimate decision maker), he or she is obliged to
subsequently disregard any evidence deemed inadmissible. Studies in the U.S. and Germany suggest that judges
in common law and civilian traditions experience extreme difficulty disregarding evidence. See Andrew J.
Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty ofDeliberately Disregarding, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1270 (2005); JACKSON & SUMMERS, supra note 550, at 73.
56o See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory ofExperts: Deference or Education?, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 1131, 1144 (1993); Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the DaubertDecision, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1157, 1174 (1994).
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approach, whereby opinions or techniques that have been admitted before the adoption of
reliability standards continue to be admitted. This tendency persists at times even when
there has been controversy about a technique or the evidence was originally admitted with
caveats. Courts devote selective attention to empirical reliability where demonstrable
reliability exists, while seemingly retaining a basic operating assumption that most
evidence should be admissible. Worryingly, courts seem to reserve particular skepticism
for experts called by criminal defendants. Overall, there is a serious lack of clarity around
the expression of results, particularly when it is appropriate to individualize. The
prevailing focus on experience rather than expertise discourages forensic scientists from
testing the reliability of their work or becoming familiar with scientific literature and
reasoning.
1. The Historical Legacy
One of the more confronting implications from revelations about the quality of
forensic science and medical evidence, in conjunction with the emerging limits of legal
practice, particularly the failure to consistently identify very real epistemic frailties during
trials and appeals, is that many past convictions were probably mistaken, and very many
criminal proceedings admitted incriminating expert opinions that were either wrong,
grossly exaggerated or otherwise misleading. Very many criminal trials were, in
561consequence, substantially unfair. Similarly, many guilty pleas were undoubtedly
accepted from innocent persons-presumably over-represented by minority groups, the
poor and the poorly educated-pragmatically responding to accusations predicated upon
or bolstered by mistaken or misleading expert opinions. Unreliable and speculative expert
opinions were often contaminated by exposure to prejudicial information but appeared as
independent corroboration, even when the other evidence was mistaken-such as
mistaken eyewitness identifications and confessions obtained under duress.
Where types of evidence, or individuals or laboratories are shown to produce
mistakes, these should not be treated as isolated errors. Rather, there should be reviews (or
audits) of other cases to determine whether poor practices are more widespread. In the
wake of the NRC report, there would seem to be a need to review convictions
substantially and systematically dependent on incriminating techniques and "expert"
562opinions that are not demonstrably reliable.
2. Once Admitted, It's Here to Stay
Once a type of opinion or technique is admitted, typically it remains admissible
unless some controversy emerges or evidence suggests that techniques and practices are
completely unacceptable. Interestingly, there tends to be limited review of previous
evidence, even once a technique is refined or shown to be limited. Moreover, where
evidence is initially admitted with reservations or constraints, or because of the particular
features of the case or the analysis, these restrictions are not always considered or applied
in subsequent decisions. Initial limitations, as in the case of bite marks in the U.S.
(following Marx) or the need for considerable familiarity to ground non-expert opinion in
Canadian image cases (after Leaney), were elided or watered-down in subsequent practice.
Often the decision to admit a kind of technique or opinion in one jurisdiction
provides support for similar practice in other jurisdictions. Legal practice in foreign
16' Even where the totality of the evidence might support guilt, admitting speculative opinions-often
contaminated by knowledge of other prejudicial information-as independent support for conviction is
inconsistent with a fair or rational process.
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jurisdictions, though not necessarily determinative, often seems to temper the way in
which local rules of admissibility are constructed and may shift attention from
demonstrable evidence of reliability (or actually enforcing admissibility standards).
Perversely, in terms of criminal justice principles, it seems much more difficult to
have a forensic science or medical technique deemed inappropriate or inadmissible than
admissible-regardless of the research support or risks of error.
3. Selective Attention to Reliability
This article documents that judges in the U.S., England and Wales, Canada and
Australia have not required forensic scientists to establish, with empirical evidence, that
their techniques are reliable, including techniques that have been relied upon for decades.
Interestingly, the only technique that seems to have been exposed to quite demanding
technical review, DNA profiling, was also the only technique where the defense obtained
access to technical insights of undoubted authority at a preliminary stage, and is the only
one of our techniques capable of satisfying a credible reliability standard given the way
interpretations are currently expressed. Judges, in conjunction with the resource
constraints on lawyers, have limited the scope and effectiveness of challenges to other
(i.e., the non-DNA) forensic science techniques.
It is no coincidence that judges in England, Wales and Australia often refer to
reliability, and sometimes validity and occasionally even refer to the copious amount of
legal and non-legal published literatures, with respect to DNA. They tend to be less
attentive to reliability, and it is of less value as a rhetorical resource, where a forensic
science technique is not demonstrably reliable (and/or is controversial). Perhaps the
primary exception is in the aftermath of high profile miscarriages of justice where
(un)reliability is often an important rhetorical resource.56 3
4. Evidence of Defendants (and Plaintiffs)
Judges seem to believe that admitting as much evidence as possible is basically
consistent with the primary goal of rectitude of decision (i.e., accuracy or "truth").564
565There is certainly a conspicuous trend in that direction in the Canadian jurisprudence.
Revealingly, the commitment to the admission of the state's expert evidence -
approaching "free proof' - is not necessarily extended to expert opinion evidence adduced
by plaintiffs in civil proceedings with juries (i.e., in the U.S.).566 Nevertheless, judges in
all common law jurisdictions have admitted and continue to admit the various forensic
science techniques we have considered notwithstanding remarkably divergent levels of
experimental support and quite different formal admissibility standards. Criminal trial
56' This occurred in response to the exoneration of the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four as well as the Splatt and
Chamberlain Royal Commissions and the Canadian inquiries cited previously. These all led to proposals for
change, but not ultimately to reliability-based research and admissibility practices.
564 See, e.g., LARRY LAUDAN, TRuTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 120
(2006).
565 Made explicit by the Canadian Supreme Court in Nikolovski. R. v. Nikolovski [1996] 3 SCR 1197 (Austl.).
66 'Free proof' entails eliminating rules of admission to enable a more naturalistic (and implicitly rational)
approach to the assessment of all relevant evidence. See JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMrERS, THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS
(2012). Our essay is, at least implicitly, an argument against free proof-at least in its more non-reflexive guises.
Not only are many of the formal rules and principles inconsistent with such a liberal response to incriminating
expert evidence, but free proof and its proponents tend to overlook, or underestimate, the weakness of trial
safeguards and the willingness of modern juries to convict. The admission of speculative incriminating opinions,
expressed by individuals presented as experts, may be difficult to overcome, even where their opinions are
contaminated, methodologically frail and mistaken. This has certainly been the case in many of the notorious
wrongful convictions and miscarriage of justice cases in recent decades.
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principles and values, like the application of admissibility rules, seem to be subservient to
admission rather than the other way around.
In theory and practice the adversarial criminal trial is intended to produce
567accurate outcomes fairly. Quite deliberately, modem criminal trial processes and rules
are asymmetrical. Though primarily concerned with correct outcomes, the system is
intended to operate in a manner that embodies the presumption of innocence and prevents
a certain kind of error-namely, the conviction of the innocent. It is the state, in
consequence, that is obliged to prove guilt to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt. With a
few exceptions, there are relatively few expectations placed upon those accused of
criminality. In addition, trials should be substantially fair - both in the way they are
conducted and in the kinds of evidence produced and relied upon. This last point includes
the ability to meaningfully respond to incriminating evidence.
All four of our jurisdictions feature a one-size-fits-all approach to expert opinion
evidence. In theory, the same standard applies to evidence adduced by the state and the
accused in criminal proceedings as well as to evidence adduced by plaintiffs and
defendants in civil proceedings.568 Nevertheless, our findings affirm that judges are
particularly receptive to incriminating expert opinion evidence. These findings are
nuanced by empirical research on criminal trials and appeals, as well as judicial responses
569to the expert opinion evidence adduced by plaintiffs in civil proceedings. In contrast to
the receptive, even laissez faire response to the state's proffers in criminal proceedings,
the expert opinion evidence adduced by criminal defendants and plaintiffs tends to be
more thoroughly scrutinized and held to more demanding standards.
These differential practices are difficult to square with legal principle. In
principle, if there is to be disparity in the system, the most onerous standard should apply
to incriminating expert opinions. The most accommodating standard should be applied to
expert opinion evidence adduced by the accused.5 70 Alternatively, all evidence should be
held to precisely the same standard. Actual practice, in contrast, seems to invert legal
principle.
It might be thought that the presumption of innocence, the requirement that the
state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the desire to only convict the guilty might
justify the adoption of a more liberal admissibility threshold in respect of expert opinion
evidence adduced by the accused.57 1 The accused should, if there is any flexibility in
admissibility standards, be given (greater) scope to introduce expert evidence that may
572raise a reasonable doubt or establish innocence. In practice, the state's incriminating
expert evidence is likely to secure easy passage, but when expert opinion is tendered by
the accused it is more likely to undergo scrutiny and exclusion. In part, this is a result of
the differential access to resources and information. Prosecutors tend to have superior
567 See HO HOCK LAI, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE LAW: JUSTICE IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 54 (2008);
WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 7 (1985). This is also a primary goal of
civil litigation, but that system is not as asymmetrical and there tend to be greater incentives to settle or produce
practical outcomes efficiently.
56' E.g., LAW COMM'N OF ENG. & WALES, REPORT ON EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN
ENGLAND AND WALES 2.17 ( 2011).
569 D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the
Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 128 (2000); Groscup et al., supra note 50, at 346.
570 See Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State's Forensic Science
andMedical Evidence, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 343, 376 (2011).
17 LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 85 (2006).
572 Regardless of the value of finality, this should be accommodated at any stage of proceedings or incarceration.
There will, of course, often be questions about what new techniques and evidence actually establishes.
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resources and much better access to forensic scientists and consultants. They also tend to
be more specialized and coordinated than many public (and private) defenders and so are
in a better position to develop strategies, share information and successfully contest expert
opinion evidence adduced by the defense. Expert evidence adduced by the defense, it
should be acknowledged, is sometimes of questionable value or speculative and often
presented by (forensically inexperienced) academic researchers rather than forensic
science practitioners. However, given the preceding discussion of admissibility practice in
response to many forensic science techniques that are currently relied upon by the state,
allowing the accused to adduce expert opinion that might not be demonstrably reliable (or
quite as demanding as any credible standard imposed upon the state) would not seem to be
inconsistent with principle or the generally accommodating responses to incriminating
expert opinion.573
5. Expression of Results
Inattention to what the NRC Report characterized as the 'knowledge base'
underpinning many forensic science techniques has meant that the issue of how results
should be expressed is often unclear-though not always explored (or conceded).57' The
lack of validation or proficiency testing means that in many areas forensic scientists
speculate on the significance of results (often apparent "matches" or "similarities"). This
may lead to attempts to express results cautiously, though in the absence of genuine
insight about methodological and procedural issues, and information about distributions,
imagined cautioned may be too cautious or-more troubling for the accusatorial trial-not
cautious enough. Increasingly, lawyers and trial judges negotiate the way results may be
expressed in courts, but this negotiation often follows from the lack of experimental
research supporting a technique. Negotiations, forming part of an admissibility
compromise, are not in any obvious sense indexed to empirical evidence. While they
might, as in the case of some recent qualifications to latent fingerprint evidence in the U.S.
and images in Australia, be better than unregulated assertions, they may nevertheless have
no tangible empirical foundations or discernible effects. Recent research suggests that
attempts by lawyers and judges to manage and perhaps mitigate the worst impacts of
expert opinions through tempering expression may make little, if any, difference to the
way incriminating opinions are actually understood-by the tribunal of fact.
Differences in interpretations, conspicuous in the way DNA profiling and other
techniques (see Table 2) are reported, are also revealing given the lack of research support
for non-DNA comparison and pattern-matching techniques. DNA profiling, in contrast,
has undergone extensive testing and lengthy discussions by well-resourced specialist
576groups that practically resolved a range of ongoing difficulties (and uncertainties). Few
other forensic science techniques have anything like the level of research support,
multidisciplinary consensus, or highly trained experts in non-forensic domains using
similar techniques and methods. When we compare the manner in which opinions are
1 Moreover, the practices of trial and appellate judges cannot be reduced to the quality of the counsel and
arguments raised in admissibility hearings and trials. Judges appear to have an ideological proclivity toward the
admission of incriminating expert opinion evidence. That proclivity might be based, in part, on a commitment
toward admission (and even 'free proof') but again, these ideas and the asymmetrical response to evidence
adduced by defendants (and plaintiffs in civil litigation) cannot be credibly explained in such terms.
574 This emerged recently, controversially, and unsatisfactorily inR. v. T. in England. [2010] EWCA (Crim)
2439, 105-06 (Eng.).
1 See, e.g., Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony ofForensic Identification Science:
What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 436, 444-45 (2009).
576 MICHAEL LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING, 83
(2008); ARONSON, supra note 515, at 98.
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expressed, however, the non-DNA comparison (or identification) sciences are likely to be
linked to positive identifications (so-called individualizations). This is the strongest form
of expression: converting (apparent) similarities or "matches" into certain conclusions
about identity or source. In some instances this may be because investigators and
technicians are, or were historically (i.e., pre-DNA evidence), unaware of the complex
issues associated with identification and individualization, particularly around similarities,
the distribution of features in relevant populations, as well as a range of procedural biases
that might influence interpretive and comparative practices.
There is no coherent rationale for the manner in which different types of evidence
and opinions are expressed in reports and testimony. Rather, forms of expression are
historically contingent, reflecting: the age of techniques and the length of admissibilty
(with older techniques generally leading to higher levels of confidence or certitude); the
amount of supporting research (the more research the more cautious, and empirically-
predicated, expressions tend to be); the nature and extent of challenges; the degree of
mobilization (and controversy) beyond the courts; the involvement of (non-forensic)
scientists; and, the impact of notorious cases (e.g., bite mark cases in Australia or
problems with voice spectrographs in the United States).
Older and empirically tenuous techniques frequently use the strongest forms of
expression-e.g. a "match" as positive evidence of identity.7 Most of these expressions
were developed, or shaped, through ongoing interactions between courts and investigative
communities. Perhaps inadvertently, and unwittingly, courts have actively participated in
the production and legitimation of "expertise" and even "fields" through their
admissibility practices.5" Generally, admission (understood, and represented, as a proxy
for reliability) has tended to stall interest in research. Somewhat perversely, verdicts,
pleas, admissions, and the opinions of the experts themselves, rather than independent
research have all been used to ground and support many of the claims associated with
techniques not based on analysis of DNA. In some cases experience acquired during the
course of an investigation by a police officer or a forensic scientist is considered adequate
to ground admissibility, especially where the alternative is to allow the jury to examine
"'evidence" unaided or to exclude potential evidence. For a variety of reasons, not the least
of which is the potential for embarrassment to criminal justice institutions, few
prosecutors, judges or forensic scientists have much interest in destabilizing earlier
admissibility settlements.
6. Implications for Forensic Science Practices
Legal (i.e., judicial) recognition of "fields" or "expertise" confers social and
evidentiary legitimacy in circumstances where there may be few epistemic bases for that
status. Courts should be looking for independent-that is, non-legal-evidence of ability.
In the criminal sphere courts should be slow to confer their imprimatur (which may imply
reliability), especially in jurisdictions requiring "reliability." The alternative is an
undesirable tautology where legal recognition substitutes, almost always prematurely, for
reliability.
As things stand, it is simply unknown whether many of the experts permitted to
testify in courts can actually do what they claim, let alone how accurate they are. This is a
deplorable state of affairs for all jurisdictions regardless of the admissibility standard.
Courts have been instrumental in recognizing "experts" and "fields" and providing
1 These techniques are often used by individuals with less scientific and statistical training than scientists and
technicians involved in DNA analysis. See LYNCH, supra note 582, at 11-12.
571 SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA, 50-51 (1997).
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alternative pathways (such as treating the evidence as non-expert lay opinion or treating
recognition evidence as fact thereby circumventing opinion rules) that facilitate the
admission and reliance on practices and opinions that are not necessarily accepted beyond
forensic contexts. Many of those appearing in courts as expert (and non-expert) witnesses
are not familiar with standard research methods or the kinds of studies that might
illuminate the validity and reliability of their techniques. In consequence, many of those
giving forensic science evidence are oblivious to, or inadequately trained to credibly deal
with, some of the most pressing questions around validation and reliability and the ways in
579which to express opinions in reports and before lay persons.
E. Differences Within and Among Jurisdictions
Our study documents the remarkable similarities in admissibility practices across
the four jurisdictions (and their many states and territories). In this section we consider
some of the differences in our sample. Notwithstanding overarching similarities, there are
variations in the way some courts within and across jurisdictions manage different kinds
of forensic science evidence and in some of the basic structures and resources that
influence jurisdictional practices.
The interpretation of images and bite marks, for purposes of identification, are
probably the most varied in our sample. Perhaps the variation stems from the influence of
the Smith decision on Australian case law and the relative distribution of cameras.5so In the
U.S., England and Wales, and Canada, police with limited exposure to the accused-
including "familiarity" acquired during the course of an investigation-are allowed to
offer positive identification evidence through watching images of an alleged crime. In
Australia, in Smith, the High Court largely prevented police identifications." This has led
to greater recourse to the opinions of 'experts' and non-investigative familiars.582 England
and Australia both seem to have more expert witnesses testifying in relation to facial,
body, gait and clothing comparisons derived from images than Canada and the United
States. This may be a consequence of more cameras, but would seem to be more closely
linked to their accommodating jurisprudence. In the United States, expert witnesses
commenting on images have largely relied upon photogrammetry. They are sometimes
called upon by the defense in post-conviction reviews.583 Allowing police to testify, as
'familiars' rather than "experts," may help to circumvent reliability standards for expert
opinions in Canada. In Canada, in the place of expert witnesses, police officers, prison
guards and parole officers tend to express their opinions about identity. The early case of
Leaney provided access to the courts where there is sufficient "familiarity" (or
recognition) and since that time there has been little need for more expensive and less
predictable "experts." The use of prison guards and parole officers in recent years
probably reflects a desire to have individuals who appear independent of the investigation
testify. Unavoidably, their participation reveals that the accused has prior convictions,
often having served time in prison. This may be seen as acceptable in a jurisdiction relying
heavily upon its judges for fact-finding. Notwithstanding these differences, all
59 Jennifer Mnookin et al., 'The Need For A Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences' (2011) 58 UCLA Law
Review 725; Simon A. Cole, 'Acculturating Forensic Science: What Is 'Scientific Culture', and How Can
Forensic Science Adopt it?' (2010) 38 Fordham Urban Law Journal 435; Gary Edmond, Actual innocents? Legal
limitations and their implications for forensic science and medicine, 43 AuSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 177 (2011).
"o Compare Smithy. The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650, 656 (Austl.); with Nguyen v. The Queen (2007) 180 A
Crim R 267, 274 (Austl.); and Li v. The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281, 294 (Austl.).
.. 206 CLR at 656.
582 See Murdoch v. The Queen [2007] 167 A Crim R 329 (Austl.).
. Wisc. v. Avery, 807 N.W.2d 638, 647 (2011).
584 R. v. Leaney, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 393, 415 (Can.).
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jurisdictions enable some kind of 'expert' or criminal justice employee to proffer their
incriminating opinions about the identity of persons of interest in images.
These differences are interesting because they imply that the various jurisdictions
have different approaches to relevance-a logical concept-as well as the manner in
which they treat fact versus opinion evidence at least in relation to images. The same
concerns are not applied, or not applied consistently, in other areas, even though there
would seem to be few conceptual reasons to distinguish the interpretation of images from
the interpretations of sounds, by way of example, at a conceptual level. Moreover,
relevance is rarely used to exclude expert evidence, even where the abilities of forensic
scientists are uncertain and their opinions might be unreliable and, hence, incapable of
rationally influencing the assessment of facts in issue.
Differences in response to bite marks are more difficult to explain. In part, they
seem to be linked to underlying problems with techniques and interpretations as well as
ongoing controversy associated with notorious miscarriages of justice and critical
academic commentary. Although in Canada, dental evidence has been used to suggest
problems with the state's allegations. Variation in responses to incriminating images and
bite marks, along with the general responses to the other techniques, reinforce the
unprincipled nature of admissibility jurisprudence and practice.
While there are differences in the responses to voice comparisons (and
spectroscopy), bite marks, LCN DNA techniques and who gets to interpret incriminating
images, practical differences, tend to be on the margins or relatively minor. In most cases,
such opinion evidence is admissible (in some form), though occasionally subject to
qualification or comment or restriction on precisely who is entitled to express the opinion.
Even formally discredited techniques, such as some kinds of bite mark interpretations and
voice spectroscopy, might be admitted subject to witnesses qualifying their opinions and,
in England, Wales, Canada and Australia, judicial warning. Admissibility practice seems
to have no direct correspondence with the value of evidence, admissibility standards
(especially formally stipulating reliability), or the efficacy of safeguards such as cross-
examination or directions and warnings.
III. CONCLUSION
Our comparative study and analysis identifies serious problems with the
provision, reception and assessment of many forms of forensic science and medical
evidence used routinely to investigate and convict citizens in all adversarial jurisdictions.
Our study suggests that admissibility standards have not contributed to the exclusion (or
informed systematic evaluation) of unreliable and speculative forms of incriminating
opinion evidence in courts. Indeed, admissibility standards seem to have little discernible
impact on the quality of forensic science and forensic medicine evidence. This applies to
jurisdictions with common law and statutory standards, and includes jurisdictions that
expressly stipulate the need for reliability.
In consequence, too much incriminating opinion evidence, based on techniques
of unknown value and expressed in terms whose influence on lay persons is simply
unknown, is routinely admitted in criminal proceedings. Our findings affirm that
admissibility is important, and probably more important than conventionally believed,
because adversarial proceedings, especially the quotidian trial (and here we might add plea
bargains), are not well suited to identifying and conveying the complexities and
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In order to improve performances, and to align more closely with espoused goals
of accuracy and fairness (or truth and justice) and increasingly efficiency our lawyers and
judges must be willing to exclude expert opinion evidence that is not demonstrably
reliable. Legal institutions and personnel would seem to need to develop means of
obtaining more mainstream and methodologically-sensitive advice and evidence. Without
wanting to promote wholesale technocratic reforms, or to be understood to imply that
accommodating exogenous knowledge and empirical studies would be straightforward,
legal institutions must nevertheless begin to revise the ways in which they identify, admit
and assess scientific, medical and other expert opinions. In the face of emerging criticism
and evidence of wrongful convictions, continuing reliance upon unreliable and speculative
opinions and blind faith in the value of trial safeguards will erode the social legitimacy of
criminal justice institutions.58 5
585 See Gary Edmond, Advice for the Courts? Sufficiently Reliable Assistance with Forensic Science and
Medicine (Part 2), 16 INT'L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 263, 267 (2012).
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COLORADO'S UNDEMANDING NOTICE REQUIREMENT: PRO SE
DEFENDANTS AND FORENSIC TECHNICIAN TESTIMONY
Sarah M. Morris and Lauren L. Fontana
"The right of confrontation may not be dispensed with so lightly."
I. INTRODUCTION
"Call my accuser before my face," Sir Walter Raleigh demanded, before his triers
refused and sentenced him to death. Raleigh's command, which criminal defendants have
echoed since his 1603 trial, is of renewed relevance after a string of decisions by the
United States Supreme Court, as well as continuing controversies debunking the accuracy
and impartiality of forensic testing.
Since 2004's Crawford v. Washington,3 the United States Supreme Court has
transformed the scope of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. One facet of this
transformation has been the holding, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, that the Sixth
Amendment is violated by the admission of forensic reports without the testimony of their
authors.5 In Melendez-Diaz, the Court determined that an accused's Sixth Amendment
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him extends to laboratory analysts.6 This
express extension of the right of confrontation to forensic analysts is critical in an era
I The authors are two practicing civil rights attorneys at the Denver, Colorado law firm of KILLMER, LANE &
NEWMAN, LLP.
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
2 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3id.
4 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
5 Id. at 310-11; see also Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2708 (2011) (determining that said
confrontation right is not satisfied by surrogate technician testimony). But see Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.
2221, 2228 (2012) (plurality opinion) (concluding that Confrontation Clause was not violated by expert witness
who testified as to DNA match of samples she had not herself tested).
6 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 347-48.
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when "[s]erious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal
trials."7
In the course of reaching its holding in Melendez-Diaz, the Court passed on the
basic validity of state "notice-and-demand" statutes, which, it said:
[i]n their simplest form . . . require the prosecution to provide notice to
the defendant of its intent to use an analyst's report as evidence at trial,
after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may
object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst's appearance
live at trial.8
The decision specifically cited an opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court, Hinojos-
Mendoza v. People,9 but neither discussed the merits of that opinion nor passed on the
constitutionality of the Colorado statute itself.10 Hinojos-Mendoza, in turn, had upheld the
constitutionality of Colorado's notice-and-demand statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-309(5),
as to defendants represented by counsel, but expressly left open the constitutionality of the
statute as applied to pro se defendants.
7 Id. at 319; see, e.g., id. at 318-19 (documenting how "[florensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk
of manipulation"); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2007) (Michael, J., dissenting) ("In
one notorious case, a forensic serologist at the West Virginia Department of Public Safety falsified hundreds of
forensic tests between 1979 and 1989."); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 2004)
(documenting misconduct of one Oklahoma forensic chemist across at least four criminal cases and two
professional sanctions); Paul C. Giannelli, Admissibility ofLab Reports: The Right ofConfrontation Post-
Crawford, 19 CRIM. JUST. 26, 30 (2004) ("Anyone who would question the value of cross-examination in this
context need only look at recent newspaper headlines."); Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59
VAND. L. REV. 475, 491-500 (2006) (detailing the "[m]yth of [r]eliability" surrounding forensic evidence and
describing scandals at Baltimore and Phoenix crime laboratories); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 791, 843 n.86 (2007) (citing problems
with DWI testing and with FBI laboratory results); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE FBI
DNA LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES i-iii (2004) (reviewing protocol
and practice vulnerabilities following discovery of misconduct by DNA analyst who, from 1988-2002,
consistently failed to complete control tests in a majority of her cases and falsified laboratory documentation to
cover it up); Jack Healy, Colorado State Lab Accused ofMishandling Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2013
(reporting how investigation revealed "problems including bias against defendants, inadequate training and flaws
in the way evidence is stored at the lab");Joseph Goldstein & Nina Bernstein, Ex-Technician Denies Faulty DNA
Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013, at Al5 (discussing New York City laboratory technician who missed and
commingled biological evidence in rape cases); Nick Bunkley, Detroit Police Lab Is Closed After Audit Finds
Serious Errors in Many Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A17 (reporting the closure of Detroit's crime
laboratory after an "audit said sloppy work had probably resulted in wrongful convictions"); Denise Lavoie, Ex-
state Chemist Annie Dookhan Pleads Not Guilty; Faces 6 Charges of Obstruction, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3 1,
2013, at B2, B22 (documenting criminal charges against former state chemist accused of faking test results, who
allegedly would add cocaine to samples and report results as positive without testing); Solomon Moore, Science
Found Wanting in Nation's Crime Labs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at Al (describing National Academy of
Sciences report containing "sweeping critique of many forensic methods that the police and prosecutors rely on,
including fingerprinting, firearms identification and analysis of bite marks, blood spatter, hair and handwriting,"
which was later cited in Melendez-Diaz); Campbell Robertson, Questions Left for Mississippi Over Doctor's
Autopsies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/us/questions-for-mississippi-doctor-
after-thousands-of-autopsies.html?pagewanted=2 (describing forensic pathologist who, between the late 1980s
and late 2000s, misrepresented his qualifications and testified as to theories well beyond those standard in the
field). In short, "[i]t is not difficult to find instances in which laboratory procedures have been abused." Williams,
132 S. Ct. at 2250 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326 (citation omitted).
9 169 P. 3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007).
'o Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 327 (citing Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007)).
" Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.3d at 670 n.7. ("We offer no opinion on whether the analysis would be altered if
Hinojos-Mendoza had been a pro se defendant.").
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This Article tackles the question that Hinojos-Mendoza left open. Section II
reviews the United States Supreme Court's line of cases, beginning with the watershed
case of Crawford v. Washington, redefining the reach of the Confrontation Clause to bar
the admission of testimonial statements of an unavailable witness whom the defendant did
not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Section III details the Colorado Supreme
Court's three pronouncements on the constitutionality of Colorado's notice-and-demand
statute, the last of which came after-but, this Article argues, does not follow-Melendez-
Diaz. Section IV reviews, in the words of dissenting Colorado Supreme Court Justice
Martinez, "the U.S. Supreme Court's steadfast refusal to presume waiver [of a
fundamental constitutional right] from inaction."12 Section V adds a review of other state
court decisions on the constitutionality or lack thereof of notice-and-demand statutes as
enacted across the country. Section VI concludes that the way by which the statute waives
an accused's constitutional right to confrontation renders the statute unconstitutional as
applied to pro se defendants. In reaching that conclusion, this Article bears in mind the
United States Supreme Court's admonition that "[t]he Sixth Amendment stands as a
constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not
still be done."1 3
II. "[W]HAT THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PRESCRIBES"'4 : CRAWFORD V.
WASHINGTON AND ITS PROGENY
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which extends to federal and state prosecutions, 1 5 guarantees a criminal
defendant "the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."16 Until recently,
courts held that the admission of an unavailable witness's testimony did not offend the
Confrontation Clause if the testimony bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability."' In a recent
line of cases beginning with the watershed case of Crawford v. Washington, however, the
United States Supreme Court rejected this method of analysis and left in its place a
holding that the Confrontation Clause is violated by the admission of testimonial
statements of an unavailable witness whom the defendant did not have a prior opportunity
to cross-examine.19 This Section details Crawford and its relevant progeny, culminating in
the most recent cases that apply Crawford to the testimony of laboratory technicians and
analysts.20
12 Cropper v. People, 251 P.3d 434, 442 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (Martinez, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
" Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938), overruled in part on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
14 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
"Mendozav. People, 169 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (citing Pointerv. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406
(1965)).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The analogous provision of the Colorado Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant "the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face." COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16.
17 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
" See id. at 60-62 (characterizing the Roberts reliability test as "amorphous" and a "malleable standard [that]
often fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations"). The Court further described reliability as "a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee." Id. at 61. According to the Court, the Roberts test, rather than
ensuring that guarantee was realized, operated as "a surrogate means of assessing reliability." Id. at 62.
19 Id. at 68.
20 Two cases in the Crawford line, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011) (holding that murder
victim's statements to police identifying defendant after he was shot but before he died were not testimonial
because they were intended to help police resolve an ongoing emergency, and Crawford did not bar their
admission); and Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 355-56, 377 (2008) (holding that a murdervictim's statements
to police about the defendant three weeks before she was murdered were not admissible pursuant to Crawford
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A. Crawford v. Washington: Redefining the Confrontation Clause's
Protection
In the watershed case of Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme
Court announced a new test governing the scope of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to
the accused of the right be confronted with the witnesses against him.21 Tracing the
confrontation right to Roman times, the Court drew two inferences about the meaning of
the Sixth Amendment.22 First, the Court concluded that "the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed" was the "use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused."23 Accordingly, the Court determined that the Framers directed the
,24Confrontation Clause at "witnesses" who "bear testimony." The Court in turn defined
"testimony" as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact."25 Though it ultimately left for another day the pronouncement of a
comprehensive definition, Crawford did enumerate examples of what it termed the "core
class of 'testimonial' statements":
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;
extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions; statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.26
The second inference that the Crawford Court drew was that the Framers, via the Sixth
Amendment, "conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine."27 In its analysis, the Court
forcefully described the Confrontation Clause as "a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee,"28 not intended to be left to "the vagaries of the rules of evidence."29 The Court
because the defendant could not confront his accuser, despite the fact that his actions caused her to be
unavailable), are excepted, as they do not bear on this Article.
21 Crawford, and for that matter Davis after it, were written by Justice Scalia. Some trace the origins of the
opinion to Justice Scalia's dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), in which he rejected the majority's
holding that a Maryland statute did not violate the Confrontation Clause by permitting a child abuse victim to
testify via one-way closed-circuit television rather than face-to-face in a courtroom against the accused. Justice
Scalia characterized the majority opinion as the "subordination of explicit constitutional text to currently favored
public policy." Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, the holding contravened the
Constitution because "[t]he purpose of enshrining [the Confrontation Clause's] protection in the Constitution was
to assure that none of the many policy interests from time to time pursued by statutory law could overcome a
defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." Id. Justice Scalia would have required face-to-face
confrontation of the child witness because, he stated, "For good or bad, the Sixth Amendment requires
confrontation, and we are not at liberty to ignore it." Id. at 870.
22 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 53-54.
23 Id. at 50; accord id. at 53 ("[E]ven if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay,
that is its primary object. . . .").
24 See id. at 51 (citing 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)) (defining
"witnesses" as "those who 'bear testimony"') (first internal quotation omitted).
25 Id. at 51 (citing 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)) (internal
quotations omitted).
26 Id. at 51-52, 68 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
27 Id. at 54.
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summarized its holding as follows: "Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination."3 0
B. Davis v. Washington: Further Defining "Testimonial"
The day to which Crawford left a more comprehensive definition of
,31 3"testimonial" soon came. In Davis v. Washington,32 the Supreme Court clarified
Crawford's definition of "testimonial" within the context of police interrogations.3 3 While
still refusing "to produce an exhaustive classification," the Court held:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.3 4
The key difference, according to the Davis Court, is between describing "what is
happening" and "what happened."3 5 Given that Davis addressed only statements in
response to police interrogations (and then, not even "exhaustive[1y]"36), questions
remained concerning the application of "testimonial" to statements made in other contexts.
C. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Forensic Technician Affidavits Are
Testimonial
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme Court took up
one variant of those remaining questions: whether affidavits from forensic analysts are
testimonial statements triggering the protection of the Confrontation Clause.3 7 The
Massachusetts state court below had admitted into evidence sworn affidavits called
"'certificates of analysis" that showed the results of forensic analysis performed on the
substances seized from the criminal defendant to be cocaine.38 The defendant had objected
on Confrontation Clause grounds, but the court below admitted the certificates pursuant to
a state statute "as 'prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of
30 Id. at 68.
' See id. ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."').
32 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
* Id. at 817, 822. Davis also determined the companion case ofHammonv. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 819-21. As a
primary matter, the Davis Court clarified, in case Crawford had left any doubt, that Crawford applies only to
testimonial statements. Id. at 824. Technically, Crawford had not decided this question, nor had it
comprehensively defined testimonial evidence. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
34 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. Importantly, the Court noted that its holding did not imply "that statements made in the
absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial." Id. at 822 n.1. The Court was careful to explain that
its decision did not "consider whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement
personnel are 'testimonial."' Id. at 823 n.2.
" Id. at 830. The Court did note the possibility that a conversation might "evolve into testimonial statements." Id.
at 828 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36 Id. at 822.
1 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307 (2009).
3 Id. at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the narcotic . . . analyzed."'3 9 The state courts below held that the certificates were not
testimonial hearsay subject to the protections of the Confrontation Clause.40
The United States Supreme Court quickly and decisively reversed.4 1 The Court
had no trouble viewing the documents at issue "quite plainly [as] affidavits" and therefore
"within the 'core class of testimonial statements"' described in Crawford."42 Accordingly,
[a]bsent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to 'be confronted
with' the analysts at trial." 4 3 In reaching its holding, the Court rejected two rationales that
other courts had employed to admit forensic affidavits as evidence. First, the Court
rejected the notion that the Compulsory Process Clause, and a defendant's ability to obtain
"witnesses 'in his favor"' under it, could serve as an adequate substitute for an accused's
confrontation right. Second, the Court rejected the proposition that forensic analysis
affidavits are admissible as business records.46 Instead, the Court determined: "there [may
be] other ways-and in some cases better ways-to challenge or verify the results of a
forensic test. But the Constitution guarantees one way: confrontation. We do not have
license to suspend the Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy is
available. " "The Confrontation Clause-like those other constitutional provisions-is
binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience."
The Court recognized that its opinion had practical ramifications, but was
convinced that those consequences would not be dire.4 9 The Court observed, "Many States
have already adopted the constitutional rule we announce today, while many others permit
the defendant o assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause right after receiving
,5 0notice of the prosecution's intent to use a forensic analyst's report," and explicated as
follows:
In their simplest form, notice-and-demand statutes require the
prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an
analyst's report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a
period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence
absent the analyst's appearance live at trial. Contrary to the dissent's
perception, these statutes shift no burden whatever. The defendant
always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection;
notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within which he
must do so. States are free to adopt procedural rules governing
objections. It is common to require a defendant to exercise his rights
under the Compulsory Process Clause in advance of trial, announcing
his intent to present certain witnesses. There is no conceivable reason
39 Id. at 309 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 13) (omission in original).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 329.
42 Id. at 310; see also id. at 329 ("This case involves little more than the application of our holding in Crawford v.
Washington").
43 Id. at 311 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54) (emphasis in original).
44 Id. at 326-29.
45 Id. at 3 13-14, 324-25 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend VI).
46 Id. at 321-24.
47 Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
48 Id. at 325.
49 Id. (explaining that "the sky will not fall after today's decision").
'0 Id. at 325-26 (footnote omitted).
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why he cannot similarly be compelled to exercise his Confrontation
Clause rights before trial. See Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P. 3d
662, 670 (Colo. 2007) (discussing and approving Colorado's notice-
and-demand provision) .
The Court expressly disavowed the notion that its opinion constitutionalized anything
,52more than the "simplest form [of] notice-and-demand statutes." The majority opinion
offered no discussion of the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in Hinojos-Mendoza other
than the citation offered above.
Justice Kennedy's dissent, however, would have drawn a distinction "between
laboratory analysts who perform scientific tests and other, more conventional
,53witnesses." The former, Justice Kennedy believed, are not 'witnesses against" an
accused within the original meaning of those words.4 Rather, the Framers intended the
Confrontation Clause to apply only to the latter, which he defined as witnesses with some
personal knowledge of the defendant's guilt.5 5 Throughout, Justice Kennedy expressed
grave concerns about the practical implications of the Court's holding,56 and suggested
that the holding failed to account for "the increasing reliability of scientific testing."5 7 His
opinion contains little doubt that the holding granted criminal defendants and the defense
bar a tactical advantage that will certainly be deployed.
Importantly, Justice Kennedy rebutted the majority's interpretation of notice-and-
demand statutes.59 His opinion recognized that such statutes, contrary to the majority's
reasoning, "do impose requirements on the defendant," which operate to "reduce[] the
confrontation right."60 He named Colorado, and Hinojos-Mendoza specifically, among this
group.61 This Article will go on to argue, using the Hinojos-Mendoza opinion itself, that
Justice Kennedy's interpretation was the better one.
D. Bullcoming v. New Mexico: Rejecting Surrogate Technician
Testimony
The Court next visited the topic of confrontation of forensic technician witnesses
62in Bullcoming v. New Mexico. There, the prosecution introduced testimonial evidence,
" Id. at 325-27 (some internal citations omitted, emphasis added).
52 Id. at 327 n.12 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("We have no occasion today to pass
on the constitutionality of every variety of statute commonly given the notice-and-demand label. It suffices to
say that what we have referred to as the 'simplest form [of] notice-and-demand statutes,' is constitutional."
(citation omitted)); accord Andrew W. Eichner, Note, The Failures ofMelendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and the
Unstable Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 437, 450-51 (2011) (observing that after Melendez-Diaz,
certain variations of notice-and-demand statute may yet be deemed unconstitutional).
" Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).





59 Id. at 355-56.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 3 56-57 (citing, inter alia, Hinojos-Mendozav. People, 169 P. 3d 662, 668-71 (Colo. 2007); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 16-3-309)).
6 2 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2707 (2011). One opinion interceded between Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, butthe Court
did not use it to offer any substantive guidance on its holding inMelendez-Diaz. Four days after the publication
of its opinion inMelendez-Diaz, the Court granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia. 557 U.S. 933 (2009). Several
months later, the Court disposed of the case, per curiam, by vacating the judgment of the Virginia high court and
remanding the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion in Melendez-Diaz v.
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namely, a forensic laboratory report certifying that the DWI defendant's blood alcohol
concentration level was above the threshold for aggravated DWI, but it did so via the
63testimony of an analyst who neither signed the report nor observed the test reported.
Citing Crawford and its line, including Davis's pronouncement hat the "Confrontation
Clause may not be 'evaded by having a note-taking police [officer] recite the . . .
testimony of the declarant,"'64 the Court determined that the right of confrontation is not
,65satisfied by such so-called "surrogate testimony." The Court once again rejected the
notion that laboratory reports are non-testimonial, and firmly reiterated its holding in
66Melendez-Diaz that they are. In so doing, the Court disavowed any reliance on the
supposed reliability of such reports: "the comparative reliability of an analyst's testimonial
report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar.
This Court settled in Crawford that the 'obviou[s] reliab[ility]' of a testimonial statement
does not dispense with the Confrontation Clause."6 7
Justice Ginsburg, in a portion of her opinion joined only by Justice Scalia, echoed
Melendez-Diaz and rejected any notion that its holding imposed an undue burden on
68 69
prosecution. According to her, any such burden was capable of being reduced.
Retesting of the sample at issue by the analyst to be called was always an option.7 0
Similarly, the Court reiterated that states may enact notice-and-demand statutes that
"specifically preserv[e]" an accused's confrontation right.
Justice Kennedy again dissented, echoing his Melendez-Diaz dissent and also
tracing the problems with the majority opinion to Crawford and the cases extending it.72
His opinion detailed his view that, via Crawford and later cases, the "Court has taken the
Clause far beyond its most important application, which is to forbid sworn, ex parte, out-
of-court statements by unconfronted and available witnesses who observed the crime and
do not appear at trial. 73 Making passing reference to notice-and-demand statutes, Justice
Kennedy discarded the majority's reliance on such laws as an appropriate "palliative" for
the disruption to be wrought by its holding.
Massachusetts." Briscoe, 559 U.S. at 32. The holding of the Virginia court on remand, in Cypress v.
Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 206 (Va. 2010), is addressed in Section 0., infra.
6 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709.
64 Id. at 2715 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (alteration in original) (omission in original)
(deletion of emphasis in original)).
61 Id. at 2710. A majority of the Courtjoined in all but one part of the decision written by Justice Ginsburg.
Justice Sotomayor joined in all but Part IV of that decision, id. at 2709, and also issued her own concurrence in
part, id. at 2719-23.
66 Id. at 2717 (majority opinion).
67 Id. at 2715 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)).
6 Id. at 2717.
6 9 Id. at 2718.
70 Id. ("New Mexico could have avoided any Confrontation Clause problem by asking Razatos to retest the
sample, and then testify to the results of his retest rather than to the results of a test he did not conduct or
observe."); Jesse J. Norris, Who Can Testify about Lab Results after Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming?: Surrogate
Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 375, 385 (2011) ("[T]he Court's opinion did not
rule on the constitutionality of surrogate testimony when the surrogate had played some role in or observed the
test, or had offered an independent analysis of either an analyst's report that was not admitted into evidence, or
machine-generated 'raw data' that was admitted into evidence.").
' Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2718.
72 Id. at 2723-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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E. Williams v. Illinois: "Nothing Comparable Happened Here"75
If Bullcoming was a sign that the Crawford majority was fracturing, the next case
to reach the Supreme Court's docket confirmed it.76 In Williams v. Illinois, the Court took
up the issue of whether "Crawford bar[s] an expert from expressing an opinion based on
facts about a case that have been made known to the expert but about which the expert is
not competent to testify."7  At Williams' bench trial, the prosecution called an expert
witness who testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory matched a
profile produced by the state laboratory using Williams' blood sample.7 " The expert
testified that the outside laboratory was accredited and provided the police with a DNA
profile, and explained that according to shipping manifests admitted as business records,
swabs taken from the victim were provided to and received back from the outside lab.7 9
The expert did not testify as to the accuracy of the profile of the outside lab, nor did he
testify as to how the outside lab handled or tested the sample.0 The outside laboratory
report was neither admitted into evidence, nor identified as the source of the expert's
opinion; the expert testified that her testimony relied exclusively on the outside report.1
The problem, as Justice Thomas explained in his concurrence, was that the expert's
testimony "went well beyond what was necessary to explain why she performed the
[match]."82
Justice Alito delivered a plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Breyer joined. The opinion issued "two independent reasons ... [to]
conclude that there was no Confrontation Clause violation in this case."8 3 First, the
plurality held that no Confrontation Clause violation was effected by the expert's
testimony because his testimony was not considered for the truth of the matter asserted.4
That is, "the report was not to be considered for its truth but only for the 'distinctive and
limited purpose' of seeing whether it matched something else."85 This portion of the
7 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2240 (2012).
76 This fracturing was evident in the fact that Williams produced a plurality opinion, as explained in this Section.
Justice Alito's opinion went so far as to suggest, "Experience might yet show that the holdings in those cases
should be reconsidered for the reasons, among others, expressed in the dissents the decisions produced." Id. at
2242 n.13.
77 Id. at 2227. Justice Sotomayor had raised this question in her concurrence in Bullcoming, noting that the
Court's opinion did not address this issue and therefore it remained to be confronted. See id. at 2233 (citing
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part)).
78 Id. at 2227. This expert was one of three expert forensic witnesses. Id. at 2229.
79 Id. at 2227.
go Id.
" Id. at 2230; see also id. at 2229-31, 2235-36. In recounting the laboratory technician's testimony, the plurality
(and the dissent) focused on the following line of questioning: "Q Was there a computer match generated of the
male DNA profile found in semen from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to a male DNA profile that had been
identified as having originated from Sandy Williams?" "A Yes, there was." Id. at 2236 (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
82 Id. at 2258 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring); accord id. at 2270 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2244 (majority opinion).
84 Id. at 2228. According to the plurality, such testimony "fall[s] outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause."
Id. In reaching this conclusion, the opinion relied in part on the long-standing rule that an expert witness may
opine as to facts even if he lacks first-hand knowledge of them. Id. at 2233; see also id. at 2228 ("[A]n expert
may express an opinion that is based on facts that the expert assumes, but does not know, to be true.").
8 Id. at 2240 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 417 (1985)). In this portion of the decision, the plurality
in several instances hinted that is holding was factually dependent on the fact that the trier-of-fact at issue was a
judge in a bench trial. See, e.g., id. at 2236-37, 2241 n. 11. Ultimately, however, the plurality disavowed the
"suggest[ion] that the Confrontation Clause applies differently depending on the identity of the factfinder."Id. at
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decision was in harmony with Crawford,8 as well as with Bullcoming and Melendez-
Diaz," according to the plurality opinion. Second, the plurality concluded that, even if the
report were considered for the truth of the matter asserted, there was no confrontation
violation." The plurality distinguished the report at issue in Williams as one that "plainly
was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual . . . no[r] to
accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial."8 The plurality stated that this
holding, too, comported with Crawford and subsequent cases.90 It distinguished the report
at issue from the reports in prior cases by noting that "[i]n all but one of the post-Crawford
cases in which a Confrontation Clause violation has been found," the statement at issue
had "the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual." 91 It went on to describe
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming as holding the forensic reports at issue to be testimonial,
but "not hold[ing] that all forensic reports fall into the same category."9 2
Justice Breyer issued a concurrence, in which he stated that he would adhere to
the dissenting views in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, but joined in the plurality.9 3
Justice Breyer would have gone farther than the majority and answered the broader
question of, "How does the Confrontation Clause apply to the panoply of crime laboratory
reports and underlying technical statements written by (or otherwise made by) laboratory
technicians?"94 His concurrence adhered to the dissents in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming
to determine that the report at issue was not "testimonial" and therefore no confrontation
was required.9 5 In reaching this decision, he agreed with the plurality's determination that
96the report at issue was not prepared for the purpose of accusing a targeted individual.
Justice Breyer would have created a presumption that "reports such as the DNA report
before us presumptively to lie outside the perimeter of the Clause as established by the
Court's precedents." That presumption could be rebutted by "good reason to doubt the
laboratory's competence or the validity of its accreditation" or "the existence of a motive
to falsify." 98
16 Id. at 2235 (majority opinion) ("Crawford ... took pains to reaffirm the proposition that the Confrontation
Clause 'does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted."' (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9 (2004)).
87 Id. at 2240. The plurality determined that "[i]n those cases, the forensic reports were introduced into evidence,
and there is no question that this was done for the purpose of proving the truth of what they asserted." Id.
" Id. at 2242.
89 Id. at 2243. In this vein, the plurality characterized the report as "not inherently inculpatory" and noted that the
technicians who prepare such reports have "no idea what the consequences of their work will be ... whether it
will turn out to be incriminating or exonerating-or both." Id. at 2228, 2244.
90 Id. at 2232, 2240.
9' Id. at 2242 (footnote omitted).
92 Id. at 2243.
93 Id. at 2245 (Breyer, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 2244.
95 Id. at 2248.
96 Id. at 2250-51; id. at 2248-49 (describing the statements at issue as "made by an accredited laboratory
employee operating at a remove from the investigation in the ordinary course of professional work" who was
"operat[ing] behind a veil of ignorance that likely prevented them from knowing the identity of the defendant in
this case"); id. at 2251 (citation omitted) ("[H]ere the DNA report sought, not to accuse petitioner, but instead to
generate objectively a profile of a then-unknown suspect's DNA from the semen he left in committing the
crime."). Despite this, the California Supreme Court has held that a laboratory analyst's report stating the
defendant's blood-alcohol content was not testimonial because "the critical portions of that report were not made
with the requisite degree of formality or solemnity to be considered testimonial." People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469,
477 (Cal. 2012).
97 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 2252.
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Yet "[flive Justices specifically reject[ed] every aspect of [the plurality's]
reasoning and every paragraph of its explication."99 Justice Thomas concurred with the
conclusion that the expert testimony did not violate the defendant's confrontation right,
but agreed with the dissent that the plurality's opinion was flawed.100 Justice Kagan,
joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, dissented.101 Her dissent determined
that the report was identical to those in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming102 and that the
expert's testimony at issue was "functionally identical" to that unconstitutionally proffered
in Bullcoming.103 When the expert introduced the substance of the report into evidence,
then, the author of "that report 'became a witness' whom Williams 'had the right to
confront."'o10  "The plurality's primary argument to the contrary tries to exploit a limit to
the Confrontation Clause recognized in Crawford'1 0 5 and created for the prosecution "a
ready method to bypass the Constitution."106 The dissent rejected the "targeted individual"
test supported by the plurality, finding that it could not be supported by Crawford and its
progeny.1 0 7 Under the dissent's reading of the Court's precedents, "[w] e have held that the
Confrontation Clause requires something more."108
After Williams, the fate of the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford is
unclear, especially as to forensic witnesses. As Justice Kagan acutely summarized in her
dissent,
What comes out of four Justices' desire to limit Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming in whatever way possible, combined with one Justice's one-
justice view of those holdings, is-to be frank-who knows what.
Those decisions apparently no longer mean all that they say. Yet no one
can tell in what way or to what extent they are altered because no
proposed limitation commands the support of a majority.1 0 9
III. COLORADO'S NOTICE-AND-DEMAND STATUTE
In the meantime, however, the fate of technician testimony is settled for the time
being in Colorado, at least as to defendants represented by counsel. Colorado has a notice-
and-demand statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-309(5), and its Supreme Court has passed
judgment on it.110 In its current form, that statute provides:
99 Id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., concurring).
100 Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas concluded that the "report [wa]s not a statement by a
'witnes[s]' within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 2260 (alterations in original).
101 Id. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
102 Id. at 2266. Accordingly, Justice Kagan determined that the report was testimonial. Id. at 2272-75.
103 Id. at 2267, 2270. Justice Kagan also accurately identified "the typical problem with laboratory analyses--and
the typical focus of cross-examination" as "careless or incompetent work, rather than with personal vendettas. Id.
at 2274.
104 Id. at 2268 (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2011)).
105 Id. at 2268. Like Justice Thomas, Justice Kagan argued that the "admission of the out-of-court statement in
this context has no purpose separate from its truth." Id. at 2269; see also id. at 2258 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 2270 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 2274 ("None of our cases has ever suggested that, in addition, the statement must be meant to accuse a
previously identified individual.").
108 Id. at 2270.
109 Id. at 2277.
10 See Hinojos-Mendozav. People, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2003).
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Any report or copy thereof or the findings of the criminalistics
laboratory shall be received in evidence in any court, preliminary
hearing, or grand jury proceeding in the same manner and with the same
force and effect as if the employee or technician of the criminalistics
laboratory who accomplished the requested analysis, comparison, or
identification had testified in person. Any party may request that such
employee or technician testify in person at a criminal trial on behalf of
the state before a jury or to the court, by notifying the witness and other
party at least fourteen days before the date of such criminal trial."'
This Section details the Colorado Supreme Court decisions analyzing the statute both
before and after Crawford.
A. People v. Mojica-Simental: The (Short-Lived) Actual Notice
Requirement
Even before Crawford, the Colorado Supreme Court took up the constitutionality
112of Colorado's notice-and-demand statute in the 2003 case of People v. Mojica-Simental.
Characterizing the statute as a mere precondition on an accused's exercise of his
constitutional right, which can be met by "minimal effort" on his part, the Court
determined that Colorado's notice-and-demand statute is facially constitutional.113 Under
the Court's conceptualization, the notice-and-demand statute "does not impermissibly
shift the burden of proof to the defendant."1 The Court determined that the defendant's
as-applied challenge was not yet ripe for review, but was careful to recognize that "there
may be circumstances where it is, in fact, an unreasonable burden and effectively abridges
a defendant's right to confrontation." The Court enumerated at least one such
circumstance: "[i]f a defendant does not have actual notice of the requirements of the
statute, or mistakenly fails to notify the prosecution to have the technician present to
,116testify." In that circumstance, the Court cautioned, 'there is a significant possibility that
a defendant's failure to act may not constitute a voluntary waiver of his fundamental right
to confrontation," as required by the Constitution.1 17
The Court concluded by enumerating "some factors" a trial court might consider
before admitting a laboratory report without its author's testimony:
whether an attorney or a pro se litigant actually knew that he was
required to notify the opposing party of his desire to have the witness
present; the reasons why notice was late or was not given at all; the
difficulty of acquiring the presence of the witness; the significance to
the case of the report and of the testimony that would be elicited from
the technician; and any other pertinent circumstances.
Underscoring the importance of actual notice, the Court stated that the statute would be
"best utilized" in practice if both the prosecution and defense "discuss the matter, at some
pre-trial opportunity, to ensure that all parties are in agreement as to whether the witness
. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-309(5) (2012).
112 73 P.3d 15, 17 (Colo. 2003).
113 Id. at 17-18.
114 Id. at 19.
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will be present."119 Unfortunately for defendants, despite the Supreme Court's subsequent
pronouncements in Crawford, the actual notice requirement that Mojica-Simental
appeared to impose was soon abandoned by the Colorado Supreme Court.
B. Hinojos-Mendoza v. People: "No Constitutional Infirmity in Section
16-3-309(5)",120
In Hinojos-Mendoza, the Colorado Supreme Court revisited the constitutionality
of Colorado's notice-and-demand statute in light of Crawford.121 First, the Court
determined that laboratory reports are testimonial statements subject to Crawford.122 This
decision predated-but accords with-the United States Supreme Court's later opinions in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. The Court went on to consider both facial and as-applied
challenges to Section 16-3-309(5).123
The Court began its analysis by noting that the right to confrontation is
waivablel24 and defining waiver "as the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right."'125 Against this backdrop, the Court conceptualized the statute as nothing
more than a statutory procedural requirement and upheld its facial constitutionality:
The procedure provided in section 16-3-309(5) for ensuring the presence
of the lab technician at trial does not deny a defendant the opportunity to
cross-examine the technician, but simply requires that the defendant
decide prior to trial whether he will conduct a cross-examination. The
statute provides the opportunity for confrontation - only the timing of
the defendant's decision is changed.1 2 6
The Court went on to uphold the constitutionality of the statute as applied to
Hinojos-Mendoza.127 Its reasoning on this prong, however, was far more detailed-and
convoluted. At trial, the prosecution introduced the lab report without the testimony of its
author. 12 Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds and, when questioned by the trial
court, explained that he had not requested the report's author pursuant to Section 16-3-
309(5) because he was unaware of the statute.129 The trial court overruled the objection
and admitted the report into evidence.130 This ruling was not without consequence. A
critical fact in determining Hinojos-Mendoza's potential punishment was the net weight of
the drugs; because the report was ambiguous on this point, and because the author of the
119 Id.
120 Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 669 (Colo. 2007).
121 Id. at 664. The Court employed the same reasoning and reached the same result in a case announced the same
day, Coleman v. People, 169 P.3d 659 (Colo. 2007), reh g denied, No. 06SC155, 2007 Colo. LEXIS 1037 (Colo.
Nov. 5, 2007).
122 Id. at 666. The dissenting opinion agreed with this portion of the Court's holding. Id. at 671 (Martinez, J.,
dissenting).
123 Id. at 667-78.
124 Id. at 668 (citing Brookhartv. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1154 (10th
Cir. 1999)).
125 Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).
126 Id. at 668-69.
127 Id. at 670.
128 Id. at 664.
129 id
130 Id. at 664-65.
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report was not required to testify to resolve the ambiguity, Hinojos-Mendoza faced a
longer potential maximum sentence.131
First, the Court abandoned Mojica-Simental as foreshadowing a different
outcome for Hinojos-Mendoza. It stated, "The dicta in Mojica-Simental was based on the
faulty premise that the right to confrontation can only be waived if the defendant
personally makes a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver."132 Instead, the Court
determined, a defendant's right to confrontation may be waived by defense counsel,133 and
it may be waived by defense counsel's failure to comply with the procedural demand of
Section 16-3-309(5).134 On the latter point, the Court issued a conclusive presumption that
"'where a defendant such as Hinojos-Mendoza is represented by counsel, the failure to
comply with the statutory prerequisites of section 16-3-309(5) waives the defendant's right
to confront the witness just as the decision to forgo cross-examination at trial would waive
that right."135 This presumption arose from a separate, underlying presumption in
Colorado law, that of defense counsel having knowledge of all applicable rules of
procedure.136 The Court's reasoning makes both presumptions irrebuttable, because it
applied the presumptions in the face of defense counsel's admission that he was unaware
of the statute and had not intended to waive confrontation. 137
The Court explicitly left open the question of the constitutionality of Section 16-
3-309(5) as applied to pro se defendants. 13 This opening, however, did Hinojos-Mendoza
no good. For him, the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion was the end of the road. That
court denied his petition for rehearing.139 And four days after the United States Supreme
Court announced its decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, and the same day it
remanded Briscoe v. Virginia, that Court denied Hinojos-Mendoza's petition for
certiorari.140
Two justices of the Colorado Supreme Court would have found in favor of
Hinojos-Mendoza's confrontation right. Having discerned in the majority opinion no
" Id. at 674 (Martinez, J., dissenting). Crucially, the report "listed the weight of the 'tan tape wrapped block' as
1004.5 grams, but omitted whether the weight included the tape and packaging or was just the net weight of the
drugs.... The maximum sentence for a class three felony possession with intent to distribute less than one
thousand grams is sixteen years in prison. The maximum sentence for one thousand grams or more is twenty-four
years in prison." Id. (footnote omitted). Because of one ambiguous sentence in a report whose author he was
denied the opportunity to cross-examine, Hinojos-Mendoza faced eight more years in prison.
132 Id. at 669 (citing People v. Mojica-Simental, 73 P.3d 15, 20 (Colo. 2003)).
. Id. ("The right to confrontation falls into the class of rights that defense counsel can waive through strategic
decisions.").
134 Id. at 670.
1 Id.
136 Id. (citing Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237, 1244 (Colo. 1992)). The Court determined that, "[g]iven this
knowledge [of procedural rules], we can infer from the failure to comply with the procedural requirements that
the attorney made a decision not to exercise the right at issue." Id.
137 Id. at 664; accord id. at 672 (Martinez, J., dissenting) ("The majority applies its presumption in this case even
though there is evidence rebutting it."); id. at 673 ("In effect, the majority creates an irrebuttable presumption by
applying the presumption of knowledge of the law when the attorney said on the record that he was unaware of
the law."). Indeed, the Court made clear that a trial court need not inquire of the defense lawyer or his client. Id.
at 670 n.6 ("[T]he trial court does not need to make sure that the attorney's failure to comply with section 16-3-
309(5) reflects the informed and voluntary decision of the defendant.").
131 Id. at 670 n.7 ("We offer no opinion on whether the analysis would be altered if Hinojos-Mendoza had been a
pro se defendant.").
139 Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, No. 05SC881, 2007 Colo. LEXIS 1036 (Colo. Nov. 5, 2007). Justices Martinez
and Bender would have granted the rehearing.
140 Hinojos-Mendoza v. Colorado, 557 U.S. 934 (2009).
141 Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 671 (Colo. 2007)
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"'constitutionally sufficient explanation for how unknowing inaction amounts to an
'intentional' waiver,"142 Justice Martinez, joined by Justice Bender, dissented.143 In the
dissent's view, People v. Mojica-Simental conditioned the constitutionality of Section 16-
3-309(5) on a "proper waiver," which could only be achieved by a "voluntary, knowing,
,144
and intentional [waiver] . . . by the defendant or his attorney." That is, Justice Martinez
agreed that defense counsel may waive the confrontation right on behalf of his client, but
disagreed that counsel could do so by inaction. Instead, Justice Martinez would have
required, before finding a "proper waiver," the type of voluntary, knowing, and intentional
action that would be required of the defendant himself.146 Justice Martinez refused the
majority's conceptualization of the statute as "a matter of timing"1 4 7 and plainly saw the
majority's reasoning for what it was: an "irrebuttable presumption" of waiver. 1 4  In the
face of evidence that no such knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver had been made
by defense counsel here, Justice Martinez would have reversed Hinojos-Mendoza's
- - 149
conviction.
C. Cropper v. People: No-Actual-Notice-and-Demand Is Constitutional
Hinojos-Mendoza has not been the Colorado Supreme Court's final word on the
constitutionality of Colorado's notice-and-demand statute. In the 2011 case of Cropper v.
People, the Court reviewed an as-applied challenge to the statute based on Melendez-
Diaz.15 0 Cropper argued that Section 16-3-309(5) was unconstitutional because it does not
actually require the prosecution to issue constitutionally sufficient "notice," differentiating
Colorado's statute from the simple notice-and-demand statutes that Melendez-Diaz opined
were constitutional. 151
In Cropper's case, the prosecution had included on its pre-trial witness list the
forensic technician who had authored a report stating that a shoe-print found at the crime
scene could have been from the same type of shoe the defendant was wearing when he
152 153was apprehended. The prosecution had also provided the report in pre-trial discovery.
At trial, the prosecution moved to introduce technician's report without his live testimony,
explaining that he was unavailable due to family emergency. 15 Finding that the defendant
142 Id. at 673.
143 Id. at 675 (Martinez, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 671. The dissent rejected the majority's characterization of Mojica-Simental's pronouncements on
waiver as "dicta" and would have categorized them as a holding. Id. at 674 n.15. Justice Martinez wrote, "The
majority has overruled Mojica-Simental's analytical foundation by discarding the requirement of a voluntary,
knowing, and intentional waiver, and leaving it without the central premise upon which the holding of facial
constitutionality is dependent." Id. at 671. Crawford required adherence to, not an abandoning of, Mojica-
Simental's holding, in Justice Martinez's view. Id. at 675 ("[P]ost-Crawford, Mojica-Simental's waiver
requirement has become even more important because it is now the only manner in which the statute can be
applied constitutionally without cross-examination.")
14 Id. at 673.
146 Id. at 674 ("[T]hough defendants need not personally waive this right, that does not justify undermining the
Sixth Amendment's fundamental constitutional protections.").
147 Id. at 673.
148 Id. at 672 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (rejecting "the majority['s] replace[ment of] Mojica-Simental's
requirement of a voluntary, knowing, and intentional waiver with an automatic waiver premised upon an
irrebuttable presumption").
19 Id. at 675 (Martinez, J., dissenting).
"0 Cropperv. People, 251 P.3d 434, 435-37 (Colo. 2011).
. Id. at 437.
1
5 2 Id. at 435.
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had not complied with Section 16-3-309(5), the trial court admitted the report. 1 5 5 As in
Hinojos-Mendoza, the trial court did so in the face of defense counsel's protestation that
she was unaware of the statute and had not intended to waive her client's confrontation
right.156
The Colorado Supreme Court adhered to its prior holding that a waiver may
result from defense counsel's inaction, 1 5 7 and that defense counsel may waive his client's
right to confrontation by not complying with the procedures set forth in Section 16-3-
309(5), even where defense counsel is unaware of the statute. 1 5  While noting that
Melendez-Diaz had been decided in the years since Hinojos-Mendoza nd was applicable
to the case at issue, the court also (rightfully) acknowledged that "[d]espite [Melendez-
Diaz's] discussion of Hinojos-Mendoza, the Supreme Court did not pass judgment on
section 16-3-309(5)."159 The Colorado Supreme Court took the opportunity to do so,
however, and "h[e]ld that providing the defense with a forensic lab report through
discovery is sufficient to put the defendant on notice that, absent a specific request under
section 16-3-309(5), the report can be introduced without live testimony."160 This result
was unchanged by the fact that the prosecution had represented that it would call the live
testimony of the technician.161 Also unchanged was the court's strict adherence to its
irrebuttable presumption that a defense lawyer who does not adhere to Section 16-3-
309(5) intends to waive her client's confrontation right.162
Likewise, Justice Martinez, and again Chief Justice Bender with him,163 remained
steadfast in his dissent from the majority's reapplication of its Hinojos-Mendoza
reasoning.164 Echoing his dissent in that case, Justice Martinez reviewed the decades of
United States Supreme Court precedent in which "the Court has steadfastly refused to
presume the waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights from inaction alone."165 Moving
to the most recent relevant United States Supreme Court precedent, Melendez-Diaz, and
its dicta that simple notice-and-demand statutes are constitutional, Justice Martinez wrote,
"Crucial to the Court's reasoning was the fact that simple notice-and-demand statutes,
unlike the variety of statutes receiving the notice-and-demand label, require the
155 Id.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 435 (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314 n.3 (2009)).
151 Id. at 436 (citing Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007)). In fact, the Court considered
this case nothing more than a re-application of Hinojos-Mendoza. Id. at 438 ("Thus, to reach our decision in this
case, we need only look to and apply the same reasoning that we employed in Hinojos-Mendoza.").
159 Id. at 437.
160 id
161 Id. at 437-38 ("Regardless of any representations that the prosecution made that the technician would testify,
Cropper had notice of the presence of the report and had an adequate opportunity to assert Cropper's
confrontation rights and request hat the technician be present for cross-examination."); see Jones v. State, 2011
Ark. App. 683, 6 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that defendant's failure to provide notice that he wanted to
examine analyst who appeared on prosecution's witness list but did not testify waived his Confrontation Clause
rights because "the Melendez-Diaz Court acknowledged that some states have notice-and-demand statutes, [like
Arkansas's], and found them consistent with constitutional requirements").
162 Cropper, 251 P.3d at 438. If anything, that presumption was strengthened, as the Court's language evinced
little patience for the defense counsel's unawareness of the statute. See, e.g., id. at 438 nn.8-9 (suggesting that
Cropper may have a colorable claim for malpractice and observing that "section 16-3-309(5) is not a new statute.
It has been in effect since 1984").
161 Id. at 438 (Martinez, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 440.
65 Id. at 439 (citingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972)). For a more detailed discussion of this precedent, see infra Section 0.
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prosecution to provide the defendant with actual notice."16 Justice Martinez reasoned
Colorado's statute does no such thing and therefore "is not a simple notice-and-demand
statute of the type approved in Melendez-Diaz."167 His dissent perspicaciously recognized
that Melendez-Diaz listed several state notice-and-demand statutes were of the "simple"
type, and Colorado's was "[n]oticeably absent."168 Justice Martinez interpreted Melendez-
Diaz's list as a "refus[al] to approve statutes that lack an actual notice requirement" and
thereby "cast[ing] doubt on the constitutionality of section 16-3-309(5) and other notice-
and-demand statutes that fail to require the prosecution to provide actual notice to defense
counsel."169 Finding no prosecutorial action that provided actual notice of prosecution's
intent to introduce the footprint forensic report without the testimony of its author, Justice
Martinez determined that defense counsel's failure to demand that testimony pursuant to
Section 16-3-309(5) "was not a constitutionally sufficient communication of waiver."170
The majority's holding to the contrary effected an unconstitutional application of Section
16-3-309(5) from which Justice Martinez dissented. In reaching this result, Justice
Martinez again maligned the majority for creating and applying a conclusive presumption
of waiver in the face of evidence rebutting it. 171
Like Hinojos-Mendoza before him, the Colorado Supreme Court's decision was
the end of the line for Cropper. That court denied him a rehearing,172 and United States
Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari.173
IV. "[T]HE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S STEADFAST REFUSAL TO PRESUME WAIVER
[OF A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT] FROM INACTION,1 74
The Colorado and United States Supreme Court cases detailed in Sections 0 and
III supra have not, of course, occurred in a vacuum. Instead, they have occurred against
the backdrop of decades of United States Supreme Court case law explaining that inaction
is insufficient to give rise to a waiver of a fundamental right, as discussed in Mojica-
Simental and in Colorado Supreme Court Justice Martinez's dissents from Hinojos-
Mendoza and Cropper.17 5 This Section details that case law.
As a primary matter, an accused's right to confront the witnesses against him is a
"bedrock procedural guarantee" and a "fundamental right."176 That "fundamental right" is
166 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009)).
Justice Martinez also traced this point to Mojica-Simental, observing that "Melendez-Diaz confirms the
fundamental importance of our emphasis in Mojica-Simental on actual notice." Id. at 441 n. 11 (citing People v.
Mojica-Simental, 73 P.3d 15, 21 (Colo. 2003)).
167 Id. at 440.
161 Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326).
169 id
17o Id. at 441.
171 Id. at 441-42. On this point, Justice Martinez firmly rejected any hint that Melendez-Diaz approved of the
presumption of waiver created in Hinojos-Mendoza nd instead read Melendez-Diaz to "impl[y] that the mere
existence of a statute is an insufficient basis to presume that an attorney made an informed decision to forego the
right to confrontation." Id. at 440-41.
172 Cropperv. People, No. 09SC828, 2011 Colo. LEXIS 358 (Apr. 25, 2011). Justice Martinez and Chief Justice
Bender would have granted the rehearing.
171 Cropperv. Colorado, 132 S. Ct. 837 (2011).
174 Cropperv. People, 251 P.3d 434, 442 (Colo. 2011) (Martinez, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 439; Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.3d 662, 671 (Colo. 2007) (Martinez, J., dissenting); People v. Mojica-
Simental, 73 P.3d 15, 20 (Colo. 2003).
176 People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 974-75 (Colo. 2004) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)); Id. at
975; see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404-06 (1965).
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guaranteed under both the United States and Colorado Constitutions."' Like other
fundamental rights, the right to confrontation is waivable."' However, "[g]enerally, the
U.S. Supreme Court has refused to presume waiver of a fundamental constitutional right
from a defendant's inaction."1 7 9 "The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed
constitutional right is, of course, a federal question controlled by federal law."Iso
To that end, the United States Supreme Court has defined the waiver of a
fundamental constitutional right as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege," dependent "upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case." The Colorado Supreme Court has summarized (and
harmonized) United States and Colorado case law to require three elements of a waiver:
that it be made (1) "knowingly," (2) "intentionally and intelligently," and (3)
"voluntarily":
Thus, a valid waiver must be "knowingly" made, that is, the person
waiving the particular right must "know" of the existence of the right
and any other information legally relevant to the making of an informed
decision either to exercise or relinquish that right. Second, the waiver
must be made "intentionally" and "intelligently," that is, the person
waiving that right must be fully aware of what he is doing and must
make a conscious, informed choice to relinquish the known right. And,
third, that conscious choice must be made "voluntarily," that is, not
coerced by the state either physically or psychologically.
Given the affirmative action required to waive a fundamental constitutional right,
"courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and . . . do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights."183 This Section details that presumption, as delineated across decades of United
States Supreme Court decisions, and across the United States Constitution's protections
for the accused.
A. The Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the fundamental Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. 14 The Court has equally consistently held
that a defendant's waiver of that fundamental right must be explicit and may not be
inferred from his inaction.18 5
177 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; COLO. CONST. at. II, § 16.
See Hinojos-Mendozav. People, 169 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2007) (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4
(1966); Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999)).
179 Cropper, 251 P.3d at 439 (Martinez, J., dissenting); see also Metzger, supra note 7, at 517-18 (explaining
how "application of the demand-waiver doctrine is particularly absurd" in the context of confrontation of
forensic witnesses).
' Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4; see also Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (citing Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965)).
... Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled in part on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981).
182 People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 121 n.4 (Colo. 1986) (emphasis added); see also Hinojos-Mendozav. People,
169 P.3d 662, 673 (Colo. 2007) (Martinez, J., dissenting).
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideonv. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (noting that "lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries").
.. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
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Case law generally traces the definition of a waiver, with regard to constitutional
rights, to the United States Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Johnson v. Zerbst,186 a case
involving the right to counsel. In Johnson, a criminal defendant was tried and convicted
without the assistance of counsel. 17 The Court "pointed out that 'courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that we
'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."'" The Court defined a
waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."18 Importantly, the Court noted that in applying that definition, "The
determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must
depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."190 The Court
remanded the case to the district court for a factual determination of whether such an
intelligent waiver had occurred.191
In the decades since Johnson, the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied this
holding to reject state court attempts to presume waiver of the right to counsel based only
on failure of the defendant to appear with counsel.192 In Rice v. Olson,193 a 1945 case, a
criminal defendant pled guilty at his arraignment without being advised of his right to
counsel.194 He alleged that he had been denied his right to counsel and to call witnesses,
despite the fact that "he had not waived those rights by word or action."195 The Nebraska
Supreme Court below had held that "[i]t is not necessary that there be a formal waiver;
and a waiver will ordinarily be implied where accused appears without counsel and fails to
request that counsel be assigned to him, particularly where accused voluntarily pleads
guilty."196 The United States Supreme Court resolutely rejected the state court's
conclusive presumption of waiver.197 First, the Court noted that "[w]hatever inference of
waiver could be drawn from the petitioner's plea of guilty is adequately answered by the
uncontroverted statement in his petition that he did not waive the right either by word or
action."198 Instead, the Court held, the defendant's denial raised a question of fact as to
whether the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment
rights.199 The Court remanded for a factual determination of whether the defendant had
made such a waiver.20 0
Two decades later, in 1962, the Supreme Court reiterated the impermissibility of
a waiver of the right to counsel based solely on the defendant's failure to appear with
116 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11 Id. at 460.
Id. at 464 (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412
(1882); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
189 Id
190 Id
191 Id. at 469.
192 Cropperv. People, 251 P.3d 434, 439 (Colo. 2011) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972);
Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966); Camley v.
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
193 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
194 Id. at 786-87.
195 Id at 787.
196 Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted).
197 id
198 Id
199 Id. at 788-89.
200 Id. at 791.
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counsel.201 In Carnley v. Cochran,202 a criminal defendant was tried without the assistance
of counsel.203 Echoing its decision in Rice, the Supreme Court rejected a state-court-
created presumption that a defendant had waived a fundamental constitutional right based
204solely on the absence of an appearance of counsel in the record. The Court
unequivocally held that "[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible."205
This is because "[tlo cast such a burden on the accused is wholly at war with the standard
of proof of waiver of the right to counsel ... laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst."206 Instead of
presuming waiver from silence or inaction, the Court stated, a waiver only arises if the
record shows "that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly
rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver."207 "[N]o such burden can be imposed upon
an accused unless the record ... reveals his affirmative acquiescence."208
B. The Right to Remain Silent
Like the right to assistance of counsel, the right to remain silent is a fundamental
constitutional right enjoyed by all citizens.209 This right arises from Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination.210 Because of the fundamental nature of the right, a
person subject to custodial interrogation "must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed"211 before he may be
questioned.212 Further, a "defendant may waive effectuation of these rights" only if "the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 2 1 3 "[A] valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after [Miranda] warnings are given or
simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained."2 1 4
The Supreme Court has explained that "[e]ven absent the accused's invocation of
the right to remain silent, the accused's tatement during a custodial interrogation is
inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused 'in fact
knowingly and voluntarily waived [Miranda] rights' when making the statement." 215In
determining whether a defendant has voluntarily waived the right to remain silent, the
201 Carley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
202 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
203 id
204 Id. at 513 ("[T]he State Supreme Court imputed to petitioner the waiver of the benefit of counsel on a ground
stated in the court's opinion as follows: 'If the record shows that defendant did not have counsel. ... , it will be
presumed that defendant waived the benefit of counsel."' (citation omitted)); Id. at 516.
205 id
206 Id. at 514.
207 Id. at 516.
208 Id. at 516-17.
209 Couchv. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) ("The importance of preserving inviolate the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination has often been stated by this Court and need not be elaborated. By its very
nature, the privilege is an intimate and personal one. It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and
thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation." (citations omitted)).
210 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . ."); see Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
211 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
212 id
213 id
214 Id. at 475.
215 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).
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Court has employed the waiver test articulated in Johnson v. Zerbst with respect o a
waiver of the right to counsel.216
This right extends beyond the point of conviction and includes a defendant's
217right to remain silent during sentencing proceedings. In fact, statements made by a
defendant facing the death penalty to a court-appointed psychiatrist at an evaluation
requested by the prosecution during the sentencing phase of his criminal proceedings may
not later be used against the defendant unless he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his right to remain silent before making statements to the psychiatrist.2 Thus, the
Court has steadfastly enforced the rule that, " [g]overnments, state and federal, are ...
constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured,
and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth,"219
absent an adequate waiver of this "essential mainstay of our adversary system."220
C. The Right to a Speedy Trial
As "one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution," the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial is yet another fundamental right.221 It is an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety
and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay
222 223will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself." In Barker v. Wingo, a 1972
case, the Supreme Court considered the contours of the right to a speedy trial, in the
appeal of a criminal defendant's conviction after 16 continuances obtained by the
224prosecution. The case gave the Court the opportunity to determine multiple potential
approaches to protect a right that is "necessarily relative" and "generically different from
any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused."225
One such approach that the Court considered was the "demand-waiver doctrine."226 "The
demand-waiver doctrine provides that a defendant waives any consideration of his right to
speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded a trial. Under this rigid
approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition to the consideration of the speedy trial
right."227 Citing, inter alia, Johnson, Carnley, Miranda, and Boykin, the Court decisively
ruled this approach unconstitutional: "Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a
fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on
216 Butler, 442 U.S. at 374-75.
217 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999). In Mitchell, the Court held that a district court may not
hold a defendant's "silence against her in determining the facts of the offense at [a] sentencing hearing." Id.
218 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468-69 (1981). The Estelle Court concluded that, "[a] criminal defendant, who
neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be
compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing
proceeding." Id. at 468. The defendant in Estelle, who had been sentenced to death, had his death sentence
reversed because his "statements to [the psychiatrist] were not 'given freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences' and, as such, could be used as the State did at the penalty phase only if [he] had been
apprised of his rights and had knowingly decided to waive them." Id. at 469 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478).
219 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
220 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
221 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
222 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
223 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
2 24 Id. at 515-16.
225 Id. at 519, 522-24.
226 Id. at 524-25.
227 Id. at 525.
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waiver of constitutional rights."228 The Court flatly rejected "the rule that a defendant who
fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right."229
D. The "Several Federal Constitutional Rights ... Involved ... When a
Plea of Guilty Is Entered in a State Criminal Trial" 2 30
The Supreme Court has taken up the issue of waiver of the constitutional rights
effected by a criminal defendant's guilty plea and, each time, applied the principle that
those rights are not forfeited except by a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver.2 3 1
232In the 1969 case of Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court expounded on
exactly which rights are waived when a criminal defendant enters a plea of guilty.233 It
found "several": the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the right to trial by
234
jury, and the right to confront one's accusers. The Court then considered those rights in
the context of a criminal defendant who had pled guilty at his arraignment to all
indictments against him.235 Alabama law required sentencing by jury thereafter, and the
236
jury found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to death. The Court determined that
Carnley's rationale, rejecting the presumption of a waiver based on a silent record, applied
with equal force "to determin[e] whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made."237 The Court
refused to "presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent
record. "23 Instead, the Court would have required "an affirmative showing" that waiver of
his constitutional rights was made intelligently and voluntarily.239 Because no such
affirmative showing existed in the record, the Court reversed the conviction.240
241The Court took up the issue again in Brady v. United States, wherein it
described Boykin's holding as adding a requirement of an affirmative showing to the long-
standing requirement that a guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent.242 The case again
considered whether a guilty plea was made voluntarily, this time in the context of a
defendant who faced a maximum sentence of death but received a sentence of 50 years
243under the plea. The defendant alleged that his plea was not voluntary because (1) the
228 Id. (footnote omitted).
229 Id. at 528. In its place, the Supreme Court announced a rule "that the defendant's assertion of or failure to
assert his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of the
right." Id. The Court made clear that the rule "places the primary burden on the courts and the prosecutors to
assure that cases are brought to trial." Id. at 529. In so doing, the Court was guided by the "unique" nature of the
right to a speedy trial, "in its uncertainty as to when and under what circumstances it must be asserted or may be
deemed waived." Id. In making its ruling, the Court "d[id] not depart from [its] holdings in other cases
concerning the waiver of fundamental rights, in which [it] ha[s] placed the entire responsibility on the
prosecution to show that the claimed waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made." Id.
230 Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
231 id
232 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
233 id
234 id
235 Id. at 239.
236 Id. at 240.
237 Id. at 242.
238 Id. at 243.
239 Id. at 242.
240 Id. at 244.
241 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
242 Id. at 747 n.4 (1970) (citing Boykin, 385 U.S. at 242).
243 Id. at 744. The sentence was later reduced to 30 years. Id.
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statute under which he was charged operated to coerce his plea because it authorized a
sentence of death, (2) his attorney improperly pressured his plea, and (3) his plea was
244induced by representations with respect to reduction of sentence and clemency. The
Court rejected the argument that the criminal statute was inherently coercive because it
245authorized a sentence of death. Instead, the Court reaffirmed that the proper test was
whether his plea was voluntary and intelligent, as evidenced by an affirmative showing in
246the record. The Court defined waiver as follows: "Waivers of constitutional rights not
only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
,247awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Applying this
definition, and reviewing the circumstances of the guilty plea, the Court affirmed that
248
Brady made the plea voluntarily and intelligently and thus constitutionally.
E. The Right to Be Confronted with One's Accusers
As described above, an accused's right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him is a fundamental right.249 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it may
not be forfeited absent a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. It has done so in the
context of the waiver of the confrontation right subsumed in a guilty plea, as described in
Section 0(0) supra, and it has do so in cases concerning more direct waivers of the
confrontation right, as detailed in this Section.
In the 1966 case of Brookhart v. Janis,250 the Court considered the conviction of
a defendant after his counsel had agreed to a prima facie bench trial.25 The defendant
argued that his confrontation right had been violated by (1) the introduction of an out-of-
court alleged confession of a co-defendant and (2) the denial of his right to cross-examine
252any of the prosecution's witnesses. The Court first observed that the defendant's
253confrontation right could not have been denied without a valid waiver. It went on to find
that the record showed that "that petitioner himself did not intelligently and knowingly
agree to be tried in a proceeding which was the equivalent of a guilty plea and in which he
would not have the right to be confronted with and cross-examine the witnesses against
him."254 Because the defendant had "neither personally waived his right nor acquiesced in
his lawyer's attempted waiver," the Court reversed the conviction.2 5 5
244 id
245 Id. at 746-47.
246 Id. at 747, 747 n.4 (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242).
247 Id. at 748 (emphasis added) (citing Brookhartv. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942); Johnsony. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Pattonv. United States, 281
U.S. 276, 312 (1930)).
248 Id. at 758. On this point, the Court pointed to an absence of "evidence that Brady was so gripped by fear of
the death penalty or hope of leniency that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh the
advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty." Id. at 750. The Court declined to
invalidate a guilty plea "whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a
lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher
penalty authorized by law for the crime charged." Id. at 751. Instead, the Court upheld the constitutionality of his
plea even though acknowledging it "may well have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death
penalty." Id. at 758.
249 See supra notes 176-77.
250 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
251 Id. at 5-6.
252 
Id. at 2.
253 Id. at 4.
254 Id. at 7. The Court found that "[h]is emphatic statement o the judge that 'in no way am I pleading guilty'
negatives any purpose on his part to agree to have his case tried on the basis of the State's proving a prima facie
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The Court reached a similar decision in the 1968 case of Barber v. Page.256
There, the Supreme Court considered the conviction of a defendant in which the principal
evidence against him was the reading of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness
257who, by the time of trial, was incarcerated in a different state. At that preliminary
hearing, an attorney for the defendant had not cross-examined the witness, although an
attorney for a co-defendant did.258 Nevertheless, the Court determined that the defendant
had not waived his right to confrontation.259 At that hearing, the Court determined, the
defendant could not have been aware that by the time of trial, the witness would be
incarcerated out-of-state, and he could also not have been aware that the prosecution
would make no effort to produce the witness by trial.260 According to the Court, "[to
suggest that failure to cross-examine in such circumstances constitutes a waiver of the
right of confrontation at a subsequent rial hardly comports with this Court's definition of a
waiver as 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."'261 Even if the defendant had cross-examined at the preliminary hearing, the
Court would have reached the same result, because "[t]he right to confrontation is
basically a trial right."262 Determining that "[t]he right of confrontation may not be
dispensed with so lightly," the Court reversed the defendant's conviction.263
Thus, it is unequivocal that a defendant's fundamental confrontation right may
not be forfeited by anything short of his knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.
V. NOTICE-AND-DEMAND PROVISIONS IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS
The Colorado Supreme Court is not, of course, the only state court to consider
the constitutionality of its state's notice-and-demand provision. To contextualize
Colorado's judicial opinions on this issue, this Section reviews case law from other states
concerning notice-and-demand statutes.
A. Unconstitutional Notice-and-Demand Provisions
Many state courts that have struck down notice-and-demand statutes have
employed a variant of the rationale that the automatic waiver of rights effected when a
defendant fails to demand testimony is not a waiver that, as the Constitution requires, is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Others have construed their state's statute in a way to
avoid constitutionally problematic results. Still others have upheld notice-and-demand
statutes while employing reasoning that supports the proposition that statutes such as
Colorado's are unconstitutional as applied to pro se defendants. This Section details those
decisions.
case which both the trial court and the State Supreme Court held was the practical equivalent of a plea of guilty."
Id.
255 Id at 8.
256 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
257 Id. at 720-21.
258 Id. at 720.
259 Id. at 725.
260 Id. Elsewhere, the Court faulted the prosecution for its lack of effort to locate the witness. Id. at 724. The
Court determined that a witness may not be deemed "unavailable" for confrontation and hearsay purposes
"unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial." Id. at 724-25.
26 1 Id. at725 (quoting Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Brookhartv. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966)).
262 Id. at 725.
263 Id. at 725-26.
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One early decision striking down a notice-and-demand statute was the Illinois'
Supreme Court's decision in People v. McClanahan.26 That decision held Illinois' notice-
and-demand statute unconstitutional even under the pre-Crawford, arguably looser Ohio v.
265Roberts framework. Similar to Colorado's, the Illinois statute permitted the admission
into evidence of a laboratory report, unless the defendant demanded testimony within
seven days of receipt of the report.266 The Court found that the automatic statutorily-
operated waiver that occurs if the defendant fails to demand "does not guarantee that this
waiver is a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences. 267 The Court emphasized that an accused's "right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . is a mandatory constitutional
obligation of the prosecuting authority. It arises automatically at the inception of the
adversary process, and no action of the defendant is necessary to activate this
constitutional guarantee in his case."268 Because the statute did not guarantee that this
constitutional obligation would be met, the Court struck down the statute as violative of
the federal and state Confrontation Clauses.2 6 9
Other states have joined Illinois. In State v. Caulfield, the Minnesota Supreme
Court deemed Minnesota's notice-and-demand statute unconstitutional.271 Minnesota's
statute was also strikingly similar to Colorado's in that it "permit[ted] the admission of 'a
report of the facts and results of any laboratory analysis or examination if it is prepared
and attested by the person performing the analysis or examination in any laboratory
operated by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension,"' but allowed the defendant o demand
272the live testimony of the analyst at least ten days before trial. The Court struck down the
statute because it did not provide adequate notice to the defendant of the consequences of
his failure to demand the testimony:
At a minimum, any statute purporting to admit testimonial reports
without the testimony of the preparer must provide adequate notice to
the defendant of the contents of the report and the likely consequences
of his failure to request the testimony of the preparer. Otherwise, there is
no reasonable basis to conclude that the defendant's failure to request the
testimony constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his
confrontation rights.27 3
264 People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470 (Ill. 2000).
265 Id. at 474-75, 478.
266 Id. at 473 (citing 725 ILCS 5/115-15); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309 (2012).
267 McClanahan, 729 U.S. at 477.
268 Id. (emphasis in original).
269 Id. at 478. In a subsequent case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that defense counsel may waive a defendant's
confrontation right by stipulating to the admission of evidence as long as the defendant does not object and the
decision to waive is a matter of legitimate trial tactics and strategy. People v. Campbell, 802 N.E.2d 1205, 1213,
1215 (Ill. 2003). Importantly, "[w]here the stipulation includes a statement hat the evidence is sufficient to
convict the defendant or where the State's entire case is to be presented by stipulation, we find that a defendant
must be personally admonished about the stipulation and must personally agree to the stipulation." Id. at 1215.
The Court thus acknowledged that, even though waiver of confrontation by counsel is permissible in some
circumstances, there remain circumstances where a defendant must personally participate in and making a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his confrontation right.
270 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn. 2006).
271 id
272 Id. at 310 (citing Minn. Stat. § 634.15, subd. 1(a), 2(a)(2004); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309 (2012).
273 Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 313. The dissent in Caulfield attempted to find that Minnesota's notice-and-demand
statute constitutional by reference to what it deemed "nonexplicit waivers of confrontation rights" authorized by
Supreme Court case law. Id. at 318 n.2 (Johnson, J., dissenting). This reasoning, however, is unpersuasive. First,
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An especially relevant interpretation of a notice-and-demand statute came in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision in Thomas v. United States.27 The
District of Columbia's notice-and-demand statute "direct[ed] that a chemist's report is
admissible in evidence in the chemist's absence (even if the chemist is available, and even
if the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the chemist), unless the
defendant subpoenas the chemist to appear."275 The court found that direction to be
problematic after Crawford and chose to construe the statute to preserve its
276
constitutionality. The Court reinterpreted the statute as follows:
As we now construe § 48-905.06, it still authorizes the government to
introduce a chemist's report without calling the chemist in its case-in-
chief, but only so long as the record shows a valid waiver by the
defendant of his confrontation right. Absent a valid waiver, which
usually must be express but under some circumstances may be inferable
from a defendant's failure to request the government o produce the
author of the report, the defendant enjoys a Sixth Amendment right to
be confronted with the chemist in person.2 7 7
As to a "valid waiver," the court considered and conformed to the United States Supreme
Court formulations of that concept.278 The court described "the best course for the
government obviously" to be to obtain an express waiver from the defendant, perhaps via
a stipulation or pretrial hearing.279 The court suggested one-and only one-circumstance
in which a court might permissibly "infer a valid waiver of the right of confrontation, in
the absence of an express waiver."280 That circumstance was as follows:
[I]f a defendant represented by counsel is provided with the chemist's
report and is advised that a failure to request the chemist's presence for
purposes of confrontation will be understood as a waiver of the right and
as a stipulation to the admissibility of the chemist's report, we think that
a trial court would be justified in inferring a valid waiver from an
unexplained or unexcused failure by the defendant to respond.2 8 1
That circumstance leaves open two possibilities where a waiver may not be inferred: (1)
where defense counsel explains or excuses failure to respond, and (2) where a defendant is
not represented by counsel. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision thus
acknowledges that pro se defendants must be analyzed differently than represented
defendants with respect o waiver of their confrontation rights.2 82
the dissent itself acknowledged that the cases it cited were distinguishable from the facts at hand, in that those
cases all involved instances of defendant misconduct. Id. Second, misconduct, of course, is not inaction but
affirmative conduct.
274 914 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2006).
275 Id at 18.
276 Id. at 5, 18-20.
277 Id. at 5 (emphases added).
278 Id. at 19 (citing Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968);
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972)).
279 id
280 id
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The Ohio Supreme Court's pronouncements on Ohio's notice-and-demand
statute echo this sentiment. In State v. Pasqualone, that court affirmed the
constitutionality of Ohio's notice-and-demand statute, but did so in a way that left two
2814
openings relevant to this Article. First, the court observed that the notice provided to
Pasqualone included notice of the consequences of his failure to demand the analyst's
testimony and also otherwise complied in full with the statute, and thus a valid waiver had
2815occurred in the circumstances presented. In making this observation, the court
specifically distinguished the case at hand from a prior Ohio Court of Appeals decision
wherein the notice provided had not stated the consequences of failure to demand
2816testimony pursuant to the statute. The court carefully confined its decision to the facts at
hand; 287at least one Ohio lower appellate case has seized on this distinction to determine
that where the prosecution's notice does not state the consequences of failure to demand
testimony, no valid waiver can be found.2 The second crucial point in the court's logic,
providing a ground on which the case may be distinguished, is that the court emphasized
that the defendant was represented by counsel and that a defendant's counsel may waive
his client's confrontation rights without approval.28 The court cited to Hinojos-Mendoza
on this point,290 and again confined its holding to the facts before it, i.e., where the
defendant is represented by counsel.291 The Pasqualone opinion therefore does not govern
the case of a pro se defendant.
In addition, other state high courts have deemed unconstitutional their state's
statutory mechanism for procuring analyst testimony based on the rationale, eventually
elucidated in Melendez-Diaz, that a state may not shift the burden of calling witnesses
292against the defendant to the defense. At least one other, the Kansas Supreme Court, has
283 903 N.E.2d 270 (Ohio 2009).
284 id
285 Id. at 275.
286 Id. (citing State v. Smith, No. 1-05-39, 2006 WL 846342, at*7 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)).
287 Id ("We determine that a valid waiver occurs in the situation presented by the case sub judice.").
288 See State v. McClain, No. L-10-1088, 2012 WL 5508133, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2012) (citing Taconv.
Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 355 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)) (citing Pasqualone "to implicitly approve the
proposition first stated [in State v. Smith] that, in order to comply with the Sixth Amendment and R.C. 2925.51
[the notice-and-demand statute], the notice provision in a lab report must convey to the defendant the
consequences of failure to demand the laboratory analyst's testimony).
289 Pasqualone, 903 N.E.2d at 275-77.
290 Id. at 276 (citing Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007)).
291 Id. at 280 ("We hold that an accused's attorney is capable of waiving his client's right to confrontation by not
demanding that a laboratory analyst testify pursuant to the opportunity afforded by [the notice-and-demand
statute].").
292 See State v. Birchfield, 157 P.3d 216, 219-220 (Or. 2007) (striking down, as unconstitutional under the State
Constitution's Confrontation Clause, a statutory requirement hat the defendant notify the state if he insisted on
the right to cross-examine a laboratory analyst); Cypress v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 206, 213 (Va. 2010)
(determining, in light ofMelendez-Diaz, that Virginia statute that shifted the burden of calling witnesses against
the defendant to the defense "did not adequately protect [the defendants'] Confrontation Clause rights" and
failure to comply with the statute did not operate as a waiver of those rights); Mnookin, supra note 7, at 799
n.19 (arguing that notice-and-demand statutes requiring that defendant's demand contain some kind of good-faith
showing are "constitutionally problematic"); cf State v. Belvin, 986 So. 2d 516, 525 (Fla. 2008) (citing FLA.
STAT. § 316.1934 (2012)) (determining that statute that permits admission of breath test operator's affidavit but
also allows defendant to subpoena the operator as an adverse witness "does not adequately preserve the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation"); State v. Miller, 790 A.2d 144, 156 (N.J. 2002)
(construing notice-and-demand statute to require only that defendant object to admission of lab certificate and
assert it will be contested, rejecting an interpretation requiring a more detailed objection as it would have placed
too great a burden on defendant). The Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Birchfield struck down Oregon's
statute on this ground, but suggested that a notice-and-demand requirement would indeed be constitutional.
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found constitutional infirmity in its notice-and-demand statute on the ground that it
extends too far beyond Melendez-Diaz's description of such statutes in their "simplest
form." 29 3
B. "[Tlreat[ing] the Question of Waiver Cavalierly" 2 9 4 : Decisions
Affirming the Constitutionality of Notice-and-Demand Statutes
By contrast, other state courts have upheld their state's notice-and-demand
statutes. Of those, some have done so with fleeting reference to Melendez-Diaz's footnote
authorizing notice-and-demand statutes "[i]n their simplest form."29 5 Lower appellate
296courts in Arkansas, Iowa, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington are among this group.
Similarly, some state courts have upheld their state's notice-and-demand statute with no
consideration whatsoever of Supreme Court case law governing an accused's waiver of
297his or her constitutional rights. One early example of this type of decision was the
Nevada Supreme Court's 2005 decision in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh.298 There, the court
determined that a forensic affidavit was a testimonial statement.299 It further determined
that, because the statute permitted the defense to object "in writing" to the admission of
the affidavit absent testimony of its author, it "adequately preserve[d] the constitutional
right to confront witnesses against a defendant by providing a statutory confrontation
mechanism."3 0 0 The statute was therefore constitutional and failure to use the statutory
mechanism would result in a waiver.301 The Nevada Supreme Court reached this
Birchfield, 157 P.3d at 219-220; cf State v. Willis, 236 P.3d 714, 717 n.1 (Ore. 2010) (observing that Birchfield
accords with the Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz).
293 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326 (2009); see State v. Laturner, 218 P.3d 23, 38-40 (Kan.
2009) (severing portion of Kansas' notice-and-demand statute, in order to transform it into a constitutional,
simple notice-and-demand statute under Melendez-Diaz). The lower appellate court in Laturner had considered,
and struck down the statute based on the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on waiver of
fundamental rights. Id. at 31-32. The Kansas Supreme Court, however, read Melendez-Diaz to cast some doubt
on that rationale, and instead severed Kansas' statute such that the remaining portions mirrored the "simplest"
notice-and-demand statute deemed constitutional by Melendez-Diaz. Id. at 39. Prior to this decision severing the
statute, the Kansas statute "require[d] not just that a defendant demand that the laboratory analyst testify at trial
but that the defendant state an objection and the grounds for the objection." Id. at 30.
294 Taconv. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 354 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
295 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326.
296 See Jones v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 683, at 6-7 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that defendant's failure to
provide notice that he wanted to examine analyst who appeared on prosecution's witness list but did not testify
did not violate Confrontation Clause because "the Melendez-Diaz Court acknowledged that some states have
notice-and-demand statutes [like Arkansas's], and found them consistent with constitutional requirements");
Watsonv. State, No. 2-1057/11-1833, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 40, at *14-16 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2013) (noting
that the Melendez-Diaz Court approved of "such statutes" as Iowa's ten-day notice-and-demand requirement);
State v. Steele, 689 S.E.2d 155, 160-61 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010); Carsonv. State, No. 11-10-00178-CR, 2012 Tex.
App. LEXIS 4721, at *5-7 (Tex. App. June 14, 2012) (per curiam) (determining that Melendez-Diaz authorized
notice-and-demand statutes and cursorily deciding that, because defendant did not demand testimony of
laboratory report author pursuant to the statute, defendant had waived his Confrontation rights); Herring v. State,
No. 05-08-01699-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3136, at *2-5 (Tex. App. Apr. 28, 2010) (same); State v.
Schroeder, 262 P.3d 1237, 1239 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) ("This rule comports with Melendez-Diaz.").
297 See, e.g., Culbersonv. State, No. 11-06-00196-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 2720, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 17,
2008) (agreeing with Deener that Texas notice-and-demand statute is not facially unconstitutional); Deener v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 522, 527-28 (Tex. App. 2006) (determining that criminal defendant suffered no Confrontation
violation where his right to confront the witnesses against him was waived by his failure to object under two
Texas notice-and-demand statutes).
298 City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203, 208-09 (Nev. 2005).
299 Id. at 207-08.
300 Id. at 208.
301 Id. at 209.
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conclusion with minimal analysis, never considering an as-applied challenge or opining on
whether and how the statute might be applied unconstitutionally.
Another example of this minimal analysis came in the North Dakota Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Campbell.302 There, the court cited Walsh to determine that the
defendants waived their confrontation rights by failing to follow the notice-and-demand
statute, but the court never once considered the constitutionality of statute itself.3 0 3
Louisiana is another of this group, as it has now twice affirmed its notice-and-demand
statute without considering the constitutional validity of the waiver effected by it. 3 04
The minimalistic analysis contained in these decisions simply fails to persuade.
The United States Supreme Court has "never treated the question of waiver cavalierly,"30 5
and state-court decisions that do cannot offer persuasive force on the question of waiver of
a federal constitutional right.
VI. "THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION MAY NOT BE DISPENSED WITH SO
LIGHTLY,, 30 6: THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF COLORADO'S NOTICE-AND-
DEMAND STATUTE AS APPLIED TO PRO SE DEFENDANTS
Against the backdrop outlined in Sections 0-0 supra, this Section picks up where
footnote seven in Hinojos-Mendoza left off and addresses how that opinion's analysis is
altered for pro se defendants.3 0 7
It has long been clear that a criminal defendant has the right to forego his
constitutionally guaranteed right to assistance of counsel in order to exercise his right to
represent himself.308 As a result, numerous questions arise regarding whether pro se
defendants and defendants represented by counsel must (or should) be treated the same
way. Dissenting in Faretta v. California, Justice Blackmun explicitly listed some of these
questions:
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? If so,
when must that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel
and the right to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the
waiver of each right to be measured? If a defendant has elected to
exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he still have a constitutional
right to assistance of standby counsel? How soon in the criminal
proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by counsel
or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial? May a violation of
the right to self-representation ever be harmless error? Must the trial
court treat the pro se defendant differently than it would professional
counsel? I assume that many of these questions will be answered with
finality in due course. Many of them, however, such as the standards of
302 719 N.W.2d 374, 378 (N.D. 2006).
303 Id. at 377-78 (citing Walsh, 124 P.3d at 209).
304 See State v. Simmons, 78 So. 3d 743, 745-48 (La. 2012); State v. Cunningham, 903 So. 2d 1110, 1121 (La.
2005).
305 Taconv. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 354 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
306 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
307 Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 670 n.7 (Colo. 2007).
30' Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) ("[T]he question is whether a State may constitutionally hale a
person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct
his own defense. It is not an easy question, but we have concluded that a State may not constitutionally do so.").
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waiver and the treatment of the pro se defendant, will haunt the trial of
every defendant who elects to exercise his right to self-representation.3 0 9
Unique concerns undoubtedly arise within the context of a defendant
representing himself at trial.310 To that end, at least some judges issuing decisions about
the constitutionality of notice-and-demand statutes have recognized a difference between a
defendant represented by counsel and a defendant representing himself. For instance,
311Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Johnson's dissent in State v. Cunningham
differentiated pro se and indigent defendants from those represented by counsel and
expressed concern regarding the effect of Louisiana's defense subpoena statute on such
defendants.3 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals did so even more persuasively
when, in Thomas v. United States,313 it suggested at least one circumstance-that of the
pro se defendant-in which a waiver may not be inferable from a defendant's failure to
demand forensic technician testimony .314
Those judges take the better view. As a primary matter, where a defendant has no
defense counsel, he is not operating under the principle that his lawyer may waive his
315rights by inaction or without approval. Similarly, Hinojos-Mendoza's "presum[ption]
that attorneys know the applicable rules of procedure"316 is obviously inoperative in the
case of a pro se defendant. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the legal
knowledge of a defense attorney may not be presumed on behalf of a pro se defendant. In
317
Carnley v. Cochran, the Court pointed out that:
While [the pro se defendant] was advised that he need not testify, he was not told
what consequences might follow if he did testify. He chose to testify and his
criminal record was brought out on his cross-examination. For defense lawyers, it
is commonplace to weigh the risk to the accused of the revelation on cross-
examination of a prior criminal record, when advising an accused whether to take
the stand in his own behalf; for petitioner, the question had to be decided in
ignorance of this important consideration.318
Lower court judges have recognized this distinction as well. For example, Ninth Circuit
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, in a dissenting opinion, wrote:
Finally, unlike Green, who was represented by counsel, Ohman had no
lawyer present. The lack of representation is critical here. The message
conveyed when a sentencing judge personally addresses a defendant
who has a lawyer by his side, and inquires whether the defendant
himself wishes to speak to the court regarding his sentence is
309 Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphases added).
30 See Sharon Finegan, Pro Se Criminal Trials and the Merging ofInquisitorial and Adversarial Systems of
Justice, 58 CATH. U. L. REv. 445, 471-72 (2009) ("Trials in which a defendant represents himself present a host
of problems that undermine the fairness of the proceedings. Determinations of competency, conflicts with
standby counsel, utilization of proper procedure, and overall fairness of the proceedings are called into question
when a defendant proceeds pro se." (footnotes omitted)).
.. 903 So. 2d 1110 (La. 2005).
312 Id. at 1127 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
31 914 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2006)
314 Id. at 19.
31. Cf Hinojos-Mendozav. People, 169 P. 3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007); Thomas, 914 A.2d at 19; People v.
Campbell, 802 N.E.2d 1205, 1213, 1215 (Ill. 2003); State v. Pasqualone, 903 N.E.2d 270 (Ohio 2009).
316 Hinojos-Mendoza, 169 P.3d at 670 (citing Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237, 1244 (Colo. 1992)).
317 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
... Id. at 511.
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fundamentally different from the message conveyed when a judge
inquires jointly of a pro se defendant/advocate and the prosecutor
whether they wish to make 'any comments . . . before [she] announce[s]
the sentence [she is] inclined to impose.' In the former case, the question
is much more likely to be interpreted by the defendant as an opportunity
to speak freely about why he deserves leniency. (He also has the benefit
of his lawyer's counsel as to what he may and may not say in response
to the invitation to speak.) In the latter case, the defendant may well not
understand, as Ohman clearly did not, that he should speak in his role as
319defendant rather than in his capacity as an advocate.
These differences provide a backdrop for the conclusion that, in the absence of
defense counsel, a defendant is returned to that baseline principle that waiver of any of his
constitutional rights must be done only by himself and only knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.320 That is, in the case of a pro se defendant, a different presumption operates:
that by which "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and . . . do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." 3 2 1
With this different presumption in mind, it is especially important to review how
Colorado's notice-and-demand statute operates. Cropper provides that merely "providing
the defense with a forensic lab report through discovery is sufficient to put the defendant
on notice that, absent a specific request under section 16-3-309(5), the report can be
,,322introduced without live testimony. This action, as Justice Martinez's dissent in
Cropper accurately observes, does not serve as "notice" that the prosecution intends to
323
offer the report pursuant to Section 16-3-309(5). This action is a separate duty under
Colo. R. Crim. Pro. 16, which governs the prosecution's disclosure obligations; disclosure
in discovery pursuant to this rule provides no indication of whether the prosecution will
324
introduce the report at trial.
This review reveals two infirmities in the application of the statute to pro se
defendants: that (1) the statute is not within the "simplest" category of such statutes passed
on in dicta in Melendez-Diaz, and (2) the "notice" provided by the statute does not trigger
a knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver on the part of a pro se defendant. As to the first
point, the precise category of "simple" notice-and-demand statutes on which Melendez-
Diaz remarked was as follows: statutes that "require the prosecution to provide notice to
the defendant of its intent to use an analyst's report as evidence at trial."325 Providing the
report in discovery provides notice only of the report's existence, not of the prosecution's
intent to use it at trial. In the case of a pro se defendant, mere provision in discovery
cannot be equated with notice of intent to use the report at trial. To complete that equation,
319 United States v. Ohman, 13 F. App'x 568, 572-73 (9th Cir. 2001) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (alterations and
omission in original).
320 This is reinforced by the fact that federal law controls the waiver of a federally guaranteed constitutional right.
See supra note 180.
321 Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled in part on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting, respectively, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S.
389, 393 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 301
U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
322 Cropperv. People, 251 P.3d 434, 437 (Colo. 2011).
323 Id. at 441 & n.12 (Martinez, J., dissenting).
324 id
325 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326 (2009) (emphasis added); see also Cropper, 251 P.3d at
439-40 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541).
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Cropper resorted to its presumption that defense counsel has knowledge of all procedural
rules.326 In the case of a pro se defendant, there is no presumption available to make the
leap from discovery to intent to use at trial. Thus, at least as applied to a pro se defendant,
,327Colorado's is not a notice-and-demand statute in "simplest form." The constitutionality
of Colorado's statute is therefore not within Melendez-Diaz's dicta.
As to the second point, as described in Cropper, Colorado's notice-and-demand
statute is triggered upon the provision in discovery of a forensic lab report.328 Absent a
demand pursuant to the statute, a defendant's right to confront the report's author is
waived.329 A pro se defendant provided a laboratory report via discovery is situated more
akin to the defendants in Johnson, Rice, and Carnley than he is to his represented
counterpart in Mojica-Simental, Hinojos-Mendoza, and Cropper. As to the pro se
defendant, "[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right
to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused."3 3 0 The automatic waiver of Colorado Rev. Stat. § 16-3-309(5) cannot govern the
pro se defendant, because to do so would "not waive th[ose] right[s] either by word or
action,"331 but would impermissibly "[p]resum[e] waiver from a silent record."332 As in
Carnley v. Cochran, "[tlo cast such a burden on the accused is wholly at war with the
standard of proof of waiver of the right to counsel . . . laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst. "333
This is so because the automatic waiver of § 16-3-309(5) neither "reveals [the
defendant's] affirmative acquiescence,"3 3 4 nor contains the affirmative showing of waiver
of a fundamental constitutional right required after Boykin v. Alabama.3 3 5 Perhaps most
importantly for the analysis, provision of a laboratory report via discovery utterly fails to
make a pro se defendant "sufficient[ly] aware[] of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." 336 Namely, the consequence that failure to demand the live testimony of
the forensic technician upon receipt of his report via discovery waives the right to confront
that technician. As applied to pro se defendants, Colorado's statute provides "no
reasonable basis to conclude that the defendant's failure to request the testimony
constituted a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his confrontation rights."337
Just as in Barker v. Wingo, 33 the doctrine of demand-waiver must be rejected as applied
326 See Cropper, 251 P.3d at 436-48.
327 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326.
328 Cropper, 251 P.3d at 437.
329 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2012).
..0 Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), overruled in part on other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981).
. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945).
332 Carley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
... Id. at 514.
334 
Id. at 516-17.
See Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 n.4 (1970)
(citing Boykin, 385 U.S. at 242)
336 Brady, 397 U.S. at 742, 748 (1970) (emphasis added) (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942); Johnsonv. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Pattonv.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930)); accord People v. McClanahan, 729 N.E.2d 470, 477 (Ill. 2000); State
v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Minn. 2006); State v. Pasqualone, 903 N.E.2d 270, 275 (Ohio 2009) (citing
State v. Smith, No. 1-05-39, 2006 WL 846342 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)); State v. McClain, No. L-10-1088, 2012
WL 5508133, at ¶ 26 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2012) (citing Taconv. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 355 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)).
11 State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Minn. 2006).
33. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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to pro se defendants under Section IV, supra.3 3 9 "Such an approach, by presuming waiver
of a fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on
waiver of constitutional rights."3 40
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has never taken lightly the requirement that
any waiver of a fundamental constitutional right must be done "voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently."341 This is particularly true for pro se defendants, who are often
"ignoran[t] of th[e] important consideration[s]"342 underlying a waiver of such rights.
Allowing a pro se defendant to waive his confrontation rights, including those against
forensic technicians, by mere inaction is inconsistent with the longstanding principle that
the right to confront one's accusers is a "bedrock procedural guarantee."343 Colorado's
Notice-and-Demand statute, which presumes a waiver by a defendant's inaction,3 44 is
therefore unconstitutional as applied to pro se defendants.
3 See Metzger, supra note 7, at 517-18 (arguing for the rejection of the demand-waiver doctrine in the context
of confrontation of forensic witnesses).
340 Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972) (footnote omitted); see also Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945)
(rejecting state-court-created presumption of waiver of Sixth Amendment right); Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506, 513 (1962) (same).
341 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
342 Carnley, 369 U.S. 506, 511 (1962).
343 Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
344 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-309(5) (2012).
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THE COST OF COLORADO'S DEATH PENALTY
Justin F. Marceau* and Hollis A. Whitsont:
This paper analyzes cost of Colorado's death penalty in court days. We compare the
number of days in court and the actual length of time from charges until sentencing in
death prosecutions and first-degree murder cases with similarly egregious facts. We found
that death prosecutions require substantially more days in court, and take substantially
longer to resolve than non-death-prosecuted first degree murder cases that result in a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Moreover, the costs of these prosecutions
are not offset by any tangible benefit. Our study shows that not only are death penalty
prosecutions costly compared to non-death cases, but the threat of the death penalty at the
charging stage does not save costs by resulting in speedier pleas when the defendant wants
to avoid the death penalty. In addition, the substantial cost of the death penalty cannot be
justified by the possibility of future deterrence insofar as social scientists increasingly
agree that the deterrence benefits of the death penalty are entirely speculative. In short, by
compiling and analyzing original data, we show that Colorado's death penalty imposes a
major cost without yielding any measurable benefits.
I Associate Professor, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. J.D. Harvard Law School 2004, Boston
College, B.A. 2000.
t Samler and Whitson, P.C. (Denver, Colorado). J.D. Yale Law School 1984, University of Redlands, B.A. 1979.
* The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Meg Beardsley, Washington and Lee University,
School of Law (J.D. 2007), and Matthew Potter, University of Virginia (J.D. 2011) in compiling and analyzing
the study data.
151
Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2013
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
There is something unseemly about putting a price tag on justice. It seems that
questions of morality and fairness ought to be one area of law where the "narcotic effect"
of a cost/benefit analysis is deemed unsuitable.' But in the realm of constitutional rights it
has long been recognized that the costs of absolute rights are prohibitive, and thus that
there is necessarily a need to balance the costs of the right against its benefit in a particular
situation - that is, there is a disconnect between the 'ideal' and the 'real' of constitutional
rights.2 Indeed, the Supreme Court routinely considers the cost of applying a right to a
particular circumstance when addressing whether there is a remedy: if the cost of a
remedy, in real terms, is too high, then the ideal of the right is not recognized.3
Cost/benefit analysis is no less necessary in the context of evaluating the appropriateness
of various forms of punishment. The cost of any particular punishment, both in dollars and
in terms of governmental credibility, should be weighed against its benefits.
Accordingly, although philosophical, religious or moral debates about the death
penalty may seem more urbane, a mature society that is mindful of economic realities
should take seriously the costs of seeking the ultimate punishment.4 Just as there are no
absolute rights, there ought to be no absolute punishments - cost is always relevant. The
Supreme Court has held that a constitutional right is generally undeserving of a remedy if
that remedy "cannot pay its way"5 - that is to say the benefits of the remedy must be
balanced against its costs. The same should be true of the death penalty; we should not
blithely accept absolutes without considering the relevant costs.6
This essay serves as a first reasoned effort to compare the relative costs and
benefits of capital punishment in the state of Colorado. The essay proceeds in four parts.
In Part I, we provide a brief overview of cost studies in other states, discussing their
proliferation as well as their findings. In Part II, we set out the methodology for our
original study of the trial costs of Colorado's death penalty, and in Part III we set forth and
analyze the results of our study. Finally, in Part IV we examine two claimed benefits of
the death penalty and provide a brief overview of the recent studies on the deterrent effect
'Justice Brennan decried over-reliance on such principles in a famous dissent, explaining that cost/benefit
analysis "can have a narcotic effect" and "creates an illusion of technical precision and ineluctability." United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives ofRights: The Rhetoric and Practice ofRights in America, 98
CALIF. L. REv. 277 (2010) (describing the balance between rhetorical attachment o absolute rights with the
actual practice of these rights); see also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALEL.J. 585, 591 (1983)
(describing "Interest Balancing," a theory of constitutional adjudication in which "remedial effectiveness for
victims is only one of the factors in choosing a remedy; other social interests are also relevant and may justify
some sacrifice of achievable remedial effectiveness."). Professor Gewirtz explains that in an interest balancing
approach when "evaluating a remedy, courts in some sense 'balance' its net remedial benefits to victims against
the net costs it imposes on a broader range of social interests. Thus, even if a particular remedy would be the
most effective in curing the violation, its costs may be sufficiently high that an Interest Balancing court would
choose a less effective remedy."
See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 55 U.S. 135 (2009); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
4 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an Old
Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 118 (2010) ("Moral and political debates about the death penalty have a
certain timeless quality. Many of the same arguments and even examples (God's sparing of Cain!) reappear from
generation to generation. It can truly seem that there is nothing new under the sun. Nonetheless, though its
novelty has largely escaped notice, the argument for abolition based on the expense of administering a system of
capital punishment is a new phenomenon-one that is extraordinarily powerful in current public policy debates,
while being virtually nonexistent in the debates of prior generations.").
Herring, 555 U.S. at 147-48 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6).
6 To be sure, the costs of many rights, for example, the right to Free Speech, may not be purely economic in the
way that this paper frames the costs of capital punishment. Instead, pure conceptions of rights often impose costs
on other rights or on the social contract more generally.
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of capital punishment, which is one of the most commonly identified tangible benefits of
the death penalty. In short, this essay provides a platform for weighing the costs of the
death penalty, as measured in our study, against the deterrence benefits of capital
punishment more generally. Although it is difficult to find reliable estimates about the
costs of capital punishment in any given jurisdiction, this essay fills that void for the state
of Colorado by providing concrete, easy to understand estimates about the relative costs of
a death penalty prosecution in Colorado. We compare the time required by the trials and
pleas of death penalty cases to the time required for the prosecution of the most serious of
the first-degree murders during the same timeframe.
I. TOWARD AN OBJECTIVE MEASUREMENT OF COST
In recent years, it has become commonplace for policymakers and academics to
consider the costs of the death penalty. Substantial public attention has been paid to the
realization that a single death penalty prosecution can "drain a county's resources" or
leave the state with fewer police officers, fewer drug rehabilitation programs and less
training for prosecutors. And with unsolved violent crimes on the rise," the cost of capital
punishment for many ailing state budgets has gained considerable prominence. Few
studies have received more attention than the California study, which found, among other
things, that the death penalty adds at least $137 million dollars of cost to the California
budget each year, an additional $308 million per execution.9 Figures like this have led
some to conclude that the death penalty is a "luxury item" -- an unnecessary add-on to a
justice system, and one that adds significant cost.10 Indeed, the cost figures have become
so staggering that even conservative pundit Bill O'Reilly recently came out in support of a
proposition to abolish the death penalty in California.11
The notion that the cost problem can be solved by simply curtailing the
opportunities for appeal misses the mark. Many of the procedures provided, such as a
review of the adequacy of trial counsel's representation, are constitutionally required.
Moreover, a significant portion of the costs of the death penalty occur at the trial level. 12
This fact has not been missed by Colorado's policy-makers. In a recent op-ed, one district
attorney, Stan Garnett, wrote that "[p]rosecuting a death penalty case through a verdict in
the trial court can cost the prosecution well over $1 million dollars (not to mention the
See, e.g., Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don't Say About the High Costs ofthe Death
Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 401, 401-03 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed.,
1997) (examining budget cuts in some states requiring massive police layoffs while funding for the death penalty
persists).
Some states have unsolved rape and murder rates of roughly 50%. See, e.g., Editorial, End the Death Penalty in
Caifornia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012, at A28; see also ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2008 31 (2011) (discussing rising rates in
unsolved homicides).
9 CAL. COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA, at 10 (2008); End the Death Penalty in California, supra note 8.
'0 Dieter, supra note 7, at 404.
"Ron Briggs, Why Conservatives Like Bill O'Reilly and Me Support Proposition 34, FOX AND HOUNDS DAILY
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.foxandhoundsdaily.com ("Opponents of Proposition 34 like to say 'let's fix the
system.' Truth is, Republicans have had their hand on California's judicial death penalty rudder for 25 years.
Voters ousted three liberal justices for failing to affirm death sentences and after nearly 20 years on the court,
conservative, Republican-appointed Chief Justice Ronald George concluded that the death penalty system is
'dysfunctional.' Current Republican appointed Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye has echoed these remarks,
saying the system is 'not effective.' Recently retired Justice Carlos Moreno, who believes in the death penalty,
supports Proposition 34 because he knows the system can't and won't be fixed.").
12 Dieter, supra note 7, at 405.
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expense incurred by the judiciary and the cost of defense counsel, which is almost always
funded with taxpayer funds in a death penalty case)."1 The same district attorney
estimated that the death penalty prosecution of a single case, including the trial and
appeals to date, has cost some $18 million.14 On March 19, 2013, Alternate Defense
Counsel Lindy Frolich testified before the Colorado House Judicary Committee that,
while a regular first degree murder case costs her agency about $16,000 per year, per case
for the defense attorneys and costs, a death penalty case costs about $400,000 per year, per
case.
Anyone familiar with the process knows that death penalty prosecutions cost
every agency more - a lot more. Every day in court entails higher level attorney, clerical,
judicial, and investigative personnel, more lawyers per side, more courtroom security, and
many more jurors.16 These proceedings require the best and the brightest, from the
attorneys to the scientists and experts, all the way down to the judicial law clerks
employed for these complex cases. Everyone looking at a typical courtroom day in a death
prosecution case can see that a vast amount of taxpayer money is being spent above and
beyond what would have been spent on a prosecution for first degree murder where the
maximum penalty is life imprisonment without parole ("LWOP").
The problem, however, is that these dollar figures are somewhat imprecise and
anecdotal because of the complexity of figuring out how exactly to assign systemic costs
of the death penalty across individual cases. Unlike the costs to the State of building a
road or purchasing a new computer system for an agency - in which case the costs are
known well in advance - the costs of any particular death penalty case (or the system as a
whole) are not only not known in advance, but are not reported to or documented by any
one agency or actor in the system.
Recognizing that the costs of the death penalty are spread among many different
agencies and across a long period of time, the Board of Governors of the Washington
State Bar Association recently explained:
The costs of pursuing the death penalty are significant, but cannot be
calculated with precision. Murder cases are generally among the most
complex and challenging cases for lawyers to try and for courts to
handle. When the death penalty is sought additional layers of
complexity enter the case, both in terms of presentation of evidence and
procedural requirements. Because of the ultimate and irrevocable nature
of the penalty, numerous extra steps are required by statute, case law,
court rules and the standard of practice in death penalty cases. In a
capital case, extraordinary responsibility is placed upon the attorneys
defending the accused, and also upon the prosecutors and the courts."
" Stan Garnett, DA: Death Penalty Not Practical for Colorado, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA (Dec. 16, 2012),
http://www.dailycamera.com/guest-opinions/ci_22194910/da-death-penalty-not-practical-colorado.
14 Id. (discussing the Nathan Dunlap case).
" Transcript of Proceedings, Colorado General Assembly, House Judiciary Committee, House Bill 13-1264
(March 19, 2013), p. 78 (testimony of Lindy Frolich).
16 In a death prosecution, typically six to eight alternate jurors present rather than the typical two alternates, and
the pool of jurors required to appear for voir dire numbers in the hundreds (approximately 1400-1800 per case),
rather than the two or three dozen potential jurors called up for voir dire in a first degree murder prosecution
where death is not sought. By statute, jurors and prospective jurors are paid fifty dollars per day. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-71-126 (West).
" Final Report ofthe Death Penalty Subcommittee ofthe Committee on Public Defense, WASH. STATE BAR
Ass'N (Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Wash.), Dec. 2006, at 14.
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All of these same considerations are present in Colorado. The costs of the death
penalty are substantial, but because they are spread across numerous steps and procedures,
and can vary widely from case-to-case, it is difficult, perhaps unrealistic, to generate a
single demonstrably correct price tag for the death penalty relative to other first degree
murder prosecutions. But the question - "How much more does it cost to prosecute a
death penalty case?" - can be answered with some precision if we focus on a comparison
of the time costs of an aggravated murder case in which the prosecution sought the death
penalty ("death prosecution") and a similarly-aggravated first degree murder case in which
they sought a sentence of life imprisonment without parole ("LWOP prosecution").8
Thanks to the work of those involved in the data collection for a recent empirical
study of the constitutionality of Colorado's death penalty, the Colorado Death Penalty
Eligibility Study (CDPES), we have access to public court documents regarding every
murder case filed in Colorado for the twelve-year period from 1999 through 2010.19 By
relying on this dataset we are able to quantify the amount of time involved in a Colorado
20
death penalty prosecution as compared to a Colorado life-without-parole prosecution.
We do not make estimates about how much a day in court costs; however, we are able to
provide objective information on exactly how much more, as measured by days in court, a
death penalty prosecution costs the State.2 1 Thus, although we do not have a set dollar
figure, the cost figures measured in days in this study are objectively verifiable, not
subject to any contradiction, and provide similarly forceful support for the conclusion that
the death penalty is a comparatively very expensive system, even relative to prosecutions
resulting in a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
" Of course, even these comparisons understate the cost of capital cases. Death penalty cases require more
experienced lawyers, more experts, and likely cost considerably more per day than non-death cases.
'9 The CDPES was based upon data provided by the State Judicial Department regarding murder prosecutions
commenced in Colorado between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2010. Elected prosecutors have shamelessly
claimed that the date range for the study was manipulated or contrived. See, e.g., Michael Booth & Kevin
Simpson, If Colorado is to have this death penalty "conversation," start here, DENV. POST, May 26, 2013,
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_2332543 8/if-colorado-is-have-this-death-penalty-conversation (quoting
District Attorney George Brauchler as stating, "The 12-year DU study started with 1999, conveniently leaving
out a previous flurry of death-sentence cases . . . ."). In reality, the date range was determined by the limited
capacity of the State Judicial Department to perform comprehensive electronic searches of its computerized
databases before 1999. The Department reported that data prior to 1999 was not electronically searchable, thus
limiting the date range of the CDPES. See Justin Marceau, Sam Kamin & Wanda Foglia, Death Eligibility in
Colorado: Many are Called, Few are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. REv. - (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2210040. See id. at 140, notes 148-149 and accompanying
text. There are a handful of non-death-prosecuted murder cases in which the district court has sealed the file from
public view, but there is no reason to believe that those few cases would change the results of either the CDPES
or this cost analysis.
20 This approach has been taken by other studies that seek to estimate the costs of a death penalty prosecution.
For example, the Washington State Bar Association Report suggested analysis of the number of additional days
required for a death penalty case: "Some information is available on the cost of operation of the trial court. The
Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) analyzed the personnel costs for a superior court judge and
courtroom staff and concluded that the staff cost to the counties for operating one trial court is $2,332 per day.
(This cost analysis does not include the general costs of operating the court facilities, such as utilities,
maintenance and security.) If an aggravated murder case takes 20 to 30 days longer to try as a capital case than as
a non-capital case, then the extra cost in terms of trial court operation would be $46,640 to $69,960." WASH.
STATE BAR Ass'N, supra note 17, at 18.
21 It is beyond the scope of this analysis to say what a day in court "costs" the State of Colorado, or the individual
jurors, family members, and others who attend and/or participate in the proceeding.
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II. METHODOLOGY
The first step was to identify a data set of death penalty jury trial cases that would
provide the best means to make a relevant comparison to the present and future costs of
death penalty prosecutions. We began with the docket sheets and court information
gathered for the CDPES, which included cases initiated between January 1, 1999 and
December 31, 2010.22 This set included thirteen death prosecutions that resulted in jury
trials and nine death cases that resulted in a plea bargain rather than a completed trial
(including one plea bargain entered during the guilt-innocence trial).
Next, we isolated those death prosecution/jury trial cases that occurred after the
United States Supreme Court's landmark 2002 decision, Ring v. Arizona. In Ring, the
Court ruled unconstitutional death penalty schemes like Colorado's, in which judges - not
juries - were exclusively responsible for assessing who was eligible for the ultimate
punishment.23 Of the thirteen death prosecutions that resulted in either a completed guilt
phase or sentencing phase trial,2 4 eight occurred prior to Ring.2 5 Because these eight pre-
Ring cases arose prior to the constitutionally-mandated role of jury involvement in capital
sentencing, they are less instructive as to the present cost and projected future cost of
capital prosecutions under Colorado's post-Ring jury sentencing scheme. We thus used the
post-Ring death penalty trials. These included the five cases found in the CDPES data.2 In
addition to this set, we added one additional case that fell outside the CDPES study range,
but for which a capital sentencing jury trial was held in late 2003.27 These six cases we
22 During the twelve-year period of time covered by the CDPES data, there were twenty-two death penalty
prosecutions. Marceau et al., supra note 19. Information regarding the death prosecutions is contained in
Appendix I, infra.
23 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Woldtv. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003). See People v. Montour, 157
P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007) (declaring a right to jury sentencing even when a defendant enters a guilty plea rather than
going to trial). The General Assembly responded to Ring v. Arizona with passage of Laws 2002, 3rd Ex. Sess.,
Ch. 1, § 2, eff. July 12, 2002, which restored jury capital sentencing proceedings to Colorado. See Woldt, 64 P.3d
at 259.
24 In one of the thirteen, the death penalty was barred because, prior to the trial, the defendant was found to have
mental retardation and was thus ineligible for the death penalty. People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019, 1020 (Colo.
2004). In another, the death penalty was barred after the trial, but before the judge-sentencing proceeding was
scheduled to begin. In the interim, the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609
(2002), which declared judge-sentencing proceedings unconstitutional. In Hagos, the General Assembly passed a
law designed to subject Hagos to a death penalty jury sentencing proceeding, but that law was held to violate the
Colorado Constitution's prohibition on special legislation. See People v. Hagos, 110 P.3d 1290, 1291 (Colo.
2005). In addition to these thirteen completed or scheduled trials, there was one case that resulted in a mid-trial
guilty plea. See infra Appendix 1 (Than). We treat this case as a guilty plea case.
25 See Woldt, 64 P.3d 256 (declaring Colorado's three-judge capital sentencing statute unconstitutional in light of
Ring).
26 These included People v. Bueno (Lincoln County No. 2005CR73), People v. Perez (Lincoln County No.
2005CR74), People v. (Sir Mario) Owens (Arapahoe County No. 2006CR705), People v. Robert Ray (Arapahoe
County No. 2006CR697), and People v. Montour (Douglas County No. 2002CR782). In Montour, a 2003 death
sentence was imposed by a single-judge sentencing proceeding that followed entry of Montour's pro se guilty
plea. The death sentence was reversed on appeal because the procedure violated Ring v. Arizona. People v.
Montour, 157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007). In 2013, finding that "justice will be subverted if Mr. Montour is not
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea," the trial judge permitted Mr. Montour to withdraw the plea. People v.
Montour, Douglas County (Colorado) No. 02CR982, Order [2013-04-09] D-325, at 14. As of this writing, the
jury trial is scheduled for 2014. For Montour case data, we have used actual pretrial proceedings as of June 1,
2013, and used future scheduled dates to calculate the projected trial date and the projected court days required
for trial (which have been added to the time spent in the 2002-2003proceedings).
27 People v. (Dante) Owens (Arapahoe County No. 1998CR2729). An LWOP sentence was imposed in 2004
following ajury sentencing trial. Because prosecution commenced in 1998, this case was outside the time
parameters of the CDPES and thus was not included in that study. While the State Judicial Department indicated
that large sets of data prior to 1999 was not searchable, individual case data is retrievable. Therefore, to be as
thorough as possible, we have included this case, because it is a post-Ring death prosecution/jury trial and cost
data (as measured in court days and length of time from charge to sentence) is available. A few other death
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refer to herein as "death prosecution/trial" cases.28 We believe this dataset includes every
post-Ring death prosecution jury/trial case.
To form our comparison dataset for LWOP prosecutions, we identified more
29recent post-Ring cases. Using the CDPES dataset, and going back to 2005, we identified
148 first degree murder cases that resulted in a trial, a conviction, a sentence of LWOP,
and a finding by the CDPES that there were one or more aggravators in the case.3 0 The
148 LWOP trial cases represent seventeen (17) counties throughout the State of Colorado
and include the vast majority of such cases in the state between January 1, 2005 and
December 31, 2010. In this analysis, we refer to these 148 aggravated first-degree murder
cases as the "LWOP prosecution/trial" cases.
Using the court docket entries gathered for the CDPES, we quantified the time
cost of prosecutions by calculating the number of court days spent in the four categories:
(1) pretrial proceedings; (2) voir dire; (3) trial; and, if applicable, (4) sentencing. We
averaged the court days required for the six death prosecutions and the court days required
for the 148 LWOP prosecutions. By comparing the average number of court days required
for a death prosecution to the average required for an LWOP prosecution, we are able to
get a relative sense of the cost of Colorado's death penalty. We used the following basic
procedures for calculating the number of days for each of the four categories: First, for
purposes of simplicity, if any proceedings were conducted in court on a particular day,
that day was counted as a court day even if the proceeding did not take the entire day. If,
however, two proceedings occurred on the same day, for example, the final day of a trial
and the first day of sentencing), we did not double count. Instead, when the sentence was
imposed on the last day of trial, it was treated as a trial day (and not a sentencing day). By
contrast, if the sentence was imposed on a separate day, that was counted as a full day
even if the sentencing did not take a full day.3 1 In addition, if a case was re-tried following
a mistrial, the second round of pretrial hearings, voir dire, and trial was added to the first
round for a total figure in each category for the case.
In addition to calculating average number of court days required, we also
calculated the average total length of time required for the trial-level proceedings in the
prosecutions were commenced prior to January 1, 1999 and continued with proceedings after that date; however,
they were not included here because none of them involved a jury sentencing trial (as did the Dante Owens case).
Therefore, none of the others could provide relevant information for the calculation of the costs of a death
prosecution/jury trial.
28 Four of the six death prosecution/jury trial cases involved ajury trial of guilt and of sentencing (Bueno,
D.Owens, Ray, and S. Owens), one resulted in an acquittal at trial (Perez), and one is currently pending a guilt-
innocence jury trial following a guilty plea that was later withdrawn following a successful appeal of the judge-
imposed death sentence (Montour).
29 Again, we use the more recent cases because only these cases fairly represent he likely costs imposed by a
trial, insofar as prior to this date jury sentencing was not required in capital cases and the length of the sentencing
trials and total number of court days was likely lower than it would be had that same trial been held today.
30 The existence of an aggravating factor makes the defendant who is guilty of first-degree murder death eligible.
See Marceau et al., supra note 19 (manuscript at 11). We used the most serious first-degree murders because we
assumed that these cases, in general, would consume more time than second degree or less serious first degree
murder cases and would therefore enable us to most closely isolate the additional costs associated with pursuit of
the death penalty. We used first degree murder convictions to build in additional assurance that we were
matching as closely as possible the egregiousness of the two sets.
" Because an automatic LWOP sentence is required for a first degree murder conviction, counting a sentencing
as a full day of court tends to exaggerate the costs of an LWOP murder conviction and thus understate the
relative amount of time costs imposed by a death penalty sentencing proceeding.
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case, infra Figure 3. For this calculation, the charge date and final sentence date were
used, but any appeals or post-conviction proceedings were not considered.3 2
III. RESULTS: COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Cost of Death Penalty Prosecutions that Go to Trial
On average, a death prosecution/jury trial case consumes approximately 148 days
in court, not including any post-conviction proceedings or appeals. This consists of
approximately 85 court days of pretrial hearings, 26 days of voir dire, 19 days of
presentation of evidence at the trial to determine guilt or innocence, and an additional 21
days in court for the jury sentencing proceeding. These findings appear in Figure 1:
Defendant Year Pretrial Voir Guilt Sentencing Total ResultSentenced Dire Phase
Bueno 2008 49 30 13 6 98 Jury LWOP
verdict
Montour 2014 120 29 23 23 195 Pending trial now
(scheduled)
Owens, D. 2004 98 14 18 14 144 Jury LWOP
verdict
Owens, S. 2008 74 25 27 27 153 Jury DP verdict
Perez 2011 62 6 10 n/a 78 Acquittal
Ray 2010 108 52 23 35 218 Jury DP verdict
Average Court Days: 85.2 26 19 21 147.6
Figure 1. Days of Court Required for Post-Ring Colorado Death Penalty Jury Trials,
by Stage of Proceeding33
As illustrated below in Figure 2, the comparison between the number of days
spent prosecuting a death penalty case and the number of days spent prosecuting an
LWOP case, even though the defendant is in fact death eligible,3 4 is stark. There is a
marked savings in time and resources when the State opts to pursue LWOP instead of a
sentence of death. The LWOP cases required only an average of 242 total days in court,
as follows: 14 court days of pretrial hearings, 1.5 court days of voir dire, 8 court days of
trial, and less than a day of court sentencing proceedings.
32 Given that there is a statutory right to counsel in Colorado state court for post-conviction proceedings when a
death sentence has been imposed, and on federal habeas review for death penalty defendants, the amount of time
and cost for post-conviction litigation would also be considerably higher for death penalty cases as compared to
other murder convictions.
" As noted, Montour's case is included because court scheduling orders permit projection of the number of days
set aside for trial and any jury sentencing proceeding.
34 See supra note 30.
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Pretrial Voir Guilt
Type of Case Hearings Dire Phase Sentencing Total
Death Prosecution/jury trials (n=6) 85.20 26 19 21 147.60
LWOP Prosecutions/jury trials (n=148) 14 1.50 8.20 0.78 24.48
Figure 2. Comparison of Average Number of Days in Court for Death
Prosecution/jury trials and LWOP Prosecutions/jury trials35
On average, a death prosecution that goes to trial requires over six times more
court days than a comparable LWOP prosecution. The differences at each stage of the case
are striking. Voir dire in an average LWOP case takes about a day and a half, but for an
average death prosecution the jury selection takes an average of 26 court days. Similarly
striking is the cost of a capital sentencing hearing as opposed to an LWOP sentencing
proceeding. A capital sentencing proceeding takes an average of 21 days in court), but
because a first-degree murder conviction carries a mandatory sentence of LWOP, the
LWOP sentencings are almost always simultaneous with the jury's rendering of a verdict
of guilty and usually take a matter of minutes..
B. Total Length of Time Between Charge and Imposition of Sentence
Another way that some studies have expressed "cost" of death penalty
prosecutions is by reporting the length of time that it takes to resolve a death prosecution
as compared with an LWOP prosecution.36 Victims' families, attorneys, jurors, judges and
others experience financial and other hardships when cases take a very long time to
resolve. One national organization composed of relatives of murder victims who stand
opposed to the death penalty, Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation, has explained
that "[t]he death penalty delays justice and it delays the healing process. Capital cases
often take 25 years or more to reach completion, all the while keeping victims' families
stuck in the system much longer than is the case with non-capital trials." 37
Because our study of costs is focused on data relating to the days required to
complete a trial and sentencing only - not appeals - we cannot draw firm conclusions
about the total length of time needed to bring a death penalty case to "completion."
However, our trial level data confirm the fact that a Colorado death prosecution takes
longer to resolve than an LWOP prosecution. In fact, as Figure 3 demonstrates, a death
prosecution case takes dramatically longer to resolve - even in the trial court, and even if a
death sentence does not result.
" As noted above, this is based upon all six of the Colorado post-Ring death penalty jury trials that either have
occurred (Bueno, D. Owens, S. Owens, Perez, Ray) or are scheduled (Montour), and the set of 148 LWOP
prosecutions (1) in which death was not sought, (2) that were commenced on or after January 1, 2005, and (3)
that resulted in a conviction for first-degree murder and an LWOP sentence.
36 See, e.g., Terance D. Miethe, Estimates of Time Spent in Capital and Non-Capital Murder Cases: A Statistical
Analysis ofSurvey Data from Clark County Defense Attorneys, Department of Criminal Justice, University of
Nevada, Las Vegas (Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://aclunv.org/files/clarkcostreport.pdf.
" How it Causes Harm, MURDER VICTIMS' FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION, http://www.mvfr.org/how-it-
causes-harm/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
2013] 153
159
Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2013
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Average length of time from Additional time from charge to sentence
Type of case charge to sentence required for death prosecution/jury trial
LWOP prosecution/ 526 days
Jury trial (n=148)
Death prosecution/ Jury 1902 days 1376 days for death prosecution
trial (n=6) (1902 - 526 = 1376)
Figure 3. Comparison of delay in jury trial cases for death and LWOP prosecutions,
as measured by average days from filing of charge to imposition of sentence
Figure 3 illustrates that a death penalty trial prosecution takes much longer from
charge to sentence than does an LWOP prosecution that goes to trial. Assuming both cases
go to a jury trial, the death prosecution takes, on average, 1,902 days, or almost four
calendar years longer in district court than an LWOP prosecution.38
C. Total Cost of Maintaining the Death Penalty System
As illustrated above, the per-case cost (as measured in number of court days
required and length of time from charge to sentence) of a death penalty trial and
sentencing compared to an LWOP trial and sentencing is staggering. The total amount of
delay and the number of court days required for an LWOP prosecution are a fraction of
those required for a death prosecution. Moving beyond the per-case costs, we wanted to
know the aggregate cost (as measured in court days required and length of proceedings) of
Colorado's death penalty prosecutions. In other words, we wanted to know how many
total death prosecutions have been funded by the criminal justice system, with what
results.
One methodology might have been to go back to Colorado's reinstatement of the
death penalty in 1979,39 determine the aggregate costs of all of the death penalty
prosecutions, and compare this against the "benefit" of the 1997 execution of Gary Davis,
who is the only person executed in Colorado since Gregg v. Georgia re-authorized the use
of capital punishment.4 0 However, given the unavailability of electronically-searchable
data going back that far, and the fact that capital litigation has grown exponentially in
" Even though our focus of this study is on delay in trial court proceedings, we can offer some general
observations about the added delay to appeals caused by a death prosecution. Two relatively recent developments
in Colorado law have had a dramatic impact on the number of years it takes to resolve a death prosecution. The
first was in 1997, when Colorado adopted a unique system for death penalty appeals, which requires defendants
to file their post-conviction claims before the appeal can even begin. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-12-201 (West
1997). The practical effect of this reform has been to delay the filing of a direct appeal for several years. Second,
in 2002, for the first time, Colorado amended its statute to provide for a remand for resentencing in the event that
a death sentence is reversed on appeal. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(7) (West 2002). Previously, when
a death sentence was reversed, the automatic penalty was life imprisonment without parole ("LWOP"). While
only one case has been through this new process so far (Montour), the impact on delay of the case can already be
seen. Montour's case was reversed on appeal in 2007, but instead of the automatic imposition of a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole, the case was remanded for resentencing. Later, citing unreliability of the pro se
guilty plea Montour entered in 2003, the trial court permitted him to withdraw it and set the case for a guilt-
innocence trial in 2014 - more than eleven years since the killing that spurred the death penalty prosecution. See
supra note 26 and citations therein.
39 Laws 1979, H.B.1269, § 1. This was the first post-Furman v. Georgia legislation that was held to be
constitutional. See People v. Dist. Ct., 196 Colo. 401, 586 P.2d 31 (Colo. 1978). See Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972).
40 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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complexity over the past three decades, such research might have little present-day utility
in projecting the present and future costs of Colorado death penalty prosecutions. Thus,
we return to the CDPES data as it is a comprehensive, recent, and reliable dataset.
Colorado paid for twenty-two new death prosecutions between January 1, 1999
and December 31, 2010,41 but (as of this writing in June 2013), has to show for it only five
death penalty sentencing proceedings,42 two possible future executions (Ray and Owens),
and the right to continue to seek the death penalty against Montour. The cost of death
prosecutions in Colorado is high, and the execution yield is extraordinarily low.
Colorado appears to have a long history of spending resources on many death
prosecutions, but coming up with almost no death sentences and even fewer executions.43
Since 1980, Colorado has paid for well over 110 death prosecutions, but executed only
one man, Gary Davis. Perhaps because of the complex procedures involved in
attempting to ensure that only the guilty and the deathworthy are executed, most death
sentences in Colorado have contained legal, procedural, or constitutional errors such that
they had to be reversed on appeal or by later trial court proceedings. Out of a dozen death
sentences imposed since 1976, only three case were not reversed on appeal: that of Gary
Davis (who was executed in 1997), Frank Rodriguez (who died of natural causes on death
row), and Nathan Dunlap (who was just granted an indefinite "temporary reprieve" by the
Governor of Colorado). Thus, the fact that a Colorado case may initially result in a death
sentence is not a reliable predictor of whether the defendant will, in fact, ever be executed.
It may be a matter of subjective judgment whether the execution rate (less than
one execution out of over 110 prosecutions), or the reversal rate (9/12, or 75%) should be
regarded as a failure. Even if the death penalty machinery does not produce any
executions, it is possible that there is some societal value or good generated by the system
(other than executions). But if the point of paying for and maintaining a death penalty
system is to produce executions, it can hardly be disputed that Colorado has failed
miserably in that regard. Whatever else Colorado's death-prosecution money is buying, it
is not buying executions.
Given the undisputable fact that Colorado's death penalty money is not buying
executions, it is reasonable to query whether there is some other "commodity" that can be
attributed to maintenance of Colorado's death penalty system, and that makes the
enormous expenditures worthwhile. There are only two possible arguments that have been
offered to justify maintenance of a death penalty system that results in almost no
41 The 22 cases are listed in Appendix 1. There was litigation after January 1, 1999 in death prosecutions that
were commenced prior to January 1, 1999 and therefore were not included in the CDPES. None resulted in a
final death sentence or execution. See Stephanie Hindson, Hillary Potter & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Gender,
Region and Death Sentencing in Colorado, 1980-1999, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 549, 592 (2006). No death
sentences resulted from any of the prosecutions. Since December 31, 2010, two additional death penalty
prosecutions have been commenced and are noted on Appendix 1; one resulted in a guilty plea and sentence to
LWOP for a double homicide, while the other is still pending as of this writing.
42 See infra Appendix 1 (Montour, Paige, Bueno, Ray and Owens).
43 See, e.g., Hindson et al., supra note 42, at 580-82. As noted above, there were a few death prosecutions
immediately preceding the study period, and another shortly after; however, none resulted in an execution or
even a final death sentence.
44 Id. at 580, 587 (identifying 110 death prosecutions between 1980 and 1999. There have been an additional
thirteen death prosecutions since the conclusion of their investigation). See infra Appendix 1.
45 Id. at 586-88. Two additional death sentences were untested by an appeal, but did not result in a Colorado
death sentence, because in one the defendant committed suicide (Johnnie Arguello), and in the other the
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executions: leverage in negotiations for swift plea bargains, and general deterrence. In the
next sections, we offer a cost-benefit assessment of both of those claims.
IV. BENEFITS OF THE DEATH PENALTY: GUILTY PLEAS AND DETERRENCE
In order to properly appreciate the value of death penalty prosecutions, it is
necessary to compare the costs of such prosecutions, as identified in this study, with the
benefits of the death penalty prosecutions. On one end of the scale, as our study shows, the
costs of the death penalty in Colorado are strikingly high. The benefits, however, appear to
be illusory.
Although there exists a wide range of moral arguments that one might level in
favor of capital punishment,46 just as we limit our discussion of costs to quantifiable costs,
so too do we limit our examination of benefits. We consider the potential savings
associated with the death penalty because of the rise in number and efficiency of plea
bargains in cases where death is charged, and we consider the deterrence benefits of the
death penalty.
A. Does the Death Penalty Save Money by Resulting in Swift Guilty
Pleas?
To test the hypothesis that the threat of the death penalty prompts swift guilty
pleas and thus reduces the costs of prosecution while still ensuring an LWOP sentence, we
examined death prosecutions that resulted in guilty pleas to first degree murder and
resulted in an LWOP sentence. In short, we wanted to see whether existence of Colorado's
death penalty system provides a speedy path to an LWOP sentence such that the savings in
the guilty plea cases could offset the expenses of maintaining the death penalty system in
47the non-plea cases.
Approaching this inquiry requires two steps: (1) comparing the costs involved in
the death prosecution/LWOP plea cases to the costs of successful LWOP jury trial
prosecutions, and (2) comparing the costs involved in "failed" death penalty jury trial
prosecutions - i.e., those in which death is pursued all the way through trial, but no death
sentence results - with any savings in the death prosecution/LWOP plea cases to
determine whether the savings in the plea cases offset the expenses in the failed death
prosecutions. Each of these inquiries yields information about whether maintenance of a
death penalty system can be justified by its value in producing guilty pleas to LWOP
sentences.
1. Costs in Death Prosecution/LWOP Plea Cases48
Prosecution for the death penalty rarely results in a plea of guilty to first degree
murder. It happened in Colorado only five times during the CDPES study period.
46 Of course, moral arguments for and against the death penalty all presume a system that results in executions,
not a system like Colorado's, which primarily results in process, not executions.
47 Even though there are many reasons a defendant might enter a guilty plea, and in any given case the plea may
not be the result of a defendant's fear of receiving a sentence of death, we examined all guilty pleas without
regard for the motivation behind them; in other words, we essentially "credit" the death penalty prosecution with
having produced the guilty plea, even if the plea was entered for completely independent reasons.
48 There were four guilty pleas to a lesser offense. See Appendix 1. We did not analyze guilty pleas to lesser
offenses for either death prosecutions or LWOP prosecutions, because we wanted the most precise comparison
possible between the post-Ring dataset of LWOP prosecution/jury trial cases, and, presumably, a plea to a lesser
offense can be induced by the threat of an LWOP sentence anyway, making it difficult to isolate the coercive
effect of the death prosecution. Thus, assessing or comparing the costs of the non-LWOP guilty plea cases is
beyond the scope of this article.
156 [Vol. 3
162
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol3/iss1/8
THE COST OF COLORADO'S DEATH PENALTY
Because there was such a small sample size for the death prosecution/LWOP plea cases
(n=5), we expanded the set to include the Sher case, which is the only case that arose after
the conclusion of the dataset for the CDPES. We call these six cases the "death
prosecution/LWOP plea cases." They are shown in Figure 4.
County Year Defendant Result Court Length of TimeProsecuted Days
Denver 1999 Ramirez LWOP (2 counts) 17 1216
Denver 1999 Than LWOP (2 counts) 30 736
El Paso 1999 Albert LWOP 12 499
El Paso 2006 Lee LWOP 24 746
Douglas 2006 Rubi-Nava LWOP 41 882
Douglas 2011 Sher LWOP (2 counts) 17 389
Total spent on death prosecutions/LWOP plea cases (n=6) 141 3798
Average per case for death prosecution/LWOP plea cases (n=6) 23.5 633
Figure 4. Colorado death penalty prosecutions that resulted in a guilty plea to first
degree murder and an LWOP sentence, cases commenced after January 1, 1999
The next step is to compare the death prosecution/LWOP plea cases with the set
of LWOP cases examined above, i.e., the 148aggravated first degree murder cases that
resulted in a conviction and LWOP sentence following a jury trial and that could have
been, but were not, prosecuted as death penalty cases ("LWOP prosecution/trial cases").
Figure 5 reports the results.
Average Average Comparison to LWOP/jury 
trial case
Type of Case court days length (in Average Average Length from
days) Court Days Charge to Sentence
LWOP prosecution/jury trial 24.48 526 -- --
cases (n=148)
Death prosecution/LWOP plea 23.50 744.66 1 less day 218.66 more days
cases (n=6)
Figure 5. Comparison of average number of days in court and average length of time
required for prosecutions that resulted in convictions for first degree murder, by
type of prosecution
49 See infra Appendix 1. To be sure, the prosecution may have threatened a sentence of death in other cases even
though they did not explicitly notice the case as a death penalty case. However, there is no way to measure
exactly how common such threats are. Nor is there a way of knowing how plausible a death prosecution was in
such cases when the prosecution did not even identify one or more aggravating factors in the required charging
instrument.The aggravating factors and the decision to seek death must be made within 63 days of the
preliminary hearing. COLO. CRIM. P. § 32.1(b) (West 2012).
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As a per-case average, it takes more court days to prosecute a death penalty case,
even if it results in a guilty plea to LWOP, than it takes to simply prosecute the case as an
LWOP jury trial. Figure 5 shows that a death prosecution that results in a guilty plea to
first degree murder takes an average of about 23 12 court days, while only about 24 12
court days are required if the case goes to trial and results in a conviction for first degree
murder and an LWOP sentence. That is to say, a death prosecution guilty plea costs about
the same as an LWOP trial, as measured in court days required.
As measured by our other "cost" factor - length of time from the date of charge
to the date of sentencing, the facts also belie the claim that death prosecutions result in
speedier justice. The average length of time from filing of charge to imposition of
sentence in the death prosecution/LWOP plea cases is 744.66 days, or over 218 days
longer for the death prosecution/LWOP plea cases than for the LWOP prosecution/jury
trial cases.
These findings substantially undermine the claim that death prosecutions are
more efficient because the threat of a death sentence induces a swift or less expensive
guilty plea to a first degree murder charge.
As shown in Figure 5, the death prosecution/LWOP plea cases took about a day
less in number of court days over the LWOP prosecutions that went to jury trial, but took,
on average, a year-and-a-half longer to get from charge to imposition of sentence. These
results reveal no empirical support for the claim that the death penalty is cost-effective
based on its ability to induce guilty pleas to first degree murder.
As will be seen next, however, a complete cost analysis must take into account
that, in order to induce the occasional guilty plea to first degree murder (and to obtain the
even more rare death sentences), Colorado must maintain a death penalty system that
exacts costs even when it fails to produce executions or guilty pleas to first degree murder.
2. Marginal Costs of Failed Death Penalty Prosecutions
A 2012 analysis of empirical data from Georgia, analyzed by Sherod Thaxton,
the Dickerson Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School, suggests that the benefit
of induced plea bargains resulting from the threat of execution is illusory at best:
The empirical findings in this article suggest that the threat of the death
penalty has a substantial causal effect on the likelihood that a defendant
accepts a plea agreement. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the effect is
clearly insufficient to offset the substantial administrative and financial
costs arising from the occasional capital defendant taking her chances at
trial (or, in some instances, even the capital case that incurs significant
pre-trial or pre-penalty phase cost prior to a plea agreement). The
government's use of the death penalty to obtain convictions quickly and
cheaply appears to fail on both of these dimensions-and this may be
particularly true in marginal cases because the likelihood of trial, a non-
death sentence, or a reversal on appeal is particularly high.
In other words, there is a distinct probability that the death prosecutions that
result in guilty pleas would have cost the State the least to try. In contrast, the death
prosecutions that actually go to trial may be the marginal ones in which, as Thaxton notes,
the chance is lower that a death sentence will result and survive an appeal.
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As Thaxton notes, the marginal costs or savings in the death prosecution/LWOP
plea cases must include the cost of not merely those cases themselves, but also the cost of
maintaining the entire death penalty machinery, without which there is no credible threat
of execution which, as the theory goes, is a prerequisite to inducing the guilty plea.5 1 Thus,
the costs of the entire system must be placed into the mix, including the cost of the
"failed" death penalty trial prosecutions - i.e., the cases that are pursued right up to or
through trial, and sometimes even through a capital sentencing proceeding, but without a
death sentence or execution resulting.
Using our dataset, we first identify Colorado's "failed" death penalty
prosecutions and calculate an average per case cost (measured in court days). These are
shown in Figure 6.
County Case No. Defendant Result Court Days
Denver 1999CR2029 Donta Paige LWOP (judge sentencing) 51
Denver 1999CR2738 Abraham Hagos DP barred after trial because of Ring v. 56
Arizona; LWOP
Teller 2000CR178 Anthony Jimenez convicted of lesser charge 167
Adams 2000CR1675 Manuel Melina convicted of lesser charge 42
Adams 2000CR634 John Sweeney convicted of lesser charge 38
Adams 2000CR638 Jesse Wilkinson convicted of lesser charge 32
Weld 2002CR457 Allen Bergerud Hung jury; death penalty dropped before 92
retrial. Convicted in 2" trial, LWOP.
Adams 2002CR2231 Jimmy Vasquez DP barred before trial because of mental 48
retardation; LWOP
Lincoln 2005CR73 David Bueno Jury LWOP verdict 98
Lincoln 2005CR74 Alejandro Perez Acquitted of all charges 78
Total days spent on failed death prosecutions 1 Acquittal 702
4 Convicted lesser charge
Average court days per case 5 LWOP sentences 70.2
0 death sentences
Figure 6. Colorado death penalty trial prosecutions that did not produce a final
death sentence, cases commenced after January 1, 1999
In Colorado, including all death prosecutions commenced since January 1, 1999,
there were ten "failed" death penalty cases that went through trial (and in two cases,
through a capital sentencing proceeding), even though no death sentences resulted. (In five
of the ten, the trial did not even result in a first degree murder conviction). In total, 702
" Id. at 52-53.
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court days were spent on these death prosecutions. On average, each case required
approximately 70 days in court.
Figure 7 shows the comparison between the average number of court days
required to litigate an LWOP prosecution/trial case to conclusion, as compared to a
"failed" death penalty prosecution - i.e., one that does not result in a death sentence.
Type of Case Average Total court days
LWOP prosecution/jury trial cases (n=148) 24.48
Failed Death prosecution/jury trial cases (n=10) 70.2
Total Additional Average Court Days for Failed Death +45.72
Prosecution/Trial Cases
Figure 7. Comparison of Average Number of Days Required for "Failed" Death
Prosecution/Trial Cases and LWOP Prosecution/Trial Cases
The failed death penalty prosecutions require substantially more court days than
do the LWOP trial prosecutions: on average, 45.72 more days in court are required for the
failed death penalty prosecutions as compared to an LWOP trial. This is in marked
contrast to the mere savings of approximately one less court day required on average when
a death penalty prosecution results in an LWOP plea instead of trial.
The next step is to calculate what Colorado would have spent on ten average
LWOP prosecution/trial cases. We take the average 24.48 days (as shown in Figure 2) for
the average LWOP prosecution/trial case and multiply it by ten (the number of failed
death penalty prosecutions) for a total of 244.8 days that would have been required to
simply litigate the failed death prosecutions as LWOP trial prosecutions. Instead, as
shown above in Figure 6, Colorado spent 702 court days on those ten death prosecutions.
Thus, using actual data from the cases, it is possible to answer the question
whether, for cases commenced since January 1, 1999, Colorado "saved" more court days
by prosecuting cases for the death penalty but then accepting a guilty plea to first degree
murder and an LWOP sentence. Colorado "saved" approximately six court days by
inducing the six guilty pleas to first degree murder, but, above and beyond the cost of
those six cases, "spent" 702 additional court days on ten failed death penalty prosecutions,
for a net "cost" of 696 days.
In conclusion, in order to make the death penalty system available to "save"
about a day in court on each death prosecution/LWOP plea cases, Colorado has to
maintain massive expenditures of court days on death prosecution cases that fail to
produce death sentences or executions. It is apparent that the marginal savings of the death
prosecution/LWOP plea cases are overwhelmed by the marginal costs of the failed death
penalty trial cases. A final question remains, however: in spite of the fact that the
Colorado death penalty scheme does not result in executions and is vastly more expensive
(even accounting for induced LWOP guilty pleas), is there some clear benefit that
overwhelms the enormous cost of the system? Proponents of the death penalty sometimes
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B. Does the Death Penalty Deter Future Murders?
Although it is commonplace to assert that the death penalty is an effective
deterrent, recent independent studies undermine this conclusion. Stated differently,
although the costs of the death penalty in Colorado are high, the deterrence benefits appear
to be entirely speculative.
For decades, scholars have produced conflicting empirical research regarding the
effect of capital punishment as a deterrent for homicide; for each article finding a deterrent
effect at least one paper finding no such effect was published. In the face of such
conflicting empirical conclusions, the National Research Council convened an
independent committee to study whether the available data supports the conclusion that
the death penalty has a deterrent effect.52 The findings of this committee, published by the
National Academy of Sciences in 2012, are that it is impossible to conclude that the death
penalty serves as a meaningful deterrent.53 Specifically, the committee summarized its
findings and conclusions by saying:
The committee concludes that research to date on the effect of capital
punishment on homicide is not informative about whether capital
punishment decreases, increases, or has no effect on homicide rates.
Therefore, the committee recommends that these studies not be used to
inform deliberations requiring judgments about the effect of the death
penalty on homicide. Consequently, claims that research demonstrates
that capital punishment decreases or increases the homicide rate by a
specified amount or has no effect on the homicide rate should not
influence policy judgments about capital punishment.
The most current, comprehensive, and neutral study of the deterrent effect of capital
punishment, therefore, concludes that there is no evidence that the death penalty provides
even a marginal deterrent benefit above a long prison sentence.
Notably, other recent academic studies have gone even further in suggesting that
there is no connection between the death penalty and deterrence. For example, a recent
study reported that 88% of the country's top criminologists surveyed do not believe the
56
death penalty acts as a deterrent to homicide. It is safe to say that there is a consensus
among leading researchers that the death penalty either does not deter, or that there is no
evidence that it deters.
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that any conclusion about the limited
deterrence value of the death penalty in general is particularly salient in Colorado where
the rate of executions is staggeringly low. Since the reinstatement of the death penalty in
52 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 33 (Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Pepper
eds., 2012), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/download.aspx?id=327 1.
" Id. at 2.
54 Id.
5 Notably, the committee also notes that it is unable to conclude that the death penalty has no deterrent effect.
Simply put, the findings are that there is no evidence in support of a deterrence thesis; the studies to date have
failed to show that the death penalty deters or does not deter crime. Id. at 3 ("A lack of evidence is not evidence
for or against the hypothesis.").
51 Michael L. Radelet and Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views OfLeading
Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 505-506 (2009) (eighty-seven percent concluded that the
abolition of the death penalty would not have a significant effect on murder rates and 75% believe that "debates
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Gregg v. Georgia,5 7 Colorado has only executed one person. If one accepts that actual
executions are required in order to generate a meaningful deterrent, then even assuming
capital punishment is capable of deterring homicides elsewhere, in Colorado the non-
existence of actual executions may have stripped the death penalty of any deterrent
value.5 9 We do not suggest that the absence of executions in Colorado proves that the
state's death penalty is without any deterrent benefit, but it is worth pointing out that the
as-yet unsubstantiated deterrence theory is probably even more attenuated in Colorado.60
With the lack of demonstrable deterrent effect in any state, it would be implausible that
the death penalty could have any deterrent effect in a state where only one person has been
executed since 1967. And given that the most current research does not find any deterrent
effect for the death penalty across the United States, the prospect of a deterrent benefit in
Colorado seems particularly illusory.
V. CONCLUSION
This essay summarizes the quantifiable costs of the death penalty. We do not
address the argument that these sentences impose a moral injury on society. Likewise, in
summarizing the benefits of the death penalty, we have focused exclusively on
quantifiable benefits and avoided arguments about the moral imperative of the death
penalty. Our findings are unequivocal: Colorado's death penalty imposes tremendous
costs on taxpayers and its benefits are, at best, speculative, and more likely, illusory.
Specifically, we found that death prosecutions require substantially more days in
court, and take substantially longer to resolve, than non-death-prosecuted first degree
murder cases that result in a sentence of LWOP. The costs of these prosecutions are not
offset by any tangible benefit. Our study shows that not only are death penalty
prosecutions costly compared to non-death cases, but the threat of the death penalty at the
charging stage does not save costs by resulting in speedier pleas to first degree murder.
The difference in court days between guilty pleas in death prosecution cases and complete
trials in LWOP prosecution cases is negligible and overwhelmed by the exponentially-
increased number of days required for failed death penalty prosecutions that result in
neither a plea bargain nor a death sentence.
The substantial cost of the death penalty cannot be justified by the possibility of
future deterrence insofar as social scientists increasingly agree that the deterrence benefits
of the death penalty are largely non-existent in general, and the deterrent value is likely
even less in Colorado where there has been only one execution in three decades. In short,
the death penalty imposes a major cost without yielding any measurable benefits.
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
See Hindson et al., supra note 42, at 587 (describing case of Gary Davis).
59 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 33 ("Among states that provide authority for the use of the
death penalty, the frequency with which that authority is used varies greatly.... [S]ince 1976 three states-
Florida, Texas, and Virginia-have accounted for more than one-half of all executions carried out in the United
States, even though 40 states and the federal government provided the legal authority for the death penalty for at
least part of this period. Constructing measures of the intensity with which capital punishment is used in states
with that authority is a particularly daunting problem.").
60 Id. at 29 ("The theory of deterrence is predicated on the idea that if state-imposed sanction costs are
sufficiently severe, certain, and swift, criminal activity will be discouraged."); but see id. at 33 ("[A]ctual
frequency of executions may not alter would-be murderers perceptions of the risk of execution and therefore not
alter behavior even if there is a deterrent effect.").
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APPENDIX 1
Cost Study Death Prosecutions in Colorado, by year of prosecution6 '
Year County Defendant Procedure Days in Length from Result
Court Charge to Sentence
1998 Arapahoe D.Owens Trial 144 1964 LWOP (3)
+jury sentencing
trial
1999 Denver Ramirez Plea LWOP (2 17 1216 LWOP (2)
counts)
1999 Denver Than Plea LWOP (2 30 736 LWOP (2)
counts)
1999 El Paso Albert Plea LWOP 12 499 LWOP
2000 Morgan Palomo Plea lesser 26 602 Lesser
2000 Adams Lopez Plea lesser 26 465 Lesser
2001 Arapahoe Brown Plea lesser 22 644 Lesser
2006 El Paso Lee Plea LWOP 24 746 LWOP
2005 Rio Medina Plea lesser 14 372 48 years
Grande
2006 Douglas Rubi-Nava Plea LWOP 41 882 LWOP
1999 Denver Paige Trial 51 652 LWOP
+ judge sentencing
trial
1999 Denver Hagos Trial 56 2246 LWOP
2000 Teller Jimenez Trial 167 1345 Lesser
2002 Adams Vasquez Trial 48 740 LWOP
2000 Adams Melina Trial 42 738 Lesser
2000 Adams Sweeney Trial 38 408 Lesser
2000 Adams Wilkinson Trial 32 513 Lesser
2002 Weld Bergerud Trial 92 1315 LWOP
2002 Lincoln Montour Pending trial 195 4201 pending
2005 Lincoln Perez Trial 78 1866 Acquitted
2005 Lincoln Bueno Trial 98 854 LWOP
+jury sentencing
trial
2006 Arapahoe S.Owens Trial 153 1007 Death Sentence;
+ jury sentencing pending appeals
trial
2006 Araphaoe Ray Trial 218 1520 Death Sentence;
+ jury sentencing pending appeals
trial
2011 Douglas Sher Plea LWOP (2 17 389 LWOP (2)
counts)
61 This is primarily the CDPES dataset of death prosecutions commenced between January 1, 1999 and
December 31, 2010, with two additions: The 1998 D. Owens case, which commenced prior to January 1, 1999, is
included because there was a post-Ring (2003) jury capital sentencing proceeding, providing relevant
information for present and future costs of death prosecutions/jury trial cases. The 2011 Sher case, which was
commenced after December 31, 2010, is included because it provides relevant information about the present and
future costs of death prosecution/LWOP plea cases. See Marceau et al., supra note 19 (manuscript at 23-26)
(describing how the CDPES was performed).
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THE DEATH PENALTY SPECTACLE
Tung Yin*
Capital punishment in the United States has a serpentine history. The death
penalty was the presumed sentence for a large swath of crimes during colonial times
(though often not imposed), and it was not constitutionally limited to punishment for
homicides until 1977. The Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in 1972,3 but,
four years later, upheld the revised capital punishment schemes that numerous states had
instituted in response to the 1972 decision.
4
Since then, death penalty cases have produced plenty of spectacles. A ghastly
example occurred in 1997, when Florida's electric chair malfunctioned, causing flames to
burst from the condemned inmate's face mask.5 The state Attorney General took the
opportunity to warn future would-be killers, "better not do it in the state of Florida
because we may have a problem with our electric chair."6 An absurd example comes from
that same year, when David Lee Herman slashed his throat and wrists with a prison razor
in a suicide attempt; prison officials saved him only to continue with his execution two
days later.
I Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. Thanks to Doug Beloof, Steve Kanter, and Aliza Kaplan for
helpful discussions and feedback, and to Jenevieve Swinford for excellent research assistance.
'See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6-7 (2012).
2 See Cokerv. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (striking down the death penalty as punishment for non-fatal
rape). Notwithstanding Coker, Congress has continued to enact federal statutes authorizing capital punishment
for crimes such as large scale drug dealing. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b) (1994). In addition, espionage and treason
continue to carry a potential death penalty. Death Penalty for Offenses Other Than Murder, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-offenses-other-murder (last updated Feb. 14, 2013).
Furmanv. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-41 (1972) (per curiam).
Jurekv. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 270-77 (1976).
Miraya Navarro, Despite Fire, Electric Chair Is Defended In Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at Al8.
6 John Grogan, Chair, Injection ... How bout Guillotine?, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 30, 1997, at 1B; Tim Padgett,
What's Wrong With Florida's Prisons, TIME MAG., Oct. 17, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1672366,00.html.
Sam Howe Verhovek, Halt the Execution? Are You Crazy?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998, § 4, at 4. Herman is
one of many examples of inmates who have been saved after suicide attempts and still executed. See, e.g., Jim
Yardley, Texan Who Took Overdose Is Executed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1999, at Al8 (quoting David Martin
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No matter what one's ultimate feelings about the legality or desirability of capital
punishment may be, it is difficult to find anything positive about Robert Alton Harris's
last night. Harris was strapped into the lethal gas chamber only to be unstrapped and sent
back to his cell due to a judicial stay, only then to have the stay lifted and to be strapped in
again, with the process repeating itself no fewer than three times. Eventually, the Supreme
Court got so fed up that it lifted the last stay of execution with a further order that "No
further stays of Robert Alton Harris' execution shall be entered by the federal courts
except upon order of this Court." Harris was initially scheduled to die at 12:01 a.m., but
his execution did not actually take place until after six in the morning.9
The Harris debacle is, of course, an extreme example of the typical situation in
which capital punishment opponents, including obviously the death row inmate, take all
manner of steps to try to mobilize public opinion against execution. Where there is a
sympathetic defendant, the media may join in, adding fuel to the anti-capital punishment
sentiment.10 In these typical instances, the death row inmate quite understandably does not
want to be put to death.
Occasionally, however, there are situations that transcend the usual spectacle of
the inmate and abolitionists teaming up to try to stop the state from carrying out the
execution. For example, one newspaper reported that many California death row
inmates, if not disenfranchised, would have voted against that state's Proposition 34,
which sought to abolish the death penalty.12 This counterintuitive assessment makes sense
when one realizes that the ballot initiative would have the effect of eliminating the right to
appointed counsel for post-conviction proceedings,1 3 which are statutorily guaranteed only
for death row inmates. 14
But a 2011 case in Oregon goes beyond the theoretical into an actual absurdity.1 5
In that case, an inmate who was condemned to death voluntarily waived his remaining
appeals, clearing the way for execution.16 His lawyers argued against his desired outcome,
leading him to fire his attorneys.1 7 Oregon's Governor then issued a reprieve, suspending
the death sentence during his term in office-but not commuting it.1 8 Enter the inmate's
Long's lawyer as saying, "It seems like a pretty sick process when you jerk a guy out of intensive care on a
ventilator.... What's the huge rush?").
Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000 (1992); Charles M. Sevilla & Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of
the Present Discontents: The Death Penalty Case ofRobert Alton Harris, 40 UCLA L. REv. 345, 346, 374-78
(1992).
9 See Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 8, at 346, 379.
'o One example was Karla Faye Tucker, who, along with her boyfriend, broke into another friend's house to steal
a motorcycle in 1983. While inside, they attacked the homeowner and his lover, killing both with repeated
hammer and axe blows. Both assailants were convicted of murder and received the death penalty. Tucker later
sought executive clemency on the ground that she had been under the influence of drugs at the time of the
killing, and that she had since convened to Christianity and become reformed. The prison warden supported this
latter contention. In part because she was scheduled to be the first woman to be executed in the United States
since 1984, her case drew large media attention. She was executed in 1998 by lethal injection. Sam Howe
Verhovek, Divisive Case ofKiller ofTwo Ends as Texas Executes Tucker, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 4, 1998, at Al.
" To be sure, many executions take place without any spectacle. See Bob Egelko, Why Inmates Prefer to Keep
Death Penalty; Proposition 34, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2012, at Al.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 68662 (West 2012).
* State v. Haugen, 266 P.3d 68 (Or. 2011).
1 Id. at 7 1.
17 Id.
" Haugenv. Kitzhaber, No. 12C16560, ¶ 4-6 (Or. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 3, 2012).
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new attorney, who brought suit to reject the Governor's reprieve, which the trial court
decided to grant.19 In other words, there is a strange spectacle where a death row inmate
successfully sues a state Governor for interfering with the inmate's decision to be
executed, only to have the Governor appeal that ruling.
This case is a fascinating commentary on, if nothing else, the fiscal waste of
having the death penalty in a state that rarely sentences defendants to death (about one per
year on average) and does not execute them unless they "volunteer" (only two have been
20executed since 1962, and both waived their remaining appeals). On the other hand, while
abolition of the death penalty sounds appealing, this inmate's case raises a tricky question:
he was already serving a life without parole sentence when he murdered another inmate.2 1
How should society punish someone like this? Another life sentence is meaningless, and
even if one rejects retribution and deterrence as legitimate punishment rationales,
incapacitation seems appropriate-executing him would prevent him from killing any
other inmates (or guards).
There are, of course, other ways of protecting inmates from fellow inmates:
maybe murderous inmates could be subject to solitary confinement for the rest of their
lives. The direction of European courts, which have been ahead of our abolitionist
movement, as well as the experience here in the United States with Ramzi Yousef, one of
the deadliest terrorists in U.S. custody, suggests, however, that such conditions of solitary
confinement may become the new Eighth Amendment battleground.2 2
I. THE DEATH PENALTY DEBATE
Currently thirty-two states, the federal government, and the U.S. military retain
the death penalty as a potential punishment, almost exclusively for homicide with
23aggravated circumstances. Debate over the legality and morality of capital punishment
24has existed at least since Socrates' death. In the 1700s, English philosopher Jeremy
Bentham launched one of the more enduring utilitarian-based arguments against the death
penalty,2 5  while his contemporary Immanuel Kant defended it in appropriate
circumstances as just "dessert."26 In 1972, Furman v. Georgia temporarily mooted the
issue in the United States by holding that the death penalty, as rendered in the cases before
the Supreme Court, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
'9 Id. at ¶ 26.
20 Cliff Collins, Let the Debate Begin: Oregon Lawyers with a Stake in the Issue Weigh in on the Death Penalty,
72 OR. ST. B. BULL. 18, 18-20 (2012). See Summary ofDeath Row Inmates, OR. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS (June
16, 2011)
http://www.oregon.gov/DOC/PUBAFF/Pages/cappunishment/cappunishinent.aspx#List of Inmateson Deat
h Row.
21 Jonathan J. Cooper, Gary Haugen, Death Row Inmate, Can Reject Clemency, Judge Says, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/03/gary-haugen-death-row-inmn1739775.html.
22 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 163 (2d Cir. 2003). See also ChristopherR. Brauchli, From the
Wool Sack, 30 COLO. LAW. 35, 35 (2001) (citing European leaders asking the United States to abolish the death
penalty).
23 Crimes Punishable by Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 2011),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/crimes-punishable-death-penalty#BJS. In May 2013, Maryland abolished
capital punishment, becoming the eighteenth state. See Joe Sutton, Maryland governor signs death penalty
repeal, CNN, May 2, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/02/us/maryland-death-penalty.
24 See Hugo Adam Bedau, Bentham 's Utilitarian Critique ofthe Death Penalty, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1033, 1036 (1983).
25 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT, 168-197 (1775).
26 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140-45 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
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punishment.2 7 Now, forty years after Furman (and 36 years after the reinstatement of the
death penalty), there is a slight trend toward slow abolition of the death penalty:
* In the past five years, six states have eliminated the death penalty from
their laws, increasing the ranks of abolitionist states to 18, an increase of
50 percent;28
* Since peaking in 1999, the annual number of death row inmates who
have actually been executed has shown an uneven but decreasing
trend;29
* Over half of all executions in the United States since 1976 have taken
place in Texas, Virginia, and Oklahoma (and over two-thirds with the
addition of Florida and Missouri).3 0
This Part of the article briefly summarizes the primary arguments in opposition to
capital punishment so as to provide relevant context for evaluating the thorny question of
how to respond to prison inmates who kill other inmates or prison guards.1
Immorality: Some capital punishment opponents argue that the death penalty is
something absolutely evil which like torture, should never be used however many lives it
might save."32 A variation of this argument is that the State sends the wrong message
when it kills someone as punishment for killing someone else.3 3 The legal version of these
morality-based arguments is that capital punishment constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment,34 although since 1976, the Supreme
27 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
28 See States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2013),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty.
29 See Executions By Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year.
30 See Number ofExecutions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region- 1976.
" For an excellent discussion of the abolitionist arguments, see, e.g., Aliza B. Kaplan, Oregon's Death Penalty:
The Practical Reality, LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
32 
See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 72 (1968) (setting
forth the argument). Of course, since 9/11, there have been suggestions that in "ticking time bomb" situations,
use of torture to extract actionable information to stop an imminent attack might be justified legally, if not
morally. See e.g., Alan Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L SCH. L.
REV. 275, 277 (2003) (arguing that if torture is going to be used anyway to stop mass terrorism, it would be
preferable to regulate it through judicial torture warrants); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S
ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 172-73 (2005) (quoting Sen. Charles Schumer as saying in a Senate hearing
that "very few people in this room or in America ... would say that torture should never, ever be used,
particularly if thousands of lives are at stake").
" See, e.g., Anna Quindlen, The Failed Experiment: Last Year Only Four Countries Accounted for Nearly All
Executions Worldwide: China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 2006, at 64. In its
snarkiest form, this is a facile argument; after all, if taken seriously, it would also mean that we should neither
imprison convicted kidnappers nor fine convicted thieves. For a somewhat more sober version of the argument,
see BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 70 (Richard Bellamy ed. 1995) ("The
death penalty is not useful because of the example of savagery it gives to men.").
34 See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That
Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U.L. REV. 567 (2010) (summarizing arguments); John Stinneford, The
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Court has used that clause only to narrow the pool of convicted criminals who are eligible
for the death penalty.3 5
Irrevocability: A second argument against the death penalty is that it is
irrevocable; the execution of a wrongly convicted defendant cannot be undone even if the
defendant's innocence is later established through, for example, DNA testing.36 When
former Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted all death sentences in the state shortly
before leaving office in 2003, one of his stated reasons was concern about possibly
executing an innocent person.37
Of course, society cannot replace the time that a wrongly convicted person loses
when he spends years in confinement before being exonerated. Depending on the law of
the state in which he was wrongly convicted, however, such a person might be eligible for
financial compensation.38 Money cannot replace lost years, but it is the standard measure
of remedy for civil wrongs and can be used to compensate persons who have been
wrongly incarcerated. To a person who has been wrongly executed, however, money is no
use.
Fiscal irresponsibility: A third argument against the death penalty is that it is
fiscally irresponsible. Studies have concluded that trying a defendant for capital murder,
from start to finish, costs anywhere from $1 million to $2.5 million more than trying a
39defendant when the maximum sentence is life imprisonment. It may seem
counterintuitive that incarcerating a person for many more years would cost less than
putting him to death, but capital cases involve more complicated trial proceedings,
including a separate penalty phase, as well as a statutory right to appointed counsel for
post-conviction proceedings."
Of course, the fact that it costs at least $1 million more to try to execute a
murderer than to incarcerate him for life does not necessarily mean that the extra money is
wasted or destroyed. Some of the increased costs may reflect the results of judicial
resistance to capital punishment. In addition, the legal costs and fees pay for services from
defense lawyers, investigators, court reporters, and others involved in the legal system.
"See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that it violates the Eighth Amendment to execute
persons convicted of crimes committed as minors); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that it
violates the Eighth Amendment to execute mentally retarded persons).
36 Since 1984, eighteen death row inmates have been exonerated due to DNA evidence. See Innocence: List of
Those Freed From Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-
list-those-freed-death-row.
17 See Eric Slater, Illinois Governor Commutes All Death Row Cases; Ryan Reduces Terms of167 Inmates to
Life or 40 Years, Calling the State's Capital Punishment System Deeply Flawed', L.A. TIMES, Jan 12, 2003, at
Al.
" See JIM PETRO & NANCY PETRO, FALSE JUSTICE: EIGHT MYTHS THAT CONVICT THE INNOCENT 52 (2011)
(noting that slightly more than half of the states have some sort of compensation scheme for eligible wrongly
acquitted persons, including Ohio's offer of $40,330 per year plus lost wages and other costs).
3 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1, 14 (1995); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences ofthe Death Penalty in
American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. L. & Soc. CHANGE 711, 719 (1990/1991); David Erickson, Capital Punishment at
What Price: An Analysis ofthe Cost Issue in a Strategy to Abolish the Death Penalty 10 (1993), available at
http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/Ericksonl993COSTSTUDY.pdf; GEN'L ADMIN. OFFICE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: LIMITED DATA AVALABLE ON COSTS OF DEATH SENTENCES 5 (Sept. 1998), available at
www.gao.gov/assets/220/211785.pdf (estimating cost of death sentence as 42% higher than a life sentence).
40 See, e.g., Judge Arthur L. Alarcon & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will ofthe Voters?: A Roadmap to
Mend or End the California Legislature's Multi-Billion Dollar Death Penalty Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
S41, S65-S70 (2011) (dissecting the cost of execution in states like California and discussing whether the death
penalty is truly benefitting the public).
41 Id. at S74, S78, S93 n.187 (outlining some of the various costs).
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In a time where many law graduates have trouble finding work,4 2 perhaps we should not
be so quick to dismantle a legal architecture that provides some measure of work, albeit of
a highly stressful and specialized nature, for lawyers and others. To the extent that this
"lawyer employment" aspect of the death penalty spectacle is at all persuasive, however,
its flaw is readily apparent. If we are simply interested in providing "work" for lawyers
and we happen to have a spare $1 million lying around for such purposes, we could just as
easily hire them to dig a bunch of holes and then fill them in again. Obviously, a more
societally productive way to provide publicly-funded "lawyer employment" would be to
spend that $1 million per year on any combination of (1) paying lawyers to represent
indigent criminal defendants challenging their convictions or their non-capital sentences;
or (2) funding public interest law firms that serve the legal needs of the poor who
otherwise must proceed pro se or forego their legal claims altogether.
To be sure, not all policy decisions are structured on the results of a pure cost-
benefit analysis. It would be nearly impossible to quantify the value of retribution, yet
retribution remains one of the central goals of punishment.4
Uncertain deterrence: The death penalty is supposed to deter would-be killers
from carrying out their horrible crimes.5 Even after decades of study, however, scholars
and practitioners have yet to reach a consensus about whether capital punishment actually
has a deterrent effect on potential murderers.4 6
Racial bias: A final argument is that, in the United States, the death penalty is
administered in a racially discriminatory manner and there is no effective way to eliminate
racial bias. David Baldus first confirmed the significance of the racial disparity in death
penalty cases in his exhaustive study of over 2,400 homicide cases between 1973 and
2000 in Georgia. Baldus found a race of the victim effect; that is, in murder cases with
aggravating facts, a defendant who killed a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than one who killed an African-American victim. 8 Subsequent studies
of the death penalties in other jurisdictions have found "a consistent pattern of white-
victim disparities across the systems for which [researchers had] data."49 There was,
42 See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
43 In many ways, this is not much of an exaggeration of what happens in states like Oregon, which retain and
periodically impose the death penalty, but rarely, if ever, carry out an actual execution.
44 HART, supra note 32, at 9 (defining retribution as "the application of the pains of punishment to an offender
who is morally guilty"); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 23 3-38
(1984); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Indeed, the decision that
capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief
that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the
penalty of death").
45 See Alarcon & Mitchell, supra note 40, at S168-S169 (using a California proposition as an example of
applying more stringent penalties for felony crimes to deter would-be criminals).
46 
See, e.g., MARK COSTANZO, JUST REVENGE: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH PENALTY 103 (1997);
HART, supra note 32, at 85; Rudolph J. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth It, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335, 350 (1996) ("[N]o
proof exists that general deterrence results from capital punishment as opposed to life imprisonment."); Michael
L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views ofthe Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (1996) ("[T]he death penalty does, and can do, little to reduce rates of criminal violence.").
But see Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and
Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005) (arguing that other studies undervalue "saved" lives in
calculations purporting to show no deterrent effect).
4 7 
See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS passim (1990).
48 See id. at 401.
49 David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration ofthe Death Penalty: An
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however, no statistically significant disparity based on the race of the defendant,0 with the
exception of the United States armed forces, where race of the victim and of the defendant
had effects.1
In McCleskey v. Kemp,5 2 an African-American Georgia death row inmate relied
on the first Baldus study in arguing that his death sentence violated the Equal Protection
Clause.5 3 He argued that he was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than
someone who killed a black victim.5 4 In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed McCleskey's
death sentence, not because of methodological flaws in the study,5 but because the study
could not address whether McCleskey's specific jury, prosecutor, and judge were biased.5 6
The court also reasoned that "discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, [so] we
would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has
been abused."5 7 William Stuntz concisely summarized the effect of the decision:
"McCleskey made discrimination impossible to prove."
The persuasiveness of each individual argument against the death penalty
obviously varies depending on the reader's sentiments but, collectively, the arguments are
powerful. The arguments do not, however, address the problem of what to do with
someone like Gary Haugen.
II. GARY HAUGEN AS A CASE STUDY
In 1981, Gary Haugen brutally raped and beat his ex-girlfriend's mother to death
with fists, a hammer, and a baseball bat.5 9 Apparently, he blamed the victim for causing
the break-up of his relationship.60 Because Haugen was indigent, the trial judge appointed
a lawyer to represent him.61 Haugen pleaded guilty and received a sentence of life
imprisonment with a possibility of parole.6 2
5o Id.
51 See David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination in the Administration ofthe Death Penalty: The Experience
ofthe United States Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1230-3 1 (2011).
52 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
5 Id. at 291.
54 Id. at 321.
5 But see id. at 288-89 (noting district court's findings of methodological problems in the study and its holding
that the study "fail[ed] to contribute anything of value"). On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit assumed the validity of
the study but nevertheless affirmed the district court's denial of the habeas petition, and the Supreme Court





51 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 291 (2011); see also id. at 120 ("The
system as a whole may discriminate massively, but as no single decisionmaker is responsible for more than a
small fraction of the discrimination, the law holds no one accountable for it.").
59 See, e.g., Helen Jung, Gary Haugen, Death Row Inmate in Limbo After Oregon's Execution Ban, Religion,
HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 10, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/10/gary-haugen-oregon-execution-
ban_n_1140197.html; see also Natalie Brand, Family ofHaugen's First Murder Victim Speaks Out, KPTV Fox
12 NEWS, Nov. 28, 2011, http://www.kptv.com/story/16140959/family-of-haugens-first-murder-victim-speaks-
out.
60 See, e.g., Natalie Brand, Family ofHaugen 's First Murder Victim Speaks Out, KPTV Fox 12 NEWS, Nov. 28,
2011, http://www.kptv.com/story/16140959/family-of-haugens-first-murder-victim-speaks-out.
61 See Helen Jung, Death Row Inmate Gary Haugen Gets Wish for New Attorney as Mental Evaluation Awaits,
OREGONIAN, July 15, 2011.
62 Jung, supra note 59; Under current Oregon law, murder that does not rise to the level of aggravated murder
(which is a death-eligible crime) carries a sentence of life imprisonment, except that after 25 years of
2013] 171
177
Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2013
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
On September 2, 2003, Haugen and Jason Van Brumwell killed David Shane
Polin, their fellow inmate at the Oregon State Penitentiary, by stabbing him 84 times and
63smashing his head with a chair. Haugen and Brumwell believed, incorrectly as it turned
out, that Polin was an informant who had reported illegal drug use by inmates to prison
authorities so that drug tests could be administered in time to test positive.6 4
Haugen and Brumwell were each charged with aggravated murder, which carried
65a potential death sentence under Oregon law. There were 18 statutory factors that
66qualified a homicide as an aggravated murder. Polin's killing satisfied two of those
factors: Haugen and Brumwell (a) were convicted murderers at the time of the killing67
and (b) committed the homicide while in prison.68 Both inmates were convicted and
sentenced to death.6 9
After the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence,
Haugen wanted to waive his remaining post-conviction challenges.70 His appointed
lawyers, however, moved to have Haugen declared incompetent to waive those rights-at
least, in the absence of a psychiatric evaluation-setting up a client-lawyer conflict.7 1 In
response, Haugen sent his own letter to the judge indicating that he wanted to fire his
appointed lawyers.7 2 The trial judge discussed the matter with Haugen directly and
73concluded that Haugen was competent to proceed pro se. Haugen's former lawyers were
appointed as standby counsel to assist him if he so desired.
At this point, the non-profit organization Oregon Capital Resource Center got
involved in the matter.7 5 The Center sought review of the trial court's decision allowing
Haugen to fire his lawyers "without a sufficient inquiry into Haugen's competence."76 The
State and Haugen both objected but the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that the trial judge
had failed to follow the required procedures in capital cases.
confinement, the inmate can petition to have the sentence changed to life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(5) (2011). The law in effect at the time Haugen was convicted, however,
provided for more lenient parole. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105(3) (1979).
63 State v. Haugen, 349 P.3d 174, 176-78 (Or. 2010).
6 4 Id. at 178-79.
6
1 Id. at 176.
66 See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095.
67 See id. § 163.095(1)(c).
61 See id. § 163.095(2)(b).
69 State v. Haugen, 349 P.3d 174, 176 (Or. 2010).
70 State v. Haugen, 266 P.3d 68, 70-71 (Or. 2011) [hereinafter Haugen Il].
" Id. at 71. See Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representations ofthe Unabomber, 24 VT. L.
REV. 417, 497 (2000), for an account of the conflicts between lawyer and client when the lawyer sees the
overriding priority as avoiding the death penalty, but the client is willing to accept the possibility of a death
sentence in exchange for litigating guilt.
72 Haugen II, 266 P.3d at 71. Although conventional wisdom suggests that "a lawyer who represents himself has
a fool for a client," an observation that would seem even truer when the client is not a lawyer, Faretta v.
Calfornia held that the government cannot force an unwilling criminal defendant to be represented by an
attorney. 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
" Haugen II, 266 P.3d at 71.
74 Id.
7 Id. at 70.
76 Id. at 71.
7 See id. at 72 (discussing OR. REV. STAT. § 137.464 (West 2009), which calls for an evaluation of the
defendant's competency by the state Health Authority where "the court has substantial reason to believe that, due
172 [Vol. 3
178
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol3/iss1/8
THE DEATH PENALTY SPECTACLE
The matter returned to the trial court, which, on Haugen's request, appointed
substitute counsel due to Haugen's allegation of a broken attorney-client relationship.
Haugen's originally appointed lawyers challenged their removal but were unsuccessful.71
Substitute counsel supported Haugen's bid to waive his remaining appeals by
having a new psychiatrist perform a mental competency examination.s The new doctor
concluded that Haugen was competent to waive his rights and so testified." During a
hearing on the matter, substitute counsel offered no contradicting evidence such as the
opinion of the previous doctor who examined Haugen and concluded that he was not
812 83competent. Following this hearing, the trial court found that Haugen was competent.8
OCRC then filed another motion, asking the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court
essentially to reverse the trial court's decision. By a 4-3 vote, the Oregon Supreme Court
denied the request, thus apparently clearing the way for the state to execute Haugen." The
trial judge set an execution date of December 6, 2011.86
On November 22, 2011, Governor John Kitzhaber acted on a request by various
anti-capital punishment groups to stop Haugen's execution by granting a "temporary
reprieve" for the "duration of term in office" on the grounds that the death penalty in
Oregon was expensive, flawed, and broken:
It is a perversion of justice that the single best indicator of who will and
will not be executed has nothing to do with the circumstances of a crime
or the findings of a jury. The only factor that determines whether
someone sentenced to death in Oregon is actually executed is that they
volunteer.7
Governor Kitzhaber did not, however, commute Haugen's sentence to life imprisonment.
Initially, Haugen seemed pleased with the reprieve, saying that it was a victory
for him.8 Soon after, however, Haugen changed his view: "I'm in . .. limbo. . . . I didn't
ask for this. I'm ready to go." 90 Perhaps Haugen was disappointed that he was still being
to mental incapacity, the defendant cannot engage in reasoned choices of legal strategies and options" to be
exercised at a death warrant hearing).








See Death Warrant, State v. Haugen, No. 04C46224, Nov. 18, 2011 (copy on file with author).
1 Press Release, Governor Kitzhaber Issues Reprieve - Calls for Action on Capital Punishment (Nov. 22, 2011),
http://www.oregon.gov/gov/media room/pages/pressreleasesp201 1/press_1 12211 .aspx. The canceled execution
had already cost the state over $57,000 in preparation expenses. Helen Jung, State Spent $1.3 Million on
Lawyers, Drugs and Preparation for Cancelled Execution, OREGONIAN (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2011/12/statespent_13_million on lawy.html.
8 Press Release, supra note 88 ("I did not [commute] because the policy of this state on capital punishment is
not mine alone to decide. It is a matter for all Oregonians to decide."). Technically, the Governor issued a
moratorium on all executions, not just Haugen's.
89 Helen Jung, John Kitzhaber Moratorium on Death Penalty Leaves Inmate Gary Haugen and Oregon
lawmakers Wondering What's Next, OREGONIAN (Nov. 24, 2011) http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
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imprisoned in death row conditions. Not long after, Haugen found a new lawyer to
challenge the validity of the reprieve.91
At this point, it is worth noting that Haugen's complaint is not devoid of support.
If Governor Kitzhaber were to change his mind and lift the reprieve, or if his successor
were to lift the reprieve, then Haugen would again face the possibility of execution. While
it may seem counterintuitive to see any harm in delaying a death row inmate's
execution-as the alternative would be to speed up the execution process-the European
Court of Human Rights, among other courts and jurists, has recognized that prolonged
stays on death row while awaiting execution can give rise to something known as "death
row phenomenon."92 According to the European Court of Human Rights, an inmate who
has "to endure for many years the conditions on death row and the anguish and mounting
tension of living in the ever-present shadow of death" would be subjected to torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment.9 3
Haugen's new lawyer successfully argued that, under Oregon law, a valid
reprieve-as distinguished from an outright commutation or pardon-required acceptance
by the inmate; because Haugen refused to accept the reprieve, it could not block the
execution.9 4 At this point, the Governor could have abandoned the fight and let Haugen
proceed to be executed, or could have exercised his plenary power to commute Haugen's
punishment to a life sentence without the possibility of parole.9 5 Instead, Governor
Kitzhaber doubled down and appealed the trial court's ruling.96 In other words, Oregon
taxpayers have had and continue to have the privilege of paying for Gary Haugen's lawyer
to argue that he should be executed, and for the state's lawyers to argue that he should not
be executed-completely backwards from the normal spectacle.
Of course, taxpayers are used to funding both sides of litigation in criminal cases
involving indigent defendants but, generally, the lawyer representing the state (i.e., the
prosecutor) is seeking to impose punishment, and the lawyer for the defendant is seeking
to avoid punishment. The taxpayers' obligation to pay for the defense lawyer is a
necessary consequence of the Sixth Amendment.9 7 In a situation like Haugen's, however,
the taxpayers are paying for the defense lawyer to argue in favor of letting the state do
what the state prison officials are ready to do, while also paying for the state lawyers to
interfere with the state itself.
91 See Haugen II, 266 P.3d 68, 79 (Or. 2011).
92 Soeringv. United Kingdom, Ser. A, No. 161, 11 EUR. HUM. RTS. RPTR. 439, 476 (1989).
93 Id.; see also Barbara Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 35, 38 (1986) (citing sources of distress); Singhv. Punjab, (1980)2 S.C.R. 582, 582-83 (India)
(recognizing death row phenomenon as basis for commuting death sentence to life imprisonment); Vatheeswaran
v. TamilNadu, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 348, 360 (India) (also recognizing death row phenomenon as basis for
commuting death sentence to life imprisonment).
94 See, e.g., Letter from Harrison Latto, attorney for Gary Haugen, to the Hon. John Kitzhaber, Governor of Or.,
regarding Gary D. Haugen (Mar. 12, 2012) (on file with author); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160-62
(1833); Helen Jung, Gary Haugen Reprieve Challenge: Judge Appears Receptive to Death Row Inmate's
Argument, OREGONIAN (July 24, 2012, 7:52 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
new s/index.ssf/2012/07/garyhaugen reprieve challenge.html.
95 See Arthur B. LaFrance, Op-Ed., Capital Punishment in Oregon Kitzhaber Should Commute All Death
Sentences, OREGONIAN, Nov. 27, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 24583894.
96 Helen Jung, Gov. Kitzhaber Appeals Decision in Gary Haugen Execution Case, OREGONIAN (Sept. 11, 2012,
3:05 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2012/09/gov
kitzhaber appeals_decision.html.
9 See OR. REv. STAT. §135.055 (1979); Gideonv. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
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III. PRISON KILLERS: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH THEM?
Haugen's case presents an unusual but not unique situation that is largely
overlooked by the conventional death penalty debate-what should be done with a prison
inmate serving a life sentence who murders another inmate (or a prison guard)? Prison
homicides by inmates are relatively rare, as one would expect given that violent criminals
are typically housed in maximum-security facilities and under the watch of prison
guards.98 Yet, they are not unheard of. Polin was the fifth prisoner killed by another
prisoner in the Oregon State Penitentiary between 1986 and 2004.99 Nationwide, prisoner
deaths due to homicide have remained relatively stable at low but non-trivial levels,
around 1-2 percent of all prisoner deaths.100 In absolute numbers, from 2001 to 2007, over
500 prisoners were murdered in state or local prisons orjails-about 70 per year.101
The government obviously owes a duty to protect imprisoned inmates from
known harms;102 according to the Supreme Court, it is "cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions,"103 including where those unsafe conditions
arise from violence inflicted by other inmates.104 In fact, in Helling v. McKinney, the Court
even concluded that a non-smoking inmate could proceed to a trial on his lawsuit alleging
that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to share a jail
cell with a smoker; o0 to prevail ultimately, he would need to prove that he was being
exposed to levels of secondhand smoke that "pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage
to his future health," as well as "deliberate indifference" to that risk by prison officials.106
It is important to keep in mind that the danger the inmate was exposed to in
McKinney was not a present harm but a future one.107 The secondhand smoke might or
might not have caused cancer or other health problems down the road, but it was not the
same as, say, exposed electrical wiring,1os where any injury would be immediate. A prison
98See MARGARET E. NOONAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239911, MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE
PRISONS, 2000-2010- STATISTICAL TABLES (Dec. 2012).
99 See Joseph Rose, Inmates Charged With Murder in Convict's Beating Death, OREGONIAN, June 16, 2004, at
D10.
'0o See NOONAN, supra note 99.
101 Id.
102 Whatever else we may think about convicted felons, we have not yet descended to the point of dumping them
into prison, slamming the door shut, and leaving them in something like the anarchistic and despotic fiefdoms
depicted in movies like ESCAPE FROM NEW YORK (AVCO Embassy Pictures 1981) and NO ESCAPE (Columbia
Pictures 1994).
'0' Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982).
104 See, e.g., LaMarcav. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993); Youngv. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 361-62
(3d Cir. 1992); Cortes-Quinonesv. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988); Rolandv. Johnson,
856 F.2d 764, 769 (6th Cir. 1988); Gokav. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649-50 (7th Cir. 1988); Pressly v. Hutto, 816
F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987); Morganv. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1987)LVillante v.
Dep't of Corr., 786 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1986); Albertiv. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1224 (5th Cir.
1986); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); Martinv. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1984);
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980).
'0' Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993); cf Kathleen Knepper, Responsibility of Correctional Officials
in Responding to the Incidence ofthe HIV Virus in Jails and Prisons, 21 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 45, 94 (1995) (arguing that prison officials might have "a duty to segregate inmates who are
highly contagious for one or more of the opportunistic infections which are associated with [HIV]").
'0' McKinney, 509 U.S. at 35; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In the end, McKinney's
case became moot when the Nevada prison instituted a smoking ban. See Bob Twigg, Smoke-Free Trend Enters
Prison, Jails, USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1996, at 04A.
1'0 McKinney, 509 U.S. at 33 ("That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates is not a novel
proposition").
'o' See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1974).
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inmate who demonstrates the capability and willingness to murder another inmate might
not pose an immediate danger to any other inmate, but may well pose some future danger
to all other inmates.
At the time that he killed Polin, Haugen was potentially eligible for parole.109 The
possibility of additional prison time (that is, a life sentence with no possibility of parole)
or even the death sentence obviously did not deter him from committing his second
murder.110 Haugen's own statements to other inmates confirm as much, because he said a
few days prior to the murder, "he was getting ready to do something kind of - kind of
foolish and that he was probably getting more time and that we wouldn't be seeing
him."111 In other words, Haugen was aware that there could be severe consequences for
killing Polin, yet he went ahead and did so anyway.112
More importantly, there is no reason to be confident that he would not kill
another inmate in the future for similar reasons. Punishing Haugen for murdering David
Polin isn't only about deterrence or retribution. Incapacitation is one of the purposes of
punishment.113 Incarceration of a convicted felon sufficiently incapacitates him from
further harming society (assuming that escape from prison is not feasible), so any
additional incapacitation from executing the inmate would be marginal-so long as we are
talking about society. From the standpoint of other inmates, there is a world of difference
between imprisonment and execution when it comes to incapacitating a fellow inmate.
The Oregon State Penitentiary has thus far protected the rest of us from Gary Haugen, but
it failed to protect David Polin.
Executing a prison inmate murderer like Haugen would thus protect other
inmates, as it would remove the source of the threat. Sentencing a convicted prison inmate
murderer but refraining from actually carrying out the execution falls short of providing
absolute protection to other inmates. It does, however, provide a greater measure of
protection than leaving the murdering inmate in the general prison population. Generally,
conditions of confinement on death row are fairly restrictive. One typical death row
regime consisted of (1) a cell measuring approximately 9 feet by 7 feet; (2) just 6 to 7 1/2
hours of recreation per week; (3) limited visits to the law library or infirmary; (4) one hour
per day out of the cell in a common area; and (5) handcuffing and shackling when
prisoners move around the prison. Even so, such restrictive conditions do not reduce the
risk of intra-inmate killings to zero.116 The federal Florence Supermax facility, for
example, has seen two inmates murdered.1 1 7 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has admitted that
'09 State v. Haugen, 243 P.3d 31, 47 n.15 (Or. 2010).
10 Id. at 35 n.4.
1 Id.
112 Id. at 34.
113 See, e.g., 1 WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, 38 (2d ed. 2003)
(explaining theories of punishment, specifically incapacitation).
114 See generally Dave Mann, Solitary Men, TEXAS OBSERVER, Nov. 10, 2010, at 6.
... Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 459 (1989) (describing conditions in
a Virginia penitentiary); see also Tracy Hresko, In the Cellars ofthe Hollow Men: Use ofSolitary Confinement
in U.S. Prisons and Its Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 8-10
(2006) (describing conditions of solitary confinement).






University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol3/iss1/8
THE DEATH PENALTY SPECTACLE
"[w]e know from cases in this court involving murders by prisoners in the control units of
federal prisons . . . that such units cannot be made totally secure."1
Restrictive confinement conditions might therefore be seen as a viable though
imperfect alternative to the death penalty if the primary concern is protecting other
inmates. Yet, things are not so simple.
For one example of a high-profile convicted defendant sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment under extremely restrictive conditions and criticism thereof, one can look at
the case of Ramzi Yousef.119 Convicted in 1996 for leading the "Bojinka plot," an
audacious but unsuccessful attempt to bomb eleven Transpacific flights simultaneously,
and in 1997 for leading the truck bomb attack against the World Trade Center in 1993,
Yousef was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first crime and 240 years imprisonment
for the second.120 Although the decisions regarding where to imprison a defendant, and
under what conditions, are typically made by the Bureau of Prisons, district judges are free
to make recommendations and, in Yousef's case, Judge Duffy said in open court:
I recommend that your visitors' list be restricted to your attorneys. The
prison should not permit friends, gawkers or media reporters to visit
with you. While normally a prisoner in administrative detention might
have some visitors from his family, in your case I would expect the
prison to require proof positive that one is in fact a member of your
family. We don't even know what your real name is. You have used a
dozen aliases. Having abandoned your family name, I must assume that
you have abandoned your family also.
The restrictions I am imposing are undoubtedly harsh. They amount to
solitary confinement for life. . . . Your treatment will be no different
than that accorded to a person with a virus which, if loosed, could cause
plague and pestilence throughout the world.1 2 1
The Bureau of Prisons incarcerated Yousef at the federal Florence Supermax
facility in Colorado under conditions similar to those endured by death row inmates: 23
hours a day in a small cell, with soundproofing to prevent inmates from communicating
with one another; one hour of exercise with "feet shackled together and his every move
watched by at least two prison guards"; and "until December 1998[,] . . . no human
contact other than that of the omnipresent guards."122 To be sure, the special
administrative measures were imposed on Yousef not merely because of the concern that
he might attack others, but also due to the belief that he might be able to incite other
" United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2000).
119 See generally Yousef 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (extensively detailing convictions relating to 1993 World
Trade Center bombing and an unsuccessful plot to bomb multiple airlines simultaneously); see, e.g., SIMON
REEVE, THE NEW JACKALS: RAMZI YOUSEF, OSAMA BIN LADEN, AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM 23 9-43
(1999).
120 See, e.g., REEVE, supra note 120, at 23 8-43.
121 Id. at 243.
122 Id. at 253. Interestingly, until 2009, Yousef had reportedly never left his cell, because he refused to submit to
the strip search that would precede his daily hour of recreation. 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean Version ofHell
(CBS television broadcast Oct. 14, 2007, updated June 19, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-
18560_162-3357727.html (quoting former Supermax warden Robert Hood). Hood's account is contradicted by
investigative journalist Simon Reeve, who reported that Yousef, after getting his confinement conditions relaxed,
struck up a friendship of sorts with Ted Kaczinski (the Unabomber). REEVE, supra note 120, at 253-54.
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prisoners if he were allowed to talk to them, or to pass messages to terrorists through
visitors.123
Yousef's confinement conditions drew criticism from a variety of sources. Stuart
Grassian, a Harvard Medical School psychiatrist, argued that solitary confinement is "a
124kind of mental torture. . . . The sensory deprivation causes enormous psychological
suffering and mental illness."125 Harvard law professor Philip Heymann, a former Deputy
U.S. Attorney General, opined that long-term solitary confinement raised "substantial
issue[s] of cruel and unusual punishment."126 Amnesty International began to investigate
Yousef's situation, which was possibly the catalyst that led the Bureau of Prisons to relax
the confinement conditions slightly.127 Even today, an attorney representing Yousef is
trying to get a court to further relax the confinement conditions.128
No court has gone so far as to hold that solitary confinement is necessarily cruel
and unusual punishment, but the issue has not been presented squarely concerning
permanent solitary confinement.129 In Wolff v. McDonnell,130 Justice Douglas disagreed
with the majority's holding regarding the amount of process due to a prisoner before being
placed in solitary confinement; whereas the majority held that the prisoner need not be
afforded an opportunity to confront accusers or to engage in cross-examination,131
Douglas believed that the consequences of solitary confinement were so significant that
,,132the prisoner was entitled to those rights "absent any special overriding considerations.
Interestingly, despite acknowledging that solitary confinement can last "months or even
years," Douglas did not indicate any substantive opposition to solitary confinement.133
In Hutto v. Finney,1 3 4 prisoners had won injunctive relief that limited their
solitary confinement to 30 days.135 Prison officials argued that the district court had
123 REEVE, supra note 120, at 252-54; see also United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 354-56 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (demonstrating the possibility of communicating through visitors). Sattar demonstrated that this concern
was not mere fantasy. In Sattar, the defense lawyer for Omar Abdul-Rahman (aka the Blind Sheikh), the spiritual
inspiration for the 1993 WTC attack, brought her translator to see her client during post-conviction meetings, but
instead of translating her conversation with Abdul-Rahman, the translator spoke directly, bringing messages
from the outside, and ultimately delivering a message from Abdul-Rahman to his overseas followers. The
lawyer, Lynne Stewart, and the translator were both convicted of providing material support to a designated
foreign terrorist organization by providing personnel in the form of Abdul-Rahman. Id.
124 REEVE, supra note 120, at 253.
125 Id. at 253-54. A former inmate at the Florence Supermax facility said that solitary confinement there "breaks
down the human spirit. It breaks down the human psyche. It breaks your mind." 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean
Version ofHell, supra note 123. No commentator objects to solitary confinement, however. Cf David McCord,
ImaginingA RetributivistAlternative to Capital Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 121-31 (1998) (arguing for
imprisoning aggravated murderers in permanent solitary confinement, with full sensory deprivation on the
birthday of the victims).
126 REEVE, supra note 120, at 254.
127 Id. at 253-54 (noting that prison officials apparently permitted Yousef to interact with fellow inmates
Kaczynski and Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh).
128 See Larry Neumister, Lawyer Seeks to Ease Conditions for '93 WTC Bomber, ASSOC. PRESS (Aug. 22, 2012
4:26 PM), http://origin.bigstory.ap.org/article/lawyer-seeks-ease-conditions-93-wtc-bomber.
129 Angela A. Allen-Bell, Perception Profiling & Prolonged Solitary Confinement Viewed Through the Lens of
the Angola 3 Case: When Prison Officials Become Judges, Judges Become Visually Challenged, and Justice
Becomes Legally Blind, 39 Hastings Const. L.Q. 763, 770-72 (2012).
'3 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Id. at 567.
132 Id. at 595-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 593-94.
134 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
13 Id. at 678.
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erroneously ruled that indefinite solitary confinement was necessarily cruel and unusual
punishment, but the Court held that the prison official's argument was based on a
misreading of the lower court's decision:
Read in its entirety, the District Court's opinion makes it abundantly
clear that the length of isolation sentences was not considered in a
vacuum. In the court's words, punitive isolation "is not necessarily
unconstitutional, but it may be, depending on the duration of the
confinement and the conditions thereof."
It is equally plain, however, that the length of confinement cannot be
ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional
standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of "grue" might be
tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.136
Note the Court's recognition that the duration of solitary confinement is an
important factor to consider in assessing its validity. Similarly, in United States v.
Johnson, Judge Posner opined that:
A prison's control unit is not intended as a punishment for the crime that
got the prisoner into prison in the first place, like a sentence of
imprisonment at hard labor. Its purpose rather is to deter and prevent
violations of prison disciplinary rules and to protect prisoners, guards,
and in some cases people outside the prison, or the society at large,
against dangerous conduct by the prisoner. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.40(a)
("in an effort to maintain a safe and orderly environment within its
institutions, the Bureau of Prisons operates control unit programs
intended to place into a separate unit those inmates who are unable to
function in a less restrictive environment without being a threat to others
or to the orderly operation of the institution"). 13 7
The court examined applicable prison regulations requiring a warden to conduct a
risk assessment before imposing any special administrative measures, including solitary
confinement, on a disruptive or dangerous inmate, and to review the risk assessment no
more than 120 days later.138 Based on these regulations, the court concluded that '[t]he
limitations in these regulations imply that the Bureau of Prisons could not assign a
prisoner directly upon his admission to the federal prison system to spend the rest of his
life in the control unit without the possibility of reconsideration."1 3 9
Because Johnson's holding was based on the court's interpretation of the relevant
statutes and regulations,140 it does not directly address whether the government could, in
fact, impose indefinite (i.e., life-long) solitary confinement as a punishment for lifers
convicted of committing another murder while imprisoned.
136 Id. at 685-87.
United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 672 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(c) (1997)).
139 Id ("The regulation requiring the bureau to review an inmate's control unit status 'at least once every 60 to 90
days . . . to determine the inmate's readiness for release from the [Control] Unit,' 28 C.F.R. § 541.49(d), points
in the same direction.").
140 Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 501.3(a), 501.3(c), 541.49(d) (1995)).
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As noted earlier, legal and medical experts raised concerns about convicted
terrorist Ramzi Yousef's extremely harsh conditions of confinement.1 4 1 Though these
conditions were nearly unique, empirical studies of prisoners in general solitary
confinement have identified severe psychological and physiological harms that can afflict
the confined prisoners with greater frequency than seen in the general prison
population.142 Symptoms include "anger, hatred, bitterness, boredom, stress, loss of the
sense of reality, suicidal thoughts, trouble sleeping, impaired concentration, confusion,
depression, and hallucinations."143 Other studies have found that six months of solitary
confinement can cause brain impairment on par with someone who has "incurred [
traumatic injury."
Not surprisingly, these negative effects have led many to argue that long-term
solitary confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, or even torture. * One
commentator notes that there is a trend in European countries toward reduced use of
solitary confinement, with greater safeguards such as daily physical and mental
evaluations by physicians.146 European prison rules do not impose hard and fast limits on
the duration of solitary confinement, but they do allow it "only in exceptional cases and
for a specified period of time, which shall be as short as possible."
Other commentators recommend limiting the maximum duration of solitary
confinement to no more than two years (absent extraordinary circumstances) or less,
and importantly, offering the prisoner an opportunity to demonstrate an ability to behave
in controlled settings and thus earn his way out of solitary confinement.149 Atul Gawande,
a medical school doctor, further argues that solitary confinement does not lead to
predictable reduction in prison violence because much prison violence stems from
overcrowding and conditions that "maximize[] humiliation and confrontation";15 0 he
points to England's experience in greatly reducing the number of prisoners in isolation by
improving their conditions of confinement. 151
141 See REEVE, supra note 120, at 251-54 (citing Sharon Walsh, 'Proud' Terrorist Gets 240 Years in N.Y.
Bombing, WASH. POST, Jan. 9,1998, at A01).
142 Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects ofSolitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review of
the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 476 (2006).
143 Id. at 488; see also Bryan B. Walton, The Eighth AmendmentAnd Psychological Implications ofSolitary
Confinement, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 277-81 (1997) (more summary of psychological effects); Craig
Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons ofthe Future: A Psychological Analysis ofSupermax and Solitary
Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 477, 515-25 (1997).
144 See Atul Gawande, Hellhole: The United States Holds Tens ofThousands ofInmates in Long-Term Solitary
Confinement. Is This Torture?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 30, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/30/090330fa ct gawande#ixzz2AC9MaBCq.
145 See Haney & Lynch, supra note 145, at 542-54; Tracy Hresko, In the Cellars ofthe Hollow Men: Use of
Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons and Its Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 1, 21-24 (2006).
146 Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and International Human Rights: Why the U.S. Prison System
Fails Global Standards, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 93-95 (2005); Eur. Consult. Ass., Recommendation
Rec(2006)2 ofthe Comm. ofMinisters to States on the European Prison Rules, R. 43.2,
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDocjsp?id=955747.




148 Haney & Lynch supra note 145, at 561; see also Hresko, supra note 147, at 25.
149 Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 132 (2008).
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The problem is that none of these suggestions that call for limiting or minimizing
the use of solitary confinement actually address how to deal with an inmate like Gary
Haugen. Over twenty years passed between when Haugen killed his first victim and when
he killed David Polin.152 Given an opportunity to show that he can "behave," he might be
well able to do so simply to get out of solitary confinement. Once released back into the
general population, who can say what he might do to the next inmate he were to suspect of
being an informant?15 3
To be sure, the situation might be more complicated than it appears. Those
twenty years of prison leading up to the day of Polin's killing may have hardened Haugen
to the point that he became capable of doing something he otherwise wouldn't have
done. 1 5 4 It may be that using smuggled drugs was the only way Haugen felt he could cope
with enduring his life sentence, and that he believed it was necessary to stop Polin from
informing on him. If so, the prison system could be seen as partially responsible for
causing him to act the way he did. Still, even if one were to imagine a counterfactual in
which the Oregon State Penitentiary implemented the improved prison conditions with
which Britain found success, there would be no certainty that Haugen would not have
killed Polin. The number of British prisoners in isolation is not zero. 15 5 Given that Haugen
premeditated Polin's murder with the purpose of silencing a person that he believed was
an informant, not someone who he felt unable to avoid a confrontation with, it seems
questionable whether anything would have kept Haugen from killing Polin.156 This
argument is not to suggest that it would be a bad idea to experiment with improving
conditions of confinement to determine whether less restrictive conditions reduce prison
violence; it is only to say that we may at best reduce-but not eliminate-prison murders.
Ultimately, prison killers such as Gary Haugen highlight a three-way conflict
among the goals of (1) eliminating the death penalty; (2) avoiding secure but restrictive
prison conditions that demonstrably harm prisoners mentally as well as physically; and (3)
protecting inmates from violence inflicted by other prisoners. Much as the push to reduce
false positives will invariably result in an increase in false negatives, here too success in
one or two goals will negatively impact the remaining goal. If the choice is between
inflicting some unavoidable harm on an inmate murderer, or imposing substantial risk of
harm on other inmates at the hands of that inmate murderer, it may be normatively just to
choose the former: the harm is simply a by-product of the goal of protecting other
inmates.15 1
If this reasoning is seen as unacceptable, it may be tempting to conclude that
what we need is "outside the box" thinking. While it would be foolish to assert that no
152 Haugen, 243 P.3d 31, 34-35 (Or. 2010).
153 Some "restorativists" may conclude that no one is beyond rehabilitation and redemption with appropriate
treatment. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 1, at 99 (discussing how some extreme restorativists believe that crime
victims can be "healed by a cathartic conference, apology, and restitution," and by implication, that the criminals
will present no more threat). In Haugen's case, of course, his victim could not be part of such a conference, since
he's dead. More to the point, I suspect that the other inmates - and their relatives - would probably find little
reassurance in any claimed rehabilitation of an inmate murderer.
154 Cf JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN
AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (contrasting the harsh conditions of American prisons with the more lenient
conditions in continental European prisons).
. Gawande, supra note 146.
116 Haugen, 243 P.3d at 35.
15. This is, of course, a variation of the typical deterrence-based ebate about the death penalty: can capital
punishment be justified if it is shown to save lives of future murder victims by deterring their would-be killers?
One challenge is that the harm inflicted on the inmate is immediate and tangible (death), whereas the "saved"
victims are speculative and unknown/unknowable.
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solution is possible, a brief review of some fictional high-tech proposals depicted in
movies suggests that technology is unlikely to be a neat savior.
Implanted pain/control devices: In the science-fiction thriller Fortress,
prisoners in a maximum-security prison facility are forced to swallow an "intestinator,"
which is a device that causes instantly disabling stomach pain upon command of the ever-
watchful computer system.1 5 9 The nearest analogue in today's world would be "stun
belts," which are devices that can deliver approximately 50,000 volts in an eight-second
jolt to paralyze the wearer temporarily.160 Courts have generally upheld the use of stun
belts as an alternative to physical restraints of potentially dangerous prisoners during court
proceedings.161 Challenges to use of the belts, however, have focused on the prejudicial
impact at trial of being forced to wear the belt, and not the pain inflicted.162 As with
solitary confinement, a shorter duration of being forced to wear a stun belt-such as
during court proceedings-may be tolerable, whereas a permanent requirement to do so
may be inhumane. In any event, it is far from clear that the stun belt is an improvement,
especially given that accidental triggerings, while rare, are not unheard of.163 Even a low
rate of accidental triggerings would result in a substantial number of unintended shocks
over a 20-year period.164
165
Long-term freeze: In the world of Demolition Man, prisoners are sentenced to
the CryoPrison, where they are "frozen" (i.e., placed in suspended animation) to be
thawed out at the end of their prison term.166 Presumably, the advantage of this approach
is that the prisoner is incapacitated for the duration of the sentence, unable to harm anyone
else, but without suffering from the harmful effects of solitary confinement.
Cryonics is currently far from being a viable and reliable procedure,167 but
perhaps it can be developed into one. Speculation about its effects raises concerns that it
both fails to exact adequate punishment, and yet may also be cruel and unusual in its own
way. 16 If indeed the prisoner is frozen for 30 years and then is thawed, and feels no
passage of time, then it is somewhat hard to see the retributive value of punishment. On
the other hand, the world will have changed in 30 years, and family and friends will have
aged or even died, perhaps leaving the prisoner feeling isolate and alone.169 It's also worth
noting that, in the movie at least, Sylvester Stallone's character (who had been frozen as
part of a prison sentence) reported that he in fact did experience the passage of time,
See, e.g., FORTRESS (Dimension Films 1993).
159 See id.
160 See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1238 (N.D. Fla. 2002).
161 See, e.g., Gonzalezv . Pliler, 341 F.3d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 2003).
162 Cf Comment, The REACT Security Belt: Stunning Prisoners and Human Rights Groups into Questioning
Whether Its Use Is Permissible Under the United States and Texas Constitutions, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 239, 242-
243, 246-247 (1998) ("[A]ctivation of the belt causes immediate immobilization and may result in defecation
and urination.. . . [T]he belt's metal prongs may leave welts on the victim's skin ... [requiring] as long as six
months to heal").
163 Durham, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
164 Id. at 1239.
16' DEMOLITION MAN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1993); see also MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation 2002).
166 DEMOLITION MAN, supra note 167.
167 See Ryan Sullivan, Pre-Mortem Cryopreservation: Recognizing a Patient's Right to Die in Order to Live, 14
QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 49, 60-70 (2010) (recapping the current state of cryonics).
161 See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive Coma, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 829, 861-63, 886 (2002).
169 See ALIENS (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1986) (considering the isolation that Ellen Ripley, who
was not a prisoner, felt upon discovering that she spent 57 years in cryogenic sleep).
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making the entire experience sound like solitary confinement combined with sensory
deprivation.1 7 0 This, too, seems an unpromising alternative to conventional solitary
confinement.
Concentration of the dangerous prisoners in one location: In the movies Escape
From New York and No Escape,1 7 1 society has essentially given up on managing prisons
for extremely dangerous prisoners.172 The prisoners are instead dumped onto savage
islands with no guards and no rules other than any prisoners attempting to escape will be
fired upon.173 Within the island, however, it is survival of the fittest.1 7 4
Although the federal prison on Alcatraz Island in the San Francisco Bay held
dangerous inmates, much as the current federal Supermax facility in Florence,
Colorado, does, our society has not abandoned the idea of managing the prisoners and
attempting at least to prevent them from being able to run their own fiefdoms based upon
the rule of the strongest. The obvious flaw in this approach is that we would be forsaking
our duty to protect inmates from foreseeable harm. About the only thing that could be said
to justify such an approach would be to depersonalize the inmates on the theory that
anyone put into such a situation would necessarily be someone like Haugen. This too does
not seem like a good idea.
Metal boots with magnetizable floor: In Face/Off 176 society has built a high-tech
prison called Erehwon (read it backwards) where inmates are forced to wear metal boots
at all times. This way, if there is a riot or other physical disturbance, prison officials can
activate powerful magnets in the floor, thus immobilizing all prisoners. The movie
itself, however, demonstrates that these boots are likely insufficient to prevent an inmate
from killing another inmate, either before they can be activated, or if the victim is still
within grabbing/punching distance.1 79
Behavioral modification: In A Clockwork Orange,1s a violent young man is
arrested after a vicious crime spree that includes beating a man and raping his wife, and
beating another woman to death. After receiving a lengthy prison sentence, he agrees to
volunteer for an experiment in rehabilitating criminals by modifying their behavior.18 2 The
procedure consists of forcing him to watch violent movies while being fed drugs that
induce severe nausea.183 Subsequently, violent impulses trigger feelings of nausea.
17o See DEMOLITION MAN, supra note 167.
171 ESCAPE FROM NEW YORK (AVCO Embassy Pictures 1981); NO ESCAPE (Columbia Pictures 1994).
172 id
173 Id.
174 One could also look to the third season of the television serialized drama Prison Break, in which the main
character found himself in a fictional Panamanian prison run by the inmates, with the guards outside the facility
entirely and charged with keeping anyone from escaping. Prison Break (Fox 2005).
17' Haney, supra note 145, at 488.
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Assuming that such behavioral modification could work, it would raise a host of
issues not dissimilar to those involved in chemical castration: use of "mind-altering
drug[s] purely for purposes of incapacitation (as opposed to medical treatment)."" If
solitary confinement raises concerns because of its effect on the mental health of
prisoners, it is difficult to see how the use of mind-altering drugs to change behavior
would be an improvement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Gary Haugen saga is without doubt unusual, but it does highlight the fiscal
insanity of the current death penalty situation-especially in a state like Oregon, which
does not execute death row inmates unless they volunteer for it (and for now, under the
present Governor, not even then). One can easily imagine more societally productive uses
of the money that Oregon has poured into this case since Haugen was convicted of killing
David Polin, and yet, without the death penalty, one must wonder, who would be the next
David Polin?
Limiting capital punishment to convicted murderers of prison inmates or guards
would not answer all criticisms of the death penalty, but it would dramatically narrow the
number of people on death row. As a result, some death penalty critics seem willing to
accept the death penalty in such circumstances.18 For those who insist on complete
abolition, however, if the abolitionist drive to eradicate the death penalty is an irresistible
force, then the ongoing move to limit (if not ban) solitary confinement is an irresistible
force with an opposing vector, leaving the safety of other inmates as the immovable
object. Something has to give.
185 See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and
the Denial ofHuman Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 597 (2006) (arguing that state laws permitting chemical
castration of convicted sex offenders violate the Eighth Amendment).
116 See, e.g., Alarcon et al., supra note 40, at S182-S183 (noting the narrowness of the federal death penalty in
practice, with 11 of 58 on federal death row for murdering other inmates, guards, or during escape); CAL.
COMM'N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 13 8-39 (Gerald Uelmen ed., 2008), available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf (recommending the retention of the death penalty for a
narrow set of cases, including murdering another prisoner). Admittedly, restriction of the death penalty to such a
purely incapacitation-based pool of murderers is unlikely to garner public support, as it would mean that killers
of convicted prisoners are punished more harshly than killers of police officers, children, or even the United
States President. Cf Stephen L. Caner, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 444 (1988) (noting
the result of the Baldus study that "[w]hen flexible juries use their discretion to impose the ultimate penalty, the
lives of victims who happen to be black are simply worth less").
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"THEY'RE PLANTING STORIES IN THE PRESS": THE IMPACT OF
MEDIA DISTORTIONS ON SEX OFFENDER LAW AND POLICY
Heather Ellis Cucolo* and Michael L. Perlint
Introduction
Individuals classified as sexual predators are the pariahs of the community. Sex
offenders are arguably the most despised members of our society and therefore warrant
our harshest condemnation. Twenty individual states and the federal government have
enacted laws confining individuals who have been adjudicated as "sexually violent
predators" to civil commitment facilities post incarceration and/or conviction.2
Additionally, in many jurisdictions, offenders who are returned to the community are
restricted and monitored under community notification, registration and residency
limitations.3 Targeting, punishing, and ostracizing these individuals has become an
obsession in society, clearly evidenced in the constant push to enact even more restrictive
legislation that breaches the boundaries of constitutional protections.
Adjunct Professor at New York Law School
Professor and Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform Project, and Online Mental Disability Law
Program at New York Law School.
See generally Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment ofRegistered Sex Offenders from the State of
Georgia: A Practitioner's Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 513, 514 (2007); see also, Bruce J. Winick,
Sex Offender Law in the 1990's: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 505, 506
(1998) (discussing that individuals who commit sex offenses against children are probably the most hated group
in our society).
2 See generally Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex
Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 1071 (2012).
Id. at 1078.
Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty
Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 788, 853-54 (1996); David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of Fear:
The Case for More Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L. J. 600, 628 (2006); See Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the
Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 369, 370-71 (2009) (contending that the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
provisions must be amended to meet constitutional muster).
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The advancement of technology and mass media communication have spawned a
constant influx of information about sexual predators. News headlines and Internet
webpages are dedicated to reporting on and highlighting sexual crimes and their infamous
perpetrators. There is little disputing that the newest surge6 in legal attention and efforts
to contain sexual predators stems from the mass dissemination of sexual offender media
stories available to the general public.7 Thus, we cannot discuss our national obsession
with sexual offenses and offenders without considering how the role of the media has
framed our conceptualizations of offenders and influenced resulting legal decisions and
legislation."
The public perception of what constitutes a "sex offender" is undoubtedly linked
to the media's portrayal of these types of heinous crimes.9 The media's attention to high
profile, violent sexual offenses has been shown to elicit a panic and fear of rampant sexual
violence within our communities.10 This, in turn, places extreme public pressure on
legislators to enact more repressive legislation and on judges to interpret such laws in
ways that ensure lengthier periods of incarceration for offenders. The media's portrayal
of a "largely ineffective" criminal justice system heightens fear;12 fictionalized portrayals
of crime on television dramas may lead viewers to believe that "all offenders are
How We Began and the Need for Transition, Jacob Wetterling Resource Ctr.,
http://www.jwrc.org/WhoWeAre/History/tabid/1 28/Default.aspx; About John Walsh, America's Most
Wanted, http://www.amw.com/aboutamw/john walsh.cfm.
6 Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 2, at 1078 ("The ensuing years [post the enactment of the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act] have been marked by a dizzying array of increased registration and community
notification requirements, the emergence of harshening residency restrictions, and the elimination of
individuated risk assessment."); see infra text accompanying notes 164-193, 376-411.
Kristen M. Zgoba, Spin Doctors and Moral Crusaders: The Moral Panic Behind Child Safety Legislation, 17
CRIM. JUST. STUD.385, 385 (2004) ("The media frenzy surrounding these publicized cases has created a 'fear
factor' among parents and caregivers, begging the question as to whether the incidence of child abduction and
molestation has increased or whether the nation's heightened sensitivity is a result of increased media
reporting").
' On the way that the media frames crime stories in general, see SHANTO IYENGAR, Is ANYONE RESPONSIBLE?
How TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES 26-31 (1991).
9 Clive Emsley, Victorian Crime, HISTORY TODAY, (1998), available at http://www.historytoday.com/clive-
emsley/victorian-crime (arguing that nineteenth-century perceptions owed more to media-generated panic than to
criminal realities).
"o Lori Dorfman & Vincent Schiraldi, OffBalance: Youth, Race & Crime in the News, 4 (2001), available at
http://wwwjusticepolicy.org/research/2060 (explaining that three-quarters of the public form their opinions
about crime based on news reports-more than three times the number of people who form their opinions based on
personal experience); Jill S. Levenson et. al., Public Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection
Policies, 7 ANALYSES Soc. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2 (2007) (citing L. C. Hirning, Indecent Exposure and Other
Sex Offenses, 7 J. CLIN. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY & PSYCHOTHERAPY, 105 (1945) ( "As early as 1945, academic
scholars were commenting on the reactions of the public to sex offenders: '. . . there are periodic so-called sex
crime waves often preceded by one or more serious sex offenses which have received wide notoriety in the
newspapers. Every sex offender is looked upon as a potential murderer. Emotions run high. There are meetings
and conferences; recommendations are made .... Meanwhile, sex offenses continue to occur.'"); see also, Kate
Stone Lombardi, Fears of Kidnapping Spur Effort on Education, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1994 (reporting on an
"educational" video "Street Smart Kids" which shows headlines: "' 10-Year-Old Girl Abducted and Sexually
Molested' and 'll-Year-Old Girl Strangled.' There ensues a scene of an anguished father holding a news
conference and pleading for his son's safe return, which is followed by a headline of the child's fate: 'Boy's
Severed Head Found in Creek"').
" Levenson, supra note 10, at 2 ('Sex offenders and sex crimes incite a great deal of fear among the general
public and as a result, lawmakers have passed a variety of social policies designed to protect community
members from sexual victimization").
12 Kenneth Dowler, Media Consumption and Public Attitudes Toward Crime and Justice: The Relationship
Between Fear of Crime, Punitive Attitudes, And Perceived Police Effectiveness, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR
CULTURE 109, 120 (2003).
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'monsters' to be feared."13 The media, in short, shapes and produces the reality of crime,14
as it influences "factual perceptions of the world."
Our desire to punish, treat and categorize this "abhorrent" population is not a new
phenomenon.16 The notion of a "sex offender" or someone who engages in immoral
sexual acts or desires, has been around for centuries.17 The fear and hatred of individuals
who have committed crimes of sexual violence has existed well before the 2 0 th century
18
and well before our current, infiltrative, grand "mass-media" dissemination of
information.19 Our innate disgust at these types of offenses and our emotionally-charged
responses appear to be quite natural, given societies' morals, ethics and codes of decency;
yet, legislative actions cannot and should not be based solely (or even predominantly) on
20distorted media depictions (of both offenses and perpetrators).
Prior to the most recent spate of legislative enactments, the sexual psychopath
laws had been enacted in order to provide treatment in lieu of punishment on individuals
who commit crimes of a sexual nature.21 But never before our most recent attempts to deal
with the population has there been such a moral panic,22 accompanied by such a massive,
" Id. On how fictional television shows focusing on forensic analysis have become icons "for anxieties within
the legal system about truth finding and legal outcomes" and raise questions about "the future of the rule of law,"
see Christina Spiesel, Trial by Ordeal: CSI and the Rule ofLaw, in LAW, CULTURE AND VISUAL STUDIES (Anne
Wagner & Richard Sherwin eds., 2013) (in press).
14 Keith Hayward, Opening the Lens: Cultural Criminology and the Image, in FRAMING CRIME: CULTURAL
CRIMINOLOGY AND THE IMAGE 1, 3 (Keith J. Hayward & Mike Presdee eds., 2010).
" RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES, REALITIES, AND POLICIES 102 (1992).
16 Catharine R. Stimpson, Foreword to JUDITH R. WALKOWITZ, CITY OF DREADFUL DELIGHT: NARRATIVES OF
SEXUAL DANGER INLATE-VICTORIANLONDON, at xxii (1992) ("Victorian London was a world where long-
standing traditions of class and gender were challenged by a range of public spectacles, mass media scandals,
new commercial spaces, and a proliferation of new sexual categories and identities.").
" STEVEN ANGELIDES, THE EMERGENCE OF THE PAEDOPHILE IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 4 (2005)
(positing that "the 'paedophile' was chiefly an outgrowth of social and political power struggles around questions
of normative masculinity and male sexuality, but also that homophobia played a central role in this process.").
" Helen Gavin, The Social Construction of the Child Sex Offender Explored by Narrative, 10 QUALITATIVE REP.
395, 396 (2005) ("Historical evidence to support the existence of a dominant narrative, perceiving the child sex
offender to be inherently 'evil' and 'inhuman' can be seen in National Society for the Protection of Children
(NSPCC) rhetoric from 1888 which describes child sexual abuse as the 'vilest crime against childhood' and
abusers as 'evil'. In addition, common vocabulary used by Victorian parents in response to abusers included
'dirty beast,' 'dirty old man,' and 'dirty devil."').
'9 See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 887
n.4 (1995) (noting that Alabama, Arizona, California, Illinois, and Nevada were the first states to introduce
sex offender registration laws between 1947 and 1967); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of
Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 781 (2006) (claiming that "constitutional proceduralism" of the 1960s
spawned the severe punitive justice of the 1970s).
20 Dorfman & Schiraldi, supra note 10, at 7 (the media's coverage of crime often creates a misleading picture of
a nation far more dangerous and violent than it is in actuality).
21 Raquel Blacher, Historical Perspective on the "Sex Psychopath" Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the
Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCERL. REV. 889, 907 (1995); see generally, Sarah H. Francis, Sexually
Dangerous Person Statutes: Constitutional Protections ofSociety and the Mentally Ill or Emotionally-Driven
Punishment?, 29 SUFFOLK UL. REV. 125 (1995).
22 BENJAMIN RADFORD, MEDIA MYTHMAKERS: HOW JOURNALISTS, ACTIVISTS, AND ADVERTISERS MISLEAD US
66 (2003) ("The media profit from fear mongering through sensationalized headlines. Nothing gets viewers to
tune in to a news program like fear: fear of war, fear of disease, fear of death, fear of harm coming to loved
ones."); PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER INMODERNAMERICA 6
(1998); Ronald Weitzer & Charis E. Kubrin, Breaking News: How Local TVNews and Real- World Conditions
Affect Fear of Crime, 21 JUST. Q. 497, 503 (2004); see infra text accompanying notes 202-204 for a fuller
discussion of such panics. This is not to say that these panics have no historical antecedents, see Deborah W.
Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1317, 1320 (1998). But the earlier "sex
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country-wide outcry for retribution and deterrence. Clearly, much of the initial push to
contain, confine and monitor offenders, over the last several decades, has, at the least,
been partially motivated by the availability of mass media information and the media's
persistent display and interpretation of shocking and newsworthy sex crimes.2 It cannot
be denied that moral panic is the progenitor of the resulting laws, and therefore the
catalyst that spawned the political motivations that led to an outcry for stricter sex
offender laws and legislation.24
This moral panic has developed primarily due to the media's depiction of a "sex
offender " in the news and newspaper articles.25 The media has focused significantly on
the heinous and highly emotionally-charged crimes of individuals such as Earl Shriner,
whose crime precipitated the first new generation sex offender law, and Jesse
26Timmendequas, whose victim is the namesake of Megan's Law. A writer of a New York
Times op-ed column in 1993 concluded, "There can be no dispute that monsters live
among us. The only question is what to do with them once they become known to us."27
As a result of the incessant media coverage, the general public has conceptualized what it
believes to be the prototype of this "monstrous evil" - a male who violently attacks
stranger young children28 -- and has responded by grabbing their pitchforks and lighting
their torches29 in a unified alliance to exterminate and eradicate the beast.3 0
23Television personalities perpetrated much of the media generated panic over child abductions in the 1990's. A
prime example is found in Geraldo Rivera. The Geraldo Rivera Show: LuredAway: How to Get Your Child
Back; Panelists Discuss Their Horrifying Experiences ofLosing Children Through Abductions and Murders;
Tips Are Offered on Keeping Children Safe (Television broadcast Dec. 4, 1997) ("[T]hey will come for your kid
over the Internet; they will come in a truck; they will come in a pickup in the dark of night; they will come in the
Hollywood Mall in Florida .. . There are sickos out there. You have to keep your children [very] close to you ...
"); see also, Jeff Martin, More Predator Alerts Sent by E-mail: Notifications Delivered When Sex Offender
Moves Nearby, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 2010, at A3 ("A growing number of law enforcement agencies and states
are using e-mail to alert victims and anyone else who wants to know when sex offenders in their area move into
the neighborhood, or change jobs or schools").
24 Dave Goins, Fear Fuels Sex Offender Legislation, THE POWER COUNTY PRESS, Feb. 8, 2006, at 4-5 ("There
was other cases. But that's a big catalyst ... after all, that put the national spotlight on Idaho in a way that we
really don't appreciate."- Senator Denton Darrington discussing the crimes of William Duncan III and the result
of stricter Idaho sex offender legislation); Wendy Koch, States Get Tougher with Sex Offenders, USA
TODAY, May 23, 2006 ("Public fear of sex offenders is spurring a wave of tougher laws this year, both in
Congress and statehouses nationwide.").
25 Jessica M. Pollak & Charis E. Kubrin, Crime in the News: How Crimes, Offenders and Victims Are Portrayed
in the Media, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 59, 60 (2007) ("Reality is socially constructed, in large
part, through the media, which provide a way for dominant values in society to be articulated to the public."); Id.
at 64, ("with regards to emotion, newspapers focus on ideas whereas television emphasizes 'feeling, appearance,
mood ... there is a retreat from distant analysis and a dive into emotional and sensory involvement."').
26 Earl Shriner's crime provoked Washington State to enact the first of the new generation sex offender laws, and
the murder and sexual assault against Megan Kanka by Jesse Timmendequas produced New Jersey's Megan's
Law- that served as the "model community notification law" for other states to follow. Both crimes and their
cultural and legislative effect will be discussed, in depth, in Part I of this article.
27 Andrew Vachss, Sex Predators Can't Be Saved, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 5, 1993.
28 See generally Heather E. Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism through
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Gavin, supra note 18, at 395 ("The dominant narrative construction, in Western
societies, concerning child sex offenders identifies such individuals as purely male, inherently evil, inhuman,
beyond redemption or cure, lower class, and unknown to the victim. . .").
29 Compare, in a different context, Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal
Standard, 118 YALE L.J. 320, 324 (2008) ("Faceless crowds of online tormentors wield virtual pitchforks, carry
virtual torches, and hound innocent targets into hiding and out of the online world entirely.").
30 Gavin, supra note 18, at 397 ("Unidentified sex offenders described in the media frequently have identities
created to fit a particular stereotype, labeling the strangers as 'beasts,' 'fiends' 'brutes,' and 'animals.'
Dehumanization and depersonalization of sex offenders is a common theme in press coverage . . .").
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This paper is not the first inquiry into the media's influence on public perceptions
and moral panic;3 the media's influence on sex offender policy, legislation and public
opinion has been highlighted in depth throughout much of the literature and academic
writings. 32 The other discussions have generally focused on the media's role as a precursor
to the enactment of sex offender legislation,33 the upholding of sex offender laws in the
courts,34 and as a significant influence on the continuation of moral panic.35 But what has
not been looked at significantly, is whether and how the media coverage and presentation
of these issues has been transformed over the past two decades, and what effect, if any,
this has had on public perception. What if the media has begun to shift away from simply
highlighting and describing the feared beast and has begun to focus more on the
problematic results of laws and legislation? Would that, in turn, have an effect on public
perceptions and inevitably on the formation and enactment of laws and judicial decisions?
Slowly and somewhat recently, it appears that the tone of the media's portrayal
of sex offender issues has begun to shift. In addition to highlighting salient and horrific
sexually violent offenses and contributing to community outrage, the mainstream media
has increasingly begun to report on significant concerns surrounding the
conceptualization, treatment and containment of the sex offender population. News
articles - published in popular newspapers and media sites - more readily dedicate
information to expressing expert opinions (that were previously embedded in articles
dedicated solely to describing heinous crimes and community outrage), reporting on
statistics that question the factual basis of our perceptions, questioning the efficacy of the
laws designed to protect the community, and touching on the cost of human rights
violations resulting from our laws.
" See BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF THE WRONG THINGS
(2010); Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence ofLocal Television News on
the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. ScI. 560, 560 (2000); RADFORD, supra note 22, at 66.
32 Numerous articles have highlighted the intersection between public fears and the demand for harsher
punishments. See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other
Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 44-47
(1997) (considering the justifications behind the public's demand for harsher criminal penalties); WAYNE A.
LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA
85-108 (2009) (conceptualizing registration schemes in light of political motivations and societal trends).
" Singleton, supra note 4, at 602-07 (identifying the link between the media's increase in crime reporting and
the move for legislative action). Oprah Winfrey provided the initial impetus for the National Child Protection
Act in 1991, when she testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, urging that a national database of
convicted child abusers be established. On Dec. 20, 1993, President Clinton signed the national "Oprah Bill" into
law. Associated Press, President Clinton Signs the National Child Protection Act, N.Y. TIMES NAT'L, Dec.
21, 1993 ("At the signing of the National Child Protection Act [also known as the "Oprah Bill"], President
Clinton invited Oprah Winfrey, a supporter of the legislation, to speak.").
34 See infra footnotes 155-16 1; Children's Safety As First Priority Dictates Custody for Sexual Predators, SUN
SENTINEL, Dec. 12, 1996, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1996-12-12/news/9612110231_1_mental-abnormality-
leroy-hendricks-sexually-violent-crime (Chief Justice William Rehnquist took society's side at oral argument:
"'What's a state supposed to do - wait until he goes out and does it again'?"); Krista Gesaman, Breaking a Law . .
. That Doesn't Exist Yet: Why the Supreme Court Should Overturn the Retroactive Application of a Sex-offender
Statute, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 2010 (quoting Professor Corey Rayburn Yung: "'The court isn't sympathetic to
criminals, and they're even less sympathetic to sex offenders .. '").
" AARON DOYLE, ARRESTING IMAGES: CRIME AND POLICING IN FRONT OF THE TELEVISION CAMERA 129 (2003)
(noting that television creates a passive role for a wider and more diverse audience that is more prone to accept
information they are given as truth); Vincent F. Sacco, Media Constructions of Crime, 539 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 141, 142 (1995) (official crime statistics indicate that most crime is nonviolent yet the news
media suggests just the opposite often creating the perception of an "'epidemic of random violence'"); Robert
Reiner et al., From Law and Order to Lynch Mobs: Crime News Since the Second World War, in CRIMINAL
VISIONS: MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (Paul Mason ed. 2003) ("About two-thirds of crime
news stories are primarily about violent or sex offenses, but these account for less than 10 percent of crimes
recorded by the police.").
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This article will consider the role of the media in sex offender issues and further
theorize whether the shift in media presentation has affected public perceptions of sex
offenders and whether it has had any impact on recent legislation and the future enactment
of sex offender laws. As part of this inquiry, we will employ the lens of therapeutic
jurisprudence in an effort to assess the broader societal impact of these media depictions.
Part I will offer an overview of the major (media-centered) sex offender laws and
legislation, focusing on the media accounts of the crimes upon which they were based.
Part II will consider the impact of the media's portrayal of offenders as the pariahs of
society in the civil and criminal justice system; Part III will detail the proposed recent shift
in media presentation and consider how, if at all, this shift has made an impact on new
laws, legislation and court opinions. Part IV weighs these developments in the context of
therapeutic jurisprudence, and considers its potential impact on dealing with the aftermath
of the first decades of the media's volatile influence on this area of law and policy. We
conclude by offering several policy recommendations.
The title of this paper comes, in part, from Bob Dylan's epic song, Idiot Wind, a
song that one of us has previously characterized as "an angry, coruscating and brilliant
polemic,"36 and as filled with "searing metaphors and savage language,"3 a song that
creates "a perfect milieu for mental disability law analyses." The song is replete with
"patches of raw, unalloyed rage,"3 9 and can be construed as a "rage against failure;"40 it
"bridges the gap between bitterness and sorrow."41 It is, in Oliver Trager's words, an
"anthem to pain."42
The area of law that we are discussing in this paper is surrounded by anger, by
savage language," by "rage" and by "pain." And so much of those emotions flow -
directly and inexorably - by the way that the press has focused on the crimes that are at
the core of our concerns. The line in question (and the context in which it was written)
encapsulates, nearly perfectly, the dilemma we face.
I. THE "PLANTED PRESS STORIES"
A. Introduction
Since the early 1990s, four major legislative acts and one significant court case
served as the building blocks of sex offender containment, registration and notification.
Public outrage, political pressure, and the emphasis on and distortion of the events
preceding these acts in the media, significantly impacted these monumental legislative and
legal outcomes.
36 Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me ": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian
Spirit, the Fear ofFaking, and the Culture ofPunishment, 82 IOWAL. REV. 1375, 1379 (1997).
" Michael L. Perlin, "What's Good Is Bad, What's Bad Is Good, You'll Find Out When You Reach the Top,
You're on the Bottom ": Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than
"Idiot Wind? ", 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 235, 241 (2001-02).
" Michael L. Perlin, "Everything's a Little Upside Down, as a Matter ofFact the Wheels Have Stopped": The
Fraudulence ofthe Incompetency Evaluation Process, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 239, 243 (2004).
39 TIM RILEY, HARD RAIN: A DYLAN COMMENTARY 241 (updated ed. 1999).
40 
HOWARD SOUNES, DOWN THE HIGHWAY: THE LIFE OF BOB DYLAN 283 (2011).
41 CLINTON HEYLIN, BOB DYLAN: THE RECORDING SESSIONS, 1960-1994, 106 (1995).
42 OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA, 279 (2004).
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B. Washington State's Community Protection Act43
The first "new generation" law, that was designed to prevent offenders from
committing further acts of sexual violence, was enacted in the state of Washington as a
response to a heinous crime committed against a young child.4 5 Just six years earlier, in
1984, critics had compelled Washington to repeal its sexual psychopath law due to
46concerns over its constitutionality and effectiveness. Yet the state of Washington,
responding to community outrage and mass media coverage, enacted new legislation
aimed at enabling post-sentence civil detention for "sexually violent predators. "
In 1989, Earl Shriner, a repeat sex offender, raped and sexually mutilated a 7-
year-old Tacoma, Washington, boy. A Washington newspaper, The Spokesman-Review,
reported on the case this way: "The 7-year-old was playing in a vacant lot when sex
offender Earl Shriner grabbed him, pulled him into the bushes, raped and sexually
mutilated him."4 8 The report offered statements by the Tacoma police sergeant who
described how Shriner was "well-known" to law enforcement.49 The police sergeant made
specific remarks concerning Shriner and sex offenders in general.5 0 Regarding Shriner, the
sergeant declared that, "he [Earl Shriner] frequently contacted small children" and that
"[h]is fashion [was] to do this sort of thing... [and] Sex Offenders always reoffend."5 1 The
article went on to detail Shriner's previous crimes (targeting, abducting and abusing
children) and the resulting criminal sentences (the last one lasting for only 66 days in
52county jail).
A month later, another Seattle newspaper, the Tri-city Herald, published an
article urging stricter sex offender laws.5 3 The article called for immediate changes in the
43 Community Protection Act of 1990, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West 2001).
44 See Brian G. Bodine, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System: An Unconstitutional
Law and an Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105 (1990); John La Fond, The New
Sexually Violent Predator Law - America 's Unique Sexual Offender Commitment Law (paper
presented at the American College of Forensic Psychiatry's annual conference), April 1992, S.F. Cal.),
as cited in Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 625, 637 n.51 (1993); Grant H. Morris, The Evil that Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish Perverts, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2000).
45 Charles Oliver, Sex Crime and Punishment, REASON.COM, (Mar. 1993) ("At its heart, the Washington sexual
predator law is an emotional reaction to the too-lenient sentences levied on sexual criminals"); See generally,
Stuart Scheingold et al., The Politics ofSexual Psychopathy: Washington State's Sexual Predator Legislation, 15
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 809 (1992).
46 Roxanne Lieb, State Policy Perspectives on Sexual Predator Laws, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, & THERAPY 41, 42 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond eds., 2003).
47 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.02(1) (Supp. 1990). Earl Shriner's crime sparked a push to create a new
generation of sex offender laws, thus being the catalyst that began the movement and led other states to enact
their own version of sex offender civil commitment and community containment. GOVERNORlS TASK FORCE ON
COMMUNITY PROTECTION, FINAL REPORT, IV-4 (1989).
48 Keith Eldridge, Remembering "Little Tacoma Boy" 20 Years Later, KOMO NEWS (May 20, 2009, 9:33 PM
PDT), available at http://www.komonews.com/news/local/45571582.html.
49 Associated Press, Tacoma Sex Offender Faces Latest Charges in Mutilation of Boy, The Spokesman-Review,





52 Id. ("In 1977 Shriner pleaded guilty to assault and kidnapping in the abduction of two 16-year-old-girls in
Spanaway after he picked them up hitchhiking. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison after Eastern State
Officials determined he was not suited for a sexual psychopath program. Since his release in 1987, Shriner has
served 66 days in the Pierce County jail. . . .").
5 Associated Press, Toughen Sex Offender Laws, Gardner Urged, TRI-CITY HERALD, (June, 21, 1989) at A7.
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way Washington deals with violent sex offenders and urged Gov. Booth Gardner to call a
special legislative session." It included these quotations from a community member
spearheading the signing of the petition: "The laws have got to change to protect the
public" and "what use is a man who goes around preying on women and children." " The
article focused on a petition of 10,000 signatures, urging the convening of a special
legislative session, and specifically describes how a handful of individuals - who were
present at a demonstration in Seattle to promote the petition - clapped when a toddler
signed his name with a note saying "Governor, please keep me safe."56 Included with the
article was a picture of organized citizens demanding that public safety be the
government's first priority.
The Governor responded by convening a special task force in order to reevaluate
sex offender sentencing." The Governor's Task Force on Community Protection
recommended that the Washington legislature adopt a civil commitment procedure for a
select group of offenders.5 9 The Seattle Times described the event and the public's
reaction this way: "When that [the crime committed by Earl Shriner] happened, something
snapped in the collective conscience. Every fear ever harbored about predatory strangers
was realized in that mutilation. And the state struck back with a punitive law that has
drawn national attention."6 0
The bill was enacted as the Community Protection Act by the Washington
legislature in 1990,61 the predecessor of the Sexually Violent Predator Law,62 which
allowed the state to detain a person who had served a sentence for a "sexually violent
offense" if it could be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the person suffered from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which made the person likely to engage in
63
predatory acts of sexual violence. The Community Protection Act also mandated that sex
offenders register their whereabouts with police upon release from prison or treatment,
and authorized law enforcement to pass along that information to the communities into
64which they move. Critique of the science and procedures behind these laws continued





5 Exec. Order No. 89-04, WASH. ST. REG. 89-13-055 (1989), available at
http://www.govemor.wa.gov/office/execorders/eoarchive/eo89-04.htm.
59 
David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525, 538
(1992).
60 Linda Keene, Warning Signs -- A New State Law Alerts Parents to Predators in the Neighborhood and the
Struggle to Cope Begins, THE SEATTLE TEIES, Sept. 15, 1991, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19910915&slug=1305581.
6' Deborah L. Morris, Constitutional Implications ofthe Involuntary Commitment ofSexually Violent
Predators-A Due Process Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 594, 611 (1997); Sarah E. Spierling, Lock Them up
and Throw Away the Key: How Washington's Violent Sexual Predator Law Will Shape the Future Balance
Between Punishment and Prevention, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 879, 892-93 (2001).
62 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2001) (a "sexually violent predator" has a personality disorder or
mental abnormality that is not amenable to treatment, making them likely to engage in sexually violent
behavior).
63 Id.
64 Scheingold et al., supra note 45, at 809.
65 See generally Bodine, supra note 44.
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diagnosis and treatment of this population66 and the constitutionality of confinement under
civil commitment.67
Constitutional challenges to the statutes were more often than not unsuccessful.68
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the Community Protection Act, and found that
sexual predator provisions of the state community protection act were constitutional.69 The
Community Protection Act also mandated that sex offenders register their whereabouts
with police upon release from prison or treatment, and authorized law enforcement to pass
70along that information to the communities into which they move.
In the immediate aftermath of the enactment of the Community Protection Act,
newspapers reported on the public's fear that drove the passage of the legislation. The
Seattle Times reported that 4200 offenders had registered statewide in 1991 with
communities being warned about the "most violent."7 1 The article describes how
"[s]uddenly, real faces have been put on an inhuman crime as predator mug shots stare out
from paper bulletins. They have become lightning rods for a long-simmering wrath that
reaches back to 1989, when Earl Shriner lured a Tacoma boy from his bike and severed
72
his penis during the assault. The article continued with lengthy quotes from community
members, one such individual stating: "I think capital punishment should have been a
consideration ... and I would have no problem being the one to throw the switch," said
Ron Wilson, a father of three children who angrily nailed new planks to a fence at his
home, in a cul-de-sac accented with American flags.73 "Someone with a history of sexual
assaults against children should never be allowed on the street to re-offend. That's a slap
in the face, especially in a neighborhood with lots of children. It's like putting an alcoholic
in a tavern and expecting them not to drink." The article quoted University of Puget Sound
School of Law Professor, John Q. La Fond, arguing that communities should be protected
from predators through tougher prison sentences - not through civil commitment: "This is
lifetime preventive detention, solely to prevent possible further crime . . . . The U.S.
Supreme Court has never authorized lifetime confinement of someone who is not mentally
disabled in some meaningful sense, simply to prevent possible recidivism."7 4
Consider representative additional news headlines from the Seattle Times articles
covering this law and the containment of sexual predators: Guest Editorial -- 1990 Act
66 Gary Gleb, Washington 's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions
ofDangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 215 (1991).
6' Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender
Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 158 (1996) ("As the Court decides the sex offender cases, it will likely draw a
bright line on the constitutional map of civil commitment.") ((article published prior to the decision in
Hendricks). A system that compromises our traditional constitutional values cannot last. Sex offender
commitment laws confuse too many important values. Obscuring the critical role that mental disorder plays in
defining the state's police powers, these laws embrace a dangerous jurisprudence of prevention. We must find
other, more truthful and more principled ways to prevent sexual violence.
61 In re Blodgett, 502 U.S. 236 (1992) (upholding statute's constitutionality); Matter ofBuckhalton, 503 N.W.2d
148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (same); Matter ofLinehan, 503 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 518
N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994) (same) (state failed to prove defendant met statutory standards).
69 In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1018 (Wash. 1993); In re Haga 943 P.2d 395, 398 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); See
Julie Emery, Rapist Committed as Predator, THE SEATTLE TEIES, Mar. 8, 1991.
70 Scheingold et al., supra note 45, at 809.
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Helps Guard Against Sex Offenders,7 5 Prosecutor Praises Sex-Predator Ruling -- Law
Has 'Constitutional Seal Of Approval,76 Victim 's Mother Glad Predators Locked Up --
Special Center Is Only One In U.S. 7 7 It would seem likely that the general public -
without a significant understanding of the complex constitutional issues involved - would
hail the new generation laws as successful by keeping dangerous sex offenders out of their
community .
Although the tenor of many of the published news articles seemed to be focused
on the danger of sexual offenders and the anger within the community, early 1990's news
articles did not ignore some of the concerns over the efficacy of the Act and the
containment of violent predators.7 9 A 1993 Seattle Times article cited Jerry Sheehan,
legislative director of the American Civil Liberties Union, who argued that the law creates
a false sense of security by focusing on strangers - when, in fact, most sex offenders are
family members or acquaintances.0 The article also offered statistics on the types of
offenders, finding that only "4 percent of the 1,058 felonious sexual assaults against
children between 1989 and June of [1992] were carried out by strangers. Most, 43 percent,
were by teachers, coaches and other acquaintances. Natural parents were the offenders 22
percent of the time, followed by other relatives, 15 percent, and stepparents, 9 percent ...
."81 Yet the article continued on and finished with statements from "terrified parents" and
issuances by Gov. Mike Lowry, decreeing that "[s]exual predators are (the most)
dangerous people as frankly I can think of ....
C. Minnesota's Jacob Wetterling Act8 3
During the same year that Earl Shriner committed his notorious crime in the state
of Washington, a small community in Minnesota was outraged over the abduction of
Jacob Wetterling who went missing while riding his bike home from a convenience store
in the town of St. Joseph.4 A little over 12 hours after Jacob went missing, reporters
" Robert Shilling, Guest Editorial- 1990 Act Helps Guard Against Sex Offenders, THE SEATTLE TiMES, July 22,
1993, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/ ?date=19930722&slug- 1712209.
7 Tim Klass, Prosecutor Praises Sex-Predator Ruling - Law Has 'Constitutional Seal ofApproval', THE
SEATTLE Tims, Aug. 11, 1993, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
archive/?date=19930811&slug=1715464.
" Hal Spencer, Victim's Mother Glad Predators Locked Up - Special Center is Only One in U.S., THE SEATTLE
TIMES, May 15, 1994, available at http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
archive/?date=19940515&slug=1910634.
7 Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/us/ 04civil.html?pagewanted=all& r=1& (Sex
offenders selected for commitment are not always the most violent; some exhibitionists are chosen, for example,
while rapists are passed over. And some are past the age at which some scientists consider them most dangerous.
In Wisconsin, a 102-year-old who wears a sport coat to dinner cannot participate in treatment because of memory
lapses and poor hearing.).
79 Norman J. Finkel, Moral Monsters and PatriotActs, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 242, 260 (2006)
("Although the print media have written a number of stories and editorials about the legitimacy and effects of
community notification and involuntary commitment, it was predominantly the scholarly and scientific press,
through law reviews and empirical articles, that took a serious look at what are complex psychological,
empirical, normative, and constitutional issues.").
8o Linda Keene et al., Legal Dilemma: Rapist's Rights vs. Public's Right to Know, THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 13,





8 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
14071 (1994).
84 William Plummer & Margaret Nelson, A Town Prays for a Missing Son, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, Nov. 20, 1989,
vol. 32, no. 21, available at http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20115979,00.html.
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swarmed the Wetterling home and the abduction blossomed into a "full-scale media
event.",5 One week after, on October 30 th, the New York Times ran an article in light of the
impending holiday of Halloween.86 The article detailed the fears of the community noting
that, "many of the children say they are frightened that the abductor may strike again.
They have told teachers they cannot sleep. Few children are expected to go out on
Halloween."1 On the next evening, Peter Jennings and ABC Evening News dedicated a
segment to the impact of the crime on the small Minnesota town airing interviews with
local parents, Jacob's mother and individuals from Jacob's school." The following night,
both NBC Evening News with Tom Brokaw8 9 and CBS Evening News with Dan Rather9 0
ran segments describing the events of the kidnapping and airing statements by Jacob's
parents and other family members. In an article written one month after the abduction,
People Magazine highlighted how the community had banded together in an effort to find
Jacob and prevent any other similar crimes.91 The article detailed the events leading up to
the kidnapping and included statements by Jacob's mother, Patti Wetterling, and other
92
concerned members of the community. One father stated that he "had to help. Every
parent sees their children in Jacob. It's terrifying to people to have this happen here."93
In 1991, through efforts stemming out of the Jacob Wetterling foundation, the
legislature passed the Minnesota Sex Offender Registration Law. 9 4 In 1994, while
Washington State was trying to strengthen and expand the Community Protection Act,9 5
Congress passed the federal Jacob Wetterling Crimes against Children and Sexually
96Violent Offender Registration Act (SORA), through which the federal government
sought to encourage states, through the allocation of federal funding, to establish sex
offender registries.9 7 The act mandated that offenders who had been convicted of sexual
abuse of children or sexually violent crimes against an adult must register their community
residential address with local law enforcement for 10 years.98 Dissemination of
85 Id.





ABCEvening News with Peter Jennings: St. Joseph, Minnesota Kidnapping (ABC television broadcast Oct..
31, 1989).
89
NBC Evening News with Tom Brokaw and Dan Molina: St. Joseph, Minnesota/Missing Child (NBC television
broadcast Nov. 1, 1989).
90 CBS Evening News with Dan Rather: St. Joseph, Minnesota/Missing Child, (CBS television broadcast Nov. 1,
1989) (segment shows a local woman saying there is "fear in this small town now").
9' Plummer & Nelson, supra note 84.
92 Id. ("'We're sending a message,' says Patty Wetterling, Jacob's mother. 'You can't do this in Minnesota. You
can't take our children."').
93 Id.
94 The law was later renamed the Predatory Offender Registration law in 1993 and has been amended several
times. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 (1991).
95 In 1997, after the Kansas civil commitment statute was deemed constitutional and non-punitive in nature,
Washington put to rest any concerns as to whether it would abandon its statute. See John Q. La Fond,
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control,
15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655 (1992).
96 Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, PUB. L. No. 103-
322, § 170101, 108 STAT. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)) (repealed 2006)
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information of the offenders' whereabouts in the community was justified as "necessary to
protect public safety."99
D. New Jersey's Megan's Law'00
Around the time of the final passage of the Jacob Wetterling Act, a heinous crime
in New Jersey exploded in the media and spotlighted the need for increased community
awareness of the presence of a convicted sex offender.101 Seven-year-old Megan Kanka
was reported missing from her home in Hamilton Township, New Jersey, in 1994. 10 Early
on in the investigation, police identified a nearby residence housing three convicted sex
offenders.103 Jesse Timmendequas, who later confessed to the rape and murder of Megan,
resided in that nearby home. 10 The proximity of the predator to his prey spearheaded a
campaign to enact legislation in New Jersey that provided community notification about
specific sex offenders currently living in or upon release to the community.105 The New
Jersey legislation would eventually become the model for the tool by which the federal
government could notify the public of convicted sex offenders residing throughout the
country.1 0 6
On October 31, 1994, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Registration and
Community Notification Laws, also known as "Megan's Law,"107 and made national news
for years to come.108 Megan's Law devised a three-tier system that placed offenders in
99 Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2010)). The
act provided that the designated state law enforcement agency "shall release relevant information that is
necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under this section." Similar
language originated in Washington's Community Protection Act of 1990, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550
(West 2011).
100 42 U.S.C. § 14071.
101 Andrew Vachss, How Many Dead Children are Needed to End the Rhetoric?, THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS,
Aug. 12, 1994 ("It's not only politicians who fear the media. Prosecutors do, too, especially those prosecutors
who are politicians in disguise. How many rapists are allowed to plead guilty to 'burglary'? How many child
molesters are allowed to plead to 'endangering the welfare of a child'? How many predatory pedophiles are
allowed to serve their sentences for dozens of separate crimes concurrently?").
102 id.
'03 E.B.v. Veriero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997).
104 id
10' The public's reaction to the Kankas' call for reform prompted New Jersey to pass the first Megan's Law just
three months after Megan's murder. See id. at 1081-82; See also, Megan's Legacy, N.Y. TImES, Aug. 31, 1994
("Like Megan's family and neighbors, the legislators were properly outraged to discover that Jesse
Timmendequas, twice convicted of sexually assaulting young girls, had been living undetected in Megan's
neighborhood. But the bills they passed to appease that rage were approved without public hearings. Indeed, two
of the bills may be constitutionally shaky.").
106 For a look at litigation in New Jersey coinciding with the federal enactment see, e.g., Artway v. Att'y Gen. of
N.J., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996), rehg denied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding registration aspects of
New Jersey's "Megan's Law," and finding that challenge to notification aspects of law was not ripe); Paul P. v.
Veriero, 982 F. Supp. 961 (D.N.J. 1997) (New Jersey statute constitutional); Alan A. v. Veriero, 970 F. Supp.
1153 (D.N.J. 1997) (same); E.B. v. Veriero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp.
1199 (D.N.J. 1996) (denying motion for preliminary injunction against enforcement of Megan's Law).
107 N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (1994) (constitutionality upheld in W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D.N.J.
1996); notification requirements did not impose "punishment" on sex offenders; law constitutional)); compare
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995) (statute constitutional, but community notification provisions subject to
prior judicial review).
108 Mike Allen, Girl's Slaying Exposes Limits Of Connecticut 'Megan's Law', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998; Julia
Sommerfeld, Megan's Law Expands to the Internet, MSNBC, Aug. 17, 1999; Peter A. Zamoyski, Will
Calfornia's "One Strike" Law Stop Sexual Predators, or Is a Civil Commitment System Needed?, 32 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1249 (1995); Christine Kong, The Neighbors Are Watching: Targeting Sexual Predators with
Community Notification Laws, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1257 (1995).
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separate tiers based off of their assessed level of dangerousness and required all tiered
offenders to register with local law enforcement.109 The enactment of "Megan's Law" and
legislative modification of the Jacob Wetterling Act allowed Congress to lengthen the
federal required registration time period from 10 years to lifetime registration,110 compel
further conformity among the states, and include those offenders who qualify as sex
crime recidivists and/or were convicted of "aggravated" sexual violence.112 News
headlines - e.g., Sexual Attack on Youth Shows "Megan's Law" Limit"1 - discussed the
loopholes in notification and paved the way to nationalize the notification requirement.1
The media's coverage during the pending amendment of the Act in the House of
Representative reported on statements from Rep. Dick Zimmer, R-N.J. - "Today we're
putting the rights of children above the rights of convicted sex offenders," and Rep.
Charles Schumer, D-N.Y. - "Sexual offenders are different .... No matter what we do,
the minute they get back on the street, many of them resume their hunt for victims,
beginning a restless and unrelenting prowl for children, innocent children, to molest,
abuse, and in the worst cases, to kill." 11 5 Opposition to the Bill - citing constitutional
concerns - was easily lost amongst the crusade for children's rights and the vivid
description of the prowling predator.116
The Megan's Law amendment o the Jacob Wetterling Act was passed in 1996.117
Also included in the amendment was the authorization of a national registry that would
contain information on offenders who were labeled recidivists, deemed sexual violent
predators, convicted of coercive, penetrative sex with anyone and/or those offenders who
109 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-8 (1994).
"o Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, "Megan's Law: Final Guidelines for the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended," (Dec. 17,
1998), http://pub.bna.com/cl/19990120/2196.htm ("Megan's Law "). Simultaneously enacted was the Pam
Lychner Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3090-94 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (Supp.
IV 1998) (1st attempt toward a national registration system)).
.. If states do not comply with federal registration and community notification laws, they lose 10 percent of their
appropriation from the federal Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant Program, which provides funding for state
and local crime prevention and control programs. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §170101, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at
42 USC. § 14071 (2006)); For scholarly analysis see, Kenneth Crimaldi, "Megan's Law ": Election-Year Politics
and Constitutional Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 169 (1995); Kristen Zgoba et al., Megan's Law: Assessing the
Practical and Monetary Efficacy, 2008 No. 225370 (2006-IJ-CX-0018), U.S. Dept of Justice; Symposium,
Critical Perspectives on Megan's Law: Protection vs. Privacy, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1996) (comments
of John Gibbons, Ronald Chen, Alexander Brooks, Eric Janus, and Patrick Reilly); Jeff Barker, Upgrade Sex
Offender Law or Lose Grant, Md. Told, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 3, 2001.
"Megan's Law," supra note 110.
" John Sullivan, Sexual Attack on Youth Shows 'Megan's Law 'Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1995 (Prosecutors
point to the "limits of the state's law requiring community notification of the presence of sex offenders" and
"advocates of the law announced an effort to nationalize the notification requirement.").
114 id.
" Carolyn Skomeck, House Considers Tougher Version of 'Megan's Law', ASSOCIATED PRESS, May. 7, 1996;
see also Remembering Megan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1994 ("Children are more apt to be sexually abused in the
home than outside it. Even so, the threat posed by an unknown predator terrifies American families the most.
That is the reason for the community-notification provision that is now part of Federal law -- and for the New
Jersey bills that inspired it.").
116 Skorneck, supra note 115 ("Rep. Melvin Watt, D-N.C., raised a lonely voice in opposition. 'Our constitution
says to us that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent until he or she is proven guilty. The underlying
assumption of this bill is that once you have committed one crime of this kind, you are presumed guilty for the
rest of your life."').
11. Megan's Law, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1996).
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had sex with children under the age of 12.11" News articles post-amendment and adoption
of Megan's Law reported the public's response.11 9 An Associated Press article, Parents
Praise Megan 's Law Findings, quoted one mother's response to the adoption of the
legislation: "I know for sure my daughter was saved from having been molested," and
included a statement from the Attorney General confirming that "[a]rming law-abiding
citizens with information about sex offenders living in their neighborhoods has spared
countless children and families from the advances of sexual predators."l20
States seeking to adopt the federal statute ran news articles with statistics on sex
offenses and the benefits of registration: "U.S. Department of Justice figures show that a
forcible rape is committed every six minutes. A California study of the effectiveness of
registration programs found that most law enforcement agencies believed registration
helped them arrest suspected sex offenders . . . . Another California study on recidivism
evaluated sex offenders over a 15-year period and found that nearly 50 percent were
rearrested, 20 percent for a subsequent sex offense."121
By 2005, the national registry was available on the Internet and was linked to all
other state online registries.122 Presently, every state, as well as the District of Columbia,
has enacted sex offender community notification and registration requirement statutes.123
In addition to community notification and registration, individual states also
enacted residency restriction laws.124 Coinciding with New Jersey's enactment of Megan's
Law, residency restrictions sought to ban sex offenders from residing in specifically
designated areas.125
[R]esidency restrictions are "likely a response to high-profile media
coverage of child abduction cases. It is probably no accident that
passage of the first sex offender residency restrictions in 1995 followed
on the heels of the Klaas and Kanka murders in 1993 and 1994,
respectively. Prior to the Klaas murder, national coverage of such crimes
.. Department of Justice (Megan's Law), supra note 110 (An aggravated sexual act is defined as "(1) engaging
in sexual acts involving penetration with victims of any age through the use of force or the threat of serious
violence; and (2) engaging in sexual acts involving penetration with victims below the age of 12.").
119 Joshua Wolf Shenk, Do "Megan's Laws" Make a Difference?, US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Mar. 1, 1998
("Polls bear out changing attitudes about safety: About half of Washington parents, for example, say they're less
likely than before the law was passed to leave their kids alone--even with a baby sitter."); In 1997, the
Associated Press released an article that retold the horrific crime and further described specifics of the rape and
murder in grave detail: Donna De La Cruz, In Statement, Defendant Says He Eyed Megan Kanka All Summer,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 9, 1997 ("Timmendequas told [detectives] he put a belt around her neck after she
screamed and tried to run away when he fondled her. He said he choked her with the belt and covered her head
with a plastic bag.").
120 Scott Lindlaw, Parents Praise Megan's Law Findings, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jun. 13, 1998.
121 Needed Changes Will Toughen Megan's Law, THE BALTIMORE SuN, Aug. 17, 1996.
122 The Pam Lychner Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996 is another amendment o the
Wetterling Act: Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236,
110 Stat. 3093 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. 14071). This act allows the FBI to establish a national database of
the names and addresses of sex offenders who are released from prison and requires lifetime registration for
recidivists and offenders who commit certain aggravated offenses. The Act is named for Pam Lychner, who
became a victims' rights advocate after she narrowly escaped an attack by a repeat sex offender.
123 Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 295, 325-26 (2006).
124 Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment By a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 101, 122-27 (2007).
125 See id.; Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex Offenders: Liberty, Protectionism, Justice, & Alternatives, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 1397, 1411-14 (2009).
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was comparatively slight. Beginning with the Klaas case, however,
media coverage of such crimes exploded. The increased attention to
child abduction cases and the public outcry generated thereby likely led
to passage of the first restrictions in 1995.126
Residency restrictions prevent individuals who have committed sexual offenses,
from living within specific proximities to schools, parks and other areas where children
congregate.127 These ordinances are aimed at prohibiting offenders from residing within
particular areas and inevitably within particular cities. 12 Residency restrictions range
anywhere from 100 feet to 2,500 feet from any designated area in which minors
congregate and apply to the individual regardless of the prior crime or offending
history.129 Therefore, someone whose crime did not include children-as-victims and who
has no history of interest in or attraction to children is still subjected to ordinances
preventing him from living within a specified distance from where children may be.130
Residency restrictions that banish "undesirable individuals" from the community are
premised on the fear and belief that such individuals would, without a doubt, reoffend if
not for such residential bans.1 3 1
Judicial decisions found these laws constitutional.132 In Doe v. Miller, the Eighth
Circuit upheld an Iowa Law, prohibiting any person convicted of certain sex offenses
involving minors from residing within 2000 feet of a school or registered child care
facility.133
There can be no doubt of a legislature's rationality in believing that "[s]ex
offenders are a serious threat in this Nation," and that "[w]hen convicted sex offenders
reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested
for a new rape or sexual assault."134 "The only question remaining is whether, in view of a
rationally perceived risk, the chosen residency restriction rationally advances the State's
interest in protecting children."
1 35
The impact of judicial decisions that upheld these laws in the courts was
compounded by the media's attention to concerns of offenders residing near children in
community settings. By way of example, a July 2005 episode of the O 'Reilly Factor
126 Singleton, supra note 4, at 609-10.
1
27Cobb v. State, 437 So.2d 1218, 1220 (Miss. 1983) (upholding a probation condition requiring the defendant to
"stay out of Stone County").
128 Steven Brown et al., What People ThinkAbout the Management of Sex Offenders in the Community, 47
HOWARD J. 3 (July 2008), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ j.1468-
2311.2008.00519.x/full (study finding that the public does not necessarily agree with punitive conditions but is
insecure in the effectiveness of community containment and concerned about the reality of reintegration).
129 ALA. CODE § 15-20A-11(a) (2011) (enlarging the state's residency restriction zone from 1000 feet to
2000 feet); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5 (2011) (increasing the state's residency restriction zone to 2000 feet
under Jessica's Law); OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 57 § 590A (West 2011) (2000 feet).
130 Jim Nichols, Tossing the Book at Sex Offenders; Officials Target Hundreds Living Too Close to Schools, THE
PLAIN DEALER, Jul. 31, 2005, at Bl.
13 Karen Sloan, Towns Fear an Influx of Offenders, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 4, 2005, at 1A; see also Des
Moines Zones out Molesters, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, (Oct. 13, 2005) at 2B.
132 Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 870 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev 'd, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 1034 (2005).
133 Id.
134 Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 715 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4
(2002) (alterations in Conn. Dep't ofPub. Safety).
131 Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court decision, finding the statute to be constitutional, concluding that
the Constitution did not prevent Iowa from regulating the residency of sex offenders in order to protect the health
and safety of its citizens. Id.
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named Alabama as a state that did not care about sex offenders.136 One week after the
episode, Governor Bob Riley convened a special session of the legislature to debate
reform to Alabama's sex offender laws.137 Alabama promptly changed its current laws
and, among other things, included residency restrictions for convicted sex offenders. 138
In the next section, we will discuss our final example of legislation enacted as a
result of moral panic. We have focused on how the media influenced states' reactions to
offenders entering into the community and will now consider how high profile media
cases resulted in keeping them out of communities altogether through the enactment of sex
offender civil commitment.
E. The Kansas Experience
While the country was focused on monitoring offenders in the community,
Kansas was litigating the constitutionality of their sex offender civil commitment law. In
1994, Kansas enacted its Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) that practically mirrored
the state of Washington's sex offender containment act.139 Kansas wanted to commit an
existing "small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators... who do not
have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment
pursuant to the [general involuntary civil commitment statute]."140 The SVPA established
a separate commitment process for "the long-term care and treatment of the sexually
violent predator," statutorily defined as "any person who has been convicted of or charged
with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual
violence." Kansas clearly set forth the definition of a mental abnormality defining it as a
"congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such
person a menace to the health and safety of others."1 4 2
The pivotal case that solidified the constitutionality of the civil commitment of
sexual offenders was Kansas v. Hendricks.143 Leroy Hendricks was serving a term of 5-20
years in state prison after being convicted of taking "indecent liberties" with two teenage
boys when he clearly stated that he would continue to offend if released to the
144 145community. A Newsweek article, Too Dangerous to Set Free, discussing Hendricks'
136 The O Reilly Factor: Factor Investigation: Which States are Soft on Child Sex Offenders? (Fox News
television broadcast Jul. 11, 2005).
" Recent Legislation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 939, 942 (2006).
Id. at 941 (Act of July 29, 2005, Ala. Act No. 2005-301 (to be codified in scattered sections of ALA. CODE
chs. 13A, 14, and 15) [ Sex Offender Act], available at
http://arcsos.state.al.us/PAC/SOSACPDF.001/A0003661 .PDF. The bill passed unanimously in both houses); See
Op-Ed., Safer Children, but How Safe?, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Aug. 1, 2005, at 4A; John Davis & Jannell
McGrew, Alabama Lawmakers Line Up Crusades for Next Session (Online Extra), MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER,
Sep. 6, 2005.
139 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2001) (requiring involuntary civil confinement for sexually violent predators
with mental abnormalities or personality disorders who are likely to reoffend if untreated).
140 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997).
141 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a).
142 Id. § 59-29a02(b) (emphasis added).
143 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 395-97.
144 In re Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130-31 (Kan. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); See also
Jim McLean, Stovall Preparing to Defend State's Sexual Predator Law for Second Time Before Supreme Court,
TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Oct. 15, 2001, http://cjonline.com/stories/101501/leg stovall.shtml (discussing the
defense of Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-13 (2002), [the case that determined whether or not commitment
required a complete lack of control], Attorney General Carla Stovall comments on what the effect would be if the
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case - then pending in the Supreme Court - along with other terrifying cases of sexual
abuse, and made reference to the Megan Kanka murder, but also noted the moral panic
generated from the evening news broadcast: "According to the Association for the
Treatment of Sexual Abusers [ATSA], the re-offense rate for 'untreated sex offenders who
primarily target children' ranges in various studies from 10 percent to 40 percent, not the
'80 percent to 90 percent' that many laypeople assume by extrapolating from the 6 o'clock
news."146
Yet the headlines in other news articles read quite different. An Associated Press
article issued an eye-catching title: Study: Children Were Targets of Most Sex
Offenders.14 7 The article inundated its reader with large numbers and various statistics
intertwined with quotes from victim advocates groups. 1 4 One such quote states that: "This
high rate of child victims is behind the heightened concern and the growing number of
states passing laws that provide for notifying neighborhoods when sexual predators move
in [and] [t]he majority of sex crimes are committed against children because they are more
helpless, easier targets and easier to intimidate into silence."1 4 9 Embedded within this
article was this information: "A third of child molesters had attacked their own child or
stepchild. Another half of the molesters were a friend, acquaintance or more-distant
relative of their victim. Only one in seven molested a child who was a stranger."15 0
Despite statistics and competing factual information, society continued to
respond emotionally to these types of crimes,15 1 responses that led to the endorsement of
policies that mandated locking sex offenders away indefinitely.152 In 1997, Associated
Press newspaper and broadcast editors voted the debate over the Kansas sexual predator
law as the year's top news story.153 Sex Predator Biggest Kansas Story, an 1997 article
from the Topeka Capital-Journal, ends its report with a quote from John Garlinger - a
spokesman for the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, which
oversees the sexual predator program - who questioned the selection of the sexual
predator decision as the top story of the year: "How you can decide a bunch of perverts are
the top story?"1 54
Kansas State Supreme court decision was adopted: "If the Kansas Supreme Court opinion is adopted, the sexual
predator program would be obliterated... Hardly anybody, maybe nobody would be committed.").
145 Jerry Adler, Too Dangerous to Set Free?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 1996,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/1996/12/08/too-dangerous-to-set-free.html.
146 id




15 Remembering Megan, N.Y. TiMES, Nov 5, 1994 ("Children are more apt to be sexually abused in the home
than outside it. Even so, the threat posed by an unknown predator terrifies American families the most."),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/05/ opinion/remembering-megan.html.
152 Joan Biskupic, Court Gives States Leeway in Confining Sex Offenders, WASH. POST, June 24, 1997, § A, at 1
("At a time when the nation is focused on preventing convicted child molesters from striking again - through
longer prison sentences and community notification laws - yesterday's ruling gives legislators significant new
leeway to extend the confinement of such convicts."); See also Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., The Function of
Punishment in the Civil Commitment ofSexually Violent Predators, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 437 (2007) (finding
that when the initial criminal sentence was lenient, respondents strongly supported civil commitment without
giving any regard to future risk of repeat or dangerous behavior).
15' Traci Carl, Sex Predator Biggest Kansas Story, THE TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Dec. 26, 1997,
http://cjonline.com/stories/122697/newsexpred.html.
154 Id.; See, Downtown 20/20: No Escape (ABC television broadcast, June 18, 2001) (Don Dahler of ABC News
states, "It's a no-brainer. Convicted sex offenders are bad people, the lowest of the low, perverts. That is sure
what a lot of people think here in Corpus Christi, Texas.").
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The United States Supreme Court subsequently accepted review in the case of
Kansas v. Hendricks and found the Kansas statute to be constitutional,5  thus solidifying
the existence of current sex offender civil commitment law in the United States. An article
published in the New York Times on December 11, 1996, noted that: "It was evident from
the arguments that while the Justices have considerable sympathy for the state's goal, they
are troubled by the law's open-ended rationale."156 Six months later, a brief commentary
published in the "Health" section of the Times, strongly criticized the Court's ruling.
The author echoed the public sentiment and noted that, "[t]he Court's instinct to want to
keep this defendant incarcerated is understandable. It would be hard to imagine a less
sympathetic defendant than the person who brought the legal challenge, Leroy Hendricks.
He is a 62-year-old pedophile who has said only death would guarantee a change in his
behavior." 1 5  But the article raised the concern of the implications of the ruling: "By
upholding Kansas' approach to civil commitment, the Supreme Court has raised the
troubling prospect of states imposing indefinite confinement in a mental institution based
on a loose definition of 'abnormality' and an unreliable prediction that a person is 'likely'
to commit dangerous acts in the future." 1 5 9
Post-Hendricks, some media outlets urged states to quickly adopt similar
legislation. A Florida newspaper urged the "Florida Legislature to act swiftly to enact a
law keeping sexual predators confined indefinitely" and "not delay in offering better
protection to all Floridians, and especially children, from these violent criminals."160 By
1997, seventeen states had enacted some form of sex offender civil commitment
161legislation that was now constitutionally protected under Hendricks. Currently, 20 states
in total have enacted some form of a sexual violent predator commitment statute.162
155 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
15 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Sound Sympathetic but Troubled on Law to Confine Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/11/us/justices-sound-sympathetic-but-troubled-on-law-to-
confine-sex-offenders.html.
1 Wrong on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TiMES, June 25, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/25/opinion/wrong-on-sex-offenders.html.
158 Id.
159 Id.; see also Biskupic, supra note 152 ("This law is going to spread like wildfire," said Lynn S. Branham, an
Illinois attorney and professor who specializes in sentencing law. "This notion of 'mental abnormality' has the
potential to dramatically expand the types of persons who can be confined.").
16o Editorial, State Should Act Now on Court Ok to Keep Sexual Predators Confined, SUNSENTINEL.COM, June
25, 1997 (noting that "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding a Kansas law clear[ed] a legal path for
Florida to better protect its residents from such violent and repeated sex predators as Howard Steven Ault,
charged with killing two young sisters in Broward County").
16' Although constitutional challenges typically involving due process, ex-post facto, and double jeopardy clauses
were raised at the outset of the various state legislation, the likelihood of success on the merits was slim given
the United States Supreme Court holdings in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-58 (1997) and Kansas v.
Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 407 (2002).
162 "Twenty states (Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia have enacted laws permitting the civil
commitment of sexual offenders. In addition, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006
authorized the federal government to institute a civil commitment program for federal sex offenders." Civil
Commitment ofSexually Violent Predators, Aug. 17, 2010, http://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-sexually-
violent-predators; see 42 U.S.C. § 16971 (2006).
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F. The Adam Walsh case
Probably one of the most significant crimes in recent history occurred on July 27,
1981, when 6-year-old Adam Walsh went missing during a shopping trip with his
mother. 16 The child's ensuing abduction and murder began a twenty-plus year crusade
that would inevitably alter media and legislative history.164 Adam's parents established the
Adam Walsh Outreach Center for Missing Children on August 19, 1981 - less than one
month after the abduction.165 Two months later, the couple testified before Congress on
behalf of the Missing Children Act and the Missing Children's Assistance Act.166 As a
result of their efforts, both of these bills were passed.167 In 1993, NBC aired a television
film covering the story of the kidnapping and the efforts to pass national child protection
laws. 16 On the day that the movie was to be aired on NBC, the New York Times ran an
article prefacing the movie's content and messagel69.
The first half of "Adam" focuses on the panic and growing despair of
the parents as they discover their helplessness in dealing with authorities
outside their own police precinct. State and national agencies do not
want the added burden of looking for missing kids. They want the
problem kept at narrow local levels. Much of the film's fury is directed
at the Justice Department and the F.B.I.170
In a continuing effort to enable the capture and prosecution of such criminals,
Adam's father, John Walsh, guest-hosted the television show, America's Most Wanted in
1988.171 This also served to increase the publicity surrounding Adam's tragic abduction
"' Dan Harris & Claire Pedersen, Adam Walsh Murder: John and Reve Walsh Re-Live the Investigation, ABC
NEWS, Mar. 2, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/US/adam-walsh-murder-john-reve-walsh-live-
investigation/story?id= 1303793 1#.UV2s7hzabms.
164 Glenn Collins, The Fears of Children: Is the World Scarier?, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1988,
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/19/garden/the-fears-of-children-is-the-world-scarier.html ("IN [sic] an era of
homelessness, AIDS, drug abuse and ozone-layer depletion, at a time when preschoolers are taught about child
abuse and kidnapping, parents and child-development experts are raising new concerns about children's fears.");
Donna Leinwand & Emily Bazar, Adam Walsh's Murder Had ImpactAcross USA, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 2008,
at A3 ("Nearly three decades after Toole allegedly abducted Adam from a suburban Florida mall, the nation has
a coordinated response to missing children that includes hotlines, the FBI's database, public broadcasting alerts
and special federal law enforcement squads that can respond to the scene.").
"' John Holland, Adam Walsh Case is ClosedAfter 27 Years, L.A. TIES, Dec. 17, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/17/nation/na-adaml7.
166 John Walsh Biographical Information, NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
http://www.missingkids.com/en-US/documents/PressKitJohnWalsh.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
167 Id.
16' The film aired on Oct. 10, 1983 on NBC and was reportedly seen by an audience of 38 million people. At the
end of each broadcast of the film, a series of missing children's photographs and descriptions were displayed on
the screen for viewers, and a number was given to call if a viewer had information about them. The 1985
photograph series was introduced by President Ronald Reagan in a pre-recorded message, "[M]aybe your eyes
can help bring them home." See Associated Press, Adam Again Draws Callers, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, April 30,
1985.
169 John J. O'Connor, TV: "Adam " Movie on Missing Boy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1983,
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/10/arts/tv-adam-movie-on-missing-boy.html ("According to a nonprofit
organization called Find the Children, a Federal Government agency estimates that 1.8 million children will be
reported missing this year. About 50,000 will never be seen by their families again.").
170 id.
171 John Walsh Biographical Information, NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
http://www.missingkids.com/en-US/documents/PressKitJohnWalsh.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
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and murderl72 and brought infamous crime and criminals to the living rooms of every
American household.
17 3
One of the main goals generated by the Walshes' efforts was the need to better
track and monitor offenders on a federal level. 17 4 A convicted sex offender, interviewed by
Fox News, agreed that community notification works: "If people know a sex offender is in
their area, they should privately tell the felon his identification is known and he will be
closely watched . . . . I think all of us have to be known to the public so that the
community can keep its eye on us."175 In 2005, a USA Today article posted images of
Shasta Groenel7 and Jessica Lunsford but reported the "surprisingly good news" that
"[s]ex crimes against children have dropped dramatically in the last decade." 17 The article
praised the legislative efforts thus far and suggested that the decrease in crimes could be
attributed to online registries, improved screening for risk factors, and treatment of
offenders.17 9 It spoke of the pending bipartisan bill in Congress to strengthen Megan's
Law and noted that states and communities were "not waiting for Congress to act" and
implementing residency restrictions,1 o electronic monitoring8 and longer prison
sentences. 182
In 2006, Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
(AWA), increasing the pool of individuals required to register as well as the length of time
172 Adam Walsh Act Becomes Law, AMERICA'S MOST WANTED, July 25, 2006,
http://www.amw.com/features/featurestory_detail.cfm?id=1206 (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
173 Colleen Long, "America's Most Wanted" is Still Going Strong, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 8, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/08/americas-most-wanted_n_1411512.html ("There are more than
600,000 monthly visits to the site, and at least 40 captures from online tips.").
174 Wendy Koch, Sex-Crimes Bill Poised to Pass; Offenders Would be Tracked in National Database, USA
TODAY, July 20, 2006, at Al ("The bill aims to help police locate more than 100,000 such offenders who are
registered but haven't updated their whereabouts. About 563,000 sex offenders are registered nationwide.").
175 When Sex Offenders Do Their Time, FOXNEWS.COM, Dec. 5, 2003,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,104890,00.html ("Jeff Goldenflame, who served five years in prison for
molesting his 5-year-old daughter, was released from prison in 1991. He said Megan's Law, which requires sex
offenders to register with local communities, works.").
176 Shasta Groene was eight years old when she was kidnapped by a sexual predator. She was found alive six
weeks after the kidnapping; her brother and mother were later discovered murdered by the kidnapper. See
Nicholas K. Geranios, Videotape Shows Girl, SuspectedAbductor, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 5, 2005.
177 Jessica Lunsford's body was found almost a month after she went missing from her Florida home. See Mark
Memmott, Girl's Death Raises Questions About Tracking of Sex Offenders; Some Experts Say to Focus on Most
Likely Reoffenders, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 2005 at A4.
178 Wendy Koch, Despite High Profile Cases, Sex Crimes Against Kids Fall, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2005, at Al.
179 id
"s Id. ("Binghamton, N.Y., banned moderate- and high-risk sex offenders from living or entering an area within
a quarter-mile radius of any school, day care center, playground or park. In June, Miami Beach's Mayor David
Dermer banned convicted child molesters from moving within 2,500 feet of such areas, effectively barring them
from the city. In July, Brick Township, N.J., set a similar 2,500-foot perimeter for certain pedophiles. Under a
new policy, Florida bans certain sex offenders from public hurricane shelters, many of which are in schools. It
requires them to seek refuge in prison instead.").
. Id. ("After the deaths this year of Jessica Lunsford and 13-year-old Sarah Lunde, who was also allegedly
molested and killed by a convicted rapist, Florida approved a bill requiring the worst offenders to wear satellite-
tracking devices for the rest of their lives. In August alone, Alabama and New Jersey passed laws requiring
extensive satellite tracking of high-risk sex offenders. At least three other states - Missouri, Ohio and
Oklahoma - approved electronic monitoring this year, and North Dakota, Georgia and New York are
considering similar measures.").
182 State Statutes Related to Jessica's Law, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Florida's sex-
offender law (Jessica's Law) passed in 2006 more than doubles the mandatory sentence for sex crimes against
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of registration.183 Title I of the Act, Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA) authorized a national registry aimed at creating a database to include
information on all sex offenders across all 50 states and required all states to upload their
online sex offender databases to the national database by 2009.184 In order to expand the
group of individuals subject to registration, Congress defined a sex offense as a "criminal
offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another."18
Through the expansion of qualifying crimes, this Act was the first to encompass juvenile
offenders.186 The Act mandates three tier levels corresponding to the degree of risk and
correlates each to a specific duration of required registration, thus being the first time that
Congress considers the specifics of the offense in this line of legislation.18 7 Therefore, Tier
One, which is the lowest risk, has the least amount of time required to register' with
Tiers Two and Three following along accordingly. The tiers do not reflect individualized
assessments of risk or current dangerousness but merely classify the severity of offenses.
After Pennsylvania adopted the requirements of the AWA, a Fayette County Assistant
District Attorney told reporters: "Hopefully, by making our laws tougher, we can spare
other victims the pain of these kinds of crimes. I think this will bring a heightened
awareness about these crimes that might not have otherwise required registration, and
there will be increased penalties for people who otherwise prey on children."18 9
In 2007, the issue of retroactive application was resolved, and it was made clear
that the AWA applied retroactively in order to be successful in developing a
"'comprehensive" system that would be effective in protecting the public by widening its
183 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Child Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as
42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006)) (Under the leadership of Republican Congressman Mark Foley (Fl), the Adam Walsh
Act was signed into law by President Bush in July 2006, nulling all prior federal registration provisions).
184 See Emanuella Grinberg, 5 Years Later, States Struggle to Comply with Federal Sex Offender Law, CNN, July
28, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/201 1/CRIME/07/28/sex.offender.adam.walsh.act/ index.html?iref=allsearch
(Dru's Law, included within the wide-ranging Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, establishes a
nationwide online sex offender database. The database, named "the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public
Website," allows the public to search for sex offender information by zip code or geographic radius. Dru's Law
is named for Dru Sjodin who abducted in North Dakota, sexually assaulted, and murdered by a repeat violent sex
offender.)
185 Adam Walsh Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i). See also No EasyAnswers: Sex Offender Laws in the U.S.,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/09/1 /no-easy-answers-0 (At least 5
states require registration for adult prostitution-related offenses; 13 states require registration for public
urination; 29 states require registration for consensual sex between teenagers; and 32 states require registration
for exposing genitals in public); Rainerv. Georgia, 690 S.E.2d 827 (2010) (Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a
provision of the state's sex offender registry law that requires the registration of certain persons not convicted of
sex crimes).
18 In re T.T., 907 A.2d 416, 418-19 (2006) (whether minor's conduct must have a sexual motivation element for
application of the Megan's Law registration requirements; remanded to trial court); Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp.
425, 437 (D. Mass. 1997) (Massachusetts juvenile statute constitutional); State v. Heiskill, 916 P.2d 366, 367
(Wash. App. 1996) (juvenile registration statute constitutional); In re Welfare of C.D.N., 559 N.W.2d 431 (Minn
App. 1997), cert. denied (1997).
18742 U.S.C. § 16911(2)-(4) (2010).
188 Id. § 16915(a)(1)-(3) (Tier I offenders must register for 15 years, Tier II for 25 years, and Tier III for life).
189 Jennifer Harr, Adam Walsh Act Takes Effect Today, HERALD-STANDARD, Dec. 20, 2012, available at
http://www.heraldstandard.com/news/courts/adam-walsh-act-takes-effect-today/article a7d29629-76d6-58dc-
ab5b-9cec 191dl8c5.html. But see Phil Ray, Pennsylvania Prepares for Adam Walsh Act, ALTOONA MIRROR,
Sept. 9, 2012, ("The federal Adam Walsh Act was called a potential 'nightmare' for Pennsylvania's adult parole
and probation departments, as these are the agencies that have to register and maintain a watch over [sex
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scope and including all offenders regardless of when they were convicted.19 0 Linda
Baldwin, who directs the U.S. Department of Justice office that determines whether states
are compliant with the Walsh Act, told The Washington Examiner: "We've seen evidence
that sex offenders move from one jurisdiction to another because they may not be as
closely monitored. [The Adam Walsh Act] was designed to eliminate gaps and loopholes
among states' sex offender registration regulations. Gaps and loopholes allow registered
sex offenders to fall off the radar."191
"The passage of SORNA redefined the landscape."192 Never before had statutes
been enacted that mandated such a degree of sex offender monitoring. Post-SORNA,
states have increased their requirements for community notification - including the
controversial subset of juvenilesl93 -- and retroactive application to those individuals who
were otherwise living a law-abiding life in the community.194 States have struggled to
comply with the federal mandates and are overwhelmed with the difficulty of effectively
monitoring a huge pool of registrants - often increased by the Adam Walsh Act
requirements - while trying to appease the public by making a showing of being "tough on
sexual predators."1 9 5
G. Conclusion
It seems evident that the media has had a crucial impact on the enactment of sex
offender legislation. The emphasis on the sex offender epidemic is reflected and reified in
fear-driven quotes by politicians and concerned community members. Although the media
reported on some of the more problematic issues that arose in newer legislation and on
some discussion on the lack of information and factual basis to support the new laws,
those reports were lost amongst the pleas for punishment to lead, ostensibly, to safer
communities. In the next section, we will discuss the concept of "media criminology" as it
relates to sex offenders as the most reviled individuals and how these dynamics impact the
judiciary.
190 Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8,894 (Feb. 28, 2007)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72); see generally Wayne Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of
Administrative Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 993, 998-99 (2010).
191 Freeman Klopott, Region Resist Fed Sex Offender Rules, THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER, June 12, 2011,
available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/114982.
192 Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 2, at 1078.
193 Associated Press, Dealing with Child-on-Child Sex Abuse Not One Size Fits All, USA TODAY (Jan. 7, 2013)
("That public policy includes a federal law, the Adam Walsh Act, with a requirement that states include certain
juvenile offenders as young as 14 on their sex-offender registries. Many professionals who deal with young
offenders object to the requirement, saying it can wreak lifelong harm on adolescents who might otherwise get
back on the track toward law-abiding, productive lives."); Grinberg, supra note 184 ("It's always been a difficult
decision for the Legislature, the need to register juveniles for public safety versus the idea of confidentiality to
rehabilitate juveniles."), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-07/child-sex-
abuse/52431616/1.
194 Grinberg, supra note 184 (Roy Martin was classified a sexually oriented offender in 1997 which meant he
had to register once a year for 10 years after his release. In November 2007 he was reclassified under Ohio's SB
10 as a Tier III offender (in response to Ohio's adoption of the federal mandates) and for the rest of his life, he
would have to check in every 90 days with law enforcement to confirm his home address, employer, school
address and Internet identifiers and vehicle make. Martin hanged himself in his garage after learning he would be
reclassified under Ohio's SB 10.).
195 See supra notes 151-59; Anthony Campisi, N.J. May Join Wave ofStates Getting Tougher on Child Sex
Criminals, NORTH JERSEY.COM (Oct. 11, 2012), available at
http://www.northjersey.com/news/crimecourts/crimecourtsnews/NJmayjoin wave of states getting toug
her on child sex criminals.html?page=all.
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II. THE IMPACT OF THE MEDIA
The media-driven panic over sex offenders has directly influenced judicial
decisions - both at the trial and appellate levels - in this area of the law, especially in
jurisdictions with elected judges.
In this Part, we will discuss (1) the status of sex offenders as the most despised
individuals in the United States, (2) the role of "media criminology" in the way that we
view and characterize this cohort of the population, and (3) the susceptibility of the
judiciary to public sentiment, both in other aspects of the criminal and civil law, and in
this specific area.
A. The Most Despised Citizens
Sex offendersl96 have supplanted insanity acquittees as the most despised
segment of the American population.197 Regularly reviled as "monsters" by district
attorneys in jury summations,198 by judges at sentencings,199 by elected representatives at
200 211legislative hearings, and by the media, the demonization of this population has helped
create a "moral panic"202 that has driven the passage of legislation203 - much of which has
196 On the imprecision and overbreadth of this category, ranging from the stranger pedophiliac rapist to the
teenager consensually sending "sexting" pictures of herself to her boyfriend, see Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders:
Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (1998) ("Sex offenders do not share a common set of
psychological and behavioral characteristics."), or the driver who posts an allegedly-obscene bumper sticker, see,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-131 (1987) (including displaying such a bumper sticker as a sex offense). See
generally, Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 28, at 21 (current system "bundles statutory rape cases that deal with
sexual interactions between teenagers -- interactions that would otherwise be consensual but for the age of one of
the partners -- with cases of individuals who have committed violent pedophilic offenses").
197 Michael L. Perlin, There's No Success like Failure/and Failure's No Success at All: Exposing the
Pretextuality ofKansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (1998) ("If we are no longer focusing on
insanity defendants as the most "despised" group in society, it is more likely because there is a new universe of
'monsters' replacing them in our demonology: sex offenders, known variously, as mentally disordered sex
offenders, or sexually violent predators, the ultimate 'other.'"); see Geraghty, supra note 1, at 514 ("Sex
offenders are arguably the most despised members of our society, and states and municipalities are in a race to
the bottom to see who can most thoroughly ostracize and condemn them."); Eric Buske, Sex Offenders Are
Different: Extending Graham to Categorically Protect he Less Culpable, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 417, 433-434
(2011).
198 We have yet to find an appellate reversal of a case in which this inflammatory language was used. See, e.g.,
State v. Henry, 103 So. 3d 424 (La. Ct. App. 2012); Comerv. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934, 960 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 550 U.S. 966 (2007); Jacksonv. Ludwick, No. 2:09-CV-11928, 2011 WL 4374281 (E.D. Mich. 2011);
People v. Bonner, No. 10-09-00120-CR, 2010 WL 3503858, (Tex. App. 2010); Kelloggv. Skon, 176 F.3d 447,
452 (8th Cir. 1999).
199 See, e.g., People v. Ball, No. 09-001299-FC, 2011 WL 1086557, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
200 See, e.g., Timothy Wind, The Quandary of Megan's Law: When the Child Sex Offender Is a Child, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 73, 92-93 (2003) (quoting Rep. Mark Green); Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's
Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 339 (2001) (quoting Senator Hutchison).
201 See Rachel Rodriguez, The Sex Offender Under the Bridge: Has Megan's Law Run Amok? 62 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1023, 1031-32 (2010), quoting John G. Winder, The Monster Next Door: The Plague ofAmerican Sex
Offenders, CYPRESS TiMES (Nov. 20, 2009, 1:49 PM) ("'There's no such thing as monsters.' We tell our kids
that. The truth is that monsters are real.... These monsters are called 'Sex Offenders..'), available at http://
www.thecypresstimes.com/article/News/YourNews/THEMONSTER_NEXTDOORTHEPLAGUE_
OFAMERICANSEXOFFENDERS/25925.
202 See, e.g., Filler, supra note 200, at 317-18; Eric Fink, Liars and Terrorists and Judges, Oh My: Moral Panic
and the Symbolic Politics ofAppellate Review in Asylum Cases, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2019, 2038-39 (2008);
Eamonn Carrabine, Media, Crime and Culture: Simulating Identities, Constructing Realities, in
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES (Bruce Arrigo & Heather Bersot,
eds.) (2013) (in press) (INTERNATIONAL CRIME). See generally, STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL
PANICS 1-2 (3d ed. 2002).
203 On "legislative panic" in this context, see Wayne Logan, Megan's Laws as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61
SYRACUSE L. REV. 371, 371 (2011); Denno, supra note 22, at 1320.
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been found by valid and reliable research to be counter-productive and engendering a
more dangerous set of conditions - and judicial decisions, at the trial, intermediate
204appellate and Supreme Court levels, all reflecting the 'anger and hostility the public
205feels" about this population. The public is thus devoted to a 'predator icon" that drives
206all our law and policy in this area, a devotion that is augmented by the media's
"obsession" on criminal justice issues.207 The term "sexually violent predator" in itself is
an emotionally charged one that conjures up many misleading or inaccurate images.208 By
way of example, correctional officers rate sexual offenders as more "dangerous, harmful,
violent, tense, bad, unpredictable, mysterious, unchangeable, aggressive, weak, irrational,
209afraid, immoral and mentally ill" than other prisoners.
B. "Media Criminology"
1. Introduction
Writing in a death penalty context, Craig Haney defines "media criminology" in
this manner:
Media criminology is a commercial product rather than a body of what
is ordinarily considered "real" knowledge. Obviously, it is not based on
a collection of systematically deduced theoretical propositions or
carefully arrived at empirical truths about the realities of crime and
punishment. Its substantive lessons are intended to generate audience
share rather than to convey accurate information or provide a valid
framework for understanding the nature of crime. 210
The reporting of crime news has become a "morality play."211 Emerging from the
roots of 1 9 th century views on crime and punishment,
212 it "consistently dehumanizes and
,213demonizes perpetrators and effectively exoticizes their criminality." This reinforcing
combination of demonization and sensationalization creates an environment in which the
"'common wisdom" about sex offenders is distorted through a series of prisms that we will
discuss in the remainder of this section: the prism of media rhetoric, the prism of public
pressure, and the prism of heuristic decision-making.214 We will then consider the extent
204 On "judicial panic" in the context of same-sex marriage cases, see John Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments
Against Same-Sex Marriage, 20 CARDOzO L. REV. 1119, 1146 (1999).
205 Meghan Gilligan, It's Not Popular But It Sure Is Right: The (In)Admissibility ofStatements Made Pursuant to
Sexual Offender Treatment Programs, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 271 (2012).
206 See, e.g., Ray Surette, Predator Criminals as Media Icons, in MEDIA, PROCESS, AND THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME 131, 140, 147 (Gregg Barak ed. 1995); see id. at 132 (discussing how the media has
raised the specter of the predator criminal to that of an "ever-present image"); see also, SURETTE, supra note 15,
at 45 (discussing how the media paints a society composed of "predator criminals, violent crime fighters and
helpless victims").
207 See Craig Haney & Susan Greene, Capital Constructions: Newspaper Reporting in Death Penalty Cases, 4
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 129, 129 (2004).
208 Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 28, at 5-7.
209 JR. Weekes et al., Correctional Officers: How Do They Perceive Sex Offenders? 39 INT'L J. OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 55 (1995), as quoted in Kurt M. Bumby & Marc C. Maddox, Judges'
Knowledge About Sexual Offenders, Diff iculties Presiding Over Sexual Offense Cases, and Opinions on
Sentencing, Treatment, and Legislation, 11 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 305, 306 (1999).
210 Craig Haney, Media Criminology and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 689, 692 (2009).
211 STUART HALL ET AL, POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER 66 (1980 reprint).
212 Mark Lawrence McPhail, Rachel Lyon & David Harris, Digital Divisions: Racial (In)justice and the Limits of
Social informatics in The State of Georgia vs. Troy Anthony Davis, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 137, 149 (2012).
213 Haney, supra note 210, at 729.
214 See infra text accompanying notes 248-81.
208 [Vol. 3
214
University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol3/iss1/8
2013] "THEY'RE PLANTING STORIES IN THE PRESS" 209
to which the available research has, in any way, penetrated this miasma of distorted
thought and action, and then consider the impact that the bad laws - there is no other way
to couch it - have had on individuals and society.
2. Media Rhetoric
The cliche "if it bleeds, it leads" has become the mantra for print journalism's
attitude towards crime of all sort,2 1 5 and "encapsulates the media's unrelenting obsession
with sensational crimes."216 It is not the actuality of crime, but its "symbolic display" that
217has captured the nation. Between 1990 and 1993, crime leapt from the fifth to the first
most covered topic on the national evening news.218 It is the most popular news
category.2 1 9 Popular law and order images are attributable largely to the influences of the
220mass media. Media and the law most regularly intersect at the point of reporting of
crime.221 The resulting over-reporting of crime itself may cause the populace to believe
222 ,223crime runs rampant, resulting in calls for "more punitive responses to crime,"
224notwithstanding the reality that crime rates have declined. The crimes least likely to
225occur in real life are the ones most likely to be emphasized by the media.
215 See, e.g., RICHARD L. FOX ET AL., TABLOID JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF MEDIA FRENZY 6-7
(2d ed. 2007).
216 Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717,
735 (2009); Sara Sun Beale, The NewsMedia's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News
Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397 (2006); see also, Robert Paul Doyle & Craig Haney,
Proposition 83, Framing and Public Attitudes Toward Sex Offenders: An Application of Heuristic Models of
Social Judgment (Aug. 10, 2009) (working paper), available at http:!!
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1444688, at 3 ("In modem times, the focus on criminal justice
borders on an obsession.").
217
Hayward, supra note 14, at 1.
218 Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black Males in America, 5 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 281, 287 (2012).
219 JAMES T. HAMILTON: ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT TO SELL: HOW THE MARKET TRANSFORMS INFORMATION
INTO NEWS 82 (2004).
220 THEODORE SASSON, CRIME TALK: HOW CITIZENS CONSTRUCT A SOCIAL PROBLEM 126 (1995), citing
ROBERT ELIAS, VICTIMS STILL (1993).
221 See, e.g., Samuel Gross, DavidBaldus and the Legacy ofMcCleskey v. Kemp, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1905, 1922
(2012) (citing statistics).
222 See George A. Weiss, ProsecutorialAccountability after Connick v. Thompson, 60 DRAKE L. REv. 199, 230
(2011), discussing ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 6
(2007). Attentiveness to television correlates strongly with fear of crime. SASSON, supra note 220, at 3 (citing
George Gerbner et al., The "Mainstreaming" ofAmerica: Violence Profile No. 11, 30 J. COMI. 10 (1980)); see
generally, Sarah Eschholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the Research, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
37 (1997).
223 Dowler, supra note 12, at 111.
224 Catherine Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws That Have Swept the
Country, 58 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 37 (2010); Beale, supra note 216, at 409. "The trends in crime news have been
going up as actual crime has declined." W. Lance Bennet, The Twilight of Mass Media News: Markets,
citizenship, Technology, and the Future ofJournalism, in Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment in Action
111, 118 (Timothy Cook ed. 2005), quoting Richard Morin,AnAirwave ofCrime: While TV Coverage of
Murders Has Soared -- Feeding Public Fears - Crime Is Actually Down, WASH. POST (national weekly edition),
(Aug. 18, 1997), at 34. This may, to some significant measure, be because people can "experience crime and
criminal justice via the media and come away with the sensation ofactual experience." Ray Surette & Rebecca
Gardiner-Bess, Media Entertainment and Crime: Prospects and Concerns, in INTERNATIONAL CRIME, supra
note 202(emphasis added).
225 SURETTE, supra note 15, at 34.
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Crime reporting is not only superficial, it is also prosecution-biased.226 By way of
example, Michael Tonry places the inspiration for much of the sexual predator legislation
on the "national media, especially television, [that] permeate nearly every pore of
American life in vivid, repetitive, often hysterical colors, and [on] conservative American
politicians [who] have for nearly two decades been playing the crime card and
exacerbating public fears and then proposing or enacting repressive legislation in order to
,227allay them." Crime reporting is, also, factually, often simply wrong. A study of crime
reporting in Australia, by way of example, concluded that reportage was frequently
incorrect as to prevalence of violence, the individuals responsible for violence, and
distribution of violence.2 2 8
This call for more punitive responses is especially so in the area of sex-related
crimes with juvenile victims; "the media knows that stories of the most vulnerable
amongst us caught up in narratives of sex and violence will capture viewers and
readers."229 The media coverage that focuses disproportionately on violent crime, distorts
perceptions of actual criminal offending in multiple ways,230 -portrays criminal defendants
as less than human,"231 and leads, as will be discussed subsequently in this part, to the
enactment of laws that may actually increase sex offender recidivism rates.232
3. Public Pressure
The media's obsessive preoccupation with the fear of violence leads inexorably
to public pressure on legislators to enact more repressive legislation and on judges to
interpret such laws in ways that ensure lengthier periods of incarceration for offenders.
The mass media "has played a pivotal role in framing the sex-offender crackdown as a
domestic 'war."'233 Its portrayal of a "largely ineffective" criminal justice system
heightens fear;234 fictionalized portrayals of crime on television dramas may lead viewers
226 William R. Montross, Jr. & Patrick Mulvaney, Virtue and Vice: Who Will Report on the Failings ofthe
American Criminal Justice System? 61 STAN. L. REv. 1429, 1447 (2009) (attributing this bias, in large part, to
changes in the American publishing business); see also HERBERT J. GANS, DEMOCRACY AND THE NEWS 21- 55
(2003) (on how market forces distort the news), as discussed in Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling and the
Fourth Amendment: Of Terrorism, Slippery Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195, 231 n.
218 (2005). On how and why the entertainment media's portrayal of crime and justice is "pro crime control," see
SURETTE, supra note 15, at 39. On the impact of the media and election-year politics on the passage of crack
sentencing provisions, see David Angeli, A "Second Look" at Crack Cocaine Sentencing Policies: One More
Try for Federal Equal Protection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1211, 1223-28 (1997).
227 Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1751, 1786
(1999).
228 Mark Israel & Rick Sarre, Defining, Recording and Reporting Crime, in CONSIDERING CRIME & JUSTICE:
REALITIES & RESPONSES 1, 21 (Rick Sarre & John Tomaino eds., 2003, rev. ed.) (CONSIDERING CRIME).
229 Brian P. LiVecchi, "The Least of These:" A Constitutional Challenge to North Carolina's Sexual Offender
Laws and N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-208.18, 33 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 53, 54 (2010). On the presentation of sex crime
stories on television news in general, see Kenneth Dowler, Sex, Lies and Videotape: The Presentation ofSex
Crime in Local Television News, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 383 (2006).
230 Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REv. 571, 572 n. 4 (2011), discussing
Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 749 (2005).
231 Lynne Henderson, Revisiting Victim's Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 383, 395.
232 See, e.g., J.J. Prescott & J.E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal
Behavior? 54 J. L. & ECON. 161 (2011).
233 Corey Rayburn Yung, The Ticking Sex-Offender Bomb, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 81, 87 (2012).
234 Dowler, supra note 12, at 120.
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to believe that "all offenders are 'monsters' to be feared."235 The media, in short, shapes
and produces the reality of crime,236 as it influences "factual perceptions of the world."237
This is all the more troubling because the complexity of crime-related problems
,238"is a topic "about which most citizens have little or no direct experience." So, 'the
sensational headlines about a notorious sex offender will continue to instill fear in the
American public regarding sexual abuse, [leaving] people with a sense of hopelessness
and helplessness in addressing the problem."239 They then turn to the tool of political
pressure.240 And politicians gladly oblige by "inflaming the rhetoric ... building upon a
,241social fear of sex offenders." Politicians are, of course "experts at directing how the
public thinks."242 This is all further exacerbated by the way that society (1) accepts the
243stereotype that persons with mental illness are evil, and (2) accepts the stereotype that
all sex offenders are mentally ill,244 a conflation sanctioned by the Supreme Court's
decision in Kansas v. Hendricks.2 45
Much of the "crackdown" on sex offenders "is motivated by a general public
hatred of them as a group, which is fueled in great part by sensational media coverage."246
And this is not new. According to Professor Deborah Denno, earlier sex crime panics -
from 1937 to 1940 and from 1949 to 1955 - were similarly fueled by "a vast change in
media reports of sex crimes that were independent of the rise or fall of the actual number
of reports of sex crimes."247
235 Id. On how fictional television shows focusing on forensic analysis have become icons "for anxieties within
the legal system about truth finding and legal outcomes" and raise questions about "the future of the rule of law,"
see Christina Spiesel, Trial by Ordeal: CSI and the Rule ofLaw, in LAW, CULTURE AND VISUAL STUDIES (Anne
Wagner & Richard Sherwin eds. 2013) (in press).
236 Hayward, supra note 14, at 3.
237 SURETTE, supra note 15, at 102.
238 Haney, supra note 210, at 690.
239 Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing SexualAbuse in America: Legislating Tougher Laws or Public
Education and Prevention, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 303, 308 (1997).
240 See, e.g., Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 43 (1998); Eric S.
Janus, Closing Pandora's Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics ofSexual Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
1233, 1233-50 (2004) (discussing how the effect of politics and public outcry fuels the expansion of sexually
violent predator programs).
241 Yung, supra note 233, at 86.
242 Jeffrey Rachlinski, Selling Heuristics, 64 ALA. L. REv. 389, 413 (2012).
243 See Michael L. Perlin, "She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl ": Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and the
Irrelevance of "Ordinary Common Sense," 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 9 (2003) [Perlin, Neonaticide]
(discussing the stereotype of persons with mental illness as evil); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The
Symbolism Mythology ofInsanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 626 (1989-1990)
[Perlin, Myths] ("[historically], mental illness was tied to notions of religion and traditionally seen as God's
punishment for sin"); on the impact of media focus on the reinforcement of stereotypes in vivid cases involving
individuals with mental illness, see Matthias Angermeyer & Beate Schulze, Reinforcing Stereotypes: How the
Focus on Forensic Cases in News Reporting May Influence Public Attitudes Towards the Mentally Ill, 24 INT'L J.
L. & PSYCHIATRY 469 (2001).
244 See, e.g., Fred Cohen, The Limits of the JudicialReform of Prisons: What Works; What Does Not, 40 NO. 5
CRIM. L. BULL. ART. 1 (2004) ("it is erroneous to view all sex offenders as mentally ill or disordered and in need
of treatment").
245 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (rejecting constitutional challenges to sexually violent predator commitment statute); see
Perlin, supra note 197, at 1271.
246 Rodriguez, supra note 201, at 1057.
247 Denno, supra note 22, at 1344-45, 1346 n. 138 (discussing role of sensationalistic media reports in the 1930s
and citing then-contemporaneous sources).
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In short, media distortion feeds public panic and anxieties, and leads inexorably
to the sort of legislation under consideration in this Article. In the next section, we will
discuss why the public continues to consciously close its eyes to empirical realities and,
rather, chooses to believe, as unquestionable truth, the incessant distortions of reality that
are repeated in an endless loop by the media.
C. The Pernicious Power of Heuristics 248
"Heuristics" is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to the implicit
249thinking devices that individuals use to simplify complex, information-processing tasks,
the use of which frequently leads to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions,250
and causes decision-makers to "ignore or misuse items of rationally useful
information."251 One single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract,
252colorless data upon which rational choices should be made. Empirical studies reveal
253
jurors' susceptibility to the use of these devices. Similarly, legal scholars are
248 This section is largely adapted from MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, chapter 2 (2013) (in press), and from 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN
& HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 2.4 (3d ed. 2014) (in press).
249 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and
Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 12-17 (1990) [Perlin, Psychodynamics]; see generally Michael Saks &
Robert Kidd, Human Information Processing andAdjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 123
(1980-8 1); Robert Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship
Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (1986); Wim De Neys,
Sofie Cromheeke & Magda Osman, Biased but in Doubt: Conflict and Decision Confidence, available at
http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/joumal.pone.0015954 (2011).
250 See, e.g., Saks & Kidd, supra note 249; Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Questions of
Competency? Stripping the Facade From United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957 (1990) [Perlin,
Facade] (arguing that courts' use of heuristic reasoning has led to irrational and erroneous decisions); Michael L.
Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma ofthe Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the 1990s, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 29, 52-54 (1992) [Perlin, Dilemma]; John Carroll & John W. Payne, The Psychology ofthe Parole
Decision Process: A Joint Application ofAttribution Theory and Information-Processing Psychology, in
COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13, 21 (John Carroll & John Payne eds., 1976); John Coverdale et al, A
Legal Opinion's Consequences for Stigmatisation of the Mentally Ill; Case Analysis, 7 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL.
& L. 192 (2000) (arguing that the media's oversimplification of facts from a case note of a defendant with a
history of mental illness has led to a general stigmatization of those with mental illness).
251 See Perlin, Facade, supra note 250, at 966 n.46 (quoting Carroll & Payne, supra note 250, at 21); Perlin,
supra note 36, at 1417 (same); Douglas Mossman, Dangerousness Decisions: An Essay on the Mathematics of
Clinical Violence Prediction and Involuntary Hospitalization, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 100 n.32
(1995) (quoting Perlin, supra note 44, at 660). See also, Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical
Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 57 n.115 (1992)
[Perlin, Fatal Assumption] (Heuristics are "simplifying cognitive devices that frequently lead to ...
systematically erroneous decisions through ignoring or misusing rationally useful information"). For a
comprehensive overview, see Donald Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing
Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329
(1992); see also Philip Gould & Patricia Murrell, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Cognitive Complexity: An
Overview, 29 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 2117 (2002).
252 See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill": How Will Jurors Respond to
Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 892 (2009). See generally, David
Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policy 19 STAN. LAW. 10, 13 (1984). President Reagan's famous
"welfare queen" anecdote is thus a textbook example of heuristic behavior. See, e.g., Perlin, Psychodynamics,
supra note 249 at 16 n.59, 20. On the failures of the vividness heuristic as a cognitive device, see Amitai Aviram,
The Placebo Effect ofLaw: Law's Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 73-74 (2006).
253 See, e.g., Jonathan Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the
Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247, 264-65 (1990); Perlin,
Psychodynamics, supra note 249 at 3 9-53; Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the
Idea ofa Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1050 (1991); Joel Lieberman & Daniel
Krauss, The Effects ofLabeling, Expert Testimony, and Information Processing Mode on Juror Decisions in SVP
Civil Commitment Trials, 6 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 25 (2009); see also Caton
Roberts & Stephen Golding, The Social Construction of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity, 15 LAW & HUM.
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notoriously slow to understand the way that the use of these devices affects the way
individuals think.25 The use of heuristics "allows us to willfully blind ourselves to the
gray areas' of human behavior,"255 and predispose "people to beliefs that accord with, or
,,256are heavily influenced by, their prior experiences.
Elsewhere, one of us has argued:
[T]estimony [in mental disability law cases] is further warped by a
heuristic bias. Expert witnesses--like the rest of us--succumb to the
seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking and
employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect or attribution
theory in their testimony. This testimony is then weighed and evaluated
by frequently sanist fact-finders. Judges and jurors, both consciously
and unconsciously, often rely on reductionist, prejudice-driven
stereotypes in their decision-making, thus subordinating statutory and
case law standards as well as the legitimate interests of the mentally
disabled persons who are the subject of the litigation. Judges'
predispositions to employ the same sorts of heuristics as do expert
witnesses further contaminate the process.257
Thus, through the "availability" heuristic, we judge the probability or frequency
of an event based upon the ease with which we recall it.258 Through the "typification"
heuristic, we characterize a current experience via reference to past stereotypic
behavior;259 through the "attribution" heuristic, we interpret a wide variety of additional
information to reinforce pre-existing stereotypes.260 Through the heuristic of the
"hindsight bias," we exaggerate how easily we could have predicted an event
beforehand.261 Through the heuristic of "outcome bias," we base our evaluation of a
262decision on our evaluation of an outcome. Through the "representative heuristic," we
BEHAV. 349, 372 (1991) (explaining that jurors' pre-existing attitudes toward insanity defense are the strongest
predictor of individual verdicts).
254 Thomas Tomlinson, Pattern-Based Memory and the Writing Used to Refresh, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1461, 1461-62
(1995) (citing Perlin, Myths, supra note 243, at 611-12). But see, Stephen Ellmann, What We Are Learning, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 171, 196-97 (2011/2012) (quoting Brook K. Baker, Practice-Based Learning: Emphasizing
Practice and Offering Critical Perspectives on the Dangers of "Co-Op "tation, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 619, 628
(2011/2012) (on how "learning in the workplace promotes confrontation of ineffective heuristics and their
replacement with genuine understandings")).
255 Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 243, at 27.
256 Russell Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural Iconography and Insanity, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1381 (2009).
257 Perlin, supra note 44, at 629; Michael L. Perlin, "They Keep ItAll Hid": The Ghettoization of Mental
Disability Law and Its Implications for Legal Education, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 857, 875 (2010).
258 Perlin, supra note 36, at 1417; see also, M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention ofHealth Law, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 247,
278 n.107 (2003), discussed in Covey, supra note 256, at 1381 n. 24. On the availability heuristic in general, see
Rachlinski, supra note 242, at 399-401. On the availability heuristic's "potential for exploitation," see id. at 405.
On how this substantiates Walter Lippmann's observation that the "pictures in [people's] heads" determine their
political choices, see SHANTO IYENGAR, Is ANYONE RESPONSIBLE? How TELEVISION FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES
135 (1991).
259 Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 111,
125 (1991) (use of the typification heuristic by which a treating doctor slots "patients into certain categories, and
prescribes a similar regimen for all.").
260 See Perlin, supra note 252, at 892. See generally, Laura Stephens Khoshbin & Shahram Khoshbin, Imaging
the Mind, Minding the Image: An Historical Introduction to Brain Imaging and the Law, 33 AM. J.L. & MED.
171, 171, 182 (2007). (discussing how we attribute human behavior "to a physical source in the head").
261 Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives ofJurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of Mitigating Mental
Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL. 239, 255 (1994).
262 Id. See generally SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF
FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
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extrapolate, overconfidently, based upon a small sample size of which we happen to be
aware.26 Through the heuristic of "confirmation bias," people tend to favor "information
that confirms their theory over disconfirming information."2 6 4
Research confirms that heuristic thinking dominates all aspects of the mental
265disability law process whether the question is one of involuntary civil commitment law,
violence assessment,266 medication refusal,267 questions of diagnostic accuracy, 26 the
269 270insanity defense, incompetency to stand trial procedures, the relationship between
homelessness and deinstitutionalization,271 the impact of neuroimaging evidence in the
Kalneman et al. eds., 1982) [ JUDGMENT]; RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980) (all discussing heuristics in general); Hal R. Arkes,
Principles in Judgment/Decision Making Research Pertinent o Legal Proceedings, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 429
(1989) (hindsight and outcome biases); Neal V. Dawson et al., Hindsight Bias: An Impediment o Accurate
Probability Estimation in Clinicopathologic Conferences, 8 MED. DECISION MAKING 259 (1988) (hindsight
bias); Anthony N. Doob & Julian V. Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes and Attitudes Toward
Sentencing, 16 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCI. 269 (1984) (vividness effect); Shari S. Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The
Myth ofJudicial Leniency in Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73 (1989) (same) Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight,,
Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975) (both biases); Harold Kelley, The Process of Causal
Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1973) (attribution); Dan Russell, The Causal Dimension Scale: A
Measure ofHow Individuals Perceive Causes, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1137 (1982) (same); Saks
& Kidd, supra note 249 (availability); David Van Zandt, Common Sense Reasoning, Social Change, and the
Law, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 894 (1987) (typification). In mental health contexts, see, e.g., Harold Bursztajn et al.,
"Magical Thinking, " Suicide, and Malpractice Litigation, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 369 (1988);
David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in Mental Health
Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 485 (1989).
263 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Beliefin the Law ofSmall Numbers, in JUDGMENT, supra note
262, at 23, 24-25, as discussed in Perlin, supra note 252, at 898 n. 89.
264 Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1587, 1594 (2006), as discussed in Covey, supra note 256, at 1381 n. 22.
265 Virginia A. Hiday & Lynn Newhart Smith, Effects of the Dangerousness Standard in Civil Commitment, 15 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 449 (1987) (aberrant behavior by small number of patients in sample studied "distort[ed]
outcome perceptions;" mental health professionals significantly overstate percentage of involuntary civil
commitment cases that began as police referrals and thatjeopardized staff safety); accord Henry J. Steadman et
al., Psychiatric Evaluations ofPolice Referrals in a General Hospital Emergency Room, 8 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 39 (1986); R. Michael Bagby & Leslie Atkinson, The Effects ofLegislative Reform on Civil
CommitmentAdmissions Rates: A Critical Analysis, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 45, 46 (1988).
266 Jennifer Murray & Mary E. Thomson, Applying Decision Making Theory to Clinical Judgments in Violence
Risk Assessment, 2 EUR. J. PSYCHOL. 150 (2010).
267 See Perlin, supra note 259, at 125 (discussing Watkins v. United States, 589 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1979) (doctor
prescribed 50-day supply of Valium without taking medical history or checking patient's medical records), Hale
v. Portsmouth Receiving Hosp., 338 N.E.2d 371 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1975) (doctor failed to change prescription
following his observation of side-effects and onset of self-destructive behavior on patient's part), and Rosenfeld
v. Coleman, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 635 (1959) (doctor prescribed addictive drugs so as to help patient see nature of
his addictive personality)). See generally, 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL, § 7A-6.4a (2d ed. 2000).
268 See also Arkes, supra note 262; David Faust, Data Integration in Legal Evaluations: Can Clinicians Deliver
on Their Premises?, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 469, 480 (1989) (discussing results found in Robyn Dawes et al.,
Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 1668 (1989); Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT,
supra note 262, at 422; Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration ofProbabilities: The State ofthe Art, in JUDGMENT,
supra note 262, at 305; Michael Saks, Expert Witnesses, Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14 LAW
& HUm. BEHAV. 291, 294 (1990).
269 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 263-331 (1995); Perlin, supra note 36.
270 Perlin, Facade, supra note 250; Perlin, supra note 44.
271 Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63 (1991).
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criminal trial process,272 or the scope of a therapist's duty to protect a third party from a
tortious act by the therapist's patient or client (the so-called Tarasoff obligation).2 it
similarly dominates the public's view of criminal justice policy (animated by a media-
driven fear of crime).274 Additionally, judges - "embedded in the cultural presuppositions
,275 276that engulf us all" - are as susceptible to heuristics as are all other citizens.
So it is with the development of sex offender law and policy. The media's intense
focus on the most heinous sex offenders - making it appear that all persons charged with
"sex crimes" share these characteristics - triggers the availability heuristic and the
representativeness heuristic, "causing the public to perceive most or all so-called sex
offenders as extremely threatening and intractably deviant."277 By way of example, Daniel
Filler has argued that the availability heuristic was significantly responsible for the
2781
passage of Megan's Law. James Billings and Crystal Bulges explain comprehensively:
[T]he representativeness heuristic theory hypothesizes that people judge
the likelihood of events by how well they match any previously formed
representations of such an event. For example, individuals are more
likely to believe all sex offenders are similar to those sex offenders they
have already seen. Because most people's readily accessible memories
of sex offenders are derived from violent and outrageous media
depictions, they are more likely to believe that all sex offenders are like
279those they see on TV. .. [O]ne of the great dangers of the
representativeness heuristic is that it encourages maintenance of these
beliefs to the exclusion of other reliable information. Thus, people who
come to believe sex offenders are violent predators in this way are very
likely to ignore more accurate information that advises toward more
realistic beliefs.
[Another] example of psychological theory demonstrating the power of
media to portray false images is the availability heuristic. The
availability heuristic states that individuals judge the likelihood of
events by the availability of similar occurrences in their memory. Under
this theory, therefore, if instances of violent sexual offense readily come
to mind, individuals will presume their occurrence to be more frequent
than it really is. The available memories may also include fiction; if
272 Michael L. Perlin, "And I See Through Your Brain ": Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, and the
Impact ofAntipsychotic Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4,
5.
273 Perlin, Dilemma, supra note 250; see also, Michael L. Perlin, "You Got No Secrets to Conceal": Considering
the Application ofthe TarasoffDoctrine Abroad, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 611 (2006). In Tarasoffv. Regents ofthe
Univ. ofCal., 551 P.2d 334, 347-48 (Cal. 1976), the California Supreme Court held that therapists have a duty to
reveal confidential information about a patient where the patient presents a serious danger of violence to another.
274 See, e.g., Singleton, supra note 4, at 603-04 (discussing the vividness heuristic and the availability heuristic in
this context).
275 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 47 (2000) (quoting Anthony
D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture ofIndeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 329, 332 (1991)).
276 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 784 (2001) (discussing
judicial susceptibility to heuristics and biases when making decisions).
277 Julia T. Rickert, Denying Defendants the Benefit ofa Reasonable Doubt: Federal Rule ofEvidence 609 and
Past Sex Crime Convictions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 213, 228 (2010) (citing Doyle & Haney, supra
note 216).
278 Filler, supra note 200, at 346.
279 On how the availability heuristic affects the way viewers process TV news in general, see IYENGAR, supra
note 258, at 130-3 1.
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someone has just seen a movie about a sex offender, he is more likely to
inflate the rate of sex offense he believes to be accurate. The media
contribute to this theory by providing the prior instances of sex offense
with which to compare current events. This is especially true if the
media are presenting more violent sex crime information than
nonviolent sex crime information; people will thus overestimate the rate
of sex offense in general as well as the incidence of violent sex offense.
Because most sex offenses are nonviolent, these media portrayals of
violent sex offenses cause people to increase their belief in the
prevalence of such crimes.28 0
We believe it is impossible to understand the thrall in which the "sex offender
story" has captured the public without understanding the pernicious power of these
211
cognitive-simplifying heuristics.
D. The Impact of the Laws
1. Introduction
There can no longer be any question that sex offender laws were enacted without
any consideration being given to the valid and reliable research available to (and
accessible by) the lawmakers at the time of enactment, and that, frequently, legislators
were never asked questions that would have been "essential to understand whether such
legislation would be effective in its goal of community protection."282 This failure to
consider such data calls into question the legitimacy of all such legislation.28 Sexual
offender registration laws were enacted "without any systematic study of their
consequences"284 or of the diagnostic accuracy involved in the classification of such
2815offenders. These diagnostic tools that support confinement and containment continue to
2816be flawed. The available evidence indicates that sex offender residency statutes do not
protect children and, contrarily, "might increase the danger to the community."
280 James A. Billings & Crystal L. Bulges, Maine's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Wise or
Wicked? 52 ME. L. REV. 175, 242 (2000) (footnotes omitted). See also, Michael L. Perlin & John Douard,
"Equality, I Spoke That Word/As Ifa Wedding Vow ": Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized
Persons, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 20 (2008-09) ("Every time Detective Benson or Stabler--on NBC's popular
Law and Order: SVUprogram--says, 'There's no cure. And they all do it again,' that speaks to society's [false
ordinary common sense] about this topic").
281 See Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 251, at 57 n.115. Cf Rachlinski, supra note 242, at 415
(concluding that reliance on heuristics is "inevitable").
282 Karen Terry, Sex Offenders: Editorial introduction, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 57, 57 (2003). On the
frequent disconnect between research findings and adopted legislative policies, see Michael Tonry & David
Green, Criminology and Public Policy in the USA and UK, in THE CRIMINOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC
POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER HOOD 485, 508-10 (Roger G. Hood et al eds. 2003). On how reliable
research is often consciously ignored, see Joan Petersilia, Policy Relevance and the Future of Criminology, 29
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1991).
283 See generally Singleton, supra note 4, at 625.
284 J.J. Prescott, Do Sex Offender Registries Make Us Less Safe? 35 REGULATION 48, 48 (Summer 2012).
285 See Michael First & Robert Halon, Use ofDSMParaphilia Diagnoses in Sexually Violent Predator
Commitment Cases, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 443 (2008). See also, Robert Prentky et al., Sexually
Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357361 (2006).) (citing
twin concerns that "good science" will be unrecognized or misunderstood by the law, and that the pressures of
the law will not only use but encourage "bad science").
286 John Matthew Fabian, The Risky Business of Conducting Risk Assessments for Those Already Civilly
Committed as Sexually Violent Predators, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81 (2005).
287 Singleton, supra note 4, at 616.
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The common wisdom is that - per the television series, Law and Order: SVU -
recidivism rates are near 100% for sex offenders.2 The valid and reliable research paints
an entirely different picture: Department of Justice statistics make clear that, "not only do
few sex offenders get rearrested for committing a new sex crime, but sex offenders are
less likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for any crime at all."289 Beyond that,
such research also suggests that currently-prevailing legislation "may actually increase the
amount of risk in a community."
29 0
As we concluded in an earlier article: These laws do little to protect the public;
instead, they serve to ostracize, isolate and destroy any hope of integration, and,
contrarily, responding to community pressures, potentially increase the likelihood of
recidivism and achieve the exact opposite effect intended by the legislatures.291
The laws, then, are fatally flawed. The next question that must be considered is
this: to what extent is the judiciary - allegedly the bulwark of freedom in the face of
oppressive and discriminatory legislation292 - susceptible to the same heuristic panic? In
this next section, we will first consider the extent to which, generally, public opinion and
the media affect judicial decision-making, and will then consider briefly three other areas
of the law - civil and criminal - in which the impact of the media and public pressure
have been clearly demonstrated.
2. The Public and the Courts
Political scientist Thomas Marshall has argued persuasively that the Supreme
Court is largely successful as a policy-maker in part because it tends to follow public
opinion, more often than not issuing decisions the public will be inclined to support,293 and
that the Court seems particularly likely to issue a majoritarian decision during "'crisis
times' - times when public attention is focused closely on an issue."294 In concluding that
the Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks fit into this metric, Professor Michelle
Johnson observed that "well-established constitutional principles may be curtailed in order
to maintain public belief in and compliance with government policy,"295 a belief stemming
from the public's "strong opinions about the release of sex offenders from prison."2 9 6
288 See Perlin & Douard, supra note 280, at 20.
289 See Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing Away the Key: Should States Follow U.S. v. Comstock by Expanding
Sexually Violent Predator Commitments?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 391, 396-97 (2012) (citing Patrick A.
Langan, Erica L. Schmitt & Matthew R. Durose, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pub. No. NCJ
198281, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Releasedfrom Prison in 1994 (2003), at 2).
290 Alissa Ackerman & Karen Terry, Faulty Sex Offender Policies, in FLAWED CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES: AT
THE INTERSECTION OF THE MEDIA, PUBLIC FEAR, AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 149, 162 (Frances P. Reddington
& Gene Bonham eds., 2012).
291 Cucolo& Perlin, supra note 28, at 5, citing Zgoba et al, supra note 111 (authors thoroughly examined
efficacy and cost of Megan's Law by tracking 550 randomly selected sex offenders released between 1990 and
2000 and comparing 10 years before and 10 years after the law was enacted; no reduction in reoffending and no
reduction in the number of victims found; costs increased exponentially by $3.9 million per year by 2007).
292 For the historical perspective, see sources cited in Craig Stem, What's a Constitution among Friends?--
Unbalancing Article III, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1043, 1044 n. 3 (1998).
293 See Michelle Johnson, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Sentencing ofSexual Predators, 8 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 39, 40 (1998) (citing, inter alia, THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME
COURT 191-92 (1989)).
294 
Id. at 41 (citing MARSHALL, supra note 293, at 83); see also, David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular
Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 2047, 2070-71 (2010) ("as compared to state judges in appointive and
merit selection jurisdictions, judges facing elections, particularly partisan elections, are more likely to decide
cases in a manner consistent with majority opinion").
295 Johnson, supra note 293, at 85.
296 Johnson, supra note 293, citing Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court:
Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 Am. J. POL. SCI., 468, 493 (1997).
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Further, archival research has uncovered evidence that Supreme Court justices "have been
keenly interested in media portrayals of the Court, or that justices have made various
efforts to ingratiate themselves with journalists."297 This is, perhaps, connected to the
findings that positive media coverage increases support for the Court, 29 and that the
manner in which the media reports on issues surrounding the judicial branch has a
substantial impact on public perceptions of the judiciary.299
Judicial elections have become "high-profile political battles."3 0 0 Scholars that
have studied the impact of public opinion on judicial decisions in state courts - especially
where judges sit for election - have concluded that, as elections approach, judges avoid
controversial rulings and become more conservative in deciding criminal cases,301 and that
liberal judges "curb their support" for criminal defendants "in order to avoid opposition
from law and order groups."302 Other judges run for re-election on a "platform" of having
"issued rulings to simplify the prosecution of sexual predators."303 The evidence clearly
supports "the widespread belief that judges respond to political pressure in an effort to be
reelected .. 304
305Elections have a "chilling effect" on judicial independence, and even, in the
cases of appellate judges, on the issuance of dissents from majority opinions.306 And
297 Bradley W. Joondeph, Judging and Self-Presentation: Towards a More Realistic Conception ofthe Human
(Judicial) Animal Reviewing: Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior,
48 SANTA CLARAL. REV. 523, 256 (2008).
298 Mark D. Ramirez, Procedural Perceptions and Support for the U.S. Supreme Court, 29 29 POL. PSYCHOL.
675, 676 (2008).
299 Rachel Luberda, The Fourth Branch of the Government: Evaluating the Media's Role in Overseeing the
Independent Judiciary, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 507, 515 (2008).
300 Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 791
(2010).
301 G. Alan Tarr, Politicizing the Process: The New Politics ofState Judicial Elections, in BENCH PRESS: THE
COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 52, 58 (Keith J. Bybee ed. 2007) (BENCH PRESS).
302 LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 121 (2006). See
also, Gregory Huber & Sanford Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?
48 AM. J. POLL. SCI. 247 (2004) (elected judges will become more punitive as standing for reelection
approaches).
303 Norman Reimer, Fear Unleashed: Money, Power and the Threat to Judicial Independence, 34 CHAMPION at
9,10 (Nov. 2010). See, e.g., Tarr, supra note 301, at 54 for an account of the impact of advertising on judicial
elections. See also Devera B. Scott et al., The Assault on Judicial Independence and the Uniquely Delaware
Response, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 217, 232-234 (Summer 2009) (discussing how ajudge thwarted a campaign for
an early retention election by increasing a defendant's controversial sentence from 60 days to a term of three to
ten years in jail). The opportunity for political malevolence here is clear:
A recent advertisement for the Montgomery County Maryland bench featured a mailing
with a mug shot of a convicted sex offender who was allowed to return home. The
mailing, which went out days before the election stated, "enough is enough," but what the
ad failed to mention was that none of the judges who were opponents of the candidate had
anything to do with the case.
Nathan Richard Wildermann, Bought Elections: Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White, 11 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 765, 784-85 (Summer 2003).
304 Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence ofRetention Politics on Judges' Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 169 (Jan.
2009).
30' Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South? Overcoming History, Elections, and
Misperceptions about the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 817, 859 (July 1998). There is also valid
and reliable research that teaches us that judges facing retention elections tend to decide cases in accord with the
ideology of the political party likely to reelect them. See Shepherd, supra note 304; See also, Stephen B. Bright,
Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from
Office for Unpopular Decision?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 310 (May 1997).
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judges are not immune from the impact of "moral panics," flowing from "the public's
passive acceptance of media and politician-driven images of the nature and extent of
crime."3 0 7 Those images, Professor Andrew Taslitz, concludes, "have likewise led the
public to believe that judges impose unduly lenient sentences, despite the ever-harsher
nature of sentences via mandatory minimum legislation, sentencing guidelines, moral
panics, and a host of other mechanisms."3 08
State judicial determinations of the due process rights of sexual predators have
been explicitly found to have "the potential to, at the very least, generate contentious and
hard fought retention bids."3 0 9 Media accounts of crimes are the source that voters
generally use to form their judgments on courtroom sentencing.310 The problem is abetted
by what Mark Obbie calls "results-oriented legal journalism" - "reporting on the outcome
of a court case without acknowledging the legal authority that the court cited in reaching
that outcome."3 11
Judges perceive these threats in "all but identical" ways to the ways that "police
chiefs . . . politicians and [newspaper] editors" perceive them,3 12 threats, again, in
313significant measure due to the increase in the media's reporting of crime. Professor
Catherine Carpenter links this explicitly to the question that we are addressing in this
article:
The proliferation of sex offender registration laws has been linked to the
increased media coverage of child abuse cases involving previously
convicted sex offenders. One additional fact contributes to this
perception. Showcasing high-profile, but rare crimes, turns the symbolic
into the pervasive in the eyes of the public. The effect is a skewed
perception of the likelihood that the crime will be repeated.3 1 4
306 Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence on State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study, 49
J. POL. 1117, 1117 (Nov. 1987).
307 Andrew Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause ofMass Incarceration, 9 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 174 (2011); see Singleton, supra note 4, at 628 (discussing how the laws in question
"pander to the electorate and pass laws driven by community fear and outrage").
30' Taslitz, supra note 307, at 174, citing Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity
Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 860-67 (2000). Interestingly, judges agree that their
sentences are "too lenient on [sexual] offenders." Bumby & Maddox, supra note 209, at 312.
309 Eric W. Buetzow, Ignoring the Supreme Court: State v. White, the Civil Commitment ofSexually Violent
Predators, and Majoritarian Judicial Pressures, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 430 (2006). Notes Professor John La
Fond succinctly: "Judges in Washington State are paid very well. They are also elected. As a result, judges
generally rule in favor of the prosecution on all contested trial issues." John Q. La Fond, Can Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral? Sexual Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants and Policy, 41
ARIz. L. REv. 375, 406 (1999).
30 Paul Robinson et al., The Disutility ofInjustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1940, 1982 (2010).
." Mark Obbie, Winners and Losers, in BENCH PRESS, supra note 301, at 159. On how this problem may be
exacerbated by the ease of Internet access and a concomitant "new era of crabbed and narrow-minded
readership." See Dahlia Lithwick, The Internet and the Judiciary: We Are All Experts Now, in BENCH PRESS,
supra note 301, at 178.
312 Philip Jenkins, Failure to Launch: Why Do Some Social Issues Fail to Detonate Moral panics? 49 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOL. 35, 35 (2009), citing HALL ET AL, supra note 211, at 16. Professor Craig Haney has noted: "Media
myths and misinformation substitute for real knowledge for many members of the public who--as citizens,
voters, and jurors--participate in setting policy agendas, advancing political initiatives, and making legal
decisions." Haney, supra note 210, at 690. We believe he could have added easily and accurately added
"judges" to the "citizens, voters, and jurors" phrase.
" Carpenter, supra note 224, at 38.
314 Id., citing, in part, Singleton, supra note 4, at 604-05; see also, Johnson, supra note 293 (discussing
generally the public and media influences on courts and on legislatures to enact laws that deal harshly with
convicted sex offenders); Anthony C. Thompson, From Sound Bites to Sound Policy: Reclaiming the High
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In short, when it comes to the questions we are discussing in this paper, judges
are far more like members of the general public than they are unlike them.
3. Judicial Susceptibility to Outside Influence: Some Examples
A brief look at other areas of both the criminal and civil law reveals that judges
are not immune from public pressure and from media assaults. Whether the substantive
issue is the death penalty, sentencing or tort reform, the conclusion is the same: courts are
susceptible to the press and to the threat of electoral opposition.
a. Death Penalty315
Judges are especially responsive to constituent influence in death penalty
cases.316 In three states (Florida, Alabama, and Delaware), judges have the ability to
overturn jury sentences in death penalty cases.317 According to a report done by the Equal
Justice Institute, in Florida (a state where judges are elected), there has not been a single
judicial override of a jury-imposed death penalty in twelve years; in Alabama (another
judicial election state), 92 percent of judicial overrides are to impose death sentences in
cases in which jurors recommended life imprisonment; on the other hand, in Delaware
(where judges are appointed), no judge has ever imposed a death sentence via judicial




A recent Colorado study has concluded that "aggressive media coverage also has
had an impact on sentencing decisions by government officials,"320 a finding that is
consistent with the research that consistently finds that "judges are not immune to public
opinion - or what they perceive public opinion to be,"321 a public opinion that is shaped, in
322
significant measure, by the overrepresentation of crimes of violence. This misinformed
public opinion leads policymakers (including judges) to be reluctant to use less severe
punishments for "fear that would lead to even greater public dissatisfaction with
Ground in Criminal Justice Policy-Making, 38 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 775, 802 (2011) ("The media's role in
shaping prevailing perceptions of crime has policy implications for legislators and judges responsive to shifts in
public opinion.").
. See generally, MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE
STATES 122 (2013).
31 See Melinda Gunn Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts. 54 J. POL. 427, 431
(1992).
1 Michael L. Radelet, Overriding Jury Sentencing Recommendations in Florida Capital Cases: An Update and
Possible Half-Requiem, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 793,794 (2011).









%/0201fill; see generally, DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION:
AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 48 (2010).
39 Ifill, supra note 318; see also, Fred B. Burnside, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury Override,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 1017,1037 (giving examples ofjudges citing their decisions to override jury life sentences in
their campaigns or being voted out of office for their failure to impose or uphold death verdicts). See generally,
Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics ofDeath: Deciding between the Bill ofRights
and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995).
320 Philip A. Chemer, Sentencing for Felony and Misdemeanor Convictions-- Time Actually Served, 30 COLO.
LAW. 27, 31 (Feb. 2010).
321 Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, News Media Influences on Public Views ofSentencing, 14 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 451, 454 (1990).
322 Id. at 452.
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sentencing decisions." Such misinformation feeds the voters' "overwhelming ... desire
[for] courts to get 'tough on crime"'; judicial election-campaign pledges to be "tough on
crime" (and tough-on-crime adjudications) "are designed to channel that desire into
votes."324 Similarly, a United Kingdom study confirms that "increasing and incessant
punitive rhetoric" has had a further important impact on the decisions of sentencers in
England and Wales.325
c. Tort Reform
In an effort to obtain legislation limiting tort liability, insurance lobbyists created
a perception that the tort system overcompensated victims,326 effectively changing the
attitudes of judges "by a corporate public relations campaign targeted at the public in
general and at judges in particular."327 The resultant pro-tort reform media agenda has led
to "an increasingly pro-defendant mind-set among judges," reflected in their propensity
"to reject liability-expanding claims, to defer to legislatures and regulatory agencies, and
,328to use tort reform reasoning in their opinions and decisions. Scholars have attributed
these changes to pro-tort reform propaganda that has occupied such a prominent role in
media writings and commentary.329 Argues Professor Sandra Gavin:
It is clear that much of today's "truth" about products liability reform is
a response to a semantically created political crisis; it is a result of a war
of words taking place in the media rather than the courts. Its foundation
is in impassioned rhetoric, often funded by the very constituents seeking
to profit from its agenda.330
Professor Mark Galanter's explanation of how these perceptions came to
dominate the system sounds startlingly like the discussion above with regard to the
public's views of sex offender cases: "[Tort reformers'] calculating instrumentalism is set
within a complex cycle of media distortion, cognitive overestimation, professional
aggrandizement, judicial vacillation, and popular ambivalence, embracing and scorning
,331the enlarged possibilities of remedy."
4. Conclusion
In both criminal and civil cases, judges - especially judges who face re-election -
are responsive to media influence and constituent pressure. There is no reason to think
323 Id. at 465 (discussing recommendations made in NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON
AND PROBATION, INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990)).
324 Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: "Tough on Crime" Soft on Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52
ARIz. L. REV. 317, 335 (2010).
325 Tim Newbum, "Tough on Crime ": Penal Policy in England and Wales, 36 CRIME & JUST. 425, 459 (2007).
326 Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the Judiciary, 27 GONz. L. REV. 303, 316 (1991).
327 Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo'sRetort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1637, 1719 n.359
(1993) (citing Schwartz, supra note 326).
328 Bruce A. Finzen & Brooke B. Tassoni, Regulation of Consumer Products: Myth, Reality and the Media, 11
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 539 (2002) (citing, inter alia, Schwartz, supra note 326, at 330-33); see also id. at
524 ("Although the tort reform campaign has been multi-layered, taking place in the courts, legislatures and in
Congress, its most effective efforts have been aimed at convincing influential members of the media to champion
a reformist vision of civil justice.").
329 Id. at 539.
..0 Sandra Gavin, Stealth TortReform, 42 VAL. U.L. REV. 431, 459 (Winter 2008).
. Mark Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace ofPunitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1, 11-12.
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they would be any less responsive to such pressure in cases involving sex offenders - the
most despised of all litigants332 - than in these other cohorts of cases.
E. Conclusion
We agree with Prof. Thomas Zander that "diagnosis should never be a pretext for
social control," 333 and with Dr. Robert Prentky and his colleagues that the courts need to
exert "firmer control" over testimony in sexually violent predator hearings that is of
"questionable value."3 3 4 But until we take stock of the realities that we have sketched out
in this section of the article - the impact of media distortions on legislative policies, the
lack of a factual basis for the public's obsessive fears (fears based on "biased recall and
unrealistic crime stereotypes"),335 the ways that such media distortion and public pressures
affect judicial decision-making - we are doomed to endlessly play out a "pathological"
336morality drama. And we do this in spite of the overwhelming empirical evidence that
shows that the laws in question have little or no effect on sexual offending rates and
recidivism.3 37
In the next section of this article, we will consider whether there may, actually,
be some better news ahead, and will discuss the existence and significance of some recent
shifts in media attitudes and approaches, mostly in the context of newer legislative
initiatives at both the state and local levels.
III. A MEDIA SHIFT
A. Introduction
In Parts I and II, we demonstrated the impact of the media on the formation and
sustainability of legislation and judicial decisions involving sex offenders. Over the past
decade, there have been countless stories covering the gruesome details of shocking sexual
crimes, and reports of public outcries of rage and demands for punishment and
retribution.338 However, more recently, the media has begun to increasingly report on
concerns over the effects of these laws and their impact on the realities of community
safety .339 As much as "[t]he media play[s] an important role in the way the public
perceives the criminal justice system" and "present[s] the public with 'an increasingly
distorted view of sex offending,"' 3 4 0 the media can also be viewed as a "messenger" in this
332 See supra text accompanying notes 196-208.
Thomas Zander, Commentary: Inventing Diagnosis for Civil Commitment ofRapists, 36 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY& L. 459, 468 (2008).
334 Robert Prentky et al., Commentary: Muddy Diagnostic Waters in the SVP Courtroom, 36 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 455, 455 (2008).
. Doyle & Haney, supra note 216, manuscript at 24.
336 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 511 (2001).
Logan, supra note 203, at 402, citing, inter alia, Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al., Effects of South Carolina's Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Policy on Deterrence ofAdult Sex Crimes, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
537, 550 (2010); Richard Tewksbury & Wesley G. Jennings, Assessing the Impact of Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notification on Sex-Offending Trajectories, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 570, 572 (2010).
.. See Pollak & Kubrin, supra note 25, at 63 ("The news media allow for private events, or individual
crimes, to become public concerns.").
339 See Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CAL. L. REv. 2093, 2117
(2010).
340 Marcus A. Galeste et al., Sex Offender Myths in Print Media: Separating Fact from Fiction in U.S.
Newspapers, 13 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 4, 5 (2012).
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phenomenon - encouraged to cover the "newsworthy" issues.34 Regardless of whether the
media incites the fear or the fear incites the media to report on the issues in question,342 the
long-view outcome has resulted in judicial decisions and legislation that fail to be
effective in the ultimate goal of ensuring safety and removing sexual predators from
communities. Although, if the media is, in fact, responsible for distorting the facts and
generating fear, then inversely, as it increasingly reports on the defects in legislation and
problems with the laws, we would expect to see an impact on the enactment of subsequent
legislation if it is similarly designed and implemented.
The media has increased its reporting on the concerns over these laws and the
343realities of community safety post-enactment. As other academics have noted, concerns
with this legislation were raised in the early days of the new generation of sex offender
laws, 3 4 4 but articles focused upon the problems with these laws and their ineffectiveness
have steadily increased in recent years, mostly since the enactment of the AWA. 3 45 The
question to ask, then, is this: what effect, if any, has this had on public sentiment and laws
and legislation post 2006?
B. Recidivism Unmasked
News articles have increasingly published pieces on the likelihood of sex
offender recidivism - what was previously published as "common truths" about sex
offenders is now, finally, openly being questioned and challenged in the mainstream
media.346 An article in the Wall Street Journal dispelled prior media reports of re-offense
rates and noted past misconceptions as reflected in a quote from a California legislator in
1996 to the New York Times: '"What we're up against is the kind of criminal who, just as
soon as he gets out of jail, will immediately commit this crime again at least 90 percent of
the time," 3 4 7 and a statement from Fox News in 2005: "Not only are they almost certain to
continue sexually abusing children, but some eventually kill their young victims." 3 48 ABC
News published information on myths about sex offenders and included statistics
(generated from studies in the late 1990s) revealing that "approximately 60 percent of
boys and 80 percent of girls who are sexually victimized are abused by someone known to
the child or the child's family," and that '[r]elatives, friends, babysitters, persons in
positions of authority over the child, or persons who supervise children are more likely
than strangers to commit a sexual assault."3 4 9
341 Singleton, supra note 4, at 602 ("Americans are preoccupied with fear, particularly fear of crime.").
342 See id. at 603 ("Although researchers may disagree about the cause and effect relationship between media
coverage of crime and public perception of crime, there is evidence that the former influences the latter.").
343 See infra text accompanying notes 346-49.
344 See generally Winick, supra note 1 (discussing the therapeutic jurisprudence approach to analyze sex
offender laws).
345 This increase in attention to the problems and concerns of sex offender legislation will be shown, considered,
and discussed throughout this section of the paper.
346 Paul Heroux, Sex Offenders: Recidivism Re-Entry Policy and Facts, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2011, 2:39
PM) (discussing the realities of re-offense in light of national attention to the Jerry Sandusky case, and suggests
that sex offender registries provide a false sense of security), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-
heroux/sex-offenders-recidivism b_976765.html.
347 Carl Bialik, How Likely Are Sex Offenders to Repeat Their Crimes? THE NUMBERS GUY (WALL ST. J. Blog)




AlfythsAbout Sex Offenders, ABC NEwS (Oct. 23, 2008), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90200&page=1#.UVNGtFsjqXQ. Some additional myths listed include:
"most sex offenders reoffend"; "the majority are caught, convicted and in prison"; "sex offense rates are higher
than ever and continue to climb"; "all sex offenders are male"). Id.
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Not only have media outlets more recently readily reported on previously
perceived myths surrounding sex offender recidivism, but, as we will discuss next, news
headlines confirmed that there was a "new" type of sex offender targeting our children.
C. The "Sex Offender" in the News
Within the past decade, media stories have increasingly focused on the "new"
profile of an offender. We are no longer purely fixated on the "stranger predator" as we
were in the 1990s, but are now mesmerized by stories about offenders who had been
otherwise considered upstanding members of the community. Countless news stories are
dedicated to uncovering the child predators in our "places of worship" - both religious3 50
and sports related.351 This new profile of a pedophile has been found in churches,
synagogues, boy scout troops, public schools352 and universities - to name a few. 3 5 3 A
Washington Post article offered staggering statistics of more than 6,100 accused priests
and 16,000 victims since 1950, according to a 2011 analysis by the John Jay College of
Criminal Justice in New York City and the latest annual report by the Center for Applied
Research in the Apostolate, which tracks statistics of abuse by U.S. Catholic priests.3 5 4
Secrecy in an insular community prevented news reports from listing the numbers of
sexual abuse incidents in the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community, but scholars believe that
abuse rates are roughly the same as those in the general population; the limited reports
stem from the fact that most abuse victims are "fearful of being stigmatized in a culture
where the genders are strictly separated and discussion of sex is taboo."3 55
350 Dan Gilgoff, Catholic Church's Sex Abuse Scandal Goes Global, CNN WORLD (March 19, 2010, 10:23 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/03/19/catholic.church.abuse/index.html; Neal Conan, Amidst Church
Scandals, Who Still Joins The Priesthood, NPR: TALK OF THE NATION TRANSCRIPT (Jan. 23, 2013, 1:00 PM)
(explaining that a decade after news of the sex abuse scandal in the Boston archdiocese of the Catholic Church
broke, reports of abuse continue to emerge), http://www.npr.org/2013/01/23/170085074/amidst-church-scandals-
who-still-joins-the-priesthood; A Guide to Catholic Sex Scandals, ABC News (Aug. 23, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/slideshow/guide-catholic-sex-scandals-1 1289279; Barbara Bradley Hagerty,
Abuse Scandal Plagues Hasidic Jews In Brooklyn, NPR (Feb. 2, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=99913807.
351 Kevin Johnson, Sandusky Sentenced in Penn State Sex Scandal, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 2012,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/10/09/sandusky-sentenced-penn-state-sex-scandal/1609101/;
Jesse Mckinley, Coaches Face New Scrutiny on SexAbuse, N.Y TIMES, April 14, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/us/new-scrutiny-on-coaches-in-reporting-sexual-
abuse.html?pagewanted=all; see also An entire CBS News web page is dedicated to "The Penn State Scandal"
with links to numerous articles discussing the Jerry Sandusky child abuse scandal (Assistant Coach of Penn
State's football team who was found guilty on 45 counts of child sexual abuse and convicted of molesting 10
boys over a 15-yearperiod), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/2718-400_162-1332/the-penn-state-scandal/.
352 Not discussed in this article but necessary to note is the intense media focus on young attractive female
schoolteachers who have sex with underage students. See, Michael Winter, Ex-Texas Teacher Guilty ofHaving
Sex With 5 ofHer Students, USA TODAY, Aug. 17,2012, http://content.usatoday.
com/communities/ondeadline/post/2012/08/ex-texas-teacher-guilty-of-having-sex-with-5-of-her-
students/1#.UU4glFsjqXQ; see also The 50 Most Infamous Female Teacher Sex Scandals, ZIMBIO.COM,
http://www.zimbio.com/The+50+Most+lnfamous+Female+Teacher+Sex+Scandals (providing a compilation of
infamous teachers involved in sex scandals).
"'See generally Thomas G. Plante, Priests Behaving Badly: What Do We Know About Priest Sex Offenders?, 10
SEX. ADD. & COMP. 93 (2003); Kathryn A. Dale & Judith L. Alpert, Hiding Behind the Cloth: Child Sexual
Abuse and the Catholic Church, 16 J. CHILD SEX. ABUSE 59 (2007); Henry A. Giroux & Susan Searls Giroux,
Universities Gone Wild Big Money, Big Sports and Scandalous Abuse at Penn State, TRUTH-OUT.ORG (Jan. 12,
2012, 3:09 AM).
354 Cathy Lynn Grossman, Philadelphia Trial Revives Catholic Church Sex Abuse Crisis, USA TODAY, June 7,
2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/story/2012-06-05/philadelphia-priest-sex-abuse-
case/55453208/1.
. Sharon Otterman & Ray Rivera, Ultra Orthodox Shun Their Own for Reporting Child Sexual Abuse, N.Y
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Reports of countless incidents of sexual abuse in the Boy Scouts was revealed
after 20,000 pages of documents dating back to the 1920s was obtained after a two-year
356court battle. Sexual abuse in the world of college sports made media headlines
throughout the country after Assistant Coach Jerry Sandusky, of Penn State's football
team, was found guilty on 45 counts of child sexual abuse and convicted of molesting 10
boys over a 15-year period.357
Yet, the focus on predators in closely-knit religious communities or on NCAA
Division I college campuses has not conjured the same image of an offender that would
otherwise incite public outrage, political movements and calls for legislative mandates that
flowed from the "stranger/pedophile murder" cases.358 For example, numerous cases of
abuse within the Hasidic community have been documented in homogeneous and insular
neighborhoods in Brooklyn, New York, and Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes
has continually been accused by victims' rights advocates of "going easy" on alleged
Hasidic child molesters and rapists who reside in those neighborhoods.3 5 9 Hynes had
additionally refused to identify the sexual abusers in the Hasidic community who had been
charged with offenses.360 The author of an opinion piece in the New York Post stated:
"There exists in this city a group of unparalleled perverts that's wrapped in Teflon .. 361
When the documents detailing suspected abuse in the Boy Scouts were released, concern
over violation of privacy, due process and the possibility that named individuals were
362innocent was noted in a news article. And when evidence surfaced showing that a
356 See Experts Say Posting Boy Scouts'Perversion Files' Online Sends Message Against Protecting Molesters,
FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/10/19/experts-say-posting-boy-scouts-
perversion-files-online-sends-message-against/; ee also Michael Martinez & Paul Vercammen, Attorneys
Release Confidential Boy Scout Files on Alleged Child Sex Abusers, CNN (Oct. 18, 2012, 8:29 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/18/justice/boys-scouts-sex-abuse-report.
.. Johnson, supra note 351; see also Keith Ablow, Sex Offenders at School and Next Door, FOXNEWS.COM
(Nov. 28, 2011) http://www.foxnews.com/health/2011/11/28/sex-offenders-at-school-and-next-door/; see also
Nicole Auerbach, Penn State Abuse Probe is Ongoing, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2011,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigten/story/2011-11-07/Penn-State-sexual-abuse-
investigation-continues/51116880/1.
358 See generally, Johnson supra note 351. Noteworthy legislation that occurred after the Jerry Sandusky scandal
was a Florida law enacted to encourage universities to report sexual abuse and financially penalize them if they
knowingly and willfully fail to. See, e.g., Alyssa Newcomb, After Sandusky, Florida Passes One ofNation's
Toughest Sexual Abuse Reporting Laws, ABC WORLD NEWS (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/sandusky-florida-passes-nations-toughest-sexual-abuse-
reporting/story?id=17434307#.UU4xclsjqXQ ("The Penn State scandal helped shape a new Florida sexual abuse
reporting law that has been called the toughest in the nation, holding universities and individuals financially and
criminally liable for failure to report suspected abuse."). But see, e.g., Michelle Boorstein & William Wan, After
ChildAbuse Accusations, Catholic Priests Often Simply Vanish, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2010 ("[I]t's up to the
individual dioceses how, or whether, they keep tabs on priests who are removed from the ministry or defrocked
after sex-related allegations"); see also Ted Oberg, The Former Priest Pedophile Next Door, ABC 13 (April 21,
2008), http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/in-focus&id=6095496.
359 Anderson Cooper, Hasidic Child Sex Abuse Allegations, CNN (June 18, 2012, 10:50 PM),
http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/1 8/tonight-on-ac360-child-sex-abuse-scandal/ (reporting that District
Attorney Hynes is accused of neglecting the prosecution of abuse in order to appease the Rabbis in order to get
their support and keep his position).
360 Jspace Staff, DA Withholds Names of Sex Offenders from Hasidic Community, JSPACE.COM (April 30, 2012,
4:08 PM), http://wwwjspace.com/news/articles/da-withholds-names-of-sex-offenders-from-hasidic-
community/8770.
36' Andrea Peyser, Protecting the Unholiest Sinners, N.Y. POST, May 24, 2012.
362 Experts Say Posting Boy Scouts' Perversion Files' Online Sends Message Against Protecting Molesters,
supra note 356 ("In ajoint statement, attorneys who worked on the case stated: 'In fact, we are in no position to
verify or attest to the truth of these allegations as they were compiled by the Boy Scouts of America,' the
statement read. 'The incidents reported in these documents attest to notice of potential child abuse given to the
Boy Scouts of America and its affiliates and their response to that notice.'"); see also Michael Martinez and Paul
Vercammen, Attorneys Release Confidential Boy Scouts Files on Alleged SexAbusers, CNN (October 18, 2012),
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beloved and renowned college football coach, Joe Paterno, protected the pedophilic
activities of his colleague, assistant coach Jerry Sandusky, the general community was
hesitant to express itself as to what action, if any, should be taken.363 A CNN report noted
that, "In the aftermath of Sandusky's arrest, Paterno was treated as a victim, a man who
was caught up in something he wasn't aware of. Now we know that was a lie."364 The New
York Times reported that even after Sandusky "made admissions about inappropriate
contact in the shower room" in 1998 to the Penn State campus police, '[n]othing happened
.... Nothing stopped."3 6 5
In the next section, we will look at emerging legislation in the 21st century and
consider whether increased media reports citing low recidivism, identifying offenders who
were trusted members of the community and acknowledging the rarity of the "stranger"
sex crime has had any impact on creating new legislation.
D. Effect on Emerging Legislation
Scandals that have occurred in religious and academic institutions have not
evoked the same level of demand for reactive legislation, but they have kept the focus on
366pedophiles and child molesters in the media. That focus continues to incite the public
and drive legislators to create or reaffirm legislation after every new, shocking sex offense
367story highlighting a "stranger sex crime" case. Despite the current focus on 'familiar"
predators and media accounts pointing to low recidivism and re-offense rates,368 the
Florida Legislature enacted "Jessica's Law" in 2005 after Jessica Lunsford was murdered
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/1 8/justice/boys-scouts-sex-abuse-report ("CNN is not linking to the reports
because it hasn't verified the allegations that they contain and because the attorneys admit that they haven't
checked the veracity of the allegations.").
363 See generally, Johnson, supra note 293; Jessica Tully, Penn State Students Set Up Paterno Statute Watch,
USA TODAY, July 19, 2012; Jay Jennings, Was Sandusky Protected by Football Culture, CNN (June 19, 2012,
3:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/18/opinion/jennings-sandusky-football (discussing how popular sports
icons are idolized and "seem immune to the rules that apply to the rest of us").
364 Roland S. Martin, Joe Paterno was a Coward, CNN (July 15, 2012, 11:10 AM)
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/15/opinion/martin-patemo-coward ("The most powerful men at Penn State failed
to take any steps for 14 years to protect the children who Sandusky victimized," and "documents show[] Patemo,
his family and his legion of supporters lied in order to protect Paterno's name. All he cared about was breaking
the all-time record set by Grambling State head coach Eddie Robinson.").
361 Pete Thamel, State Officials Blast Penn State in Sandusky Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011.
366 See Aaron Levin, Penn State Scandal Draws Attention to Child Sexual Abuse, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, at 14-16
(Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://joumals.psychiatryonline.org/ newsarticle.aspx?articleid= 181079; see also
Melissa DiPento, Following Sandusky Case, Parents Callfor More Education on Sexual Abuse in Schools,
NJ.COM (Oct. 10, 2012, 6:48 AM), http://www.nj.com/gloucester-
county/index.ssf/2012/10/following thesandusky_ casepa.html; Malcolm Gladwell, In Plain View- How Child
Molesters GetAway with It, NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 2012.
367 See, e.g., Jim Doyle, Public's Overriding Fear: Will They Do It Again? /Anxiety Remains Despite Low
Recidivism Among Many Offenders, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 12, 2004 (reporting on the release of
convicted sex offenders from Atascadaro State Hospital); Chris Cassidy, Robert A. DeLeo to Review Bill to
Publicize Sex Offenders, BOSTON HERALD.COM (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://bostonherald.com/newsopinion/localpolitics/2012/12/robertdeleo r view billpublicize sex offenders
("House Speaker Robert A. DeLeo says he will re-evaluate a stalled Beacon Hill bill that would make the names
of even low-level sex offenders public, signing the Bay State on to a national online sex-offender database, after
horrifying child sex abuse charges against a Wakefield man last week."); Jonathan Zimmerman, Sandusky and
SexualAbuse: From Apathy to Panic, PHILLY.COM (June 27, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-06-27/news/
32425600_1_sexual-abuse-summer-camp-male-victims (analyzing our current views on pedophilia: "Rather than
simply vilifying pedophiles like Sandusky, we might also pause to consider how our shifting views of them have
affected American childhood.").
361 Jenkins, supra note 312, at 35.
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by a convicted sex offender.369 The law mandated stiff minimum sentences for child
abusers and a version of Jessica's Law - the Jessica Lunsford Act - was introduced at the
371federal level in 2005, but was never enacted into law by Congress. Without support on a
federal level, individuals and organizations began a movement to encourage all states to
enact similar legislation. Bill O'Reilly - political commentator and host of "The O'Reilly
Factor" on the Fox News Network - created an Internet page to inform and urge all states
,371
to "pass Jessica's Law."
The unsuccessful attempt to enact Jessica's Law on a federal level, was
overshadowed by the politically significant legislative enactment of the Adam Walsh Act
(AWA).372 The AWA -which was developed in response to a boy's abduction by a
stranger sexual predator3 7 3 - was enacted in 2006, despite the wide availability of well-
known, researched valid and reliable studies that showed low recidivism and re-offense
rates by sex offenders, and despite media articles which exposed the unlikely occurrence
374of stranger attacks. The goal of the AWA was to uniformly track on a national level sex
offenders - of whom the public would otherwise be unaware, in spite of the statistical data
demonstrating that 60 percent of boys and 80 percent of girls sexually victimized were
abused by someone they knew.3 7 5
Since the AWA became law, there has been an increase in media reports on its
376failure to keep communities safe. In 2009, newspapers focused their attention on an
expansive study by the New Jersey Department of Corrections and Rutgers University on
the effectiveness of Megan's Law.37 7 The study found that Megan's law "has failed to
deter sex crimes or reduce the number of victims since its passage 15 years ago."3 7 8 The
369 Jessica Lunsford Act, H.R. 1505, 109th Cong. (2005); Associated Press, Fla. Gets Tough New Child-Sex Law,
CBS (Feb. 11, 2009.7:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-692465.html.
370 Jessica Lunsford Act, H.R. 1505, 109th Cong. (2005).
.. Bill O'Reilly, What Is Jessica's Law, THE FACTOR ONLINE, http://www.billoreilly.com/jessicaslaw, ("There is
simply no question that Jessica's Law will save lives, and similar laws need to be instituted in every state. Which
is why we at The Factor have been putting pressure on Governors.").
372 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. §16901 (2006).
" Id. See supra text accompanying notes 163-91.
374 See, e.g., Lin Song & Roxanne Lieb, Adult Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review of Studies, WASHINGTON
STATE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, Jan. 1994, at 1; 30 Kristen M. Zgoba & Leonore M. J. Simon, Recidivism
Rates of Sexual Offenders up to 7 Years Later: Does Treatment Matter?, CRIM. JUST. REV., Sept. 2005, at 155;
see also Jill S. Levenson, Sex Offense Recidivism, Risk Assessment, and the Adam Walsh Act (unpublished study,
Lynn University), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/workGroups/sexoffenders/AWASORNsummary.pdf.
. Jenkins, supra note 312.
376 Regarding the concern over juvenile registration, see also Jacob Perryman, Differing Opinions: Local D.A.,
opponents of changes at odds, TIMES OBSERVER (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://www.timesobserver.com/page/content.detail/id/560865/Differing-Opinions.html?nav=5006 ("It is tragic
that PA will register juveniles as young as 14 years-of-age, potentially for the rest of their lives"); Associated
Press, Dealing with Child-On-Child Sex Abuse Not One Size Fits All, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2012 ("Many
professionals who deal with young offenders object to the [Adam Walsh Act] requirement, saying it can wreak
lifelong harm on adolescents who might otherwise get back on the track toward law-abiding, productive lives.");
Maggie Jones, How Can You Distinguish a Budding Pedophile From a Kid with Real Boundary Problems? N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2007 ("Community notification makes people feel protected - who wouldn't want to know if a
sex offender lives next door? But studies have yet to prove that the law does, in fact, improve public safety.");
see also ABC 20/20, http://abcnews.go.com/2020/AgeOfConsent/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (dedicating an
Internet web page to news articles discussing sex offender laws and "age of consent").
. See Susan K. Livio, Report Finds Megan's Law Fails to Reduce Sex Crimes, Deter Repeat Sex Offenders in
N.J., THE STAR LEDGER, February 7, 2009.
378 Id. (explaining that despite wide community support for these laws, there is little evidence to date, including
this study [conducted by the state Department of Corrections and Rutgers University], to support a claim that
Megan's Law is effective in reducing either new first-time sex offenses or sexual re-offenses); see also David
Morgan, Megan's Law No Deterrent o Sex Offenders, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 1:36 PM),
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study made note of the fact that sex offenses in "New Jersey, as a whole, experienced a
consistent downward trend of sexual offense rates, with a significant change in the trend in
1994 (the year Megan's Law was passed)."3 7 9 Media reports also focused on the estimated
$5.1 million spent in 2007 in order to assist N.J in carrying out the law. 38 0 Other news
reports highlighted the extensive costs other states were facing when trying to conform
their state version of Megan's Law with federal mandates under the AWA.31 California,
which received $135.6 million in its 2009-10 federal allocation, decided the changes - to
3812comply with the AWA - were more costly than the loss of grant money. An article in
the Philly Post, an online newspaper, echoed the concern for costly implementation and
whether the expense was worth the benefit:
There are pushes and petitions for all sorts of laws based on a single,
tragic instance: "Jessica's Law," "The Adam Walsh Act," "Kyleigh's
Law," ".Tyler's Law," "'Judy and Nikki's Law." We're so outraged by
the actions of one offender that we determine to punish all persons,
down through the ages, who behave like that offender. They're laws
born of knee-jerk reactions, of the heart, not the head. They're rarely
effectual and rarely even used. But they satisfy our deep, primal urge for
3813
punishment and revenge.
An op-ed column in the New York Times by Roger N. Lancaster, a professor of
anthropology and author of Sex Panic and the Punitive State,3 8 4 asserted that "sex
offender laws are expansive, costly and ineffective - guided by panic, not reason" and
suggested a new approach:
[T]o promote child welfare based on sound data rather than statistically
anomalous horror stories, and in some cases to revisit outdated laws that
do little to protect children. Little will have been gained if we trade a
bloated prison system for sprawling forms of electronic surveillance that
offload the costs of imprisonment onto offenders, their families and their
communities.385
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-4780981.html; Beth DeFalco, Megan's Law Not a Deterrent,
FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.nassaupba.org/public/public interest/ meganslaw/ap-newsbreak-
report-finds.shtm (noting a 1999 study that suggested that notification laws are counterproductive and that the
fear of exposure may cause offenders to avoid treatment, and may encourage pedophiles to seek out children as a
result of adult isolation).
379 Morgan, supra note 378.
380 Livio, supra note 377; see also Andy Newman, N.J. Law; Forecast for Enforcing Megan's Law':
Complicated, Costly, N.Y. TIvMS, Jan. 14, 1996 (illustrating the fact that the New York Times forecasted costly
implementation of Megan's Law in 1996).
381 See Emmanuella Grinberg, 5 Years Later, States Struggle to Comply with Federal Sex Offender Law, CNN
NEWS (July 28, 2011, 11:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/07/28/
sex.offender.adam.walsh.act/index.html.
382 See Chuck Biedka, Tougher Pennsylvania Megan's Law Act May Hit Snag Because of Costs, TRIBLIVE NEWS,
(April 18, 2010), http://triblive.com/x/leadertimes/news/ s_677001.html#axzz2OV9Yffzl.
38 Sandy Hingston, Do We Really Need Megan's Law? Maybe not, but what legislator would vote against a
dead child?, The PHILLY POST (Oct. 3, 2011), http://blogs.phillymag.com/thephillypost/ 2011/10/03/need-
megans-law/.
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Other more recent news articles blamed the ineffectiveness of Megan's Law on the lack of
resources and lack of conformity to the requirements of the AWA.3 86
The increase of media focus on the costs of implementation and ineffectiveness
of Megan's Law, has not, to date, led to the repeal of legislation, but may have helped
states decide to not conform to the requirements under the federal AWA. States have
struggled to reconcile the difficulty of effectively monitoring a huge pool of registrants, a
pool often increased by the AWA requirements, and the desire to appease the public and
make a showing of being "tough on sexual predators."38 7 Public demands on politicians
and states facing loss of federal funding has continued to dictate decisions on whether to
comply with the Act.388 As of 2012, only fifteen states were deemed to be in compliance
with AWA (seven in full compliance) and a handful of states have decided to openly opt
out of federal funding.38 9
Ohio repealed its version of Megan's Law and subsequently enacted its
counterpart to the AWA - providing increased obligations and registration requirements to
be applied retroactively to previously-registered sex offenders390 - but the Ohio Supreme
Court declared the law to be unconstitutional on the issue of retroactivity and separation of
391powers. On December 20, 2011, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett signed into law
the "Adam Walsh Bill,"392 in order to bring the Commonwealth into compliance with the
8 See Tatiana Morales, Why Megan's Law is Getting an "F", CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 7:25 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500168_162-694413.html (discussing the failure of Megan's Law as part of a
special series on the Early Show, Broken Promises); see also Brian Freskos, Adam Walsh ActReignites Debate
of Sex Offender Policies, STAR NEws ONLINE (Feb. 3, 2012, 8:41 AM), http://www.stamewsonline.com/
article/20120203/ARTICLES/120209899 (discussing North Carolina's abstention from adopting provisions and
loss of federal assistance).
387 See, e.g., John Caher, New York Opts Out of Compliance With Adam Walsh Act, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 7, 2011)
(explaining that The Adam Walsh Act would place additional restrictions on anyone convicted of a sex-related
crime; although passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law in 2006, only seven states (Ohio, Delaware,
Florida, South Dakota, Michigan, Nevada and Wyoming) agreed to fully comply with that Act. The state of Ohio
subsequently declared the Act to be unconstitutional. California does not comply with this Act); Campisi, supra
note 195; Sean Murphy, Federal Sex Offender Laws: Arizona, Many Other States Don't Meet Standards,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2012. 3:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/04/states-dont-meet-
federal-sex-offender-laws n 1941060.html ("Some lawmakers determined that the program would cost more to
implement than to ignore. Others resisted the burden it placed on offenders, especially certain juveniles who
would have to be registered for life.").
388 See Ted Gest, Feds Begin Penalizing States That Haven'tAdopted New Sex Offender Law (April 12, 2012,
4:37 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2012 -04-soma.
389 Caher, supra note 387.
390 The Adam Walsh Act & Ohio Senate Bill 10, S.B. 10, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2008), available
at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillTextl27/127_SB_10_ENN.pdf; see also State v. Holloman-Cross,
2008 WL 1973568 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (noting that Ohio's Adam Walsh Act does not violate the ex post facto
clause of the U.S. Constitution); State v. Davis, 2012 WL 3222667, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012) (noting that the
appeals court previously reached a similar conclusion in another ruling, State v. Smith, 2012 WL 253237 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2012), and that prior ruling is in conflict with cases from two other appellate courts: "Until the Ohio
Supreme Court issues a definitive ruling on this issue or until it remedies the conflict among the districts, we are
bound by precedent of this court. Accordingly, we sustain Davis's assignment of error, reverse his sentence, and
remand the matter to the trial court to impose a sentence consistent with Megan's Law.").
391 See State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753, 766-67 (Ohio 2010) (holding that reclassificationviolated separation of
powers doctrine because it changed the duties imposed by courts); see also In re Bruce S., 983 N.E.2d 350, 353
(Ohio 2012) (noting that Ohio's Adam Walsh Act's classification, registration, and community-notification
provisions cannot be constitutionally applied to a sex offender who committed his sex offense between July 1,
2007, and Dec. 31, 2007, the last day before Jan. 1, 2008, the effective date of the classification, registration, and
community-notification provisions; application of these Adam Walsh Act provisions to offenses before their
effective date violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution).
392 PA SB1183, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011).
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AWA.3 9 3 Pennsylvania's adult parole and probation departments considered the federal
Adam Walsh Act a potential "nightmare" and maintained that there was "[no] way"
present staff could handle all the background checks and other duties required under the
AWA.3 9 4 The press article reporting on these developments noted that the neighboring
state of Ohio spent millions of dollars on implementation and the ensuing flood of
litigation, only to have its law declared unconstitutional.3 9 5 But few politicians dare to vote
against such laws, because if they were to do so, the attack ads would practically write
themselves.3 9 6
Despite the significant problems with the AWA, when a sensational media
account detailing a horrific act of sexual violence, politicians - in an effort to appease
397angry constituents - still look to the AWA as the answer. John Burbine, a convicted sex
offender who videotaped himself sexually assaulting children from his wife's unlicensed
day care business in Massachusetts, provoked a call for compliance with the AWA.39 In
response though, a local Massachusetts newspaper dedicated an article to addressing the
problems that come with enacting the AWA. 39 9 The article discussed the results from a 10-
year study by Jill Levinson and colleagues that found that the AWA tier system
significantly failed to predict recidivism.400 The piece also noted the $ 10.4 million it
would take for Massachusetts to come into compliance with the AWA and cautioned that
"a bloated registry that treats all offenders the same (even though they aren't) usurps
valuable resources that could be allotted to those who truly need to be tracked and
monitored."4 0 1 An article from the Boston Globe echoed similar cautions - noting the
recent research on lack of accuracy in determining risk - though the article's author aptly
put forth the counter-argument: "It is easy to understand the emotional appeal of the 'if it
just saves one child' argument."'402 Despite the fear, "basing public policy on the rare
horrific crime committed by one registered sex offender, while ignoring the extensive
393 See PA Sexual Offender Management, PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/pasexualoffender management/20801 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2013).
394 See Phil Ray, Pennsylvania Prepares for Adam Walsh Act, ALTOONA MIRROR (Sept. 9, 2012),
http://www.altoonamirror.com/page/content.detail/id/564065/Pennsylvania-prepares-for-Adam-Walsh-
Act.html?nav=742.
395 Pennsylvania Fails to Comply with Adam Walsh Sex Offender Law, 24-7 PRESS RELEASE (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.24-7pressrelease.com/press-release/pennsylvania-fails-to-comply-with-adam-walsh-sex-offender-
law-252404.php.
396 See supra notes accompanying text 375-94; America's Unjust Sex Laws, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009
(arguing that America's sex laws are unjust and are doing more harm than good), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/14165460.
397 See Crimesider Staff, John Burbine, Convicted Sex Offender, Allegedly Assaulted Children From his Wife's
Daycare Business, CBS NEWS (Dec. 7, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57557809-
504083/john-burbine-convicted-sex-offender-allegedly-assaulted-children-from-his-wifes-daycare-business/.
398 See Shana Rowan, The Adam Walsh Act is Not the Answer: USA Families Advocate an Intelligent Sex
Offender Registry, CAPE COD TODAY (Dec. 18, 2012, 5:03 PM),
http://www.capecodtoday.com/article/2012/12/18/3664-adam-walsh-act-not-answer ("In the wake of the horrific
sex abuse allegations against convicted Level 1 sex offender John Burbine, numerous politicians are calling to
bring Massachusetts into compliance with the Adam Walsh Act, which would publicize the identities and
addresses of Level 1 and Level 2 sex offenders.").
399 Id; but cf Shana Rowan, Low Risk Was Never Meant to Mean No Risk, CAPE COD TODAY (Jan. 25, 2013,
4:26 PM), http://www.capecodtoday.com/article/2013/01/25/16737-low-risk-was-never-meant-mean-no-risk
("Just as studies have shown that most high-risk offenders will never commit another sex crime, some low risk
offenders will.").
400 See Rowan, supra note 398.
401 Id.
402 Shana Rowan, Punish the Sex Offender- Not the Entire Offender Group, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 21, 2012).
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research of the entire former sex offender population, does not result in a fair and reasoned
criminal justice system."4 0 3
Although states have been hesitant to adopt the strict and costly restrictions under
the federal AWA, they have not been hesitant to enact their own strict mandates, nor have
states been scaling back their legislative efforts to restrict and monitor sex offenders.404
Post-AWA and subsequent to the availability of widespread information citing the
ineffectiveness of community notification and monitoring, states have enacted a variety of
laws in order to further punish, monitor or restrict sex offenders:
1. Forty-six states have passed laws similar to Jessica's Law that mandates
steep minimum sentences for those convicted of sexual crimes against a
child;40 1
2. Some states have passed ordinances restricting or monitoring Internet
access406 and online gaming,07 for convicted offenders;
3. A growing number of states that have enacted laws restricting the activities
of sex offenders on Halloween; 40s
4. One state attempted to restrict a sex offender's access to a public library;
5. Other states have tried to restrict sex offenders' access to church4" or other
public facilities; 410
6. States have instructed parole and probation officers to track offenders using
Global Positioning Systems (GPS)41 1 equipment, which the offender is
forced to keep on his body at designated times;
403 id.
404 Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 2, at 1089. ("Today, Louisiana's Megan's Law includes one of the
most detailed and extensive lists of required information, including palm prints, a DNA sample, and all
landline and mobile telephone numbers.") The statute requires sex offenders and child predators alike
to provide local law enforcement with detailed information including: the name and aliases used by the
offender; physical description of the offender; addresses, including temporary housing, employment,
and school; a current photograph; fingerprints, palm prints and a DNA sample; a description of every
vehicle registered to or operated by the offender, including license plate number; a copy of the
offender's driver's license; and every email address, online screen name, or other online identifiers
used by the offenderto communicate on the Internet. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(C)(1) (2012).
405 Campisi, supra note 195.
406 An Indiana law that bans registered sex offenders from using Facebook and other social networking sites that
can be accessed by children was found to be unconstitutional. Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, Indiana, 705
F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 2013); Norimitsu Onishi, Suit Contests Limits on Online Activites of Sex Offenders, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2012) (Offenders "must inform the authorities of their e-mail addresses, user names, screen
names and other Internet handles, as well as report any additions or changes within 24 hours.").
407 Kevin Collier, New York Deleted 2,100 Sex Offenders' Online Gaming Accounts, THE DAILY DOT (Dec. 21,
2012), http://www.dailydot.com/news/new-york-sex-offenders-gaming-accounts-deleted/.
408 At least ten states and city municipalities have enacted statutes imposing restrictions on the activities of sex
offenders on Halloween. The laws seem to fall into one of two main categories: (1) specific restrictions on
registered sex offenders, and (2) restrictions on paroled sex offenders, or those on conditional release programs.
A California law known as "Operation Boo" allows officials to conduct nighttime checks on the evening of
Halloween to make sure some registered sex offenders are insider their homes with the lights out. Nicole
Gonzalez, ParoleesArrested in Operation Boo, NBC SAN DIEGO (Nov. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/ local/Four-Parolees-Arrested-in-Operation-Boo-
176719141.html#ixzz2TUlvYPBi. Similarly, a New York law known as "Halloween: Zero Tolerance" allows
state investigators to make unannounced home visits, curfew checks, and phone calls to enforce the laws. Alv
Adair, NationalAlert Registry: Prepare for Sex Offenders on Halloween, YAHOO! VOICES (Oct. 11 2007),
http://voices.yahoo.com/national-alert-registry-prepare-sex-offenders-599 179.html.
409 State v. Perfetto, 7 A.3d 1179, 1183 (N.H. 2010).
410 Doe v. City ofAlbuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012) (city failed to show that its ban - restricting
access to a public library- was narrowly tailored and that it left other avenues for sex offenders to receive
information and ideas from the library.)
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7. States have required individuals convicted of certain non-sex crimes to
register as sex offenders.41 2
Finally, nothing can compete with the most prevalent and controversial
restrictions enacted to keep sex offenders from offending in the community - residency
restrictions. As discussed in Part 1, these restrictions were widely adopted and, by 2008,
30 states had enacted residency restrictions for offenders in the community.4 Although
residency restrictions have withstood a vast amount of constitutional challenges, 1 some
courts have begun to question the intent of the legislation and render opinions finding
certain regulations unconstitutional.15
Somewhat in sync with emerging concerns by courts and scholars over the
constitutionality and effectiveness of residency restrictions, media articles began to report
on the issues that accompanied the legislation.416 One article noted: "despite research that
411 In 2006, as part of the Adam Walsh Act, the federal government offered grant programs and
technical assistance to states in order to implement similar electronic monitoring programs: See Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 621, 120 Stat. 587, 633-34 (2006)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16981 (2010)) (authorizing the Attorney General to award grants
to states and local governments to carry out programs to outfit sex offenders with electronic
monitoring units); Alabama was one of the first states to use GPS, ALA. CODE 15-20A-20 (2011).
412 Associated Press, Nebraska High Court Upholds Sex Offender Ruling, JOURNALSTAR.COM (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://joumalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/nebraska/nebraska-high-court-upholds-sex-offender-
ruling/article_0aa09206-8061-50ca-9d90-ae821 18b 1190.html (reporting that the Nebraska Supreme Court
upheld a law requiring an individual who was not convicted of a sex crime to register as a sex offender based off
of court records that showed evidence of sexual contact or penetration).
413 Michelle L. Meloy, Susan L. Miller & Kristin M. Curtis, Making Sense out ofNonsense: The Deconstruction
ofState-Level Sex Offender Residence Restrictions, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 209 (2008).
414 Yung, supra note 124, at 160 ("Regardless of the reasons for the first restrictions, there can be little doubt
that the highly publicized murders of Brucia and Lunsford in 2005 played a significant role in the spate of new
sex offender residency restrictions proposed and enacted in 2005 and 2006."). See generally, Mann v. State, 603
S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 2004); Thompsonv. State, 603 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 2004); Densonv. State, 600 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769; State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655 (Iowa 2005); Weems v. Little
Rock Police Dep't, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. den. sub. nom Weems v. Johnson, 550 U.S. 917 (2007)
(residency restriction did not violate constitutional right to travel, ex post facto law, or substantive due process);
State ex rel. White v. Billings, 860 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio Com. Pl. 2006) (statute prohibiting a sex offender from
residing within 1000 feet of school premises was a civil regulatory measure and thus did not violate Ex Post
Facto clause).
415 Some courts have begun to question strict residency restrictions, and whether such restrictions are
unconstitutional in their application. See, e.g., United States v. Rudd, 662 F.3d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 2011); see
also Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1486-87 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (holding that public notification
provisions are punitive and violate the Ex Post Facto Clause when applied to offenders convicted of crimes
which predate the Washington Act); and similarly, State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1043 (Kan. 1996), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997) (holding that a law permitting unrestricted public access to a sex offender registry
violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws). Consider also the majority opinion of Doe v.
Baker, 2006 WL 905368 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that "a more restrictive act that would in effect make it
impossible for a registered sex offender to live in the community would in all likelihood constitute banishment
which would result in an ex post facto problem. . ."). The appeals court in Mann v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections
determined that an unconstitutional taking had occurred where an offender was forced to move from his home
after a child-care facility opened within 1000 feet of his property. 653 S.E.2d 740, 760 (Ga. 2007). In rendering
its decision, the Court considered the economic hardship that occurred as a result of the taking as well as the
interference with an individual's reasonable investment-backed expectation when purchasing property for a
private residence. The Court additionally assessed the statute and found that it effectively empowered private
third parties with the state's police power. Id. In 2009, Indiana's Supreme Court, in State v. Pollard, held that the
residency restriction "violates the prohibition on Ex Post Facto laws.. .because it imposes burdens that have the
effect of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed [at the time the] crime was committed."
908 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ind. 2009).
416 Monica Davey, Iowa's Residency Rules Drive Sex Offenders Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2006, at Al (reporting on the consequences of Iowa's residency restrictions and calling into question
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shows sex offender residency requirements actually hamper the rehabilitation of offenders,
jurisdictions across the country continue to pass them."" Despite evidence of their
ineffectiveness, new or expanded laws were proposed in twenty states in 2007 and
legislators urged the public to "give it time to work." " Illinois Attorney General Lisa
Madigan defended the newly enacted laws: "We're trying to protect children [and] [w]e're
dealing with people raping children. These are horrible crimes. ,
Further discussed by the media, was the vast amount of resources necessary to
enforce residency laws and their effectiveness is questionable given that "90% of children
who are abused are victimized by someone they know and trust."420 But, according to Dr.
Jill Levinson, "residency restrictions are one size fits all . . . . Just because someone is
designated a sex offender . . . does not necessarily mean that that person is a sexually
violent predator or pedophile."421 The same article quoting Dr. Levinson mentioned the
ongoing problems with the Iowa residency restrictions that were the focus of the Doe v.
422Miller case. Since the decision in Doe, Iowa has been unable to keep track of the vast
number of registered offenders and the restrictions unduly overburdened parole and
probation officers. Regardless, Iowa legislators refuse to be seen as "soft on sex
offenders" and even after realizing that "they [the legislators who pushed the residency
restriction laws] were wrong and that [the laws] should be overturned," they refused to be
the ones to do it and instead, passively-aggressively, left it up to the courts to determine if
these laws violated the constitution.423 Importantly, the article noted that "[t]he general
public doesn't really care if it's good public policy," pointing to the moral panic that
occurs amongst parents when they learn that a convicted sex offender is moving into the
424
neighborhood.
Other courts, taking a different approach than the Eight Circuit in Doe v. Miller,
began to erode state residency restriction laws finding that the exclusion from areas
amounted to banishment425 and violated offenders' constitutional rights.426 Local
the restrictions' effectiveness); Associated Press, Sex Offenders Living Under Miami Bridge, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2007, at A22.
417 Paula Reed Ward, Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders Popular, But Ineffective, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Oct. 26, 2008), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/region/residency-restrictions-for-sex-
offenders-popular-but-ineffective-618411/.
418 Wendy Koch, Sex-Offender Residency Laws Get Second Look, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2007),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-02-25-sex-offender-laws-coverx.htm (statement by Georgia
State Rep. Jerry Keen who advocates children's safety before the convenience of sex offenders).
419 id.
420 Ward, supra note 417.
421 id
422 Id.; Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
423 Ward, supra note 417 (stating, "they're a fearful bunch.. they've done such a good job of selling it, they
can't turn and go the other way").
424 id
425 Due to the restrictions upheld by the Doe court, individuals may be uprooted and forced to move from
established residences, be unable to return home after prison, and may be prevented from residing with their own
children, thus further disabling the family unit and removing the needed support of family members. See Jill
Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage: Family Members ofRegistered Sex Offenders, 34 AM. J.
CRIM. JUST. 54 (2009). The Doe court specifically addressed and dismissed the argument of banishment: "While
banishment of course involves an extreme form of residency restriction, we ultimately do not accept the analogy
between the traditional means of punishment and the Iowa statute. Unlike banishment, § 692A.2A restricts only
where offenders may reside. It does not 'expel' the offenders from their communities or prohibit them from
accessing areas near schools or child care facilities for employment, to conduct commercial transactions, or for
any purpose other than establishing a residence." Doe, 405 F.3d at 719; Mann, 653 S.E.2d at 742 ("Under the
terms of [Georgia's sex offender] statute, it is apparent hat there is no place in Georgia where a
registered sex offender can live without being continually at risk of being ejected.); Berlin v. Evans,
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communities also began to question whether the expense caused in defending such laws
was worth their benefit.427 Huntington Beach, California "changed its sex-offender park
ban after the law's constitutionality was challenged in court" and amended the ordinance
to allow authorities to write case-by-case exemptions to the sex-offender ordinance rather
428"than impose a blanket ban restricting all offenders. An ordinance in Montville,
Connecticut, was actually repealed before a lawsuit was initiated.429 Town Council
members openly voiced their opinion that the "so-called child and senior safety zone ...
designed to keep registered sex offenders from town-owned and town-leased property ...
was not really enforceable [and] was one of those ordinances that looks good on face
value, but it really didn't do anything."43 0
Thus, despite some courts' refusal to uphold the constitutionality of strict
residency restrictions and news accounts citing ineffectiveness, the fear of an attack
against children continued to be displayed in of the form of ordinances seeking to bar
offenders from living in specific areas.431 For example, in 2012, despite this increase in
knowledge and media attention to the ineffectiveness of residency restrictions,432 Attorney
General Kilmartin of Rhode Island praised a Superior Court Justice for her decision for
the Court upholding the state's residency restrictions.4 3 3 Ignoring an influx of information
dispelling any connection between re-offense rates and proximity to children, Kilmartin
felt that "it was eminently reasonable... to set public policy and determine the need to put
modest distance between sex offenders and school children."4 3 4 In 2010, New Hampshire
923 N.Y.S.2d 828, 835 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (acknowledging that the registrant, atier I offender, was
effectively banished from living in Manhattan).
426 Dana Littlefield, Court: Law's Restrictions On Sex Offenders Unreasonable, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE
(Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/sep/15/tp-court-laws-restrictions-on-sex-offenders/
(reporting on an appellate court decision upholding a ruling that a state law barring registered offenders from
living within 2000 feet of parks and schools is too broad and violates the offenders' constitutional rights).
427 Sarah De Crescenzo, Backpedal On Sex Offender Ban Gets Officials'Attention, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER
(Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/city-379823-sex-cities.html, ("A sudden about-face by Lake
Forest officials on an ordinance barring registered sex offenders from parks is reverberating throughout the
county as attorneys and city officials discuss whether the law is worth defending in court.").
428 Jaimee Lynn Fletcher, H.B. Changes Sex Offender Ordinances After Lawsuit, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/ordinance-408906-sex-beach.html.
429 Izaskun E. Larrafleta, Aontville Rescinds Sex Offender Ordinances, THE DAY (Jan. 15, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.theday.com/article/20130115/NWS01/130119835/1070/NWS1501.
430 id
43 Dan O'Brian, Sex Offender Case Rekindles Debate on Bans, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/regionals/west/2012/10/17/southborough-sex-offender-case-rekindles-
debate -over-bans/xy4EBl8NWCIsRNBEqYtFyl/story.html (reporting that police failed to realize that a
registered sex offender was living near a preschool for two years; without making note of the fact that the
individual did not reoffend during that time, a community member stated, "When you have these people in an
area where there are children, it just heightens their need").
432Ward, supra note 417 ("Further, studies conducted by the Minnesota Department of Corrections and Colorado
Department of Public Safety have not shown any correlation between sex offender recidivism and living near
schools or parks."), Eric Zom, Restrictions on Sex Offenders Lack sense, Common and Otherwise, Restrictions
On Sex Offenders Lack Sense, Common and Otherwise, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 21, 2011),
http://blogs.chicagotribune. com/newscolumnistsezorn/2011/06/offender.html ("'There was no significant
relationship between reoffending and proximity to schools or day cares,' concluded an academic study of such
restrictions published last year in Criminal Justice and Behavior, the journal of The American Association for
Correctional and Forensic Psychology. 'The belief that keeping sex offenders far from schools and other child-
friendly locations will protect children from sexual abuse appears to be a well-intentioned but flawed
premise."').
433 Press Release, State of Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Kilmartin Applauds
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State Sen. David Boutin sponsored a bill to encourage police departments to notify the
public when sex offenders are released into a neighborhood.4 3 5 He introduced the
legislation to please constituents hoping to banish all the sex offenders from his
hometown.436 Boutin told lawmakers,
a convicted child sex offender heinously struck again and was charged
with felonious sexual assault against a 7 year old [and] [q]uick adoption
of this bill and dissemination of notification guidelines to local law
enforcement will go a long way towards preventing another sexual
assault, with regrettable consequences for the victim, family and
437community, who all share in the burden of the pain.
Although the bill died on the Senate floor (even in an election year), neighbors of a
recently released sex offender in a New Hampshire town started a website and posted the
following comments: "You show true restraint by not beating the tar out of this lowlife.";
"I hope you guys get rid of the bastard. What a piece of crap."; "This is an incestuous
family of whack-jobs and psychopaths, and it makes me feel good to know they are going
down."; "Hang 'em high and let the sun set on 'em. Only in a perfect world right?
,4381Haha." One of two conclusions can be drawn from the public's continued reaction
towards convicted offenders: 1) they are not being exposed to the news reports citing low
recidivism, re-offense rates and rarity of stranger sex crimes, or 2) despite new
information, they just do not care.
E. Civil Commitment
After Kansas v. Hendricks4 3 9 , scholars and attorneys aptly predicted that, [t!Ihis
law is going to spread like wildfire."440 Twenty states1 and the District of Columbia have
enacted laws permitting the civil commitment of sexual offenders.442 Soon after the
decision in Hendricks, States' legislators rushed to enact their own civil commitment laws
and construct facilities to contain large numbers of sexual predators.4 4 3 As with most other
areas of sex offender legislation, media-highlighted sex crimes helped to fuel and support
civil commitment. Minnesota's sex offender civil commitment program increased
exponentially after the 2003 murder of Dru Sjodin, prompting state prison authorities to
435 Chris Domin, Sex Offender Laws are Based on Rage and Fear, CORRECTIONS.COM (March 12, 2012),
http://www.corrections.com/news/article/30085.
436 id
437 Id. Boutin failed to mention that the case against the offender had been dropped due to lack of evidence.
438 Id; see also Steven Brown et al., What People ThinkAbout the Management of Sex Offenders in the
Community, 47 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 259 (2008) (finding that the public does not necessarily agree with
punitive conditions but is insecure in the effectiveness of community containment and concerned about the
reality of reintegration).
439 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
440 Biskupic, supra note 152 (quoting Lynn S. Branham, an Illinois attorney and professor who specializes in
sentencing law, "This notion of 'mental abnormality' has the potential to dramatically expand the types of
persons who can be confined.").
441 Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Civil Commitment ofSexually Violent Predators (2010),
available at http://www.atsa.com/civil-commitment-sexually-violent-predators (listing the twenty state as
Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin).
442 id
443 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 78 ("Nearly 3,000 sex offenders have been committed since the first law
passed in 1990.... In Coalinga, Calif., a $388 million facility will allow the state to greatly expand the offenders
it holds to 1,500. Florida, Minnesota, Nebraska, Virginia and Wisconsin are also adding beds.").
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refer all high-risk offenders for commitment.444 As years passed, the considerable costs
necessary to maintain these institutions drastically dissuaded additional states from
enacting their own civil commitment schemes.445
New York passed its sex offender civil commitment statute in 2007,
notwithstanding numerous concerns of the ineffective treatment and serious financial
burdens associated with these laws,446 per the announcement of State Senator John J.
Flanagan that "[w]ith the passage of this legislation, we have the opportunity to save lives,
protect our children, and ensure that our communities are safe from sexual predators who
roam our streets in pursuit of their next victim." However, an article published soon
after enactment reported that in state after state, expectations of the benefits of sex
offender civil commitment had "fallen short"4 4" and since the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of these laws... only a small fraction of committed
offenders have ever completed treatment to the point where they could be released free
and clear.4 4 9 It further reported that, "[t]he cost of the programs is virtually unchecked and
growing, with states spending nearly $450 million on them this year [2007]. The annual
price of housing a committed sex offender averages more than $100,000, compared with
about $26,000 a year for keeping someone in prison, because of the higher costs for
programs, treatment and supervised freedoms."50
In 2012, the Seattle Times ran a four-part series - "The Price ofProtection" - and
revealed the extensive waste of dollars and resources at Washington state's civil
commitment center on McNeil Island - a "state of the art" facility that housed about 300
*,451sex offenders on an island across the Puget Sound "behind coils of concertina wire.
The articles found that the institution was "plagued by runaway legal costs, a lack of
444 
AP IMPACT: Treatment for Sexual Predators Squeezes State Budgets As Programs Grow, FOXNEWS.COM
(June 21, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/06/21/ap-impact-treatment-sexual-predators-squeezes-state-
budgets-programs-grow/ [Treatment Squeezes]; see also Anne Meyer, Sex Offender's Daughter Speaks Out to
Keep Him Locked Up, KWCH 12 Eyewitness News (Nov. 7, 2011), http://articles.kwch.com/2011-11-07/mental-
hospital 30371736 (quoting a daughter who is advocating to civilly commit her sex offender father in Kansas, "I
just don't want him getting out and hurting other children. I know I have had to live with what he did to me my
whole life, the nightmares it [sic] just doesn't ever stop.").
445 The state of Florida spent an average of $41,835 per committed individual; by contrast, the state spent
$19,000 per prison inmate per year. By contrast, Pennsylvania spent $180,000 per year per committed individual
and $3 1,363 per inmate per year. The cost of civil commitment is exponentially higher than prison time. See
Chart, A Profile of Civil Commitment around the Country, N.Y. TiMES (March 3, 2009), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/ 2007/03/03/us/20070304_CIVILGRAPHIC.html; Christine Willmsen,
States Waste Millions Helping Sex Predators Avoid Lockup, SEATTLE TiMES (Jan. 21, 2012),
http://seattletimes.com /html/ localnews/2017301107_civilcomm22.html.
446 Treatment Squeezes, supra note 444 ("Some states have steered clear of the civil-commitment system, partly
because of financial reasons. In Louisiana, legislation died last year after top lawmakers questioned the cost and
constitutional issues. Vermont legislators rejected a similar proposal.")
Of the nearly 3,000 convicted sex offenders sent to civil commitment centers in 18 states from 1990 to 2007,
only 50 "graduated" from the courses while 115 have been released due to legal technicality, old age, or terminal
health; and even those few who were released wind up living on state prison grounds because communities shun
the released. Davey and Goodnough, supra note 78; see also Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, A Record of
Failure at Center for Sex Offenders, N.Y. TiMES (March 5, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/us/
05civil.html?pagewanted=all.
447 John J. Flanagan, Senate Passes Civil Commitment Legislation, NYSENATE.GOV (Jan. 20, 2006),
http://www.nysenate.gov/news/senate-passes-civil-commitment-legislation.
448 Davey & Goodnough, supra note 78.
449 id.
450 id
451 Willmsen, supra note 445.
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,452financial oversight and layers of secrecy." The newspaper reported on the poor
management of the institution and overwhelming employee misconduct, including
consistent misuse of work computers from staff viewing pornography .4 One article also
discussed the questionable reasoning behind the constitutionality of the law, quoting the
superintendent of the McNeil Island facility: "It's a highly controversial law .... You are
talking about restricting someone's freedom after they have served their prison sentence,
not for what they have done, but for what they might do."454 Furthermore, the article went
into depth questioning the reliability of the science used to uphold these commitments -
questioning the definition and determination of "high risk,"45 5 ability to predict recidivism
and the value assessment ools,456 and the credibility of the experts testifying in these
types of cases.457 Professor W. Lawrence Fitch aptly observed that "no one would ever
dare offer to repeal because it's just untenable."4 5" Regardless of the cost, "no one wants
to be . . . perceived to be soft on sex offenders. 459
By way of example, State Rep. John Trebilcock advocated for civil commitment
460
in Oklahoma following the abduction of a 2-year old girl by a repeat sex offender.
Trebilcock stated: "As we have seen with the Penn State scandal, a single child molester is
capable of devastating the lives of countless innocent children . . . . These criminals
typically remain a public-safety threat even after completing a prison sentence and it is
necessary to ensure they are not allowed to return to the communities they have
victimized."461 The article quoting Trebilcock also notes tragedy follows an international
462
scandal in the Catholic church involving widespread abuse of children by priests. Also,
still carved in the public's hearts and minds are the murders of those children who became
household names; child-protection laws were created in their memory: Polly Klaas, Adam
Walsh, Megan Kanka. Civil commitment laws for pedophiles were born out of the
revulsion that followed those and other high-profile sex crimes against children.463
452 Christine Willmsen, Troubles Persist on Predator Island, SEATTLE TiMES, Dec. 15, 2012,
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019912618 mcneilislandl6m.html [Troubles Persist] ("[T]he state ...
wasted millions of dollars because of lack of oversight, unchecked defense costs and delayed commitment trials.
The state spends about $170,000 a year for each of the 297 sex offenders on McNeil Island."); Willmsen, supra
note 445.
453 Willmsen, supra note 445.
454 Willmsen, Troubles Persist, supra note 455.
455 Willmsen, supra note 445 ("Psychologists have no precise way to determine if any specific offender will
commit a violent sex crime in the future . . . .").
456 Id. (quoting an offender after hearing testimony at his civil commitment hearing: "It would have been cheaper
if they would have hired a gypsy and some fortune tellers ... I would have had just as much luck.").
457 Id. (citing recycled psychological evaluations and the extensive costs billed by experts).
458 Treatment Squeezes, supra note 444.
459 id
460 Julie Delcour, Time to Pass Civil Commitment Law for Sexual Predators, TULSA WORLD (Jan. 8, 2012),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/opinion/article.aspx?subjectid=214&articleid=20120108_214_GIPerhap64553.
461 Id ("Civil confinement isn't a perfect solution, but what is the solution in a world of Marcus Berrys [the
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The article also considered the following points from a New York Times
investigation:
* Sex offenders selected for commitment are not always the most violent;
some exhibitionists are chosen, for example, while rapists are passed over.
And some offenders are past the age at which some scientists consider them
most dangerous. In Wisconsin, a 102-year-old who wears a sport coat to
dinner cannot participate in treatment because of poor hearing and memory
lapses.
* Treatment programs are often unproven, and patients cannot be forced to
participate.
* Program costs are virtually unchecked and mushrooming.
* Unlike prisons and other institutions, civil-commitment mental-health
facilities often receive little consistent, independent oversight or monitoring.
* Few states have figured out what to do when offenders are "ready" for
release from civil commitment facilities.4 6 4
Nonetheless, it seems evident that other states have been hesitant to pass their
own statutes due to the overwhelming financial costs in creating, running and defending
the institutions. An Associated Press analysis found "that the 20 states with so-called 'civil
commitment' programs will spend nearly $500 million [in 2010] to confine and treat
5,200 offenders still considered too dangerous to put back on the streets."4 6 5
Although no other "new" states moved to pass sex offender civil commitment
statutes, in 2010, a federal civil commitment scheme to encompass federal prisoners who
were in the custody of the attorney general or the federal bureau of prisons was upheld in
466the case of United States v. Comstock. Comstock involved Section 4248 of the Adam
Walsh Act, which gives the federal Bureau of Prisons the power to detain "sexually
467dangerous" federal prisoners even after they have served out their entire sentences.
Rejecting a constitutional challenge raised by individuals who were in federal custody and
deemed "sexually violent," the Supreme Court upheld section 4248 and found that
468
Congress had the authority to create legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Whether or not the Justices writing for the majority were moved or influenced in
any way by public sentiment,469 they supported the notion that it was necessary and proper
for Congress to prevent this "dangerous" cohort of individuals from entering society.
464 id.
465 Treatment Squeezes, supra note 444 (citing the 65 million per year it costs Minnesota to house and treat sex
offenders).
466 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010).
467 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (West 2012). This provision was incorporated into the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (West 2012). See also Predators and the Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl0001424052748703652104574652392015371328.html ("Sex offenders
are the least sympathetic of the legal plaintiffs. Still, we were dismayed last week to see so many Supreme Court
Justices during oral arguments apparently willing to let the federal government take over an area of law
governing criminals that the Constitution grants to the states.").
468 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1954 (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 4248, the Supreme Court held this federal civil
commitment statute, which authorized the Department of Justice to detain a mentally ill, sexually dangerous
federal prisoner beyond his regular release date, to be a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.).
469 See id. at 1959-65.
470 Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventative Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 969, 996 (2011) ("[T]he majority opinion essentially rewrote law surrounding the Necessary and
Proper Clause to allow for virtually unfettered federal power in the area of sex offender civil commitment."). The
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Thus, the majority accepted the fact that sexual predators pose a high risk of
dangerousness and that future risk can be determined." Notably, three of the five persons
who were designated "sexually dangerous" in the Comstock case were only convicted of
472
possessing child pornography, not of an offense involving sexual touching or
penetration.
It is evident that sex offender civil commitment is not going by the wayside. The
number of persons in state and federal detention centers dedicated sex offenders has
continued to climb. 3 Clearly, the media focus and attention on the costs and corruption
surrounding sex offender civil commitment has been ineffective in repealing current
statutes or dissuading enactment of federal civil commitment.474 No doubt it has also had
little effect on the general public who are appeased by any method that keeps offenders
out of their communities and limited effect on politicians who could never survive the
career repercussions of speaking out against it.
Certainly, a case can be made that we have slowed down in our fervent crusade
against this monstrous evil, but we are far from taking steps to reverse the ineffective
legislation that has been put in place. Possibly the answer is time: "In America it may take
years to unpack this. However practical and just the case for reform, it must overcome
political cowardice, the tabloid media and parents' understandable fears."475
We now turn to the question of therapeutic jurisprudence: Can this discipline
provide the tools to allow us to make better sense of this area of the law?
Comstock Court expressly declined to address whether 18 U.S.C. § 4248 or its application denied equal
protection, procedural or substantive due process, or any other constitutional rights. 130 S. Ct. at 1965.
471 Justice Alito's concurring opinion is focused upon the fears of "dangerousness" and "risk" in allowing this
population to return to the community and therefore, must support federal intervention; citing evidence of the
States' unwillingness to assume the financial burden of containing these individuals, Justice Alito deemed that
the burden thus fell upon Congress to prevent these prisoners to enter the community and "present a danger
[wherever] they chose to live orvisit." Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring).
472 Id. at 1955.
473 JOHN Q. LAFOND, PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: How SOCIETY SHOULD COPE WITH SEX OFFENDERS 145
(Am. Psychol. Assoc. 2005) (referring to the use of civil commitment as a growth industry); WASH. STATE INST.
FOR PUB. POLICY, COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS AUTHORIZING INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006 UPDATE, REVISED (2007), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid=07-
08-1101.
474 Most of the media accounts of Comstock focused more on issues involving the broad powers of Congress and
whether these powers were sanctioned by the Constitution's "Necessary and Proper" clause. A New York Times
article laid out a brief synopsis of the Justices' decisions and quoted Justice Alito: "Just as it is necessary and
proper for Congress to provide for the apprehension of escaped federal prisoners," he wrote, "it is necessary and
proper for Congress to provide for the civil commitment of dangerous federal prisoners who would otherwise
escape civil commitment as a result of federal imprisonment." Adam Liptak, Extended Civil Commitment ofSex
Offenders is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010) (quoting Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Comstock, 130 S.
Ct. at 1970).
475 America's Unjust Sex Laws supra note 398.
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IV. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 7
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past two decades
has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).4 11 Initially
employed in cases involving individuals with mental disabilities, but subsequently
expanded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for
assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent,
the law that can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.478 The ultimate aim of
therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles
can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating
due process principles.47 9 There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler
clearly identifies how it must be resolved: "the law's use of mental health information to
improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice concerns."so As one of us
has written elsewhere, "[a]n inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that
therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties."4 1
Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people's
lives"482 and focuses on the law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-
476 Part IV is largely adapted from the works of Michael L. Perlin. See Michael L. Perlin, Striking for the
Guardians and Protectors ofthe Mind": The Convention on The Rights ofPersons with Mental Disabilities and
the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1159 (2013) [ Perlin, Guardians]; Michael L. Perlin,
"John Brown Went Off to War": Considering Veterans' Courts as Problem-Solving Courts, NOVA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) [ Perlin, Veterans' Court]; Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom is Thrown into Jail: Using
Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Remediate the Criminalization ofPersons with Mental Illness, MICH. ST. U. J. L. &
MED. (forthcoming 2013); Michael L. Perlin, Understanding the Intersection Between International Human
Rights and Mental Disability Law: The Role ofDignity in INTERNATIONAL CRIME, supra note 202.
477 See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (Carolina
Academic Press, 1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (Carolina Academic Press 1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (Carolina Academic Press, 2005); David B. Wexler,
Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008). Wexler first used the term in a paper
he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into
Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27, 27-32 (1992).
478Michael L. Perlin, What is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623, 623 (1993); KATE
DIESFELD & IAN FRECKELTON, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND
DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (2006) (providing a transnational perspective).
479 Michael L. Perlin, And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got: The Role and
Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2005); Michael L.
Perlin, Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain: Considering The Sexual Autonomy Rights ofPersons
Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals And In Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481 (2008);
Michael L. Perlin, You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks: Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV.
683, 692-97 (2003). On how TJ "might be a redemption tool in efforts to combat sanism, as a means of
'strip[ping] bare the law's sanist fagade,'" see Michael L. Perlin, Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror: The Legal
Profession's Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers With Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591
(2008), quoted in Michael L. Perlin, Things Have Changed: LookingAt Non-Institutional Mental Disability Law
Through The Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 544 (2003). See also, Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks ofInfluence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
575, 585-86 (2008); Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice And Transformation Through The Teaching
And Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School ChildAdvocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561,
599 n.111 (2005).
480 David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts ofLegal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 17, 21 (1993); see also, e.g., David Wexler,Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE
PSYCHOL. 179 (1996).
481 Michael L. Perlin, A Law ofHealing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, Where the Winds
Hit Heavy on the Borderline: Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
775, 782 (1998).
482 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with Victims of Crime, 33
NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
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4813being. It suggests that "law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid
imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with
other values served by law should attempt to bring about healing and wellness."" TJ
understands that, "when attorneys fail to acknowledge their clients' negative emotional
reactions to the judicial process, the clients are inclined to regard the lawyer as indifferent
and a part of a criminal system bent on punishment."A" By way of example, TJ "aims to
offer social science evidence that limits the use of the incompetency label by narrowly
1486defining its use and minimizing its psychological and social disadvantage."
In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of topics through a TJ lens,
including, but not limited to, all aspects of mental disability law, domestic relations law,
criminal law and procedure, employment law, gay rights law, and tort law. As Ian
Freckelton has noted, "it is a tool for gaining a new and distinctive perspective utilizing
socio-psychological insights into the law and its applications."" It is also part of a
growing comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more humane and
psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and
respectfully.48 These alternative approaches optimize the psychological well-being of
individuals, relationships, and communities dealing with a legal matter, and acknowledge
concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and obligations. In its aim to use the law to
empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote well-being, TJ has been described as
"[a] sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law . .. a movement towards a more
distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasises psychological
wellness over adversarial triumphalism."4 90 That is, TJ supports an ethic of care.491
48 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and Strategies, in
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (Daniel P. Stolle, David B.
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds.2000) (PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE).
44 Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Modelfor Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY DETENTION
AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate
Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
48 Evelyn H. Cruz, Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to Know the Immigration
Consequences ofPlea Agreements, 13 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 47, 59 (2010).
486 Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and change in the Life of the Law: Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Make a
Difference?, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65 (2003). The most thoughtful sympathetic critique of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence remains Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 193 (1995).
487 Michael L. Perlin, Things Have Changed: Looking at Non-Institutional Mental Disability Law Through the
Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 544-45 (2003).
48 Freckelton, supra note 482, at 576.
489 Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive Law Movement, in
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 485, at 465.
490 Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329-
30 (2001); see also, Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement: Challenges for the TJ
Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 342
(Majorie A. Silver ed., 2007); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in
Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-06
(2006). The use of the phrase dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
491 See, e.g., Brookbanks, supra note 492; Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A
"Therapeutic" Approach to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385
(2006); David B. Wexler, Not such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many Of Professor Quinn's
Concerns About Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007);
Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education:
Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 607 (2006).
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One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.492 Professor Amy
Romer describes the "three Vs": voice, validation and voluntariness,493 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that
litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken
seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation.
When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and
validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and
validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the
litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very
process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation
that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved
behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel
that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions.
The question to pose here is this: Does our current sex offender legislation make it more
or less likely that Prof. Ronner's vision - of voice, voluntariness and validation - will be
fulfilled? 495
Before we consider this question, it is necessary to reflect on the reasons - that
we identified in an earlier article496 - why the legal system has resisted TJ principles in a
criminal law context: fear of being seen as "soft on crime," imperiling the judge's re-
election chances;4 9 7 judges' traditional adversity to endorsing or utilizing any intervention
that might be perceived as being "touchy -feely" ;498 the ways that, like the general public,
judges have, by and large, bought into myths about sex offenses and sex offenders;4 9 9 the
deep need on the part of judges to convince themselves that the "system works,"0 0
492 See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 161 (2005).
493 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as
Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOUROL. REV. 601, 627 (2008). On the importance of "voice," see also,
Freckelton, supra note 481, at 588.
494 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94-95 (2002); see generally, AMY D. RONNER, LAW,
LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).
495 On the extent to which current legislation is therapeutic for victims, see Leonore M.J. Simon, Sex Offender
Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 485 (1999).
496 See Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 28 .
497 Paul D. Carrington, Public Funding ofJudicial Campaigns: The North Carolina Experience and the Activism
ofthe Supreme Court, 89 N. C. L. REV. 1965, 1990 (2011). See also, generally, John Tomaino, Punishment and
Corrections, in CONSIDERING CRIME, supra note 228, at 171. Again, as earlier noted, the literature is replete
with studies of political campaigns -many of which were successful- that turned on this precise issue; see
Carrington, supra, at 1989-90 (discussing the California Supreme Court election of 1986 that led to the defeat of
Chief Justice Rose Bird and two other associate justices perceived in this way); John Blume & Theodore
Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
465, 470-72 (1999) (discussing political campaigns aimed at ousting individual judges for being "soft on crime").
498 See Jonathan Lippman, Achieving Better Outcomes for Litigants in the New York State Courts, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 813, 830 (2007). This is especially relevant in the context of the emotionally-charged area of sex
offender law where any alternative approaches could be construed as condoning or minimizing the underlining
offense.
499 See, e.g., Winick, supra note 1, at 552 (discussing the "small" likelihood of ajudge ever overruling a
prosecutor's discretionary determination in such cases).
500 See, e.g., Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT.
REV. 4, 21 (2007) (discussing ways in which judges can improve the public's satisfaction with the court system
in the United States). Judges typically express great faith in the adversary system, see Daniel W. Shuman et al.,
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especially in the area of sex offender law where alternative solutions are accompanied by
deep analytical inspection of science-based studies and complex sociological elements -
clearly outside the realm of the judges' knowledge and role.01
502As we have discussed in the same earlier article, the origins and development
of sex offender law have had a profoundly anti-therapeutic effect.5 0 3 Of especial
importance is the way that, "the confrontational adjudicative process of traditional courts
encourages advocacy of innocence, discourages acceptance of responsibility, and
influences [subsequent acceptance] of treatment once sentenced."5 0 4
Other scholars have considered the impact of TJ on sex offender law, and have,
virtually uniformly, found that our law and practices ignore all of the precepts of TJ.50 5 In
the most extensive analysis, the late Professor Bruce Winick identified a constellation of
factors - impact of labeling effects on treatment outcomes and on the reinforcement of
antisocial behavior, impact on clinicians who provide sex offender treatment, impact of
sexually violent predator laws on persons with genuine mental disorders506 - that, in the
aggregate, "undermine the potential that sex offenders will be rehabilitated."o5 0  In this
analysis, Prof. Winick concludes - unequivocally - that "sexual predator laws . . . pose
significant antitherapeutic consequences for both sex offenders and clinicians involved in
the sex predator treatment process."o5 0 Professor Bill Glaser lists multiple ways that the
ethical guidelines governing psychology practice are breached by sex offender laws:
An Empirical Examination ofthe Use ofExert Witnesses in the Courts - Part H: A Three City Study, 34
JURIMETRICS J. 193, 207 (1994) (reporting on survey results), and their opinions typically express a deep-seated
"attachment to commonly held beliefs," see Lode Walgrave, Restoration in Youth Justice, 31 CRIM. & JUST. 543,
547 (2004), notwithstanding the reality that "subconscious influence can cloud their decisions and impede their
legal reasoning," even when "they desire to render a 'fair' decision." Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the
Person Beneath the Robe: Practical Methods for Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Biases, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
1, 3 (2006) ("Consequently, in many circumstances, for judges to be fair, they must be capable of identifying
subconscious influences on their behavior and they must neutralize the effects of such impulses.").
'o' See generally, Fabian M. Saleh, Pharmacological Treatment ofParaphilic Sex Offenders, in SEX OFFENDERS:
IDENFICATION, RISK ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND LEGAL ISSUES 189 (Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 2009); Eric
Silver et al., Multiple Models Approach to Assessing Recidivism Risk: Implication for Judicial Decision Making
Criminal Justice and Behavior, 29 CRIM. J. & BEHAV. 538 (2002).
502 See Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 28, at 34.
503 This is so for many reasons: the presumption in current sex offender laws that there is a "standard" type of sex
offender; the presumption that all sex offenders are recidivists; the presumption that most sex offenses are
committed by strangers; the presumption that "banishment" laws minimize reoffending and provide incentives
for sex offenders to engage in treatment in the community or demonstrate a pro-social lifestyle; the fact that the
current universe of sex-offender laws ignores the multiple ways that the court process and the roles played by
defense counsel and the prosecution-as is done currently-support cognitive distortions that can be used by sex
offenders as ways of justifying sexual offending, and, simultaneously, often provide disincentives for sex
offenders to undergo treatment. See id. at 34-36.
504 Astrid Birgden & Heather Ellis Cucolo, The Treatment of Sex Offenders: Evidence, Ethics and Human Rights,
23 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 295, 300 (2010); see also Astrid Birgden & Tony Ward, Pragmatic
Psychology through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Lens: Psycholegal Soft Spots in the Criminal Justice System, 9
PSYCHOL., PUB POL'Y & L. 334, 357 (2003) (arguing that offenders will only accept responsibility for their
actions if legal actors take a motivational approach towards the offender). On the therapeutic jurisprudence
implications of separate "sex offender courts," see Kari Melkonian, Michigan's Sex Offender Registration Act:
Does It Make Communities Safer? The Implications of the Inclusion of a Broad Range of Offenders, a Review of
Statutory Amendments and Thoughts on Future Changes, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 355, 375 (2007).
505 On ways that TJ can integrate the "health care and social control functions" of the mental health system, see
Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative
Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 161, 166 (1995).
506 Winick, supra note 1, at 53 8-49.
50 Id. at 548.
50 Id. at 537.
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* The primary measure of treatment success is that of the protection of society
rather than alleviation of the offender's suffering.
* Treatment, to be effective, must usually be involuntary.
* Effective treatment requires that confidentiality be breached.
* Generally, the offender must not be allowed any choice of therapy or
therapist.
* Offenders may be forced to accept therapy from non-clinicians or
unqualified staff, and
* Effective therapy requires multiple other infringements on an offender's
dignity and autonomy.5 0 9
Further, Professor John La Fond has argued that sexual offender predator laws
are so destructive to individual and community well-being that TJ "must take a normative
stance and assert that the law should be repealed or substantially changed assert its
primacy and require change regardless of competing values."sio This insight has led Astrid
Birgden to urge that TJ must "provide a framework for setting a limit when the law is anti-
therapeutic toward offender rights." She suggests, by way of example, that alternative
monitoring strategies that are more likely to have therapeutic outcomes are available
through "appropriate case management, interagency cooperation and community
engagement."512
Reconsider the role of the media in the dissemination of information (and, more
pointedly, misinformation) about sex crimes and sex offenders, and the impact that this
has had on the enactment of legislation (at the Federal, state and local levels) and on
513judicial decisions. There has been almost no academic literature about the relationship
between TJ and the media in any related context, and other than our prior piece on sex
offender recidivism and TJ,5 1 4 virtually none, to the best of our knowledge, about the
relationship in this context. Only Bruce Arrigo and a colleague have come to grips with
this issue:
The related doctrines of civil commitment and chemical castration of
sex offenders suggest hat individual citizen well-being, as an important
dimension of therapeutic jurisprudence, gives way to other, competing
state interests fueled by intense and adverse media scrutiny and/or
public clamor for reform, particularly with explosive issues or high
profile cases.
Perhaps LeRoy Kondo's suggestion - that mental health court judges reach out to
,516the media as "advocates of therapeutic jurisprudence" - should be taken to heart by
scholars and researchers who know, beyond any doubt, that the media misrepresentations
59 Bill Glaser, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Ethical Paradigm for Therapists in Sex Offender Treatment
Programs, 4 W. CRIMINOL. REV. 143, 145-46 (2003).
"o La Fond, supra note 309, at 378 .
. Astrid Birgden, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Offender Rights: A Normative Stance Is Required, 78 REV.
JUR. U.P.R. 43, 51 (2009).
512 Astrid Birgden, Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic): A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 14
PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 78, 87 (2007).
. See generally Part I of this article.
514 Cucolo & Perlin, supra note 28.
515 Bruce A. Arrigo & Jeffrey J. Tasca, Right to Refuse Treatment, Competency to be Executed, and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: TowardA Systemic Analysis, 23 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 44 (1999).
516 LeRoy Kondo, Advocacy ofthe Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of
Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE L. REv. 373, 422 (2000).
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(although finally being remediated by more recent, more sober stories) are so much to
blame for the current state of affairs. Such affirmative action on the part of those who
know how distorted media depictions have traditionally been will also serve to generate
new considerations of the significance of procedural justice5 1 7 and restorative justice 5 1 to
these inquiries.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed how the media and public perception shapes legislation
in monitoring, controlling and detaining those individuals classified as sexual violent
predators - looking at both the media accounts that shaped our laws, the effect of media
criminology on the political and judicial system and the shift in media representation of
sexual crimes and sexual predators. The vast amount of information - news articles,
scholarly interpretations and media reports throughout the 20 plus years of the "new
generation" laws - is impossible to consider fully in a single law review article, and
therefore the authors cannot make any definitive statements as to the total effect of the
media's impact. However, we can offer some theories and tentative conclusions:
1. Media attention to high profile and emotionally reactive sexual crimes
incites general fear that there may be an undetected sexual predator lurking
near "our own children," ready to attack at any moment. This fear is
understandable but irrational in that it is based purely on emotion and usually
without any factual basis of such imminent danger.
2. Reaction based on fear is usually directed towards finding feel-good
solutions that briefly calm the fear frenzy. Therefore, politicians calling for
legislative changes look to promote laws that appear to offer safety and
security. Media reports of other jurisdictions and states enacting these
"'safety" laws, evoke a need to conform one's own community/state's laws in
order to do "everything possible" to foster safety - regardless if the measures
are effective or not (or if they, are in fact, counterproductive).
3. Courts confronted with these laws are hesitant to strike them down or to
modify their scope and/or range in any way, in large part, because of fear of
voter retribution.
517 See Mary Margaret Giannini, Redeeming an Empty Promise: Procedural Justice, the Crime Victims'Rights
Act, and the Victim's Right to Be Reasonably Protectedfrom theAccused, 78 TENN.L.REV. 47, 85 (2010) (
"Procedural justice theory generally posits that an individual's evaluation of the fairness of a decision is not
based only on the final conclusion reached by decision makers, but also on the process by which the authorities
reached that conclusion."); see generally, Jonathan D. Casper et. al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 483 (1988); Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule ofLaw? The Findings
ofPsychological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661 (2007); Tom R. Tyler, What is
Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness ofLegal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOCY
REV. 103 (1988).
. Professor John Braithwaite defines restorative justice as a means by which to restore victims, restore
offenders, and restore communities "in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just." John Braithwaite, A Future
Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999). See also, e.g,
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 11 (2002) (RESPONSIVE REGULATION)
("Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in the offence come together to resolve
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future."). A consideration
of the potential impact of the use of these principles on the resolution of cases involving sex offenders is
generally beyond the scope of this article See, e.g., Rick Sarre, Restorative Justice, in CONSIDERING CRIME,
supra note 228, at 31; see generally, PERLIN, supra note 228, chapter 6.
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4. Although it appears that the media has increased its reporting on the failures
of sex offender legislation, it cannot combat the power of fear. Statistics,
facts and expert opinions supporting low recidivism and familial profile of
an offender cannot compete with fear and emotional responses to the
perceived threat of the safety of loved ones and innocents. The
perniciousness of the vividness heuristic discussed extensively above5 1 9
continues to dominate this area of law and policy.
5. Current legislation continues to exist, regardless of its benefit, purely on the
hope - even if it has been proven by valid and reliable research evidence to
be a false hope - that it will make some small difference and - even more
substantially - because of the concern that repealing it will leave
communities vulnerable and directly lead to the commission of an untold
number of horrific sexual offenses. Alternative solutions that might actually
have an impact on sex offending are too complex, too multi-textured, and too
time-consuming to be considered by the general public and by legislatures.
Idiot Wind, from which the first portion of the title of this article is drawn, is a
song of "towering rage";520 it depicts the moment "when everything breaks apart."521 Our
sex offenders policies were born in "towering rage" and they have resulted in a state of
affairs in which their "corrupt ways had finally made [us] blind."522 We hope this article
helps to remediate the ways that politicians, abetted by the media, have "cover[ed] up the
truth with lies." 5 23
519 See supra text accompanying notes 252-56.
520 SOUNES, supra note 40, at 303.
521 Carrie Brownstein, Blood on the Tracks, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO BOB DYLAN 155, 158 (Kevin J.
H. Dettmar ed. 2009).
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